Metacognition in year one : an exploration of metagognition in five and six year old children during a cognition acceleration programme by Larkin, Shirley Margaret
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








Metacognition in year one : an exploration of metagognition in five and six year old
children during a cognition acceleration programme
Larkin, Shirley Margaret
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
Metacognition in Year One: 
An Exploration of Metacognition in Five and 
Six Year Old Children During a Cognitive 
Acceleration Programme 
Shirley Margaret Larkin 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the 
PhD degree of the University of London 
School of Social Science and Public Policy, 
King's College, London, 2005 
Acknowledgements 
The completion of this thesis owes a great deal to the many people I have met and 
worked alongside during the past six years. My thanks go to the teachers and 
children who welcomed me into their schools, challenged my perceptions and 
patiently answered my questions. I am grateful for the support of other students 
and researchers along the way. A special thank you goes to Mike Askew and Jill 
Hohenstein who made insightful comments at important stages of the research. I 
have been privileged to conduct this research as part of a much larger project. The 
wisdom, research skills and humour of the CASE@KS 1 team (Philip, Grady, 
Anne and Karl), made the last six years a joyous learning experience. Most 
importantly, the intellect, humour and generosity of my supervisor, Philip Adey, 
has enable me to develop from a naive student, with an interest in thinking, to a 
relatively competent researcher. Without his encouragement, this thesis would not 
have been completed. Finally, my love and thanks go to Henry, for without him, I 
would never have started on the path of becoming a researcher. 
2 
Abstract 
Metacognition is a higher level of cognition, consisting of stored metacognitive 
knowledge and monitoring and control processes. Theoretical models of 
metacognition tend to view it as late developing. This project investigated the 
possibility of facilitating metacognition in five and six year old children during a 
cognitive acceleration programme (CASE@KS 1). 
A quasi-experimental approach, consisting of pre- and post tests measured the 
development of metacognition in 24 year one children in four CASE schools and 
18 year one children in 3 matched control schools. Results of the tests indicated 
that the CASE programme had a positive effect on metamemory and interpretative 
theory of mind. Test results suggested that metacognition may not be a unified 
phenomenon, but consist of different factors, with their own developmental tracks. 
Qualitative data from the tests was subject to a phenomenological analysis to 
provide descriptions of metacognition from the child's perspective. 
Over 60 classroom observations of CASE tasks and numeracy lessons resulted in a 
unique coding system of teacher and child metacognitive behaviours. Frequency 
counts of these behaviours showed that CASE lessons had more and a greater 
spread of metacognitive behaviour than numeracy lessons in either the 
experimental or control schools. Three case studies revealed complex interactions 
between the classroom environment, the task, collaborative groups and individual 
social and cognitive factors. Teachers' knowledge, opinions and beliefs about 
metacognition, learning and early years pedagogy were also found to impact on 
the facilitation of metacognition in the classroom. 
Factors which could influence the creation of metacognitive environments in early 
years education are discussed. Avenues for future research into metacognition are 
identified including the use of phenomenological analysis to gain a greater 
understanding of metacognition in young children. 
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Chapter 1 
RESEARCH CONTEXT -A PERSONAL 
JOURNEY 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A seventeen year old boy sits forlornly at the back of an English class, staring 
blankly at the work before him. The task is to construct an advertisement, writing 
the copy and suggesting an illustration for any teenage product. The work follows 
on from two lessons on the media and advertising where all aspects of advertising 
including, style, message and medium have been discussed When the teacher asks 
why he isn't progressing with the work all the boy can say is because "7'm stuck". 
Further probing by the teacher reveals that the boy doesn't know why he is stuck. 
On his own he is unable to make the link between the real advertisements he has 
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seen and the task he is now set. He is unable to begin to plan how he is going to 
do it and he is unaware of what he already knows about the subject. 
A four year old is shown a tube of sweets and asked what it contains. The child 
answers sweets. A researcher shows that in fact the tube contains crayons and 
then asks the child what a friend who has only seen the tube would say it 
contained. The child answers "crayons". 
What is the link between these two scenarios? Firstly, there is a fifteen year gap 
between the first event and the second event. Secondly, I was involved in both 
cases, in the first instance as a newly qualified teacher of English and 
Communications working in a Further Education College and in the second 
instance, as an educational researcher on this project. Thirdly, both scenarios felt 
uncomfortable, albeit to different degrees. This feeling is probably recognised by 
all teachers, who have struggled to understand why their students are unable to see 
or understand what has been explained to them, or what appears to be obvious. 
For some teachers, repeated exposure to this feeling can lead to frustration and 
from there to a tendency to generalise as in "my children just don't think" (a 
teacher from this project). Yet another factor that these two events have in 
common, is that both "students", the seventeen year old and the four yearold, 
were of average intelligence for their age, neither had any specific learning 
disability, both had English as a first language and had normal language 
development. 
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However, what really links these two events, is that both students were not failing 
because of cognitive skills, but because of higher level thought processes or 
metacognition. The two scenarios differ in that the seventeen year old is 
displaying a failure of particular metacognitive abilities. These include 
metacomprehension, (understanding whether or not you understand something), 
metacognitive skill, (planning or thinking of how to approach a problem), 
metacognitive knowledge, (knowing what you already know) and meta-reasoning 
skills (testing possible solutions and monitoring progress). The four year old is 
displaying a failure of theory of mind, (understanding that other people have their 
own thoughts). All the above are aspects of metacognition. In these two 
scenarios, the four year old is in the more favourable position, as theory of mind 
tends to develop with age and without overt instruction, whereas the other aspects 
of metacognition are less likely to develop without some kind of help. 
Like many teachers, fifteen years ago I was unaware that some of my adolescent 
students whilst bright and motivated, were still unable to be self-reliant in terms of 
their own work. They misjudged the time needed to complete a piece of work and 
they seemed to lack study skills, although these were taught. They consistently 
failed to answer the question set, whilst failing to realise that this is what they were 
doing. It seemed that something had been missed from their years of education. 
How had they got to a post school environment, taking advanced level subjects 
without these skills? It was difficult to begin to address these problems, whilst 
trying to cover the material content necessary to pass an external examination in a 
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limited time. Thus it seemed to me then, that an earlier intervention with younger 
children might have more chance of success and ensure that the higher level of 
cognitive skills was nurtured, along with the necessary skills relevant to 
curriculum areas. 
2 CASE(a, KS1 THEORY 
In 1999, the opportunity arose to study the impact of one such intervention called 
Cognitive Acceleration Through Science Education at Key Stage One (hereafter 
called CASE@KS 1). The CASE@KS l programme is based on Piagetian theories 
of stage development (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) and Vgotskyan theories of social 
construction of knowledge (Vygotsky, 1978). It aims, through collaborative group 
work and problem solving to accelerate the development of concrete operational 
thinking in five to six year old children. 
Research comparing expert and novice problem solvers has shown that they tend 
to differ in the extent and range of metacognitive processing they use, (Chi, 
Feltovich, & Glaser, 1980; Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982). Expert problem solvers 
across different domains were found to employ metacognitive strategies such as 
planning, monitoring, checking, reflecting and making analogies, (Linn, 1.986). 
The CASE@KS1 programme involves children working in groups of six to solve a 
problem designed around Piagetian schema of seriation, classification, points of 
view and causality. There are twenty-eight activities and each activity takes 
around thirty minutes to work through, (Adey, Robertson, & Venville, 2001). A 
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typical year one class of thirty children is divided into five groups of six children 
each (a CASE@KS I focus group). There is one activity for each week of the 
school year, excluding weeks at the beginning and end of the term. Each 
CASE@KS I focus group works on that week's activity with their teacher, for 
thirty minutes. The groups are rotated, so that the same focus group does not 
always do the week's activity on the same day of the week. The activities are 
structured around the five pillars of CASE theory. These are concrete preparation, 
cognitive conflict, social construction, metacognition and bridging, (Adey, 2002). 
In terms of CASE theory these pillars have been defined as follows : (Edited from 
(Shayer & Adey, 2002) 
2.1 Concrete Preparation 
Introduction to the problem including its context and the vocabulary it requires. 
All children should be engaged with the task and the teacher should begin to 
"induce in the students the learning behaviour they are to work with in the second 
(construction) phase of the activity". (p. 5) 
2.2 Cognitive Conflict 
This involves the Piagetian idea of equilibration, which CASE describes as the 
"process by which cognitive processing mechanisms in the mind accommodate to 
events which cannot readily be assimilated and which create some sort of 
cognitive conflict". (p. 5). It also involves the Vygotskyan idea of a zone of 
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proximal development, which is the difference between what someone can do with 
support and what they can do unaided. Cognitive conflict is created by providing 
cognitive challenges of moderate difficulty and support in the form of 
collaborative group work, a teacher/leader and group discussion. 
2.3 Social Construction 
This draws on the Vygotskyan idea that knowledge and understanding is firstly 
constructed socially and then internalised by the individual. It takes account of 
Piaget's view of the importance of the social context, in the development of 
cognition. The children are encouraged to describe and explain their ideas, to 
collaborate with others and to explore new ideas, through group discussion and 
listening to others. 
2.4 Metacognition 
As described by CASE theory it involves children "becoming conscious of their 
own thinking and developing and practicing the technical vocabulary necessary for 
describing different thinking actions" (p. 6). In terms of CASE theory it is a 
process that takes place subsequent to a cognitive act. 
This is a very limited view of metacognition and whilst it forms the basis of the 
way metacognition was introduced to participants engaged in the CASE 
programmes, it only begins to scratch the surface of what metacognition is. It was, 
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however, the starting point for this research project and forms a part of the context 
in which this project is embedded. 
2.5 Bridging 
This involves making new thought processes useful in different contexts. Children 
on the programme are asked to link what they have learnt about one schema, to 
other areas, where that knowledge may become useful. 
CASE@KS 1 as a project, includes a set of activities and materials designed to 
facilitate these "pillars", by providing opportunities for cognitive conflict, social 
construction and metacognition. The project included a professional development 
programme for the teachers. This aimed to help them to develop the pedagogy 
characteristic of cognitive acceleration. This involves focusing on the schemata of 
concrete operations and managing cognitive conflict, promoting social 
construction and metacognition, through scaffolding and questioning. The 
facilitation of metacognition is in the pedagogy, not simply in the activities. For 
further information on the professional development programme, see (Adey, 
Hewitt, Hewitt, & Landau, 2004). 
3 CASE(KS1 PROJECT 
The CASE@KSI project began with a developmental year in one London 
Borough in 1998-99. The main intervention project began in September 1999 in 
ten schools (fourteen year one classes), within that Borough. A control group of 
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five schools (eight year one classes), was selected from the same area and matched 
as far as possible in terms of social and demographic characteristics. The project 
was funded from a single regeneration budget, allocated to that local education 
authority. The main project took a quasi-experimental design, to test whether the 
development of concrete operational thinking could be accelerated by this 
intervention. The evaluation relied largely on the statistical results of a series of 
pre- and post intervention tests of conservation, administered to a one third 
stratified sample, a drawing test of spatial ability given to all the children and a 
post test of Ravens matrices also given to all the children. There was also a 
comprehensive programme of training the teachers in CASE theory and method, 
which included both in class support and external workshops. This programme of 
professional development was also evaluated, (Adey et al., 2004). In 2001 results 
of the statistical analyses of these tests for the main CASE@KSI project were 
available and these showed a significant effect for the intervention classes over the 
control classes, (Adey, Robertson, & Venville, 2002). 
4 FORMULATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The CASE@KSI project provided a very good opportunity to research 
metacognition and its connection to cognitive development and academic success. 
The initial research questions were formed under the influence of the paradigm 
adopted by the main project. These were: 
1. Can metacognitive ability be enhanced? 
2. Are metacognitive gains related to cognitive/academic gains? 
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3. How is metacognition facilitated in year one classrooms? 
4. What factors, associated with teachers, impact on the development of 
metacognition in year one classrooms? 
These research questions are looking at change and the effect of one aspect of the 
CASE@KS I programme. Thus a quasi-experimental design, which paralleled that 
of the main project, was adopted. The intention was to measure the development 
of metacognition in a sample of children from the CASE@KS I experimental 
schools and compare this, with the development of metacognition, in a sample 
from the CASE@KS I control schools. 
However, this proved to be problematic. Firstly, a review of the literature on 
metacognition, (See chapter 2) showed that the CASE definition was over 
simplified. Different definitions have been put forward by different groups of 
psychologists. Educationalists and philosophers have also contributed theories of 
metacognition and there remain many contested aspects of definition. Secondly, 
attempts to measure metacognition have been fraught with issues of reliability and 
validity and there are still no uncontested comprehensive standardised measures 
for this age group. Thirdly, the majority of studies of metacognition are done with 
older children or adults, because the age at which metacognition is thought to be 
possible is still disputed, but there is a tendency to link it to the development of 
other cognitive processes and a certain level of language development. These 
issues are returned to throughout this project. In addition to this, few studies of 
metacognition are able to take into account the social and emotional contextual 
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factors that a project based within an educational setting must do. Thus, for this 
project, the role and influence of significant adults, in this case teachers, on the 
development of metacognition, is also investigated. Finally, this project appears, 
to date, to be unique in its attempt to describe what metacognition feels like for the 
five and six year old children who participated. The majority of published 
research on metacognition takes a definition of metacognition from the extant 
literature and whilst this project also does this, as delineated in chapter 2, it goes 
one step further. It attempts a phenomenological description of different aspects of 
metacognition, in order to understand what it means to be metacognitive at the age 
of five to six years old. 
Thus, this project combines both quantitative and qualitative methods. The 
quantitative methods attempt to measure the development of metacognition of a 
sample of the participating children, over one academic year. The qualitative 
methods provide an original approach to describing metacognition from the 
children's perspectives, and an analysis of social and contextual factors. 
Throughout this thesis problematic issues concerning metacognition are returned 
to. 
5 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
Firstly, chapter 2 outlines the various theories of metacognition that have been put 
forward since the 1970s, and explains the decision to base this research on the 
developmental psychology perspective of John Flavell's theory of metacognition, 
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(Flavell, 1979). However, other more recent theories have influenced this work 
and these are also discussed. During the last six years, (the time scale of this 
project), there has been a consistent interest in metacognition from psychologists, 
educationalists and philosophers. Chapter 2 also reviews some of this more recent 
literature and describes the state of research on metacognition today. 
Following this discussion of the issues and problems with research into 
metacognition, chapter 3 goes on to describe the research questions for this project 
in more detail. The design of the project is outlined and related to each of the 
research questions. Issues of measurement, language and project ethics are also 
discussed. Chapter 4 gives an account of a pilot project undertaken in early 1999 
and describes how this affected the design of the full project. The limitations and 
constraints of the design and methods used are discussed, along with wider issues 
of undertaking an investigation in a real setting, within a network of complex and 
interacting contextual factors. 
A particularly original feature of this research is an attempt to use a 
phenomenological description of the children's reflections on different aspects of 
cognition. Chapter 5 explains why and how this method was adopted and presents 
a step by step description of the method in use. 
Chapter 6 presents the four tests of metacognition, which in line with the quasi- 
experimental approach, were administered to all the sample of children as pre- and 
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post intervention tests. The tests are explained individually and quantitative 
results are given. The test data is then used to provide phenomenological 
descriptions of these aspects of metacognition, as explained in chapter 5. Finally, 
the quantitative results from the four tests are correlated using Spearman Rank 
Correlation, with each other and with the results of tests from the main 
CASE@KSI project. The results are discussed in the light of the research 
questions and links are made back to the theories delineated in chapter 2 and 
forward to the contextual factors examined in future chapters. 
Over the year of this project, the children in the experimental schools were 
observed working on CASE@KS 1 activities in situ and during numeracy hour 
lessons. Children from the control schools were also observed during numeracy 
hour lessons. Chapter 7 presents a new method of categorising children and 
teacher behaviours as metacognitive, based on Flavell's theory of metacognition 
(Flavell, 1979). This method is fully explained and examples of the analysis are 
shown. Frequency counts of the instances in different categories are made, in 
order to compare the metacognitive behaviour of teachers and children during 
CASE@KS 1 activities, with their metacognitive behaviour during numeracy 
lessons. This method is also used to compare the metacognitive behaviour of 
teachers and children in the experimental schools, with those in the control 
schools. Issues of reliability and validity are also discussed. 
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Whilst chapter 7 examines metacognition as demonstrated in a group setting, 
chapter 8 focuses in on three individual children and tracks the development of 
their individual metacognition over the year and the extent to which the group has 
influenced this. 
The focus of this research project is the development of metacognition in five to 
six year old children. However, the underlying assumption to the project, is that 
metacognition does not develop in isolation, but within a network of contextual 
factors. Since this project has an educational setting, arguably the most important 
factor, other than the children, is the teacher and the CASE@KS1 project sets 
great store by its professional development programme for teachers. 
Chapter 9 of this thesis focuses more on the teachers and reports a qualitative 
analysis of semi-structured interviews undertaken with the eight participating 
teachers at the beginning and end of the intervention year. An important aspect of 
these interviews is asking the teachers about their own metacognition, as well as 
about their pedagogic role, in terms of facilitating metacognition in the children. 
Wider methodological issues around conducting face to face interviews are 
discussed and the particular structured method of analysis is explained and 
justified. 
Chapter 10 firstly outlines the findings of all the different aspects of this project. 
The quantitative results of the four tests of metacognition; the findings from the 
26 
phenomenological descriptions; the teachers' and children's metacognitive 
behaviour during observed periods in the classroom; the findings of the case study 
analyses of three individual children tracked over the year and the issues arising 
from interviews with the teachers are summarised. These findings are then 
discussed in the light of the initial research questions and in the context of extant 
theories of metacognition. 
In the conclusion the discussion is widened to show what new insights have been 
discovered about the development of metacognition in young children. Some 
further problems with research in this area are highlighted, in the context of very 
recent published papers on the topic. The influence, of the findings from this 
project, on the state of research into metacognition in general, is discussed and 
future directions are outlined. 
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Chapter 2 
DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS OF 
META COGNITION WITH OTHER CONSTR UCTS 
I INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes and discusses the theoretical underpinnings for this project. 
Section 2.1 presents issues surrounding the definition of metacognition and then 
introduces John Flavell's theoretical model of metacognition on which this project 
is based. This model is compared with other models of metacognition and related 
concepts of self-regulation and cognitive models of intelligence are discussed. 
The extent to which cognition and metacognition are separate and how they 
interact has been an issue in research on metacognition from the beginning. 
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Section 3 reviews the literature on this and introduces many of the problems 
researchers have faced in investigating these links. 
Section 4 introduces the concept of theory of mind, which is a particularly 
important aspect of the development of metacognition in young children. 
Different theoretical perspectives on the development of theory of mind are 
discussed in the light of its centrality to metacognition. 
In Section 5 the literature on metacognition is brought up to date, with an 
exploration of research on metacognition over the last six years, ( the length of this 
project). Trends are identified, the state of research on metacognition today is 
discussed and future lines of inquiry are suggested. 
The conclusion shows how the literature has influenced the research questions for 
this project both theoretically and in terms of methodological problems and issues. 
2 DEFINITIONS AND MODELS OF METACOGNITION 
2.1 Introduction 
Most commonly, the term metacognition is used to refer to knowledge about 
cognition and monitoring and control of cognition. Yet this simple definition does 
an injustice to the large amount of theoretical, conceptual and empirical work that 
has been carried out to attempt clarification of a concept, which has been 
bedeviled by definitional problems since the word was first coined in the 1970's. 
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Some of these problems arise out of the original conceptualization, whilst others 
are more clearly linked with measurement issues. A major theoretical problem, 
which will be discussed here, is the extent to which metacognition is a conscious 
act. This is inextricably linked to the other problematic areas of automatic versus 
controlled processing; the nature of executive functions; abstraction and reflection; 
self regulation and regulation by others. The other problems, which are linked to 
measurement, include introspection, verbal reports as data, and validity of 
measurement instruments; these will be discussed in chapter 6. 
One of the definitional problems of modern research on metacognition arises out 
of the confusion between metamemory and metacognition. In 1971 as discussant 
to a symposium on memory where the term metamemory was first used, Flavell 
made a clear link between memory and cognition. Agreeing with Piaget, on the 
concept of memory as "another mode of knowledge [which] cannot be dissociated 
from intelligence" (Piaget, Inhelder, & Sinclair-de-Zwart, 1968), Flavell 
comments: "if memory itself is mostly applied cognition then memory 
development must largely be applied cognitive development" (Flavell, 1971). 
Citing Hagan's work on the growing consciousness of the child and development 
of self-awareness, Flavell concludes by defining memory development: 
"it seems in large part to be the development of intelligent 
structuring and storage of input, of intelligent search and 
retrieval operations and of intelligent monitoring and knowledge 
of these storage and retrieval operations -a kind of meta-memory" 
(Flavell, 1971)p. 277 
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Whilst this refers specifically to metamemory, it seems clear that Flavell sees 
memory as a form of cognition and thus metamemory is a fonn of metacognition, 
which has memory as its object; similarly we could make the same case for 
metacomprehension. 
2.2 Flavell's Model 
Flavell's developmental model of metacognition (Flavell, 1979) states that 
monitoring of cognition comes about from the action and interaction of four 
distinct classes of phenomena: metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive 
experience, goals (or tasks), actions (or strategies). 
Metacognitive knowledge is described as stored knowledge about one's own and 
others' cognitive processes and knowledge or beliefs about the factors that act and 
interact to affect cognition. These variables are described in three categories: 
person, task and strategy. The person variable contains everything you know 
about people as cognitive beings including beliefs about differences in cognition 
between individuals; differences in the individual between tasks, and a concept of 
the "universals of cognition" i. e. types of understanding which include attending, 
problem solving and communicating. The person variable of metacognitive 
knowledge interacts with the task variable. The task variable too, includes sub 
categories including a) the information available about the task and how that 
impacts on how the task should be managed and leads to predictions of success 
and b) metacognitive knowledge about the task goal i. e. that some tasks are easier 
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than others. The strategy variable of metacognitive knowledge contains the 
knowledge about what strategies are likely to be effective in achieving different 
goals. However, often confused here is the distinction between cognitive 
strategies and metacognitive ones. It seems clear from Flavell's model that the 
stored metacognitive knowledge includes strategies and when to employ them 
"Cognitive strategies are invoked to make cognitive progress, 
metacognitive strategies to monitor it" (Flavell, 1979)p. 909 
However, the distinction is not always clear and the same strategy can achieve 
both goals. For instance, Flavell provides the example of studying for an exam 
where, when wondering if you know the material well enough to pass the exam, 
you may monitor your progress by testing yourself, this is a metacognitive strategy 
aimed at assessing your knowledge and monitoring your learning. However, this 
strategy with a metacognitive intention may also result in you acquiring more 
knowledge and thus the strategy serves a cognitive function as well. 
Metacognitive knowledge then is stored in long term memory and concerns the 
interactions of three variables: person, task and strategy. Flavell argues that in this 
sense metacognitive knowledge is similar to other knowledge stored in long term 
memory and thus can be activated by a deliberate conscious search or by 
unintentional automatic retrieval cues provided by the goal. --- 
"However activated, it may and probably often does influence 
the course of the cognitive enterprise without itself entering 
consciousness" (Flavell, 1979)p. 907 
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This is an important point to remember about Flavell's model, that metacognitive 
knowledge affects cognition unconsciously as well as giving rise to a conscious 
experience (which Flavell calls a metacognitive experience). Thus the theoretical 
model which underpins this project differs from the CASE@KS I definition of 
metacognition, which requires it to be a conscious process. Whether fully 
conscious, available to consciousness or unconscious it seems that metacognitive 
knowledge leads us to evaluate and act in the light of the interactions between 
goals, tasks and strategies and further, metacognitive knowledge helps to interpret 
the meaning and implications of metacognitive experiences. 
A distinction is made by Flavell between metacognitive experiences which arise 
out of metacognitive knowledge that has become conscious e. g. remembering a 
similar problem to the one you are working on and metacognitive experiences 
described as feelings, for instance, that you are far from solving the problem. 
Acting on this feeling will however be guided by your metacognitive knowledge. 
Thus metacognitive experiences of feelings of puzzlement or failure can have far 
reaching effects on the cognitive goal, maybe leading to abandoning it. In 
addition, metacognitive experiences add to or revise the metacognitive knowledge 
base. Metacognitive experiences then are influential in developing the 
metacognitive knowledge base and in ongoing cognitive enterprises. The 
implications of this are that we should facilitate and encourage metacognitive 
experiences for children, if we believe that development of a rich metacognitive 
knowledge base is important for learning. Flavell's model of metacognition is 
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important because it stipulates the conditions under which metacognitive 
experiences may occur: 
"... in situations that stimulate a lot of careful, highly conscious 
thinking: in a job or school task that expressly demands that 
kind of thinking; in novel roles or situations, where every major 
step you take requires planning beforehand and evaluation 
afterwards; where decisions and actions are at once weighty 
and risky; where high affective arousal or other inhibitors of 
reflective thinking are absent" (Flavell, 1979)p. 908 
Of all the models of metacognition discussed in this section, Flavell's model 
indicates how metacognition can develop and suggests implications for education. 
This developmental perspective seems most pertinent for this project. Whilst 
Flavell worries about educational interventions, which may promote 
metacognition to excess, he concludes that the risk of becoming so analytical that 
one is effectively paralysed is slight, compared to the risk of ignoring the 
development of this area of mental activity. In more recent work Flavell (Flavell, 
2000) has shown developmental differences between 4,5,6,7,8 and 10 year olds in 
areas of awareness of psychological activity. For instance 4 year olds believed 
that a person could be attending to two unrelated things at the same time, whereas 
6 and 8 year olds demonstrated an understanding that attentive thought is 
selectively focussed. Flavell suggests that the younger child may conceive of the 
mind as like a lamp able to radiate thought in many directions at oncc, rather than 
as a flashlight. A further study showed that whilst 5 year olds realise that if a 
person is doing a mentally challenging activity he is likely to be thinking of that 
activity, they are less aware that if the task is an automatic one, a person's 
thoughts can be elsewhere. 
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The studies show a marked developmental progression during these ages regarding 
understanding of mental activity. When asked if someone could go for three days 
without thinking or wondering about anything 50% of the 5 year olds said this 
could be done, whilst only 10% of 9 year olds expressed that view (Flavell, 2000). 
Flavell's experimental work on development of the awareness of mental activity 
suggests that experience and practice in reflecting on mental experiences 
accumulate information, which is used to support conclusions about oneself and 
others as well as developing insights. Flavell's theoretical model of metacognition 
provides a framework for analysis of children's behaviour; distinguishes between 
the various categories of metacognition; is rooted in empirical data with young 
children and addresses the larger questions of developing consciousness. 
Metacognition is seen as a necessary development for life rather than an 
educational tool. 
"In many real-life situations, the monitoring problem is 
not to determine how well you understand what a message 
means but to determine how much you ought to believe it 
or do what it says" (Flavell, 1979) p. 910 
For these reasons, Flavell's theoretical model informs the work of this project and 
will be used to analyse classroom data for this project. Whilst a lack of attention 
to the impact of language development is apparent in this model, this will be 
addressed by integrating aspects of other theoretical models of metacognitive 
development as well as specific issues of language development. 
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2.3 Other models of metacognition 
Whilst many models of metacognition are developed as a factor of much larger 
cognitive models, some theorists have more fully articulated metacognition as a 
concept. Following Flavell and colleagues' seminal work on metacognition in the 
1970s, Nelson and Narens concentrated on the monitoring and control aspects of 
metacognition. From their work on adult cognition, they described a dynamic 
model of cognition, which has two levels, called the meta level and the object 
level. The meta level monitors and controls the object level. It is informed by the 
object level and in terms of control it subsequently modifies the object level. The 
object level includes a person's behaviour and the situation in which these 
behaviours take place. Nelson and Narens acknowledge that self reports are the 
main tool used to access these processes and these can be imperfect, wrong, biased 
etc. (Nelson & Narens, 1992). They describe the monitoring process as including 
ease of learning (EOL), judgement of learning (JOL) and feeling of knowing 
(FOK). These are all aspects of the meta level of processing and can occur before 
and during a cognitive task, whilst confidence judgements may occur during and 
after a task. These introspective judgements are important for both cognitive tasks 
and social encounters and in both cases they have been found to be less than 
entirely reliable and accurate. (Nelson, Kruglanski, & Jost, 1998). Thus, from an 
educational perspective, there is a need to alert students to this possibility and to 
36 
facilitate more accurate judgements, in areas such as allocation of study time or 
awareness of stored knowledge. 
In contrast to Nelson and Narens' model of metacognition, Wellman's model of 
metacognition views it as a development of theory of mind. Its origins, he argues, 
stem from the child's acquisition of the distinction between internal mental 
phenomena and external material objects and behaviours. Metacognition is not 
seen as one cognitive item. Its development is a development of a number of 
interwoven concepts and insights. 
"Acquiring metacognition is thus quite a complex and 
extended process because it involves acquisition of a 
multi-faceted theory of mind " (Wellman, 1985b)p. 
One of the factors to develop would be the language of mental verbs "think", 
"believe", "imagine". Wellman's developmental theory sees the development of 
an understanding of mind as intertwined with the development of an understanding 
of reality. He doubts that early development of metacognition has much direct 
bearing on a child's cognitive performance or use of cognitive strategies, but that 
the development is more salient for understanding the social and physical world. 
The development of this "multi-faceted theory of mind" is seen as a basis for 
development of ontological knowledge: 
"metacognition exerts a series of subtle, powerful influences 
on much of conceptual development"(Wellman, 1985a) p. 35 
[See Section 4 for further discussion of Wellman's theory and comparison with 
Kuhn] 
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Whilst Wellman sees metacognition as part of a larger theory of mind, Cornoldi's 
model distinguishes between two types of metacognition or what he calls 
metacognitive reflection. These are a) metacognitive knowledge which consist of a 
person's beliefs about all aspects of cognition including self evaluation, and this 
may be generalised or specific knowledge, fully conscious or less so and b) 
metacognitive conceptualisation of a task. This is metacognition activated by 
beginning a cognitive task and continues during the task. Cornoldi also identifies 
metacognitive attitude, which is described as the overall level of metacognitive 
knowledge and has cognitive, emotional and behavioural implications and specific 
metacognitive knowledge, which concerns specific aspects of cognitive 
functioning, (Cornoldi, 1998). It is difficult to see exactly how distinct these latter 
two aspects are, from the category of metacognitive knowledge described earlier. 
However, the important aspect of Cornoldi's work for this project, is that it 
describes metacognitive knowledge as being different from other forms of 
knowledge, because it includes emotional feelings related to the cognitive task. 
These feelings may be partly unconscious, but nevertheless impact on cognitive 
processing and performance. 
These fleeting, affective aspects of metacognition have also been studied by social 
psychologists, in terms of social judgements (Yzerbyt, Dardenne, & Leyens, 
1998), social beliefs and prejudice (Banaji & Dasgupta, 1998), and correct 
impressions (Wegner, Petty, & Dunn, 1998). 
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As this project is concerned with the development of metacognition in children in 
an educational setting, it utilises Flavell's developmental perspective on 
metacognition, whilst incorporating the affective issues delineated in Cornoldi's 
theory. It also takes account of the importance of the development of a theory of 
mind and this link is explored in Section 4. 
2.4 Metacognition and the necessity of consciousness 
The information processing concepts of automatic and controlled processing 
inform the debate surrounding the extent to which metacognition is a conscious 
act. Automatic processing has been defined as fast, requiring little effort and 
control by the subject and operating at a level below consciousness and takes two 
forms: one that is not age reliant and one which is reliant on experience and 
repetition, enabling what was once conscious to become automised. (Brown, 1987) 
In traditional information processing models, which describe a limited capacity 
system, this automatic processing, making minimal demands on attention 
resources, is obviously beneficial. As automatic processing is unavailable to 
consciousness, it cannot be voluntarily controlled or modified. In contrast, 
consciousness is identified with the employment of attention and rehearsal 
components, which make more demands on the system, are slower but are 
essential for higher level processes. Anderson's AEP model of intelligence 
suggests individual differences in speed of processing. People who process 
information faster can store more processing and information into working 
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memory and this can be transformed to long term memory and thus consciously 
retrieved and employed in the future. A slower processing of initial information 
clogs up the system and information is lost before it ever reaches storage. 
(Anderson, 1989; Anderson, 1992) If this is how the mind works, then 
implications for education would be to suggest ways of speeding up and 
automating basic processing through repetition and experience, whilst providing 
models of conscious processing by employing novel and difficult problems. 
Sternberg's triarchic theory of intelligence, which describes three basic 
components: metacomponents, performance components and knowledge and 
acquisition components, also emphasises the role of the high level conscious 
processing by the metacomponents as necessary for novel and difficult problems. 
(Sternberg, 1985a) In this model the performance components execute the plans of 
the metacomponents. The metacomponents monitor and feedback information 
from the performance components and decide on modifications or new strategies 
to achieve success. At the same time the metacomponents acquire general 
information about what works for certain types of problem. This information is 
processed by knowledge acquisition components and is stored in long term 
memory, ready for retrieval next time a similar problem is recognised. The 
metacomponents also monitor and evaluate themselves. A similar notion is taken 
up by Sanchez in a model of metacognition which involves not only consciousness 
and control but also a third component "self-poesis". 
"self-poesis - is a component of metacognition as basic 
as consciousness and control: thanks to it, metacognitive 
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activity is not only conscious of itself, not only controls 
itself, but goes beyond consciousness and control to 
construct itself" (Sanchez, 1998)p. 30 
This model views the intelligent system as a spiral; the self-creating element of 
metacognition allows the system to add another coil. However, within this system 
different levels of conscious control are delineated depending on the 
corresponding function. Consciousness is described as a continuum that runs from 
"vague functional consciousness" to "reflective penetrating consciousness". 
However, there is debate about whether the lower end of consciousness, often 
procedural in nature and seen in displays of error detection and trial and error 
problem solving even by very young children, can be truly considered conscious. 
(Brown, 1987; Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 1987) 
For nativist theorists (e. g. Fodor) consciousness is not identified with particular 
functions, all cognitive functions can take place outside of consciousness. 
Consciousness then becomes a qualitative difference. Whilst the innate cognitive 
modules controlling such functions as language and visual perception operate 
outside of conscious awareness, other cognitive procedures which are acquired 
through experience are initially accessible to consciousness before becoming 
routinised and unconscious. In this model a great deal of complex cognitive 
activity can go on outside of conscious awareness, people may reach decisions or 
conclusions about events unconsciously. 
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The notion of automated and more conscious processing is also distinguished in 
Karmiloff-Smith's Representational Redescription (RR) model. Here different 
levels of processing are described from I level which is procedural and not 
available to consciousness to more abstract El level which, whilst open to inter 
domain links, is still not conscious, to the higher levels of E2 and E3 which are 
available to consciousness. Although only at level E3 are the representations both 
available to consciousness and verbalisable. As Karmiloff-Smith points out, 
research on metacognition has focussed on this E3 level, as verbal reports have 
become paramount. However she suggests that E2 representations, whilst not 
verbalisable, are open to conscious reflection which may be activated through 
visual reportage, such as diagrams. 
"We often draw diagrams of problems we cannot verbalise. 
The end result of these various redescriptions is the existence 
in the mind of multiple representations of similar knowledge 
at different levels of detail and explicitness" 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992)p. 22 
Interestingly, in the RR model, progression to a more abstract/reflective level of 
processing is not achieved in the Piagetian sense through disequilibrium but rather 
from the system reaching a steady state. The view is that as automation occurs, 
the focus of attention can shift to the internal representations themselves. This 
Karmiloff-Smith calls "metaprocedural process" and it is obviously a-different 
level of processing to initial goal-oriented processing, but not necessarily 
conscious or statable. 
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A variant on information processing models, which resonates with some but not all 
aspects of the RR model is the PDP (Parallel Distributed Processing) model. 
(McClelland, Rumelhart, & Group, 1986) Here processing is conceptualised as 
occurring in a large number of processing units which excite and inhibit others in a 
network. Information about an object or event is distributed widely across the 
processing system and it is not necessary for an object to be fully represented in 
consciousness before information about it can influence experience, thought or 
action. The main difference between PDP models, and traditional information 
processing models is that as processing is distributed, there is no need for a higher 
control function or executive system. Some modules are accessible to 
consciousness and voluntary control whereas for others, the processing is so rapid 
across the network as to exceed the span of consciousness. Through fast automatic 
parallel processing, steady state is rapidly reached and the information becomes 
accessible to consciousness. PDP models consider all information processing to 
be initially unconscious, although slowing down the processing by, for instance, 
ambiguity can provoke conscious awareness. For PDP models then, there is no 
need for the representation redescription of Karmiloff-Smith's model, or for a 
central executive function of other information processing models. 
For this project the emphasis through children working on CASE@KS 1 tasks is to 
make their unconscious thought processing conscious and verbalisable. As with 
much research on metacognition, this project relies largely upon self-reports and 
observable behaviour to categorise the identifiable aspects of metacognitive 
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processing. However, I take the view that whilst the products of this processing 
are conscious, the processing itself may be rapid, automatic and response driven. 
One aim of the metacognitive component of the CASE project is to try and slow 
this processing down so that it becomes available to consciousness and can be 
shared amongst a group. These issues are returned to in chapter 7. Closely linked 
to notions of conscious control and monitoring is the notion of self-regulation. 
2.5 Self Regulation 
Whilst automatic and controlled processing and executive functions arise out of 
information processing simulations, the notion of self-regulation comes from 
developmental and constructivist models. For Piaget, self-regulation at its first 
level of error detection and trial and error theory testing need not be conscious but 
self-regulation develops through experience, through stages of autonomous, active 
and finally conscious regulation. It is only when the individual is capable of 
reflection on an action, that consciousness emerges. This early conscious 
reflection or "reflective abstraction" is tied to concrete action and is more 
descriptive than directional. Piaget suggests that it is only with the level of formal 
operational thought that the individual is fully able to abstract and carry out 
cognitive processes entirely on the mental plane. This, Piaget sees, as an end state 
in the development of consciousness. (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). However, this 
project takes the view that whilst a consistent and reliable ability to abstract and 
reflect may only occur with a certain level of cognitive maturity, which may be 
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characterised as formal operational, younger children, given the opportunity and 
supportive context, may be able to demonstrate this ability in some areas. This 
forms the lead question which underpins all the other research questions for this 
project: Can children of five to six years engage in a level of abstraction we can 
call metacognition? 
For other developmentalists self-regulation involves motivation and self-directed 
action (Zimmerman & Schunk, 1989) or the conscious activities of planning, 
monitoring and evaluating, thus regulating cognition (Borokowski, Carr, Rellinger, 
& Pressley, 1990). Occasionally the literature is unclear about the distinction 
between self-regulation and self-control. However, Diaz clarifies the situation by 
stating that self-control refers to an internalised model of a real caregiver to whom 
the child responds, whereas self-regulation involves a self-created and monitored 
plan of action. (Diaz, Neal, & Amaya-Williams, 1990). The latter self-regulation 
then seems to be a creative, intentional act driven by consciousness. From this 
distinction the type of self regulation which is most closely linked to 
metacognition is the latter, which is generated through either individual 
introspection or perhaps more likely constructed through social interaction. This 
socially constructed view forms the basis of the research questions of whether 
metacognition can be enhanced and the effects of peer group and adult assistance 
in this development. 
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Self-regulation is linked to the notion of metacognition as a conscious act. Brown 
states: 
"the ability to step back and consider one's own thought 
(or language) as an object of thought and to go further, 
use the subsequent conceptualisation to direct and redirect 
one's cognitive theories is late developing. Confused in the 
metacognitive literature, even lost in some versions of the 
concept, is the essential distinction between self-regulation 
during learning and mental experimentation with one's 
own thoughts" (Brown, 1987)p. 96 
Brown thus links "true" metacognition to its purpose in directing and controlling 
learning and makes the case for it being late developing. However, more recently 
social-cognitive and developmental perspectives have demonstrated aspects of 
conscious reflection occurring in young children. (Pramling, 1988) [Chapter 7 
returns to the empirical evidence for this]. 
Explanations of self-regulation from social-cognitive perspectives emphasise the 
developmental changes in cognition responsible for goal setting, attributions and 
modelling (Bandura, 1986; Schunk, 1989) and self-regulation developing 
throughout life and constructed by social interactions. (Paris & Byrnes, 1989) The 
basis for this social interactionist model is Vygotsky, and it focuses on the use of 
language during social interaction to perform the monitoring and control functions. 
These functions eventually become internalised. This internalisation is seen as a 
transformation from the social to the individual level not just an imitation. The 
transformation is both gradual and mediated by interaction with a more expert 
other. For Vygotsky all higher psychological functions develop through social 
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interaction. Whilst language plays a central role, the more capable other also aids 
this inter/intra development by organising and shaping the environment, 
interpreting events, directing attention and regulating problem-solving. In this 
way the metacognitive load is lightened for the child; the facilitator assuming the 
metacognitive functions of regulation until the child can internalise this function. 
(Vygotsky, 1978) Empirical research has described this theory in action, much of 
it with mother and child dyads. Wertsch focuses on the development of self 
regulatory skills in pre-schoolers describing four levels of interaction from basic 
comprehension of the task to independent self regulation in carrying out the 
activity (Wertsch, McNamee, McLane, & Budwig, 1980), whilst others have 
focussed on educational establishments (e. g. (Pramling, 1988) 
3 The Link Between Cognition and Metacognition 
3.1 Introduction 
Following Flavell and Brown's (Brown, 1978; Flavell, 1979) definitional models 
of metacognition in the 1970's [see previous section], cognitive psychologists 
turned their attention to the links between cognition and metacognition. They 
attempted to fine tune the earlier models and to indicate the theoretical, empirical 
and developmental issues that arise from the concept of metacognition. --. 
3.2 Theoretical Issues 
The fundamental issue from a theoretical viewpoint is the extent to which 
cognition and metacognition are conceptually distinct. Borokowski developing 
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Campione and Brown's model of intelligence (Campione & Brown, 1978) argues 
for metacognition as a distinct component; one of the four components of the 
executive system, along with knowledge base, control processes and scheme. In 
Borkowski's model the executive system "initiates and regulates retrieval of 
knowledge from long-term memory, modifies the knowledge base and mediates 
problem solving"(Borkowski, 1985). Borkowski sees metacognitive knowledge 
integrated with "strategic behaviours" or control processes as fundamental to 
successful problem solving and moreover: 
"the dynamic interchange not only enables the learner 
to select, modify and invent strategies, but also to enlarge 
the contents of metacognition through successful problem-solving" 
(Borkowski, 1985) p. 114 
Whilst arguing for a theoretical distinction between metacognition and the other 
components of the executive system, Borkowski also acknowledges that in the end 
this distinction may be false, (Borkowski, 1985). 
Other researchers (Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & Campione, 1983), (Garner & 
Alexander, 1989; Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Wertsch, 1978) and most notably 
(Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982) have indicated the difficulty inherent in 
separating metacognition from cognition. However, whilst Sternberg, (Sternberg, 
1986) and Nelson, (Nelson & Narens, 1992) argue for conceptual distinctiveness, 
it is the empirical work of Slife (Slife, Weiss, & Bell, 1985) and Swanson 
(Swanson, 1990), which is most often cited as evidence of separateness. The 
earlier study of Slife, Weiss and Bell measured the effects of metacognitive factors 
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in problem solving, whilst attempting to hold cognitive factors constant among 
two groups of elementary school students. One group are described as "disabled in 
mathematics", whilst the other group are described as "regular students", both 
groups were matched in terms of IQ scores. Whilst the limitations of the 
experiment are discussed by Slife et al in terms of methodology and adequate 
matching, their results showed that the "learning disabled" group were less 
accurate in their knowledge of their own cognition and were less accurate in 
predicting the number of problems they would solve, even though this group was 
older and had more practice with the prediction task. The "learning disabled" 
group were also found to be less accurate in monitoring their problem solving 
performance and in identifying right and wrong answers. Slife et al argue that 
since the relevant cognitive factors were matched between groups, it was the 
metacognitive factors that accounted for their poorer performance and hence 
cognition and metacognition are distinct factors of intelligence. The argument 
here, is that cognitive and metacognitive processes are different. Metacognition, 
as in Flavell's description, involves both stored metacognitive knowledge and 
monitoring and control functions. 
The later study (Swanson, 1990), aimed to determine the independence of 
metacognition and general aptitude on various problem solving measures. Their 
sample consisted of children in grades 4 and 5 with diverse academic aptitude as 
measured by the Cognitive Abilities Test (CAT) (Thorndike & Hagan, 1978) and 
those with scores below 105 and above 120 were selected. The children were also 
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tested with a questionnaire, designed to test metacognitive aptitude, with those 
scoring above 45 deemed high aptitude and those below 45 low aptitude. Their 
results showed that high metacognitive children out performed lower 
metacognitive children in problem solving regardless of their general aptitude 
level. Further, the high metacognitive/low general aptitude children performed 
significantly better than the low metacognitive/ high general aptitude children. 
Swanson argues that from this evidence, metacognition and general aptitude can 
be treated as distinct and that metacognitive knowledge has a positive effect on 
cognition. 
Whilst the methods and procedure of these two studies are rigorous and the results 
valid, the difficulties of measuring metacognitive aptitude are important to note. 
Thorpe & Satterly, (1990) identified this difficulty further. Testing children on 
four commonly used metacognitive measures: generating strategies, word list 
generation, organisation of prose and judging task difficulty, they found a common 
pattern of development in the children's response, but no evidence for an overall 
general metacognitive factor. The methodological problems surrounding 
measurement of metacognition are most pertinent to this project and will be further 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
In addition, Yussen, (1985b) has argued for a more eclectic approach to research 
on metacognition. He argues that restricting testing of metacognition to problem- 
solving activities and puzzles such as Tower of Hanoi, used extensively in 
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cognitive research, explores only one rarefied aspect of cognition. In order to gain 
a better understanding of the influences of metacognitive activity on cognition, a 
fuller picture is needed, including exploration of ill defined problems and planning 
activities. 
3.3 Further Empirical Evidence for the Effect of Metacognition on 
Cognition 
Difficulties in defining metacognition, as discussed in Section 2, have led to 
conflicting views on the connections between cognition and metacognition. 
Working in the area of memory and metamemory, Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 
(1982), in a review of twelve empirical studies, found only low to moderate 
correlation between metamemory and performance on memory tasks, whilst 
Wellman's similar review, (Wellman, 1983), found substantial links between these 
two constructs. However it was the work of Schneider, (1985), in comparing these 
findings that indicates the difficulties in defining metacognition. Schneider 
pointed out that whilst Cavanaugh and Perlmutter's findings relate to knowledge 
of organizational strategies, Wellman's review focuses on memory monitoring, 
and in this sense both findings are correct. 
Other researchers have found a positive correlation between metacognition and 
cognition in terms of memory, (Cornoldi, Gobbo, & Massoni, 1991), bilingulism 
(Garcia, Jimenez, & Pearson, 1998), problem solving, (Karmiloff-Smith & 
Inhelder, 1974) (Chi et al., 1980; Chi et al., 1982; Davidson, Deuser, & Sternberg, 
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1994; Davidson & Sternberg, 1998), reading comprehension (Baker, 1984; 
Hacker, 1998; Markman, 1979; Palinscar & Brown, 1984), writing (Raphael, 
Kirschner, & Englert, 1986), maths (Carr & Biddlecomb, 1998; Schoenfeld, 1992), 
and conceptual change in science (Hennessey, 1999). In addition work with gifted 
children, which compared the declarative metacognitive knowledge of gifted and 
non-identified children, of six and seven years of age, through a metacognitive 
interview questionnaire, found that the gifted children had higher general 
metacognitive knowledge than other children, (Schwanenflugel, Stevens, & Carr, 
1997). Whilst some studies do not find significant differences between gifted and 
non-gifted children in aspects of metacognition such as meta attention and meta- 
memory, (Kern, 1989; Kurtz & Weinert, 1989), the majority of studies in this area, 
has supported the view that gifted children possess greater metacognition than 
other children. However, Schwanenflugel et at., (1997) indicated an important 
consideration in this research; the parental support given to gifted children. Moss, 
(1990), found that mothers of gifted pre-schoolers used more metacognitive 
comments, when engaged in problem solving with their children, than did other 
mothers. The effects of social interaction on metacognition will be further 
discussed in chapter 8. 
Whilst many of Schwanenflugel et al's (op. cit. ) individual results did not show 
high significant differences between gifted and non gifted children, closer analysis 
found that the gifted children understood the reasons and significance of 
metacognition for performance. For instance, gifted children better understood 
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when it was harder to remember and when it was harder to pay attention. These 
types of insight, it is argued, are crucial to employing metacognitive knowledge 
for strategy use. Similarly, Davidson & Sternberg, (1984), found that whilst non- 
gifted students could be taught metacognitive strategies, which brought their 
problem-solving performance up to the level of the gifted students, the gifted 
students would spontaneously search for and select the necessary information. 
Schwanenflugel et al's research with gifted and non-gifted children supports this 
claim. The gifted children were more likely to understand the reasons for their 
metacognitive experiences, for instance, why receiving a list that can be made into 
a story can help their memory and why it is sometimes hard to attend to 
something. It is this ability to infer causal and contextual attributions about 
metacognitive knowledge, they argue, that appears to account for higher usage of 
metacognition on cognitive problems and further, this ability appears critical to 
using strategies in unfamiliar situations, (Alexander, Carr, & Schwanenflugel, 
1995). Understanding of metacognition then appears to be implicated in transfer 
of strategies and skills across domains. This is an important aspect of this project 
since the research questions address not only the facilitation of metacognition but 
the effect of metacognition on cognitive tasks and achievement across domains. 
3.4 Transfer 
Transfer may refer to direct crossing over of a skill from one domain to another or 
the construction of a new skill, which involves a new combination of old skills and 
knowledge. The ability to transfer skills from one domain to another is crucial to 
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learning. Brown et al, (1983), have argued strongly that the ability to transfer skill 
from a context dependent state to a relatively context independent state, marks an 
important stage of development in learning. Citing empirical studies as evidence 
Davidson & Sternberg, (1998), have described the variables that are relevant to 
successful transfer. These are cognitive ability, similarity of the structure of 
different problems, similarity of content, practice and experience with similar 
solution problems. The metacognitive aspects of strategy knowledge, including 
knowing when and how to use them are especially important in successful transfer. 
Work with expert problem solvers found that experts are more attendant to the 
deep structure of the problem they are solving and use this knowledge to select a 
particular strategy, whilst novices are more likely to attend to surface structure or 
content similarity, (Chi et al., 1980). In addition, skilled problem solvers use 
metacognitive processes to monitor and modify their image of the problem as they 
seek to solve it, (Hayes, 1981). 
The ability to transfer, as displayed by expert problem solvers, appears to depend 
on the ability to abstract principles of the problem, which allows for a mental 
representation that is not context bound or tied to the concrete aspects of the 
problem. Carr & Biddlecomb, (1998), have suggested that children's inability to 
transfer mathematical knowledge to real-life situations is a result of their inability 
to abstract at a more general level. They compare this high level abstraction, 
which involves self-awareness and which allows for reflection on the process and 
results of reflection, to the Piagetian notion of "reflected abstraction" (Piaget, 
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1976). This is contrasted with other forms of abstraction: empirical which is based 
on sensory/motor material and reflective, which uses schemes and mental 
operations as source material. It appears that it is this higher level, reflected 
abstraction, which allows for the gifted children in Schwanenflugel's (op. cit. )work 
to infer causal and contextual elements of their metacognition. Carr & 
Biddlecomb, (1998), suggest that without a general level of abstraction, children 
are unable to see the relationships among different types of maths problems and 
consequently, cannot see beyond the task in hand. Implicit in this notion of 
reflected abstraction affecting transfer, is the view that the abstraction is a 
conscious, verbalisable process. However, another view delineated by Adey & 
Shayer, (1994), suggests that the highest level of abstraction may result from an 
unconscious development of a central processor in the brain effected through 
practice with the Piagetian notions of cognitive conflict and construction. These 
factors, they argue, are at least as important as metacognition, in producing 
transfer. Most of the programmes, which have sought to improve problem-solving 
ability across domains, have used instruction in metacognitive processes and 
moreover, have found that talking about strategies, and explaining reasoning with 
peers and others has a positive result, (Palinscar & Brown, 1984; Paris, Cross, & 
Lipson, 1984; Resnick, 1988). The reciprocal learning process used in reading by 
Palinscar and Brown led to marked improvement in reading comprehension, which 
lasted over time and across domains. 
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Many early thinking skills programmes found that their methods of teaching 
general, logical thinking skills, in order to solve puzzles, did not enable students to 
transfer these thinking skills to achieve better results, in different academic 
subjects. Similarly, when thinking skills have been taught in one particular 
curriculum area, they often do not transfer to other curriculum areas, (Nickerson, 
Perkins, & Smith, 1985). However, in this respect a precursor to the CASE@KS I 
project, CASE@KS3, which involved secondary school children replacing their 
science lessons with CASE@KS3 lessons, did find that children on the programme 
attained better results in science, mathematics and English, when compared to the 
control groups, (Adey & Shayer, 1994). It may be that these secondary school 
CASE tasks enabled the students to explore and play with their thinking processes, 
and this flexibility of thinking transferred across domains, affecting attainment in 
different subject areas. As Claxton has pointed out, learning strategies are tied to 
the context in which they are learned. It, therefore, seems necessary to provide a 
variety of contexts and guises in which these strategies can be used. The learner 
should then be encouraged to make links between these contexts and transfer their 
thinking processes. It is this process of repeated embedding, disembedding and re- 
embedding of thinking processes and contexts that makes transfer of learning more 
likely. (Claxton, 1999) 
Similarly, Carr, (Carr & Biddlecomb, 1998) argued that whilst abstraction needs 
to be encouraged, care should also be taken to facilitate development of children's 
cognitive structures and to provide for a strong conceptual knowledge base, from 
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which children can construct strategies and metacognitive awareness of those 
strategies. This echoes Brown's caveat to facilitating metacognition, that it is 
impossible to reflect, unless there is something to reflect about (Brown, 1987), and 
supports the growing consensus that metacognitive strategies should be taught 
within a domain, rather than independently. 
4 The Link between Theory of Mind and Metacognition 
4.1 Introduction 
The theory of mind literature has tended to focus on the child's developing ability 
to attend to her own and others' mental states and to connect mental states to 
behaviour. However, in debating how this ability develops, the literature suggests 
links between theory of mind and metacognitive processing, and yet the 
development of each appears to follow different paths. 
On one level, the development of a theory of mind involves becoming self- 
conscious and conscious of others. It involves thinking about representations: 
desires, beliefs and intentions, rather than about objects. Thus it involves a 
development of meta-representations (Olson, Astington, & Harris, 1988a). 
One of the main differences between theory of mind and metacognition is that 
under "normal" conditions the child develops a theory of mind simply and 
seemingly without overt instruction; so that by the age of four children are almost 
always successful at passing standard false-belief tests. [Evidence from (Wimmer 
57 
& Perrier, 1983) and this project chapter 6]. Under three years old, the majority of 
children fail these same tests. Carpendale and Chandler argued that what has 
developed by the age of four is a "copy theory of mind" in which children 
mentally represent behaviour in the world in a straight forward copying sense. 
They argue that this is only the beginning of developing a theory of mind and not 
until much later (i. e. middle childhood or beyond), do children consciously 
construct representations and become aware of doing so. That is they develop an 
interpretative theory of mind, which enables them to comprehend that given the 
same stimulus two people can have different interpretations and that both are 
valid, (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). They argue that the problem with the 
standard false belief tests, such as Maxi and the chocolate or the Smartie tube test, 
is that when children answer these correctly, researchers draw the conclusion that 
they are aware of the "interpretative nature of the knowing process" (Carpendale 
& Chandler, 1996) p. 1687. They say that passing such tests requires only a basic 
understanding, that people with different experiences, end up with different 
beliefs. Their argument is also borne out by the post-tests done with five to six 
year olds for this project, (See Chapter 6). This awareness of the self-constructive 
nature of thought, is more truly a metacognition than the process involved in "copy 
theory of mind". 
4.2 Theory theory model 
The main debate regarding the development of theory of mind centres around two 
competing paradigms: The theory theory notion (Gopnik, 1996; Gopnik & 
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Wellman, 1992; Wellman, 1990) and the Information Processing idea best 
characterised by TOMM, (German & Leslie, 2000). The theory theory notion 
views the child as a scientist trying to make sense of their world. In this view the 
child builds concepts of the world through interaction with the environment and 
assimilates these concepts into a theory. As the theory is tested and found to be 
wanting, for example, in the experience that what people say does not always 
equate with their behaviour, then the theory is replaced with a more adequate one. 
This does not imply however, that the child is consciously aware of this process, or 
that s/he is evaluating evidence in order to change the theory as a scientist might. 
In this sense then the theory theory approach is not commensurate with a meta- 
process. Penner made just this distinction in his theory theory model, which refers 
to a concept termed prelief, (Perner, 1995; Perrier, Baker, & Hutton, 1994). 
The concept of prelief states that whilst three year olds understand pretend play, 
can relate an agent to a proposition (e. g. a mother using a banana as a telephone), 
and can evaluate this situation as pretend, the three year old does not understand 
that the agent also relates to and evaluates the situation and that evaluation may be 
different. Yet, by the age of four, children have come to this understanding. The 
distinction is between what something represents and how it represents it. Only if 
there is a conscious knowledge that this distinction exists can we call this a meta- 
level process. 
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The theory theory approach of Gopnick and Wellman (op. cit. ) suggests a 
development of theory of mind between the ages of two and five. The two year 
old is driven by desire towards objects, but there is no propositional relationship 
between the mental state and the world. The three year old has developed a theory 
that encompasses belief and that makes the link between thought and behaviour. 
By the age of four to five, the child has mastered the concept of 
misrepresentations. For the theory theorists, the process of the child's changing 
concepts in developing a theory of mind are no different to the processes of 
conceptual change in any other domain, for example, number, science and the 
natural world. Carey suggests that important factors for conceptual change in 
these other domains are metacognitive, for example, the use of analogy, 
comprehension monitoring and abstract comparisons, (Carey, 1985; Carey, 1988). 
Wellman suggests that children build a theory of mind in this conceptual way from 
their own experience and observations and comparisons with others' experiences. 
Whilst this is a domain specific theory building, once it has developed, it becomes 
part of other concepts, (Wellman, 1990). In Wellman's sense the initial theory of 
mind must become integrated with the larger concepts of cognition to become of 
practical use in understanding the social and personal world. When he refers to 
theory of mind, he speaks of the whole developmental conceptual theory of inner 
states: knowledge of oneself as a cognitive being and knowledge of others as 
cognitive beings is one aspect of his model. The model fully consists of: 
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1. Existence: knowledge that mental processes exist and that "people possess 
minds" 
2. Distinct processes: distinguishing of mental processes e. g. dream, think, reason 
3. Variables: mental and non mental processes that impinge on persons mental 
states 
4. Integration: relatedness of mental processes, how they co-ordinate and compete 
5. Cognitive monitoring: assessing state of own cognition and "knowing how" to 
apply cognitive conceptions to tasks 
Edited from Wellman, (1985a) 
In this way then, Wellman's view is of an integrated theory of mind or a 
development of metacognition. 
From empirical research Wellman credits the pre-school child with a naive 
understanding of at least the first four of the above categories. Much of the 
empirical evidence on which this model relies involves experiments where 
children are asked questions about mental states. In these tests, children as young 
as two can use mentalistic words such as "think", "believe" and "remember" 
However, Mitchell suggests that use of these words does not definitively refer to 
descriptions of mental states. In addition, these mental states that the words seek 
to describe are not consistent and use of a descriptive word does not mean that we 
are describing the same thing. Furthermore, references to another's mental state 
demands we make an analogous connection between what we feel and what the 
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other appears to feel, from our observation of its behaviour and language, 
(Mitchell, 2000). It is perhaps, as Olson suggests, that use of mental state terms in 
fact, describes the perspective of the speaker, (Olson, 1988b). 
Mitchell goes on to argue that it is this very ability to attend to one's own mental 
state that allows us to describe another's. The idea is that since an understanding 
of the self as having mental experiences implies the concept of a person, we 
therefore understand that there are others (persons) like ourselves. It is only when 
the child distinguishes self from others, that s/he becomes aware of mental states. 
In contrast to the theory theory model, Mitchell suggests that rather than 
extrapolating from one's own experience to understand another's mental state, the 
understanding only comes about through an understanding of cultural norms. The 
suggestion is that the story we tell ourselves about others' mental states has to 
make sense to us in cultural terms: 
"differences between children and adults in their 
psychological interpretations may well be based on 
differences in interpretations of what is plausible 
given a story" (Mitchell, 2000) p. 51 
In this view the development of theory of mind involves the development of 
increasingly sophisticated analogies, which are used to connect the self to others 
and the environment. This use of analogy is a meta-process. Thus rather than 
theory of mind developing spontaneously through interaction with the 
environment, it is encultured by the covert forces of the social/cultural world. It is 
more common for children and adults to speak of their own or others' beliefs and 
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desires, than for them to reflect metacognitively on a problem. It may be, that 
understanding of self and others is more salient, than understanding of the 
concepts of cognition, or that, as Yussen suggests, understanding of self and others 
is in constant flux and therefore defies absolute categorisation, (Yussen, 1985a). 
If this is the case, then Langer's suggestion that a child's state is one of 
"mindfulness", whilst increasing age tends, through routinised behaviour, to lead 
to "mindlessness", then the child is constantly interpreting mental states, which 
allows for rapid development of theory of mind. In contrast, for the adult the only 
reason to become metacognitive about a situation is when the structure of the 
situation is novel. The importance here, is the distinction between the novelty of 
structure, which leads to mindfulness, against the novelty of content, which does 
not, (Langer, 1985). It is, however, difficult, as Yussen has argued, to interpret 
these states of "mindfulness" and "mindlessness". Yussen's critique of Langer's 
position suggests that even a mindless state involves some processing, and 
although behaviour may suggest mindlessness, we cannot be sure that is the 
individual's state, (Yussen, 1985a). 
4.3 Cognitive Complexity and Control Theory (CCC) 
So whilst Mitchell has argued against the theory theory approach from the point of 
view of social/cultural narratives and Langer has argued against its developmental 
perspective, Frye's contention with the theory theory approach is that it is domain 
specific. Frye points out that theory of mind is different from beliefs about nature, 
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since theory of mind is not identified by content. Instead, it rests on "making 
connections between mental states and content", (Frye, 2000). This making of 
connections appears to be a meta-level process. Frye's model of Cognitive 
Complexity and Control Theory (CCC) states that the developmental changes in 
theory of mind are due to the ability to reflect upon judgements made. He 
suggests that it is the ability to employ "embedded rules" i. e. "if-if-then" rules 
rather than "if-then" rules. This seems to resonate with Flavell's descriptions of 
level 1 and level 2 processing, (Flavell, 1978). The development of theory of mind 
is then seen as a development of a meta-representational system, in which 
executive functions of planning and deliberative action are necessary. Frye also 
suggests that development of theory of mind is not just a change in conceptual 
theory (as in the theory theory model), but a change in the child's psychological 
capabilities. 
Similarly, the Information Processing model of German and Leslie also finds the 
theory theory model wanting, since there is no demand for the possession of 
abstract concepts to depend on knowledge of those concepts. They argue that it 
would seem impossible to build a theory without knowledge of the concepts one is 
employing and that the theory theory model does not explain how the child 
develops a theory of mind, except in an analogous description of other concept 
development. Their own theory seeks to fill this gap and postulates a Theory of 
Mind Mechanism (TOMM) in the brain, which is specialised for attending to 
mental states, (German & Leslie, 2000). 
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4.4 Theory of Mind Mechanism (TOMM) 
The TOMM model describes attitude concepts such as belief, desire and pretend as 
featuring in representational structures called M-representations (meta- 
representations). These M-representations are distinct, in that they specify an 
agent, a content and an anchor to the real world. The TOMM does not provide the 
child with a theory of pretending or believing, but a basis for acquiring knowledge 
about mental states. By attending to mental states, the child learns about them. 
Thus, in the TOMM view, the child recognises pretence, without knowing what 
pretence is. Central to the information processing model is the notion of a 
selection processor (SP), which develops over the early years and allows the early 
default mechanism of seeing beliefs as true, to be overridden. A false belief 
experiment by Zaitchik showed that children who do not get to see, but rather are 
told that an object has changed place, outperform the children who are given a 
standard task, (Zaitchik, 1991). German and Leslie put this success down to the 
inhibitory factor of the SP being lessened because, without seeing something, the 
child is not sure what the truth is and therefore does not need to override the 
"default true" mechanism in the same way. 
Whilst German and Leslie's evidence against a theory theory model of theory of 
mind is compelling and their model of TOMM and the SP makes sense given the 
correlation between developmental tests and standard false belief tests, it is hard to 
find any evidence for such a mechanism in the brain from neuropsychology. 
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Although work by Umilta and Stablum, (1998), in neuropsychology has shown 
evidence for control mechanisms that can selectively impair cognitive processes 
and these control mechanisms depend on the activity of the frontal and pre-frontal 
areas of the cerebral cortex. Their work does not use theory of mind tests but 
more general attention and cognitive tests. There is some evidence that links 
certain areas of the brain (mainly Brodmann areas 8&9) with theory of mind tasks 
and this region is also known to be involved in executive control, (Fletcher et al., 
1995; Passingham, 1993) However, Penner, (2000), has suggested problems with 
this linkage. Firstly, the evidence is not age or task specific and secondly, 
environmental factors, which make a difference to mastery on false belief tasks, do 
not correlate with brain maturation. Perrier suggests that further research needs to 
be done on the environmental factors, such as number of siblings and on the 
delayed mastery of false belief in deaf children and blind children, (de-Villiers & 
de-Villiers, 2000; Minter, Hobson, & Bishop, 1998). 
Whilst both the theory theory model and the TOMM model give convincing 
accounts of how theory of mind develops, the important question of why it 
develops, seemingly without overt instruction and the role of language and social 
enculturation, are skated over in both models. 
4.5 Development of theory of mind in a larger context 
If we view a developing theory of mind as a life-long enterprise, evidenced by the 
fact that adults often return to a naive realism, then the importance of 
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communication and enculturation become more prominent. Fabricus and Imbens- 
Bailey conclude that representational reasoning is not acquired suddenly, but 
involves prolonged learning. Understanding how representations work must come 
from interpretations of people's actions and speech in context, (Fabricius & 
Imbens-Bailey, 2000). 
For Freeman, the mastering of "notational systems", (for example, drawing, 
sculpting, writing, number symbols etc. ), allows for a diversification of mentalistic 
reasoning, (Freeman, 2000). The argument is, that the reasoning we develop about 
agents, is naturally connected to reasoning about the physical objects that the 
agents produce, in order to communicate. We learn about both together. 
Freeman's argument, based upon one representational system, visual art, employs 
the notion of "intentional dispersion" as being a central topic of theory of mind. 
"Intentional dispersion" relates to the simultaneous (effects/intentions) provided 
by one representational and communicative artefact. Thus Freeman explains, a 
picture of Charles I as Caesar may be a portrait of Charles, be about the artist's 
conception of kingship and be directed towards viewers with an intention to 
influence their perception. In a similar way, we look for intentional diversity in 
what people say and do. Events where the agent intends some thing more or other 
than what is immediate, make us reflect on communication and the devices agents 
use, as well as on mental states. It seems that the experience of complex 
communicative interactions facilitates the development of theory of mind. These 
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communications may be language based, or emanate from other complex sign 
systems. 
The importance of language competence for developing theory of mind has been 
shown by work with deaf children, (de-Villiers & de-Villiers, 2000). Their 
argument is that the development of certain grammatical rules necessary for 
language competence also govern the development of the internal language of 
thought, without which, it would be impossible to think about someone's mental 
states. Their work has suggested that the ability to deal with complements, 
precedes, and is seemingly a pre-requisite for, understanding false belief. They 
describe a development of language from the basic sentence mapped onto an event 
which is true, through the ability to understand the discrepancy between sentences 
and reality (as in pretence), to mastery of embedded structures and realisation of 
falsehood in embedded structures (as in lies, mistakes). Then there is an extension 
from verbs of communication to verbs of mental states (as in beliefs), which 
enables the child to represent the invisible thoughts and beliefs of others. 
They do not claim that theory of mind depends on language, but that the specifics 
of the false belief test, depend on a certain mastery of language. They view the 
overall process as one of mutual facilitation between language and theory of mind 
and point out that conceptual development in theory of mind may also facilitate 
later language development. Language development and verbal fluency are 
recurring themes throughout this project. See chapter 6 for further discussion of 
language and metacogniton. 
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Counterfactual reasoning is also seen to be important in success on false-belief. 
Perner and Feichtinger's ongoing research quoted in (Perner, 2000) on 
counterfactual reasoning, found that reasoning from a complete counterfactual 
conditional was more difficult for three to five year olds than reasoning from 
counterfactual antecedents or future hypotheticals. Robinson and Beck also 
suggested that false belief and counterfactual tasks are mastered at the same time, 
since both require an understanding that the same proposition can have different 
truth values, (Robinson & Beck, 2000). For Perrier the mastery of the 
counterfactual depends upon an understanding of "aboutness", and understanding 
that counterfactuals are about the real world but are false. The counterfactual 
conditional takes reference points from the real world. It is different to an 
understanding of pretence, but shows events as being different from what they 
really are. For Perner then 
"to think this way requires the same intellectual ability 
that I have claimed necessary for false belief: to 
understand a proposition(the context of the belief; 
the counterfactual conditional) as referring to (be about) 
the real world" 
(Pemer, 2000) p. 394 
Perner goes on to distance himself from the strong theory theory approach-by 
finding salience in the simulation theory of Riggs and Peterson (Riggs & Peterson, 
2000), which equates mastery of false belief with a general ability to 
"imaginatively reason". Riggs and Peterson argue that rather than success on false 
belief tasks being dependent on having acquired an understanding of meta- 
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representations construed as a theory, (as in theory theory) what develops is an 
ability to construct an answer to a false belief question. They argue that beliefs are 
not held in the mind in a finished form, but that a question triggers an imaginative 
construction of the event in question and this leads to an answer. The incorrect 
answer is then a failure in reasoning, rather than a failure to understand the 
concept of belief. They make the point that the reasoning employed is "everyday, 
practical reasoning" and not deductive reasoning. The answers are probable and 
not certain. Their empirical work suggests that the difficulty children find with 
false belief tasks lies in the counterfactual reasoning required. The importance is 
on being able to simulate the self in a past state and to suppress information we 
know now. Thus ascribing false belief to others is the same as ascribing false 
belief to oneself and the mental state is not directly simulated rather "it is the 
knowledge base that we simulate directly, while the belief is derived" (Riggs & 
Peterson, 2000) p. 96. 
This model counters other models of theory of mind that suggest that children first 
have knowledge of their own mental states and then apply these concepts to others 
through analogy. This would seem to suggest a less important role for executive 
functions, although Riggs and Peterson are careful not to entirely rule out the role 
of executive functioning as an explanation for why children fail counter-factual 
reasoning tasks. 
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4.6 Theory of mind and development of epistemology 
An important link between theory of mind and metacognition in the context of 
lifelong development of reflective thinking is made by Kuhn, (Kuhn, 1999; Kuhn, 
2000). Kuhn argues that the challenges children face in understanding a theory of 
mind are connected to the more complex forms of thinking that challenge adults' 
effective reasoning. More specifically, the link Kuhn makes is between meta- 
knowing, meta-strategic knowledge and epistemology. Meta-knowing is defined 
as awareness, understanding and control of one's own cognitive functions and 
those of others (knowing that), whilst meta-strategic knowing is about mental 
processes (knowing how) and epistemology the conceptualisation of knowing in 
its abstract, theory form. The argument is, that a truly constructivist theory of 
mind recognises this epistemological concept and ultimately maintains what she 
terms an "evaluative epistemology". 
"Evaluative epistemologists have reconciled the idea that 
people have a right to their views with the understanding 
that some views can nonetheless be more right than others. 
They see the weighing of alternative claims in a process 
of reasoned debate as the path to informed opinion, and they 
understand that arguments can be evaluated and compared 
based on their merit. " 
(Kuhn, 1991) cited in (Kuhn, 2000) p. 318 
As with Piaget's formal operational thought and the idea of "reflected abstraction" 
(Piaget, 1976), the notion of evaluative epistemology could not be considered until 
adolescence at the earliest and may never be achieved at all. 
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Kuhn's lifelong perspective seems to answer the difficult questions of when, how 
and why metacognition and theory of mind develops. Whilst not a theory theory 
approach it has resonance with the developmental perspective of that movement, 
but it also resonates with Langer's theories of "mindfulness" and "mindlessness" 
(Langer, 1985) and with the growing complexity of the various processing 
mechanisms in the brain, which develop over time, as described in the information 
processing movement. If Kuhn's conceptual change theory is correct, then it 
argues for educational practice to take this into account, throughout the school 
years and beyond. It is then better to start early with facilitating metacognitive 
processing in the early years of schooling and building upon this groundwork in 
the years that follow. Likewise, theory of mind doesn't stop with an 
understanding of others as cognitive beings but needs continuous stimulation to 
continue to develop. 
"Young children's dawning awareness of their own and 
others' mental functions lie at one end of a developmental 
progression that eventuates in complex meta-knowing 
capabilities not realised before adulthood, if they are 
realised at all" (Kuhn, 2000) p. 320 
Kuhn also argues that meta-knowing is strongly implicated in cognitive ability and 
knowing how you know, puts oneself in charge of knowing and ultimately in 
charge of one's own life. 
Kuhn's emphasis on the acquisition of an evaluative epistemology in which it is 
recognised that an individual has their own perceptions of an event, whether 
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correct or not, seems to form a link with the phenomenology of the French 
philosopher M. Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty argues against both empiricism 
and rationalism to formulate a phenomenology that understands that human 
behaviour is always open to conscious interpretation. What needs to be evaluated 
and debated then, is not only the perceived behaviour and context of that 
behaviour, but also the pre-conceptions of the perceiving subject. Rather than 
perception being one of pure sensations, human beings are always presented with 
interpreted objects. Understanding this and using this understanding to evaluate 
our own and others' behaviour seems to be the ultimate goal of metacognition and 
theory of mind. Trying to understand one's own and others' behaviour in the 
world, appears to be part of the human condition and an activity in which we all 
engage at whatever level. For Merleau-Ponty, in order to understand the world we 
have to not only study the world, but also ourselves (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). 
5 Recent Literature 
Following Flavell's seminal paper on metacognition and cognitive monitoring 
(Flavell, 1979), there was, throughout the 1980s and 90s a deluge of research 
papers published which allied metacognitive processing to cognitive skill and 
academic performance. (Alexander et al., 1995; Borkowski, 1985; Borkowski, 
Ryan, Kurtz, & Reid, 1983; Carr, Alexander, & Folds-Bennett, 1994; Davidson et 
al., 1994; Forrest-Pressley & Waller, 1984; Garcia et al., 1998; Hall, Bowman, & 
Myers, 1999; Hennessey, 1999; Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Kern, 1989; Kurtz & 
Weinert, 1989; Lucangeli, Galderisi, & Cornoldi, 1994; Luke, 1999; Pramling, 
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1988; Pressley et al., 1987; Raphael et al., 1986; Schoenfeld, 1992; 
Schwanenflugel et al., 1997; Slife et al., 1985; Sternberg, 1998; Swanson, 1990; 
Zimmerman & Schunk, 1989). From a developmental perspective metacognition 
quickly became associated with abstract levels of thinking, particularly in a 
Piagetian sense it was linked with "reflected abstraction" (Piaget, 1976). In this 
sense, metacognition became a developmental goal. 
In recent years there has been a growth in research into the development of 
metacognition in children. As Whitebread points out, the early research into 
children's metacognition, which tended towards laboratory based studies 
emphasised what children could not do, (Whitebread, Coltman, Anderson, Mehta, 
& Pasternak, 2005). However, more naturalistic studies such as those by 
Whitebread in nursery classrooms [ibid]; by Georghiades and Thomas in primary 
classrooms, (Georghiades, 2004; Thomas, 2003) and evidence from this project, in 
primary classrooms, have shown that the early laboratory based studies may have 
under-estimated the metacognitive abilities of young children. Importantly, these 
most recent studies have used different methodologies in order to investigate 
metacognition in education. Instead of relying on self-report and laboratory 
studies, these new studies have used observations of children's behaviour in 
naturalistic settings or have asked children to comment on their own or others' 
cognitive behaviour whilst engaged on cognitive tasks. Whitebread in particular, 
claims that these methods provide much more reliable indications of children's 
metacognitive processing. His team have collected evidence from 32 early years 
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classes of children of 3 to 5 years, demonstrating children's metacognitive abilities 
in terms of metacognitive knowledge and self regulation of performance, [op. cit]. 
However, as research for this project shows investigating children's metacognition 
in classroom settings is not without its particular problems. In particular, 
educational practices that are likely to encourage metacognitive development and 
the practice of metacognitive language are not commonly observed elements 
within early years settings, as a number of researchers have pointed out, (Bartsch, 
Horvath, & Estes, 2003; Fisher, 2002; Thomas, 2002a; Thomas, 2003; Whitebread 
et al., 2005). Whilst this lack of educational practices likely to facilitate 
metacognition is a consistent finding from UK classrooms following the national 
curriculum, there has been, to date, a large number of intervention programmes 
designed to remedy this situation. These have included many different types of 
thinking skills programmes and interventions, (See McGuinness, 1999; and Eppi 
Centre Review, 2004, for an overview). 
However, many projects based in educational contexts naturally prioritise the 
educational achievement aspects of metacognition and tend to grapple less with 
the theoretical issues surrounding metacognition. There is a danger that 
metacognition is becoming seen as a cure-all for underachieving students and in 
the process, there is an over simplification of definition or a confusion of terms 
such as metacognitive skill, metacognitive awareness, meta-reasoning, 
metacognitive ability, meta-learning and so on. It is important that the empirical 
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evidence from recent research projects in naturalistic settings is used to develop 
theory of metacognition, as well as offer pedagogic strategies, [See chapter 10 p 
432] 
The theoretical distinctions of different aspects of metacognition made during the 
1990s have developed Flavell and Brown's original conception of metacognition 
and led to distinct theoretical fields. The metamemory research strand continues 
with the work of Nelson and Narens, who delineated two different types of 
metacognitive processing: self-monitoring and self- regulation (Nelson et al., 
1998; Nelson & Narens, 1992). The self monitoring aspect refers to keeping track 
of one's own cognitive progress during a task and this is seen as a "bottom up" 
process as information from the interaction between the self and the task is fed 
back. Self regulation, on the other hand, refers to the executive activities of 
planning, directing and evaluating and is seen as a "top down" process. The study 
of self-monitoring focuses on ongoing feelings and judgements such as ease of 
learning (EOL), judgements of learning (JOL) and feeling of knowing (FOK). It is 
from studies of children's monitoring processes that theories of self regulated 
learning have developed. This continues to be an important link between 
metacognition theory and educational practice. The concept of self-regulated 
learning has been developed to include an understanding of the learner's personal 
goals as well as the contextual features of the learning environment. Boekaerts 
suggests that learners need to develop and aptitude for both social regulation and 
self regulated learning. She goes on to say that students need to practice and 
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extend their goal setting processes in order to flourish and take control of their 
own learning, (Boekaerts, 2002). 
Whilst Boekharts uses the concept of self-regulated learning to bridge the gap 
between psychological theories of learning and classroom practices, Kuhn 
provides a similar bridge between theory and practice in terms of metacognition. 
Kuhn uses her theoretical conceptualisation of metacognition and theory of mind 
(see section 4.6) and links this with the educational concept of critical thinking, 
proposing that teachers need to understand the theoretical concept of 
metacognition and how best to foster it, (Kuhn & Dean, 2004). 
In a similar way this project aims to make the connection between the original 
broad conception of metacognition as delineated by Flavell (op cit) and the 
educational practices observed in year one classrooms during a cognitive 
acceleration programme, and during the normal numeracy curriculum. The 
reasons for using Flavell's theory rather than any other have been outlined on page 
35. However, whilst Flavell's theory is used as a framework for coding the 
observable metacognitive behaviour of the children in the study, the coding of 
teacher behaviours, which appear to affect or facilitate this processing uses a 
grounded approach. By using this double approach the social, contextual and 
psychological factors of later theories of metacognition can be taken into account. 
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Whilst this project explores metacognition in terms of education and learning 
research on metacognition has widened to other areas outside of education, such as 
emotional disorders and psychotherapy (Wells, 2000), forensic psychology and 
eye witness accounts (Perfect, 2002), substance abuse (Toneatto, 1999). Since the 
early days of research on metacognition in the 1970s it has been closely linked to 
work on memory and this strand of research continues along with 
neuropsychological and neuropsychiatric research such as (Hanten, Levin, & 
Song, 1999; Rourke, Halman, & Bassel, 1999). Work on the neuropsychological 
aspects of cognition and metacognition have led in the past to major advances in 
the building of theoretical models of metacognition and theory of mind such as the 
representational redescription model. (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). 
Metacognition continues to be linked to motivation and other aspects of the self 
and personality (Boekaerts, 1999; Vollmeyer, 1999). There has also been a major 
input in these areas by researchers from a social psychology perspective. This 
movement perhaps began with a special issue of the journal Personality and Social 
Psychology, dedicated to metacognition (1998), in which Jost, Kruglanski and 
Nelson discuss metacognition in terms of its situated cultural and social context 
(Jost, Kruglanski, & Nelson, 1998). This important article has led to a growth in 
research from this perspective and in terms of education, work by Thomas, (2000; 
2003) has gone further to show not only how metacognition is socially situated but 
how it can be socially constructed through classroom discourse. 
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In recent years psychologists and educationalists have come together at 
conferences such as European Association for Research on Learning and 
Instruction (EARLI) in 2003 to set up special interest groups in metacognition and 
there is now a new journal dedicated to research on metacognition and learning, 
(Veenman, 2005). 
However, whilst research on metacognition expands into applied areas and to take 
account of social contexts, there are still sceptical voices, which suggest that 
metacognition may not be as separable from cognition as researchers believe. It 
may be no more than a difference in intention, rather than a qualitative difference 
in cognitive processing, (Brown, 2003). 
Whilst this project takes Flavell's developmental view of metacognition as its 
base, the problematic issues of observing and describing others' metacognitive 
behaviour are addressed. In addition, following the research from social 
psychology, the influence of social and contextual factors are also explored. 
Moreover, in recent years there has been a growing awareness amongst some 
psychologists of the need to bring together research on cognition, with description 
of what those cognitions mean and feel like for the individuals experiencing them. 
Thus there is now a society for phenomenology and cognition and a related 
journal, along with a new journal of qualitative research in psychology, which 
includes phenomenological approaches. This study takes the understanding of 
what it means to be metacognitive as an underpinning research theme and uses 
79 
phenomenological description to seek an understanding of what metacognition is 
for five to six year old children, (see chapters 5 and 6). 
6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed various models of metacognition. A choice has been 
made as to which to include and which to leave out. The choice was informed by 
the extent to which a given model can be seen as an example of a particular 
movement, in developing theories of intelligence and the importance given to 
metacognition in the larger model. The links between cognition and 
metacognition have been discussed, with emphasis on data supporting conclusions, 
as this informs the analysis of data for this project. Section 4 concentrated on the 
development of theory of mind, because this is acknowledged as central to the 
development of metacognition, indeed for Wellman, metacognition is one aspect 
of his categorisation of theory of mind. For this project, working with young 
children, 5 and 6 years old, it is hypothesised that theory of mind will be in the 
process of developing sophistication and will be used as a measurement (along 
with others), of a general metacognitive ability. This will be taken up in chapter 3 
and chapter 6 where the difficulties of measuring metacognition will be discussed. 
Three major themes appear to have arisen out of this discussion of the theoretical 
underpinnings of metacognition. One is the development of consciousness and the 
role consciousness plays in cognitive tasks. This theme will be returned to 
throughout this thesis. In order to understand and describe more carefully what 
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was observed, different approaches will be taken. One way to address the notion 
of consciousness and to find a middle ground between a psychological 
behaviourism and introspection may be to take a phenomenological approach to 
the question and the analysis of data. This will be explored in chapters 5, and 6. 
The second major theme arising from the above and informing this project, is the 
development of language. Working with young children, some of whom are 
communicating in a language which is not their first language, brings obvious 
problems of analysis. In addition, the extent to which metacognition must be 
verbalised is a theoretical problem which will be further discussed in chapter 3, 
along with the difficulties surrounding non verbal communication. 
The third is the situated nature of metacognition and the role of peers and adults in 
its facilitation. Recent research shows a trend towards applied metacognition and 
the importance of metacognition over a larger number of domains and throughout 
the life-span. In the light of this, the lead research questions for this project which 
are: 
1. Can metacognitive ability be enhanced? 
2. Are metacognitive gains related to cognitive/academic gains? 
3. How is metacognition facilitated in year one classrooms? 
4. What factors associated with teachers impact on the development of 
metacognition in year one classrooms? 
are broken down into further sub questions, which address these major themes. 
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This project aims to investigate the notion of whether five to six year old children 
are capable of metacognitive processing and the variables that interact to affect its 
development. As this project is set in an educational setting the study aims to 
provide practical suggestions for educators, as well as investigating and describing 
metacognition in situ. The next two chapters discuss the research questions in 
more detail and show the progression of this project from an early pilot study to 
the final research design. 
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Chapter 3 
PROJECT DESIGN AND METHODS 
I INTRODUCTION 
The review of the literature on metacognition in the previous chapter suggested 
that whilst there remains a view that metacognition when defined as fully 
conscious abstract reflection on cognition is late developing, a number of 
researchers have shown evidence of young children displaying metacognitive 
processing in some areas. (Alexander et at., 1995; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; 
Boekaerts, 1999; Borkowski & Peck, 1986; DeLoache, Cassidy, & Brown, 1985; 
Estes, 1998; Estes, Wellman, & Woolley, 1989; Flavell, 2000; Flavell, Green, & 
Flavell, 1995; Kontos, 1983; Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1975; Markman, 1979; 
Pramling, 1988; Schwanenflugel et al., 1997; Thorpe & Satterly, 1990; Wertsch, 
1978). It is clear that from the age of four, children have developed some form of 
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theory of mind and are able to consider themselves and others as cognitive beings. 
As this project is set within an educational context, it is important to investigate 
not only the extent to which children of five to six years old are capable of 
metacognition but also to explore the social and contextual variables that may 
impact on its development. 
This research project is embedded within the larger context of the CASE@KS I 
intervention project and as such, it involves some of the same population of 
schools and children engaged in the main project. 
Firstly, this chapter describes the geographical and demographic characteristics of 
the area of London, in which, the research took place. Then the particular 
characteristics of each of the seven schools involved are described. These data are 
taken from local education authority sources, whereas in later chapters, research 
field notes are used, to describe some details of the year one classrooms. 
Secondly, the four main research questions are described and broken down into 
more specific sub questions. Three major factors of the investigation are then 
discussed. These are: the problem of how to measure metacognition; the possible 
effects of verbal ability on metacognition and the ethical issues surrounding 
research with children. 
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2 DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
2.1 The Area 
The inner London Borough, which is home to the schools involved in this project, 
is one of the smallest of the 33 London Boroughs, both in geographical area and 
population, but it has one of the highest population densities. It contains some of 
the most affluent areas in the country and some of the most deprived. 
Unemployment ranges from 16% in some wards to little more than 3% in others. 
The population is also ethnically diverse. Over eighty languages are used in the 
borough and over 12% of homes use additional languages to English. (Source 
local authority guide). The borough has a wide range of schools including, 
Voluntary Aided, County schools and Special schools. Most primary schools in 
the borough have nursery classes, which provide places for three and four year 
olds. Children enter main school reception classes in the year in which they 
become five. Year One children are therefore between five and six years old. 
There may be a gap of nearly a year however, between the youngest and oldest in 
any one class. 
2.2 The Schools 
The schools for the main CASE@KS1 project were recruited by negotiation 
between the project director and the local education authority. Of the ten 
CASE@KSI project experimental schools, four were recruited to participate as 
experimental schools for this research. These schools are here labelled A, B, C and 
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D. Similarly, from the five CASE@KS1 control schools, three were recruited to 
participate as control schools for this research. These schools are here labelled 
X, Y and Z. These control schools would not run the CASE@KS I project during 
the 1999-2000 academic year, but continue with the normal school curriculum and 
their teachers were not given any specific information about the main project 
during this year. These seven schools were allocated by the main project director 
and LEA advisory teacher. 
2.2.1 Experimental School A 
This school is a state funded secular or county school. It has a one form co- 
educational entry with 196 pupils. Pupils are grouped in seven classes from 
reception to Year 6. There is also a unit for up to 20 pupils who have language 
impairment, and a nursery class. 84% of pupils come from minority ethnic 
backgrounds and nearly 50% from homes where English is not the first language. 
31 languages are spoken in the school, and there is a fluctuating population of 
refugee and asylum seekers, many of who are housed in short-stay 
accommodation. Nearly a quarter of the school roll transfers each year. 61% of 
pupils are eligible for free school meals, which is above the borough average. 
25% of the pupils in the main school are on the special needs register, with 18 
pupils including those in the language unit, holding statements of special 
educational needs. Baseline tests of pupils entering the school at five years old 
show them to be below the average attainment level for the borough. In national 
tests at key stage one, just over half the pupils achieve National Curriculum level 2 
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or above in reading, writing and mathematics, whereas the national results are 
around 80% of pupils reaching level 2 or above in those subjects. The year one 
teacher involved in this project was newly qualified and undergoing her 
probationary year. 
2.2.2 Experimental School B 
School B is a Voluntary Aided primary school with 199 pupils on roll. 65% of the 
pupils come from minority ethnic backgrounds, with 48% coming from homes 
where English is not the first language. Baseline testing on entry to the school 
shows attainment to be average for the borough, but there is some concern about 
the low attainment of reception class children in English and social skills. 27% of 
pupils are identified as having special educational needs and 21% need additional 
support in English. 36.2% of the pupils are eligible for free school meals. There 
has been an ongoing problem with the instability of school leadership, a number of 
acting heads have led the school over the past four years and at the start of this 
research project the current head teacher was on long term sick leave. The year 
one teacher was newly qualified at the start of the year. Key stage one results 
show that the percentage of pupils reaching level 2 or above in reading and 
mathematics is in line with national averages and above the national average in 
writing. 
87 
2.2.3 Experimental School C 
This school is a Voluntary Aided primary school with a roll of 231 pupils 
including nursery classes. 40% of pupils are from minority ethnic backgrounds, 
with 28% coming from homes where English is not the first language. A 
proportion of these children are given extra support through an Ethnic Minority 
Achievement Grant. One fifth of the school population is identified as having 
special educational needs and 27% of pupils are eligible for free school meals. On 
entry to the school, baseline tests show average attainment, but a significant 
number of pupils achieve above average results in mathematics. The year one 
teacher at the start of this project was experiencing difficulties with teaching and 
was subjected to monitoring by the Local Education Authority inspectorate. She 
left the school at Easter and a temporary, very experienced teacher, took over. The 
effect of this change will be further discussed in chapter 7, classroom observations 
and chapter 9, teacher interviews. Key stage one results show the number of 
pupils attaining level 2 or above in reading, writing and mathematics is slightly 
above the national average. 
2.2.4 Experimental School D 
School D is a Voluntary Aided primary school. Its catchment area is one-of high- 
density population and is socio-economically disadvantaged compared to national 
criteria. There are 194 children on roll with 23 in the nursery. 40% of pupils are 
eligible for free school meals. This is above average for the borough. Ten pupils 
have statements of special educational needs, with a further 40 pupils on the 
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school special needs register. Two thirds of the school population are from 
minority ethnic backgrounds and 52% are from homes where English is not the 
first language. Baseline assessments show the children to be slightly above 
average when they enter the school. Key Stage 1 results also show above average 
attainment for children reaching level 2 or above in reading, writing and 
mathematics. The year one teacher during this project was one of the more 
experienced teachers. 
2.2.5 Control School X 
School X is a Voluntary Aided primary school with 294 children on roll. Some 
classes are a mix of two year groups. The school's catchment area is diverse, 
ranging from professional owner occupied houses, to council estates and 
temporary accommodation. Almost 50% of the children come from ethnic 
minority backgrounds; there are 22 languages spoken in the school. 47% of 
children are eligible for free school meals. This is above the national average. 
16% of children are on the school's special needs register, with four pupils having 
statements of special educational need. Baseline testing at school entry shows 
below the national average attainment level. At Key Stage 1, attainment of level 2 
or above in reading and mathematics is still below the national average; but on the 
national average for writing. One problem the school faces is the high turnover of 
staff. The year one teacher was an experienced teacher who had returned to 
teaching after having time away. 
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2.2.6 Control School Y 
School Y is a County primary school with a catchment area of mixed owner- 
occupied, rented and council property. A significant minority of pupils are from 
transient populations and come from a wide variety of ethnic groups, they often 
stay for only a short period. There are 371 pupils on roll. Attainment on entry to 
the school is very low compared to the borough average. 67% of children are 
eligible for free school meals. 92 children are on the special needs register with 2 
having statements of special educational needs. Key Stage I results are below the 
national average in reading and writing and slightly above the national average in 
mathematics. The year one teacher was in her second year of teaching at the start 
of the research project. 
2.2.7 Control School Z 
There are 224 pupils on roll at this County primary school, with 20 in the special 
educational needs unit. There is a rich diversity of ethnic background with Somali 
and Arabic the major languages spoken after English. There is a high level of pupil 
mobility. 60% of pupils are eligible for free school meals. Baseline testing on 
entry to the school shows attainment to be below the borough average. At Key 
Stage I attainment is below national averages for reading, writing and --- 
mathematics. The year one teacher was newly qualified and in her first post. 
[Source: local education authority statistics] 
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3 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The four main research questions are: 
1. Can metacognitive ability be enhanced? 
2. Are metacognitive gains related to cognitive/academic gains? 
3. How is metacognition facilitated in year one classrooms? 
4. What factors associated with teachers, impact on the development of 
metacognition in year one classrooms? 
These questions were formulated through a process of connecting issues that 
emerged from the literature, about the development of metacognition and its 
connection to learning, with the CASE@KS I programme, which proposes to 
develop metacognition. They are also informed by personal experience of 
teaching students in further education and perceiving there a general lack of 
metacognitive processing, in terms of reflection on and monitoring and control, of 
cognition. 
The process of formulating these questions and designing the study provoked 
consideration of issues around the methods to be used. This study addresses the 
problems of how to study and measure metacognition. It combines existing tests 
with new methods of analyses and attempts to provide both a quantitative 
measurement of different aspects of metacognition and a phenomenological 
description of these, as they are experienced by five to six year olds. In addition, 
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an original coding system of metacognition, as observed in classroom dialogues, 
was formulated by combining a theoretical approach with a grounded analysis. 
The study concentrates particularly on the metacognitive development of the 
children, but as this is within an educational context, it is suggested that teachers 
will have some effect on how this development is facilitated. Thus, the project 
also considers pedagogic factors including a qualitative analysis of the teachers' 
own beliefs about themselves as cognitive beings. 
The next item briefly outlines the project design before going on in further items to 
show how the design relates to each main research question and the sub questions 
contained therein. 
4 THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research took a quasi-experimental approach involving pre- and post 
intervention tests and interviews with 24 children -6 from each of the 
experimental schools (Schools A, B, C, D) and with 18 children -6 from each of 
the control schools (Schools X, Y, Z). The experimental group fell to 21 children 
by the end of the intervention year and the control group fell to 16 children by the 
end of the intervention year. The groups of six children were termed "focus" 
groups, for ease of reference. Classroom observations of CASE activities for each 
focus group in the experimental schools were carried out at two-weekly intervals 
during the year and observations of numeracy lessons for each of these groups was 
92 
carried out once per term. Classroom observations of the focus groups in 
numeracy lessons in the control schools were carried out once per term. In total 48 
observations were made of CASE activities in the experimental schools, 12 
observations of numeracy lessons were made in these same schools and 9 
observations of numeracy lessons were made in the control schools. The CASE 
activities tend to last around 30 minutes, whilst the numeracy lessons last for an 
hour. In addition, further data was gathered on three children (2 from the 
experimental focus groups and 1 from the control focus groups). This was 
gathered from before and after some of the observation periods, from informal 
conversations with these children and information from teachers. These data are 
used to form three individual case studies of the children in terms of their 
metacognitive development, (see chapter 8). All the teachers were interviewed at 
the beginning and end of the project. Further data were collected in the form of 
field notes made about contextual factors such as the classroom environment 
before and immediately after periods of observation. 
Thus the full research study is as below: 
4.1 Participants 
School Type Children 
(present for whole 
project) 
Teacher 
A Exp 2F 2M 
B Exp 2F 4M 
C Exp 4F 2M 
D Exp 2F 3M 
Newly Qualified 
Newly Qualified 
Teacher Cl (Sept 99-Mar00) 3 years 
experience. Teacher C2 (Apr 00 to 
July 00) over 10 years experience 
5 years experience 
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X Cont 4F 1M Over 10 years experience 
Y Cont 3F 3M One year experience 
Z Cont 2F 3M Newly Qualified 
Totals: 4 experimental schools, 5 teachers, 21 children 
3 control schools, 3 teachers, 16 children 
4.2 Pre- and Post Tests 
Administered individually to all the children 
Pre-test 
Test 1 Self as Learner 
Test 2 Theory of Mind 1 
Test 3 Metamemory 
Test 4 Mental Rotation 
4.3 Classroom Observations 
Post test 
Test I Self as Learner 
Test 2 Theory of Mind 1 and 2 
Test 3 Metamemory 
Test 4 Mental Rotation 
Case Tasks 12 X4 experimental schools (approx 30mins each) Total 48 
Numeracy 3X4 experimental schools (approx 60mins each) Total 12 
Numeracy 3X3 control schools (approx 60mins each) Total 9 
4.4 Teacher Interviews 
September 1999 interviews with teachers A, B, Cl, D, X, Y, Z 
Spring 2000 interview with teacher C2 
July 2000 interview with teachers A, B, C2, D, X, Y, Z 
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Teacher Cl left the school at Easter 2000 and was not able to give another 
interview. Each interview lasted approx. 45 minutes. 
5 THE DESIGN RELATED TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
5.1 Research Question 1: 
Can metacognitive ability be enhanced? 
In order to approach question one, it is firstly necessary to have a conceptual 
framework of metacognition. As delineated in chapter 2, the conceptual 
framework used for this project is a developmental view based on the empirical 
research of Flavell, Brown and Wellman, (Brown, 1987; Flavell, 1979; Wellman, 
1985b). The question involves answering a number of sub questions: 
a) How is metacognition conceptualised for this research ? 
b) What is metacognition for 5 to 6 year olds ? 
c) How can metacognition be measured ? 
d) Does CASE@KS 1 as implemented impact on any factors of metacognition ? 
Sub questions (c) and (d) are approached using a quasi-experimental method. A 
quasi-experiment has been described as "a research design involving an 
experimental approach, but where random assignment to treatment and 
comparison groups has not been used" (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). 
Since true randomisation is very difficult within school settings and with the 
constraint of sample size used in this project, the quasi-experimental design used 
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takes the form of pre-test, post-test, with established groups, matched as far as 
possible on grounds of school intake profiles. Each group of six children in the 
four experimental schools, (schools A, B, C, D), and the three control schools 
(schools X, Y, Z), were chosen by the individual teacher concerned, using the 
constraints of selection for all CASE@KS I grouping. These constraints were that 
each group of six children should be of mixed gender and of mixed general 
aptitude; aptitude was determined by the teacher in each case. A threat to the 
internal validity of the experiment is possible due to reliance on the teacher for 
group selection. This is more likely to occur in the control schools where the 
teacher is not asked to divide the whole class into groups using CASE@KS 1 
criteria, but only those that would provide control focus groups for this and other 
small scale research projects. One way to strengthen the sample match is to note 
the pre-test scores for the main project in these seven experimental and control 
schools and compare these results with the pre-test scores of the particular 42 
children who form the experimental and control focus groups for this project. A 
second way to strengthen this factor of the design is to compare the pre-test scores 
on metacognition from the four experimental focus groups with the pre-test scores 
from the three control schools. Chapter 6 shows that the experimental and control 
groups were closely matched in terms of pre- test scores. 
Whilst the quasi-experimental method addresses sub questions (c) and (d) of the 
main research question (1): Can metacognition be enhanced; as the research 
progressed and theories of metacognition were sought from the literature, it 
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became clear that a different approach was necessary to address sub questions (a) 
and (b). With the exception of Flavell's early work (Flavell, 1976), there was a 
lack of full descriptions of what metacognition is for five and six year olds in the 
literature. Even Flavell's work tends to analyse rather than describe, using a 
concept of metacognition akin to that described as an element of formal 
operational thought, (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) and then seeing how far towards 
this goal the younger children have developed. A different approach from the 
measurement one was needed to get closer to the experience of "being 
metacognitive". To attempt this, a phenomenological approach was taken to the 
analysis of the qualitative data, arising from the tests and interviews. The adoption 
of this approach was gradual, developing through the piloting phase and informed 
by an iterative process between methodology, literature and method. A full 
description of this process and the method is found in chapter 5 and 
phenomenological descriptions of different aspects of metacognition are given in 
chapter 6. 
5.2 Research Question 2: 
Are metacognitive gains related to cognitive/academic gains? 
This question includes the sub questions of 
a) What are cognitive gains? 
b) What are academic gains? 
c) To what extent are these measurements clouded by other variables? 
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The main research question requires a statistical comparison of the test results of 
cognitive development from the main CASE@KS I project for the focus group 
children with the results from the pre- and post test results from the four tests of 
metacognition. The results of this are given in chapter 6 section 5. 
As chapter 2 has described, the link between cognition and metacognition has been 
disputed by different theorists. In some cases these differences have relied upon 
the definition of metacognition as either stored metacognitive knowledge or a 
monitoring and control process. It seems clear that although inter-related, these 
two aspects of metacognition behave differently when subject to testing. For this 
research, in addition to comparing the pre and post test scores on the 
metacognitive tests with the results from the main CASE project tests, the scores 
are also compared with the results of national tests in English and Maths, taken at 
the end of year 2. These latter tests are taken as a measure of academic gains. 
Research question 2 is mainly addressed in chapter 6. 
5.3 Research Question 3: 
How is metacognition facilitated in year one classrooms? 
The pilot phase for this research illuminated the issue of the teacher's -theoretical 
knowledge of metacognition and her attitude towards its importance for learning, 
(see chapter 4). Thus research question 3 includes the sub questions: 
a) Is metacognition apparent in year one classrooms? 
b) What do teachers do to effect metacognitive processing in pupils? 
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c) Are teachers successful in provoking metacognitive responses from pupils? 
d) What other variables affect the development of metacognition in year one 
classrooms? 
The CASE@KS1 project gives high priority to professional development of 
teachers in terms of CASE method. Since metacognition is one pillar of the CASE 
programme, there is a given notion from CASE of what sorts of teacher behaviour 
might enhance metacognition. 
The sub questions are addressed largely through classroom observations. Child- 
child interactions and teacher-child interactions are analysed, using a detailed 
coding scheme devised partly from the literature and partly from a grounded 
theory approach, (See chapter 7). There is a longitudinal aspect to this analysis as 
observations are carried out at regular intervals over the year. In addition, case 
studies of three particular children give an insight into individual metacognitive 
development over the year, (See chapter 8). Field notes provide a broader context 
to these observations and inform the questions used in the teacher interviews. 
5.4 Research Question 4: 
What factors associated with teachers, impact on the development of 
metacognition in year one classrooms? 
This question addresses the role of the teacher in facilitating metacognition. It can 
be broken down into the following sub questions: 
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a) Does teachers' knowledge of and beliefs about metacognition impact on the 
development of metacognition in the classroom? 
b) Do teachers' beliefs and opinions about teaching and learning affect the way 
they try to facilitate metacognition in the classroom? 
c) Can teachers' ability to promote metacognition be developed through continued 
professional development? 
These questions are addressed using data gathered from teacher interviews, 
classroom observations and field notes from interactions with teachers. 
The four main research questions are thus broken down into sub questions and 
these often overlap and interlink. Therefore, a variety of research tools are used to 
answer the questions. The hypothesis tested by the quasi-experimental approach 
to question I is that metacognition can be enhanced and that CASE@KS I lessons 
will aid metacognitive development. A further hypothesis from research question 
2 is that metacognitive gains will be related to cognitive and academic gains. The 
approach taken to explore these hypotheses means that this part of the project 
could be replicated at some future date. This approach has also necessitated an 
original combination of tests to measure the construct of metacognition. The 
qualitative approach to the other research questions seeks to deepen understanding 
of the construct of metacognition and its development. 
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6 MEASUREMENT OF METACOGNITION 
The theories of metacognition have been fully discussed in chapter 2 and as this 
topic is returned to again in chapter 6, it will not be discussed again here. The 
major problem with a quasi-experimental design is the reliability and validity of 
the instrument used as a measure. This question is particularly pertinent to 
metacognition, given the lack of theoretical consensus about metacognition, and 
the difficulties all researchers have had in measuring it. Rather than taking the 
view that metacognition can be measured as a single higher level cognition, the 
literature suggests that there are different aspects of metacognition, some of which 
may develop at different rates, for instance compare theory of mind with 
metacognitive strategy use. Thus it seems possible that metacognition is a 
complex network of psychological processes. From the literature, four aspects of 
metacognition were identified as relevant to the age group of the study and to the 
conceptual framework delineated by Flavell, (1979), on whose empirical and 
theoretical work this study is based. These are, knowledge of self as learner (self); 
theory of mind (others); metamemory (strategies) and mental rotation (task). 
As Cornoldi (1998), has pointed out, metacognitive knowledge is different from 
other declarative knowledge, because metacognitive knowledge also involves the 
hard to define and verbalise feelings about the particular task and these aspects 
may be partly unconscious, although interacting with more conscious aspects. Yet 
in some ways metacognitive knowledge is also similar to declarative knowledge in 
that declarative knowledge also includes ill-structured information resulting from 
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personal experience. Cornoldi's example is that whilst we may know that a cat is 
a mammal with four legs etc. our knowledge also includes personal information 
eg. that cats are nice animals. We use this knowledge to help us judge whether we 
would like other animals that are similar to cats. Given that like other forms of 
knowledge, metacognitive knowledge involves many overlapping aspects such as 
range of application, ease of access, level of awareness, coherence etc. it is very 
difficult to measure one individual's metacognitive knowledge in isolation. 
Cornoldi has produced a list of twelve sources of error of variability in the 
examination of metacognitive knowledge, (Cornoldi, 1998). Of these one of the 
most pertinent to this project is linguistic competence, (See below). 
Typically, assessments of metacognition rely on inferences from classroom 
performance, ratings based on interviews of students questioned about their 
knowledge and cognitive processing, analysis of "think aloud" protocols, or 
assessments of difference between students estimates of their knowledge and 
actual knowledge determined by performance. The four tests described in chapter 
6 aim to test aspects of metacognitive knowledge. 
A great deal of research on metacognition has used versions of interview 
questionnaires devised by Kreutzer et al., (1975), Myers & Paris, (1978)or 
Borkowski & Peck, (1986). For example Swanson's research on the link between 
metacognitive knowledge and aptitude on problem solving used a version of the 
Kreutzer, Leonard and Flavell questionnaire which has questions focussing on 
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person, task and strategy variables. An example of a person variable question is : 
"Q. 5 Jim can play the piano, draw pictures and figure out math problems better 
than anyone else in the class. Do you think he's the smartest person in the class? 
Why?  
Before deciding on the measures to be used for this research, a thorough review of 
the various questionnaires used to measure metacognition and the numerous tests 
used (such as word list generation, story vignettes, performance estimate, strategy 
generating, prose organisation, peformance review) was undertaken. In addition, 
methodological issues of delayed response, as in video replay experiments, and 
researcher effects, both linguistic and paralinguistic, were considered. Ulitmately, 
the measurement of metacognitive processes used in this project was decided by 
information from the pilot study (see chapter 4). Among other things, the pilot 
study highlighted questions around the children's age and linguistic ability. From 
both a review of the literature on measurement of metacognition and experience 
from the pilot project, I concluded it was necessary to: 
1) provide tactile stimulus for children of this age 
2) base questioning on their responses 
3) take account of researcher effects but not try to unnaturally neutralise them 
4) base each test on one main metacognitive factor, rather than mixed as in the 
questionnaire method 
5) keep the interviews as natural as possible 
6) analyse the data in more than one way 
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7) consider other external factors such as time of day 
Thus, whilst the analysis of the tests is quantitative the administration of the tests 
has more in common with the qualitative methods used in interviews. 
7 LANGUAGE 
In researching with young children the researcher needs to be sensitive to the 
linguistic ability of the child, both in its receptive and expressive modes. 
However, language is also influenced by many other affective factors, such as 
motivation to think about the question, construction of purpose of the question and 
the status and role of the researcher. It is just as easy to over estimate children's 
knowledge of their own thinking, as it is to under estimate it. Lucky guesses, 
leading questions and para-linguistic cues, can all account for unreliable data. In a 
similar way personality (shyness etc. ) and affective factors (tiredness, boredom) 
along with cognitive factors (incomprehension, attention span) can all lead to 
under estimates of children's metacognitive competence. Asking questions and 
gaining answers is not a one way system. The answers the children provide, along 
with their behaviour, co-operation or not, will affect subsequent questions and 
behaviour of the researcher. Whilst professionalism as a researcher will seek to 
minimise these effects it is naive to believe that they can be neutralised. 
There is a well-documented tendency amongst young children for them to feel 
compelled to answer questions and provide a correct answer. Work by Hughes 
and Grieve showed that four year olds would answer non-sensical questions 
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without questioning the question, (Hughes & Grieve, 1980). In addition, repeated 
questions have been found to cue a change of response, as the repetition is 
interpreted as an indication of an incorrect answer, (Rose & Blank, 1974). Also 
constant probing for details can lead to invention, (Ceci, 1991). 
Given these social and linguistic difficulties and add to that other factors, such as 
tone of voice, accent and rapport, producing reliable data from questioning small 
children is a minefield, through which researchers must tread very carefully. The 
pilot study for this project was crucial in illuminating these threats to validity. 
Whilst awareness of these problems is necessary in a reflective approach to 
research, some practical solutions can also be employed to strengthen data 
reliability. Firstly, all tests and interviews with children and teachers and all 
classroom observations were audio-taped. Listening to these tape recordings and 
transcribing them verbatim, provides clues to where some of the above problems 
have occurred. This picks up misunderstandings, repetitions, leading questions, 
distractions etc. However, analysis of pauses, long and short need further 
elaboration. They could be construed as "thinking time" or boredom and 
disengagement. Field notes taken at the time aided correct interpretation. 
Contextual field notes were also made prior to and after the particular interaction. 
These included factors such as: the environment, time of day, perceived mood of 
both the participant and researcher, and the activities engaged in just prior to and 
just after the interaction. For example, had the child been taken out of a PE lesson 
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to talk to me? Did my interview/tests encroach on a playtime or lunchtime? Had 
the teacher had a successful lesson prior to my interview, or was she going into a 
staff meeting, or as in one case, a parents' evening? My own thoughts and feelings 
of how the particular interaction had gone were also recorded. 
A fuller picture of the data collected is achieved through the research design of 
triangulation of tests, classroom observations and teacher interviews and through 
multi-method analyses. The methods of analyses used are described in subsequent 
chapters under each particular aspect of the research. 
8 ETHICS 
"Research with human participants is an intrusive process", (Lindsay, 2000). 
Lindsay goes on to suggest that in considering the ethics of a project, we need to 
look at the research participants, the research task and the interaction between the 
two. In addition, I believe it is necessary to look at the motivation of the 
researcher in conducting the research. Motivations can be seen to be on a scale 
from purely altruistic to self-aggrandizement. Similarly, the effect of research on 
participants is a matter of degree. In some areas of research, most notably 
medicine, strong ethical guidelines are laid down by professional bodies, who also 
have the power to curtail or disallow any research they perceive to be unethical. 
Similarly, the British and American Psychological Societies have a code of 
conduct which may lead to transgressors being struck off the register of chartered 
psychologists. However, not all researchers engaged in psychological or 
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educational research with a psychological content, are members of these bodies. 
Many educational researchers will consult and abide by BPS codes of conduct or 
by the British Educational Research Associations own code, although this latter 
has little ability to enforce its recommendations. There seems to be a view 
amongst educational researchers, that people engaged in research with children (ie. 
people under 18 years of age) in educational settings, have an in-built integrity, 
which would disallow harmful research. It is usually peer review of educational 
research that protects participants from unethical treatment. However, my own 
experience of conference presentations and published papers is that the ethical 
guidelines considered in the research are rarely made overt. This can be contrasted 
with other areas of research such as health, medical and animal research where the 
ethical considerations are described and where ethical clearance from a 
professional ethical committee has been sought. 
In addition to the effect of the research on participants, another aspect of ethical 
research is the degree to which it is objective, unbiased and non-polemical. In this 
sense, the funding of the research, and its subsequent dissemination needs to be 
considered. In the late 1990's a report entitled Educational Research: A Critique 
addressed this notion of partisanship in educational research. It found that in a 
random survey of recently published papers of educational research in major 
educational research journals, only one third met many or all of a list of quality 
criteria, including rigour, sampling, use of primary sources and avoidance of 
partisanship, (Tooley & Darby, 1998). As Lindsay points out, although the Tooley 
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report does not directly speak of ethics, the concept of partisanship is related to 
"basic principles, especially integrity and competence"(Lindsay, 2000). Lindsay, 
however goes on to criticise the same Tooley report for it's own sampling 
methodology. 
The majority of educational researchers will follow guidelines produced by either 
British Educational Research Association (BERA) or American Educational 
Research Association (AERA). Section 7 of the BERA guidelines refers directly 
to responsibility to the participants: 
"Participants in a research study have the right to be 
informed about the aims, purposes and likely publication 
of findings involved in the research and of potential 
consequences for participants, and to give their informed 
consent before participating in research" 
and section 8 
"Care should be taken when interviewing children and 
students up to school leaving age; permission should be 
obtained from the school, and if they so suggest, the parents" 
and section 10 
"Participants have the right to withdraw from a study at any time". 
The difficulty arises in conducting research with children in a school setting. For 
instance, how far can young children be said to understand the purposes of the 
research, even when the researcher takes the trouble to explain it? or even less 
likely, how far can they be said to be aware of the potential consequences of 
publication? BERA's solution is that consent should be obtained from the school 
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and then maybe from parents. However, once a school has given consent, it seems 
less likely that an individual participant would choose to withdraw. As much as 
the individual researcher may wish to find some degree of equality of power with 
the research participants, the institutional power structures will make this more 
problematic. In large quantitative studies these issues may not be so important, 
but in small-scale, qualitative studies, the relationship between the researcher, 
participant and research task, needs to be analysed as part of the research findings. 
The research carried out for this project is set within the framework of the larger 
CASE@KSI project and as such permissions had already been obtained from the 
local education authority, schools, parents and teachers. For this study, I was 
careful to explain to each child participant that my job was to find things out and 
that I was trying to find out how children learn things. I explained that I would do 
this by going to lots of schools and seeing lots of children. I would ask the 
children to solve some problems and talk about how they had solved them. I 
would record all the questions and answers on a tape recorder and later at home, I 
would type up the words and see if different children say the same things. I 
emphasised that I was not testing children for right or wrong answers. I then asked 
"Do you want to do this with me or do you want to carry on with what you're 
doing? " All but one child wanted to be involved. This was a not unexpected 
response, since the natural curiosity and a desire to help in children of this age, 
was predictable. The one child, who didn't want to be involved at first, changed 
his mind before I got to the classroom door and was included. 
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Before testing began I introduced myself again, made some informal conversation 
with each child and showed them the tape recorder and microphone. Within time 
limits, they were allowed to explore the machine and hear their own and my voice. 
I also stressed that they could stop doing the activities if they needed to for any 
reason. I reiterated this throughout the test/interviews and sometimes curtailed the 
questioning, where I perceived a child was feeling tired or uncomfortable, 
although they had not verbalised it. All the children completed all the 
test/interviews. 
A similar regard to informed consent was taken when interviewing teachers. In 
this case confidentiality and future dissemination of the research were also 
stressed. Classroom observations were also undertaken with care to provide 
information to the observed group, including the teacher, about the purpose and 
recording of the sessions. 
Many of the issues outlined above became evident during the pilot project. The 




THE PILOT STUDY 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In March to July 1999 a small scale study was undertaken. This gave an 
opportunity to trial the test materials for one metacognitive factor, to try out an 
interview schedule with teachers, to undertake classroom observations and to try 
methods of field note collection. Due to time and access constraints only one 
metacognitive factor was tested during Phase 1 of the pilot study. At this stage the 
research design was still vague but the broad research questions were formed. 
2 PHASE 1: THE MENTAL ROTATION TEST 
The aim of the test was to see if, by presenting a mental rotation exercise as 
stimulus and asking children how they solved the problem, I could obtain answers 
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that would show an understanding of mental functioning. It was not clear, at this 
stage, whether year one children would talk about how they had worked out the 
problem, or whether they would understand the problem. 
The test was adapted from a computerised test by Estes, (1998), from whom 
permission was obtained. Four cards were produced. Each card bearing a 
pictogram of two monkeys. Each monkey has one arm in the air. On Card A both 
monkeys are standing upright with their right arms in the air. On Card B both 
monkeys have their left arm in the air, but the second monkey has been rotated to 
90°. On Card C the first monkey has his right arm raised and the second monkey 
his left arm, the second monkey has been rotated to 1201. On Card D the first 
monkey has his left arm raised and the second monkey his right arm raised. The 
second monkey has been rotated to 1800, (see chapter 6 page 225 for a copy of the 
test) 
Eight children were selected: three boys and five girls from two year one 
classrooms within the same school. The school was one in which much of the 
main CASE project pilot study was carried out and would not be used later in my 
study. The children were chosen on the basis of conservation and drawing test 
scores from the main project. Two children (interviews l and 2) had high score on 
both conservation and drawing; two children (interviews 3 and 4) had low scores 
on both conservation and drawing; four children (interviews 5,6,7 and 8) had 
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lower than average conservation scores, but higher than average drawing scores. 
The aim was to get as good a sample mix as possible with such limited numbers. 
2.1 Administration 
A scoring sheet was devised (see appendix 4.1), on which was given details of the 
individual child, age, sex, conservation and drawing test scores and then the 
questions I intended to ask. For each card the following initial question was 
asked: 
"Have the monkeys got the same arms in the air or different arms ?" 
Follow up questions were: 
"How did you do that ?" or "How did you work that out ?" 
"What was difficult about it ?" 
"What was easy about it ?" 
"Can you tell me what you said to yourself when you were doing it ?" 
"Can you tell me what things you thought about to help you do this ?" 
The children were informed of the research as outlined in ethics above. 
The tests were audio taped and fully transcribed. The original scoring method 
used symbols : 
Q to indicate a non-mental answer 
0 to indicate a general mental answer 
A to indicate a mental rotation answer 
(The categories are from Estes original test and are further elaborated in chapter 6) 
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In all cases my interest lay with the explanations rather than correct solution of the 
problem. There was no attempt made to correlate correct answers with 
explanations because each child was only given four cards to solve and so the 
probability of getting all four correct would be high. This is a limitation of 
adapting the test in this way. In asking the follow up questions I allowed myself to 
prompt further answers if none were forthcoming. 
2.2 Results 
Initial analysis of the data showed: 
Interviewees 2,3 and 5 gave total non-mental answers 
Interviewees 1,4, and 7 showed a greater amount of mental awareness, with 
interview 1 being the weakest. Yet all three needed prompts. 
Interviewees 6 and 8 showed most mental awareness, although neither got all the 
cards correct. Their conservation and drawing scores were also similar being 
below average on conservation and above average on drawing. 
2.2.1 Non-mental Answers 
Interviewee 2, Shamarl, tried to physically move the card around. She gave long 
descriptions of which way up the monkey was and what would happen if the cards 
were turned around. She physically turned backwards and forwards. She was 
unable to articulate her explanation, but seemed to have an awareness of the need 
to turn the monkeys around. Shamarl in common with interviewees 3 and 5 
maintained her non mental answers even when given very explicit prompts : 
114 
Researcher: "Did you have to say anything to yourself to work it out? " 
Shamarl: "Nn Nn " 
Researcher: "Did you have to think about it? " 
Shamarl: "No " 
Similarly, interviewee 3, Naomi also tried to turn the card around and she resisted 
prompts to give mental answers. Interestingly, at the end of the interview when 
asked: 
Researcher: "Which bit of you are you using to work this out? " 
Naomi replies: "hands" 
Using physical gestures to indicate turning was also used by other children who 
gave more general mental answers. 
2.2.2 Some mental awareness 
The interviewees, 1,4 and 7 showed a greater amount of mental awareness. In 
interview 4, Mohammed began with a confidence in left and right: 
Researcher: "How did you work that out? " 
Mohammed: "Because I know how to do it. Because I know, because he's doing 
his right hand down, he's doing his right hand up and left hand down and left 
hand up ". 
However, later in the interview as he physically rotated the card: 
Researcher: "When you put your fingers on you were sort of going this way round 
weren't you, what were you trying to do when you did that? " 
Mohammed: "Mmmm, I was trying to think how to do it" 
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Similarly interviewee 7, Luke, also gave this response: 
Researcher: "What are you doing to, figure it out? " 
Luke: "Trying to think of it" 
Whilst Luke maintained his thinking explanations with elaboration of "I think in 
my head" he still sought to physically manipulate the cards and when asked 
specifically about mental rotation: 
Researcher: "How could we turn him around without turning the card around ?" 
Luke: [Silence] 
Researcher: "Could you turn him around in your head ?" 
Luke: "No " 
In this category of answers interview 1 with George showed that he gave non- 
mental answers unless explicitly prompted, when prompted he picked up and 
repeated my language: 
Researcher: "Can you tell me what you thought about when you were doing this 
one? " 
George: `7 thought about. Well I was going to say that this one was the same but I 
changed my mind" 
Researcher: "You think it's different now? " 
George: "Because I thought that one is facing sideways and that one facing up" 
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However, when this prompt is removed, George reverted to non mental answers: 
Researcher: "How did you work that one out? " 
George: "Well, I saw that one down and this one up ": 
Researcher: "Did you do anything with the one that was facing down ? to show 
you that it had the same hand or different hand" 
George: "I just looked at the picture " 
Researcher: "Did you say anything to yourself when you were looking at the 
picture? " 
George: "No" 
Researcher: "Did you think anything? " 
George (No answer) 
2.2.3 More Mental Awareness 
Two interviewees: 6 and 8 were classed as having most mental awareness. 
Interview 6 with Sara showed that she immediately gave general mental answers: 
Sara: "That's what I think" 
Sara: "Yeah, you have to look at it and think" 
Sara: "Because I thinked about it quickly" 
Later on Sara expressed her difficulty in explaining: 
Researcher: `But you knew they had different hands in the air, how did you know 
that? " 
Sara: "Because. It's hard to say, but it's because if that was standing like that 
yeah " [indicating turning one monkeys the right way up] you would see that his 
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hand is down and his hand is up and his hand is up and his hand is down. Thai's 
why il 's different. 
Similarly Interview 8 with Cassandra begins with spontaneous general mental 
answers: 
Researcher: "How did you work that out? " 
Cassandra: "Because my brain told me " 
However, when pushed for further explanation she tries to describe: 
Researcher: "How did you work this one out? " 
Cassandra: "I tried. I tried. I tried and twisting and my [long pause] body helped 
me and my body told me that they were the same " 
Researcher: "Which part of your body told you? " 
Cassandra: "My head" 
Researcher: "Was there any other part of your body that told you? " 
Cassandra: "No " 
Researcher: "No? last time you said your brain told you last time, but this time.. " 
Cassandra: "this time my head helped me to turn them around. " 
3 HOW DID THIS INITIAL PHASE OF THE PILOT STUDY 
INFORM THE MAIN STUDY? 
Firstly, I confirmed that it was possible to use a mental rotation task to prompt 
children of this age to talk about solving problems and about thinking. The 
adaptation of the test from computer to card and the limited time available meant 
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that it would not be possible to correlate qualitative answers with performance. 
The test proved to be challenging and interesting for the children. The qualitative 
data showed a number of ways in which the children tried to explain their thinking 
whilst solving the problem and expressions of difficulty, in providing explanations 
from such young children, indicated that they were really trying to answer my 
questions. The test was easy to administer and provided good qualitative data. 
The scoring sheet was abandoned as a distraction from focussing on the children's 
answers and responding appropriately. 
Analysis of these results also indicated the ease with which children of this age can 
be led to give certain answers. Frequently my own use of particular words "I 
think", "do" were repeated in the child's answers. George's interview in particular 
points this up. When I speak of thinking so does George, when I don't, neither 
does George. Another factor in this analysis was the tendency for children to not 
only give non-mental explanations for their answers, but to go further and claim 
physical explanations, such as "my hands helped me" or "my body told me" or "I 
just looked". There appeared to be not just a lack of a logical explanation of how 
to solve the puzzle, but another type of explanation. It would be interesting to see 
if this was manifest in the main study and if it is a developmental trait, common 
only to the youngest children. 
In order to investigate this pattern further and to test other possible metacognitive 
factors a second phase of the pilot study was undertaken. 
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4 PRASE 2 
Two weeks later the same school was revisited. This time six children (3 boys and 
3 girls) were selected from a year 6 class (the last class of primary school before 
transfer to secondary school average age 10.3). The aim was to see what difference 
if any, the age difference would make to their answers and also to test the 
reliability of the test and the methods of categorical analysis. The children were 
chosen by their teacher to reflect a mixed attainment profile. 
Test/interviews were conducted individually with each child. These were 
conducted in the library, which is open plan and subject to background noise. 
Again the stimulus was the mental rotation cards, but this time the interviews were 
extended beyond explanations of mental rotation to encompass questions based on 
Flavell's model of metacognitive knowledge. It was explained to these 10 year old 
participants that I was trying to find out how younger children learn things and the 
differences between how six year olds and ten year olds solve problems. 
Two children, Lola and Jason were described by their teacher as high attainers; 
two others Nicky and Paven were described as middle attainers and the other two, 
Conrad and Kaysha were described as low attainers. The teacher commented on 
two individual students. Lola she claimed was of very high attainment compared 
to the rest of the class and Conrad was lower than the other low attainers in the 
class. 
120 
The interviews were coded for metacognitive knowledge, general awareness, 
awareness of others as cognitive beings and any description of knowledge or 
strategies being transferred from one domain to another. 
4.1 ANALYSIS 
All except Conrad gave specific mental rotation explanations for the test. Conrad 
gave a general mental explanation. 
4.1.1 Metacognitive knowledge - Person Variable 
All the children were aware of themselves as learners, but to different degrees of 
sophistication: 
Conrad was aware that he finds some things difficult to do and why that might be 
L. 18 Conrad: "sometimes its difcult " 
L. 38 Conrad: "It could be because its too hard and too long ... if its time it would 
probably be hard. 
L. 40 Conrad: "sometimes 1 know that 1 've forgotten it and it come back into my 
brain and I remember it" 
Conrad displays a view of himself as a learner at age 6 and a view of what-other 
six year olds might find difficult: 
Researcher: Do you think there was any difference between the way you used to 
think about things when you were six and the way you think about things now ? 
Conrad: No, I didn't used to think when I was six. 
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Researcher: "Do you think ifl gave this monkey problem to a six year old, they 
would have a way of working it out? " 
Conrad: "Yeah, if 'they think about it hard and if they pretend that that man is 
standing up and they put him sideways straight with each other " 
Jason had a similar view of himself at age six but knew that he had changed 
Jason: "Because I know now any time I think, I'm not wandering about, my head's 
always [unable to hear] .... the easiest, 
but when I was little and 1 used to think, 
actually I didn't use to think when I was little " 
Kaysha too was aware of herself as a learner and was specific about why she may 
find some things difficult: 
Kaysha: "i fl didn't know properly it would be because I haven't studied it or 1 
haven't been paying attention properly in class" 
She showed awareness of herself as a learner: 
"1 have a good memory ", "little things I can forget ", "1 know we studied it but I 
wouldn't quite remember how to do it" 
She was also able to reflect on how she was answering my questions whilst 
answering them: 
Researcher: "... how are you answering my questions about how you work things 
out? " 
Kayasha: "Im just thinking of what I've learnt in my past" 
Nicky was aware of the need to concentrate and use strategies 
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Nicky: "cos you have to picture in your head and ifyou picture it it's kind of hard 
to turn it around with your brain, you have to concentrate really hard then you 
will be able to do it" 
Asked about doing a difficult math or science problem : 
Nicky "I read the questions first and if I still don't understand it I read it over and 
over again until I understand it, ... if 
I get it wrong I'll ask the teacher to explain it 
properly to me so that I'll know the next time. " 
Lola described by her teacher as a high attainer, gave a sophisticated answer for 
her ability to do the rotation test: 
Lola: "1've done a lot of non verbal reasoning before" 
She showed awareness of her memory and how it works and how past learning can 
aid present problems, when asked about solving novel problems: 
Lola: "well 1 have to apply the things that I've learnt before to solve the problem, 
or if I can't apply any of the things then I'll have to ask the teacher " 
4.1.2 Strategies 
All the children were aware of strategies they used to help them. These included: 
"asking others ", "asking the teacher ", "thinking about it ", "remembering how to 
do it", Jason speaks of "backtracking ", "writing it down ", "working it out on 
paper " 
Paven spoke of 'find a way to make it look easier ", he mentioned using a drawing 
of a cake to work out fractions and writing things down. 
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Nicky emphasised reading the question until it's understood or looking back at 
notes taken in class. 
Lola suggested knowing the opposite of something can help: 
Lola: "well if] can use inverses, I could do the inverse of it to see and then do the 
inverse again to help me, so if I know the opposite of it it helps me to do that 
question " 
She also described turning the monkeys around in her head to see if they had the 
same hand in the air. 
Conrad gave a complicated multiplication strategy for x9 but it seemed very 
confusing and he admitted it only worked for x9 and not any other multiplication. 
Jason couched his answer to solving difficult or new problems in affective terms 
Jason: "well if it's a problem like someone's upset at first I always try to find out 
what's their problem and try to solve it" 
None of the other children interpreted the question in this way, but it would be 
interesting to find out if children use different methods for solving emotional 
problems compared to cognitive ones. 
4.1.3 Transfer 
Four of the children: Lola, Paven, Nicky and Kaysha described transferring 
learning from one domain to another: 
"it's like I do in science ", "I've done a lot of non verbal reasoning" "maths work 
and stuff like that helps" "when 1 do maths work to solve problems you have to use 
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your imagination or story writing you could use your imagination and turn things 
around" "most of the things I do are similar to the things I've done hef ore " 
5 HOW DID PHASE It OF THE PILOT STUDY INFORM THE 
MAIN STUDY? 
The qualitative analysis of data gathered during this phase showed clearly a 
developmental factor in children's ability to explain their own thinking. By the 
age of ten all the children in this sample could explain how they solved problems 
and what strategies were available to them. In general they said that they were 
aware that they had developed their thinking skills over time and they could 
describe the difference between being six and being ten years old. They were able 
to talk about problems they had solved in other areas and how they had used their 
memory and memory aids. They showed a knowledge of how their own mind 
works and the importance of concentration and attention. All the children 
performed well on the mental rotation task. This is in line with Estes' results, thus 
giving the task a degree of reliability. Only Conrad failed to rotate the cards and 
to provide specific mental rotation explanations. Phase II also indicated another 
area of study: that of emotional problem solving in comparison to cognitive 
problem solving. This is an area that the main study would not seek to- investigate, 
but it would be an interesting comparison. 
Following these interviews, an informal conversation with the class teacher 
inadvertently suggested issues that might be addressed in the teacher interviews. 
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The teacher had been these children's class teacher the year before. In year 5 she 
told me, the whole class had taken part in a "Thinking Skills" programme, which 
had lasted two terms. When I asked her more about this she appeared vague, not 
recalling the name or author of the programme, but stating that she had a book 
about it in her room. I asked if it had had any effect. She said she hadn't seen any 
improvement in the children "especially no improvement in thinking". I asked if 
she continued to use the thinking skills methods in her class. She said there was 
no time now "the curriculum is too bitty". She thought she sometimes involved 
thinking skills in PSI lessons (personal and social issues). Her concluding remark 
about her class was "Some don't seem to think at all". She indicated that the non 
thinkers were the lowest attainers "like Conrad". My own experience having just 
interviewed six of her class was obviously different. In direct conversation they 
had all explained their thinking, displaying various degrees of metacognitive 
processing across different factors. In wondering why our conclusions differed so 
markedly I began to question the influence of the teacher's own knowledge of and 
attitude towards developing metacognition in children. This would later help me 
to formulate questions for the teacher interviews and direct some aspects of the 
classroom observations. These aspects of the main study were worked out further 
during phase III of the pilot study. 
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6 PHASE 3 
Four months later, in the summer term the same school was revisited. Three 
children from Phase I, Shamarl, George and Sara were tested on four 
metacognitive factors. The four tests were: 
1. Mental Rotation [monkeys] 
2: Theory of Mind [smarties] 
3. Self as Learner [blocks] 
4. Metamemory [toys] 
The mental rotation task has already been explained. The second task was the 
classic theory of mind/false belief task using a smartie tube. In this test the 
interviewer first shows the child a smartie tube and asks "what do you think is 
inside? " The child usually answers smarties or sweets. The interviewer then 
shows the child that the tube really contains crayons. The crayons are placed back 
in the tube and the child asked "now if your friend was to come in and I asked 
her/him what was in the tube what would s/he say? " If the child shows that they 
are aware that the friend has no real knowledge of what is in the tube and therefore 
will infer from the packaging that it contains sweets, the child is said to display a 
theory of mind, (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). The third test consisted of asking the 
child to count five blocks and then asking them how they had learnt that and if 
they had always known how to count or if there was a time when they couldn't 
count. The fourth test involved remembering up to sixteen related toys once they 
had been covered up and then explaining how they had remembered them. 
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In phase 3 there was a slight difference in performance on the mental rotation task 
compared to phase 1. This time Shamarl gave more general mental answers than 
before, but George, unprompted, remained with non-mental answers and did not 
change. All three children succeeded on the theory of mind test. This is in line 
with the literature where most children pass this test by the age of four. The self as 
learner test showed that all the children were able to talk about themselves as 
learners and gave various explanations of how they had learned to count such as 
"my mum taught me", "learnt in nursery", "learnt from poster on bedroom wall". 
The metamemory test provided rich data with the children describing strategies 
they use for remembering, such as making stories out of the objects, naming the 
objects out loud or to self, and knowing that they had forgotten some of them. 
During phase 3, four classroom observations were carried out. Two were CASE 
lessons being trialed in the school and the other two were numeracy lessons. The 
aim as observer was to be as non-participatory as possible. Initially a contact 
summary form was used for each observation. The form included the following 
headings: 
time and date of lesson, start and end times, description of classroom 
environment, perceived atmosphere of class (eg. quiet, noisy, ordered etc. ) 
2. details of teacher, length of service, style (eg. asking questions of whole group 
or of specific children), how discipline is maintained. 
3. Summary of lesson content 
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4. Any obvious examples of metacognitive behaviour 
5. Particular aspects of CASE lesson eg. concrete preparation 
6. New questions, places to look, thoughts and perceptions 
The observations were also audio taped using a microphone placed in the centre of 
the table during the CASE lesson or as close as possible to the class during whole 
class teaching, as in the numeracy lesson. One lesson was also video taped, 
although video was later dropped as a method, as it was thought to be too intrusive 
and a distraction from closer listening and note taking. The audio tapes were 
transcribed. 
Informal chats with the teachers were also included, where this was relevant to 
metacognition. 
In addition, an interview schedule for teachers was piloted, during this phase, with 
two teachers, who would not be involved in the main study. The questions 
covered details of teaching experience, details of teacher training related to 
theories of metacognition, teachers' perceptions of their own teaching style, their 
thoughts, beliefs and knowledge of metacognitive theory and the teacher's own 
metacognitive development. The teacher was also asked to comment on the 
interview questions and the experience of being interviewed. The interviews were 
audio taped and transcribed. In one case the transcribed interview was given back 
to the teacher for comments. Field notes were taken at the time of the interviews 
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regarding my first impressions of how the interview had gone and other factors 
regarding my performance as interviewer along with my perceptions of how the 
teacher was perceiving me. 
(Further discussion of factors pertinent to classroom observations and teacher 
interviews is found in chapters 7 and 9) 
7 HOW DID PHASE III OF TIIE PILOT STUDY INFORM THE 
MAIN STUDY? 
Repeating the mental rotation test and adding the other tests allowed me to 
formulate future questions and to be aware of the effects of leading questions. The 
four tests proved to be reliable in prompting children to talk about thinking. The 
false belief test (Smartie tube), as predicted by the literature, resulted in all the 
children of this age group providing theory of mind answers. Whilst a theory of 
mind test is important for a study of metacognition, it seemed that the false belief 
test would not be adequate as a sole test of this aspect. A return to the literature 
found a theory of an interpretative theory of mind developed by Carpendale and 
Chandler, which appeared to allow for developmental discrimination at this age, 
(Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). Although this new test was not ready-for the pre- 
testing phase in September 1999, it was incorporated into the post tests in July 
2000. Further discussion, description of the test and results can be found in 
chapter 6. Phase 3 of the pilot study also determined the order in which the tests 
would be administered. 
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The final order was: 
Test 1: Self as Learner 
Test 2: Theory of mind (Smarties in September; Treasure chest and Interpretative 
test in July) 
Test 3: Metamemory 
Test 4: Mental Rotation 
The order meant that the tests began with the easiest, and ended with the most 
difficult. The pilot study had shown that the metamemory test was the one most 
enjoyed by the children, as it involved lots of little toys, and placing it third both 
kept their enthusiasm going and provided some fun. 
Undertaking a pilot study was particularly necessary for this project, as once the 
experimental year began, it would be very difficult to change any of the methods 
used, since all data would have to be gathered during this one academic year. 
During the year, as I reflected on the data gathered, codings and analyses were 
further developed. The pilot study allowed me to develop coding systems for the 
pre- and post tests used and for the classroom observations. Whilst the tests were 
originally only coded for categories of metacognitive processing in order to show 
change between pre- and post test results, during the experimental year I found 
that this method alone was leaving out a great richness of data. A return to the 
literature, in this case to philosophy, found a method of analysing such rich data 
using a phenomenological approach. This approach was used in the final analysis 
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along with the more quantitative analysis. The precise method used and its 
theoretical underpinnings are described in chapter 5. 
8 CLASSROOM OBSERVATIONS 
Initial coding for the classroom observations was done using an open coding 
method, distinguishing instances relating to the six CASE pillars and other aspects 
of classroom behaviour. Transcripts of audio taped observations integrated with 
field notes were coded as follows: 
8.1 PILOT OBSERVATION CODINGS 
Setting 
Sat around table - child, teacher same 
46 cc 66 cc 44 different 
Children standing, teacher same 
" 44 11 different 
All on carpet 
In normal classroom 
Separate room 









i, ii, iii etc 
x, y, z 
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CONCRETE PREPARATION 
Children allowed to touch & talk about things 
Children not allowed to play with materials 
All teacher questions relating to nature of materials 
All child-teacher interactions relating to comprehension of materials 
All child-child interactions exchanging knowledge about materials and strategies 
Teacher gives information about materials 
Teacher asks for ideas about what do with materials 
Teacher gives orders about what do with materials 
COLLABORATIVE WORKING 
All refs by teacher about working as a group 
All refs by child about working as a group 
Child-child comprehension questions 
COGNITIVE CONFLICT 
All refs by child to puzzlement 
All refs showing teacher asking for evidence - how/why questions 




Child-child interactions with ref to each other's ideas to resolve conflict 
Teacher-child refer to ideas of different children 
Child refers to past experience 
Child refers to past knowledge 
Teacher questions to elicit understanding 
METACOGNITION 
Child reflects on ease/difficulty of task 
Child shows general mental awareness use of I think etc. 
Child refers to own use of rules/strategies 
Teacher specific intervention to elicit above 
BRIDGING/TRANSFER 
All refs by child to similar/other activities 
Teacher attempts to promote bridging 
DISCIPLINE 
All refs to teacher-child discipline 
All refs to child-child discipline 
Teacher gives praise statements 
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Child-child praise statements 
8.2 REVIEWING THE CODING SCHEME 
However, whilst initially useful as a method of examining the complex nature of 
the classroom interactions, it soon became clear that attempting to analyse such 
vast amounts of data was in danger of obscuring the instances of metacognitive 
processing that I was attempting to find. Later and during the experimental year a 
more focussed coding system was developed, based upon metacognitive theory for 
the children's interactions and a grounded theory approach for the teacher 
interactions. As this project has a theoretical base in the model of metacognition 
described by Flavell, this was used as a way of searching the transcripts for 
children's behaviours that could be coded as metacognitive in line with this theory. 
When a behaviour was found the teacher interactions surrounding it were coded to 
form descriptive categories of their behaviour. The coding systems are explained 
and analyses given in chapter 7. In this way the classroom observations 
emphasised the metacognitive instances seen, rather than trying to analyse the 
multitude of interactions present in a year one classroom. 
9 TEACHER INTERVIEWS 
The two pilot interviews undertaken in Phase 3 allowed me to formulate the 
questions to be asked. At this stage the interview schedule was quite structured. It 
focussed on the teacher's own knowledge of theories of metacognition; her 
opinion of its usefulness for learning; any examples of children being 
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metacognitive; any strategies used to facilitate its development; any personal 
experience of the role of metacognition in her own life and her opinion of whether 
metacognition could, in fact, be taught. It was obvious from the pilot interviews 
that I would need to explain my theory of metacognition before I could elicit 
answers to these questions. The pilot interviews went well. I appeared to establish 
a rapport with the teacher and they provided thoughtful answers. However, an 
initial analysis showed that the teachers were concerned with other aspects of 
teaching and learning and often veered the conversation away from metacognition 
onto their own more pressing concerns, one in particular being the effects of the 
National Curriculum on their teaching. The problem was then how to keep the 
questions focussed on my research area, without closing down the interaction. The 
first interviews for the main study were undertaken using much the same schedule 
as for the pilot interviews. However, during the experimental year I began to have 
doubts about the method I was using and a return to the literature provided me 
with a more theoretical base for the post intervention interviews carried out in July 
2000. The full story of how the interviewing technique developed and analysis of 
both pre- and post intervention year interviews with the eight teachers involved is 
covered in chapter 9 
One limitation of the main research study, was that teachers had to be interviewed 
when access was allowed by the CASE project. This meant that in July 2000 all 
three control school teachers had to be interviewed on the same day, whilst they 
were released from school for a CASE professional development day. This was 
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hardly ideal, as some teachers also had to be interviewed on the same day by other 
researchers on the CASE project. However, they all engaged in the interview 
process fully and the data gathered was both rich and rewarding for this research 
project. The teacher interviews also provided the data relevant to research 
question. 
4: What factors associated with teachers impact on the development of 
metacognition in year one classrooms? 
10 SUMMARY 
By the beginning of the experimental year, September 1999, the pilot study had 
allowed me to design the research project. This would consist of a quasi- 
experimental approach using pre- and post intervention tests on four metacognitive 
factors, with twenty-four children from the experimental schools and eighteen 
children from the control school. This approach would be supplemented by 
triangulation with classroom observations and information about the teachers from 
interviews at the beginning and end of the year. 
During the classroom observation period, I began to focus on individual children 
and decided to incorporate a small case study element into the main project. The 
aim of this, was to try and track the development of metacognition in three 
individual children. Although gathering data in one chunk over a year can be a 
limiting factor on the research, it was necessary and possible during the year, to 
reflect on the process and change some aspects. In this way, the research methods 
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developed in response to the data gathered. Further discussion of particular 
aspects of the methods used and analysis of data is provided in future chapters. 
This chapter has explained how the pilot project influenced the design of the main 
project. A particularly significant aspect of this research is an attempt to describe 
what metacognition is for children of this age. In order to do this a 
phenomenological approach was taken to the interview data from the four tests of 
metacognition. This method is outlined and discussed in the next chapter before 
the results of it are given in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5 
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO 
METACOGNITION 
I INTRODUCTION 
The research design and methodology as described in chapter 3 has a quasi- 
experimental approach. This is partly a result of the relationship between this 
research project and the main CASE@KS 1 project. One aspect of this research is 
to evaluate CASE@KS1 in terms of its ability to facilitate metacognition in year 
one children. As a result, the project is designed with an element of measurement 
of metacognitive development and a consideration of all the problems seeking to 
measure this entails. However, this aspect of the research, although it shapes the 
way data is collected, is not the most important aspect. Throughout the research 
and overriding all the research questions is the fundamental question of what is 
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metacognition for children of this age. As chapter 2 pointed out, theoretically 
there is debate as to whether it is possible for children of this age to display 
metacognition, or whether this is only possible with the onset of formal 
operational thought, as Piaget suggested, (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). There is also, 
connected to this, the philosophical problem of whether metacognition is a 
cognitive psychological model, designed to aid our understanding of complex 
thought processes, or a phenomenological reality, which can be experienced by all 
adults and possibly children. For the sake of this research project metacognition 
was broken down into constituents, which were then tested and measured, (see 
chapter 6). Whilst these four areas (metamemory, theory of mind, self as learner 
and mental rotation) were measured with pre- and post- tests, the tests took the 
form of small interviews with the children, seeking their explanations for their 
thinking, rather than measuring reaction times or error detection. As a result, the 
data collected are qualitative in nature and are then coded to produce quantitative 
scores. However, these quantitative scores reduce the richness of the qualitative 
data. A particularly important aspect that is omitted, is the opportunity to 
interrogate these data to seek an understanding of what meaning the children make 
of the questions. These questions asked them to reflect on their cognitive 
processing and it is important to investigate what their answers mean in terms of 
knowledge of, and understanding of, their own cognition. The aim of the analysis 
of the qualitative data from these tests is to get closer to the children's own 
experience of being metacognitive. In order to do this, a particular analytic 
method is used, which takes a phenomenological approach to the data. The 
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method is based on the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and was pioneered 
as a research method in psychology during the 1970s by psychologists at 
Duquesne University, most notably Wertz and Giorgi (Giorgi, 1985; Wertz, 1983) 
This chapter will explain the theoretical and philosophical foundation for this 
approach and then go on to give a worked example of Wertz's method using some 
of the data from the metamemory test. The full analysis of these tests both 
quantitative and qualitative is given in chapter 6. 
2 PHENOMENOLOGY AND METACOGNITION 
As discussed in chapter 2, this project takes the view that true metacognition must 
be conscious or at least available to consciousness. (Brown, 1987, Baker, 1994). It 
is acknowledged that some monitoring and control aspects of metacognition can 
become automatic, but since these were once conscious they could with effort be 
brought back to our conscious awareness, even though this may have less than 
positive effects. In exploring the development of metacognition in children, we 
are exploring their expanding consciousness. The debates surrounding the 
investigation of consciousness are beyond the scope of this thesis, but one aspect 
of the debate is particularly significant. 
Whilst scientists, psychologists and philosophers debate the nature of 
consciousness and how it relates to the brain, it remains that from a first person 
perspective we experience consciousness as affecting our lives and development. 
141 
In terms of child development theory, there is a consensus view that conscious 
experience of the world affects development and can shape lives and we aim to 
protect children from traumatic experiences for just that reason. From a third 
person observer's point of view it may not be apparent what effect the experience 
is having on the person. Similarly, a first person account of an experience omits 
other information available only to an observer. It seems appropriate that an 
exploration of children's metacognition should attempt to use methods which take 
account of both the child's own reports of their conscious experience of 
metacognition and the observer's interpretation of that experience. To concentrate 
on one perspective at the expense of the other would give only a partial account as 
Max Velmans has argued: 
"Information processing models and other third-person perspective 
models are incomplete in so far as they do not encompass the subject's 
first-person perspective. Conversely, a subject's first person account 
of his actions (based on what he experiences) is incomplete in so far 
as it does not encompass information available to an external observer. 
In this sense, first person and third person perspectives are 
complementary and mutually irreducible. A complete psychology 
requires both. (Velmans, 1991)p. 705 
First person methodologies in psychology have been criticised for their 
subjectivity, their lack of validity and reliability. However, Varela and Shear have 
addressed these issues by suggesting that: 
"exploring first person accounts is not the same as claiming that 
first person accounts have some kind of privileged access to 
experience" (Varela & Shear, 1999)p. 4 
and that 
"The apparent familiarity we have with subjective life must 
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give way in favour of the careful examination of what it is that 
we can and cannot have access to, and how this distinction is 
not rigid but variable" (Varela & Shear, 1999)p. 4 
We must be careful then, to adopt methods of analysis that take account of an 
attempt to bracket out our own feelings of familiarity with the experience, in order 
to attempt to describe the experience more fully and accurately. Varela and Shear 
have made an important distinction between introspective psychology, which uses 
first person accounts and phenomenology. 
"The psychologist is motivated by research, seeks protocols and 
objects that can be isolated in the laboratory and also to establish 
empirical results that can be linked to neural correlates. The 
phenomenologist is interested in the same mental content in order 
to explore their broader meaning and place in ordinary human areas 
such as temporality, intersubjectivity and language". 
(Varela & Shear, 1999)p. 8 
This project seeks to explore the development of metacognition over one year, in 
young children engaged in many social and cultural experiences. The data 
collected are largely verbal and the exploration of metacognitive development 
relies upon analysis of the children's communication. It seems appropriate then, 
that for this part of the project, which attempts to understand how five-year-olds 
experience their own thinking, a phenomenological perspective may give valuable 
insight. 
The initial search for a method of exploring the meaning of the interview data 
collected from the children during the administration of the four tests, (see 
chapters 4 and 6) led away from cognitive psychology models and towards a focus 
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on developmental psychology. Whilst Piaget suggested that children of this age 
would be unable to reflect on their own cognition, developmental psychologists 
have since shown the extent to which, even young children, can access and talk 
about their own mental states, (Flavell, 2000; Kontos, 1983; Markman, 1979; 
Moss, 1990; Pramling, 1988; Siegler, 1996; Wertsch, 1978). Yet none of these 
studies has sought to describe what this is like for the child, in terms of the child's 
own language. A search through philosophy suggested that the phenomenology of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty might shed some light on the children's experience of 
being metacognitive. 
Merleau-Ponty sought to describe some of the mental phenomena that appeared 
psychopathological in terms of the known science of psychological processes. In 
particular, he uses a method of bracketing the known and theoretical basis for 
perception, in order to explore the experience of synaesthasia (where for instance, 
colours are experienced as sounds or shapes as tastes). His concern is to return to 
the experience itself and to understand it in terms of the individual who embodies 
it 
"Our task will be, moreover, to rediscover phenomena, the layer 
of living experience through which other people and things are first 
given to us, the system of `Self-others-things' as it comes into being 
to reawaken perception and foil its trick of allowing us to forget it 
as a fact and as perception in the interest of the object which it 
presents to us and of the rational tradition to which it gives rise. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962 p. 57) 
This focus on the self and the self's experiences, without regard for the theory of 
what something should be like, seemed to suggest a way forward for exploring the 
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children's experience of different metacognitive factors, without overlayering their 
voices with theories of metacognition from either developmental or cognitive 
psychology. Obviously, the theory of metacognition is an adult construct of a 
phenomenal experience, which may or may not be experienced by children of this 
age. It is important to listen to the children's account of their experiences when 
asked to reflect upon their own thinking. Merleau-Ponty suggested that to return 
to things themselves, is to return to a world that precedes knowledge, 
"of which knowledge always speaks and in relation to which every 
scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language" 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962 p. 9) 
As Simms suggested: 
"For the researcher to understand the world as it is constructed 
and lived by the child requires a suspension of our adult 
perceptions of what reality is" (Simms, 2001 p. 7) 
In this project however, the initial bracketing of this adult perception and 
knowledge of the theory of metacognition is later removed, in order to 
acknowledge the researcher's perspective on interpreting the children's 
experiences. This is not a naturalistic phenomenology, but one that seeks to 
combine first person and third person narratives to form a rich description of what 
it is to be metacognitive at this age and to explore how children of this age relate 
their cognitive processing. 
The phenomenological approach of Merleau-Ponty is particularly pertinent to this 
project, because Merleau-Ponty developed a critique of Piaget's genetic 
epistemology, and sought to restore the authentic experience of the child to the 
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rational logo-centric developmental model of Piaget. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964a). For 
this project, the children are on the cusp of pre-operational and concrete 
operational thought and thus it seems entirely appropriate that Merleau-Ponty's 
view of the young child as different from, but not less authentic than the older 
child, should inform this part of the research. For Merleau-Ponty the child's 
development is one of "embracing crises and regression and is not merely 
optimistically oriented towards the growth of rationality" (Meyer-Drawe, 
1986)p. 269. Furthermore, he views the achievement of the logical rational 
perspective characterised by formal operational thought as also involving a loss of 
a multi-perspectival world. Instead, Merleau-Ponty views rationality as a process 
of structuring the world in a meaningful way. In this sense, the explanations of the 
young child are not irrational, but are explanations of how they are making sense 
of their lived experience. For this reason, it is important to find a method of 
analysis, which will privilege these explanations. The aim is to see the 
explanations for what they are and what they say about metacognition. A method 
of phenomenological analysis was sought that would allow the children's 
experiences to emerge, without a conscious or sub-conscious comparison to a fully 
developed metacognition, influencing the analysis. 
3 METHOD 
Phenomenological method, by its very nature, differs depending on the particular 
type of phenomenon to be explored. Phenomenologists take the view that every 
new study is a starting over, where a different set of procedures may need to be 
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followed. Phenomenology also differs from other descriptive approaches such as 
ethnography, grounded theory and hermeneutics. Briefly the main differences are 
that ethnography involves direct observation of the individual or more usually 
group, and participation with some of the group's activities. Ethnography involves 
different perspectives and a separation of description from the interpretation. 
Similarly, grounded theory involves the study of relationships between elements of 
experience, how they compare and contrast, in order to build a theory. Grounded 
theory takes account of both the data and gaps in the data and recognises the 
importance of context and social structure. Hermeneutics is probably closer than 
either of the above to the phenomenological approach, since it focuses on 
consciousness and experience. However, the main difference is that the pure 
hermeneutic approach seeks to unmask what is hidden behind the text. It tends to 
be concerned with the relationship between author, text and reader. It goes further 
than phenomenology in its attempts to interpret a text and takes account of 
historical and contextual sources. Hermeneutics has also criticised the 
phenomenological approach, suggesting that exploring experience with any 
method will distort or even create what you experience, (Varela & Shear, 1999). 
This is, of course, the problem with any analysis of data and there is no reason to 
think that it is more of a problem with a phenomenological analysis than with any 
other. Whilst the phenomenologist attempts to describe the experience as it is, this 
is always done through one lens or another, as Gallagher has pointed out. 
(Gallagher, 2000). 
147 
In this project, the lens is that of developmental psychology and as Varela 
suggested: 
"To be sure, the exploration of experience will suffer along with 
all other methodical investigations from cultural expectations and 
instrumental bias, but there is no evidence that the phenomenal 
data gathered are not equally constrained by the proper reality of 
conscious contents. Thus whatever descriptions we can produce 
through first-person methods are not pure, solid `facts' but 
potentially valid intersubjective items of knowledge, quasi-objects 
of a mental sort. No more, no less. "(Varela & Shear, 1999) p. 22 
Within the phenomenological movement there are different methods and 
procedures for approaching data. The method used here is one pioneered by A. 
Giorgi at Duquesne University in the 1970s. It is described by Wertz (Wertz, 
1983) and is used here because it works with everyday speech communication 
about a phenomenon and seeks a "psychological description" of that phenomenon. 
It also allows for different individual experiences to be combined into a group 
description. This seemed particularly appropriate for this part of this project, since 
the emphasis here, is on describing and thereby understanding what children 
describe and understand about their own thinking. The aim was not to focus on 
individual differences between the children, but to integrate their experiences into 
a composite description. 
As Wertz points out: 
"psychological reflection and sense does not arise on a groundless 
base or come out of nowhere. Its point of departure is the 
description in everyday language of an event in the lifeworld" 
(Wertz, 1983)p. 199. 
For this project, the event to be described, is the children's explanations of how 
they had done the four tests of metacognition. In the example below, the test data 
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comes from an interview, following the metamemory test with one child, 
(Charlotte) from School C. It was from initial readings of the interviews, 
following this test, that I first became aware of the need for a different method of 
analysis from a thematic or grounded approach. Specifically, through reading and 
re-reading these interviews, I became aware that whilst I was asking children 
about how they had done the memory task, they were often replying with 
descriptions and explanations of how they remember things. It became necessary 
then, to find a method, which would privilege these descriptions and work with 
them, rather than re-interpreting or re-constructing them into a theory of 
metamemory. Thus the data speaks of "remembering" and "memory" rather than 
metamemory, but by its nature, it is a child's reflection on her own cognition. 
3.1 STEPS OF THE METHOD 
The method used and as described by A. Giorgi, consists of four essential 
steps. (Giorgi, 1975) The following describes these steps and includes the 
explications of the method developed by Wertz (Wertz, 1983): 
Step 1 
The entire description is read to get a sense of the whole. 
This is not as self-explanatory as it at first seems. Wertz points out that the basic 
stance or attitude of the researcher, during this reading process, is important. He 
suggests we should aim to empathise with the description before us: 
"We cannot be spectators but must experience the joys and pains 
of our subjects in full detail and in our very depths if we are to 
faithfully know them". (Wertz, 1983)p. 204 
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This includes using the description and language used to imaginatively place 
oneself in the position of the respondent. It also involves slowing down and 
dwelling on the description, not assuming that the meaning is clear, but allowing 
the sense of the words to emerge in relation to each other. By slowing down and 
focussing on the details, the details become more important. 
"When we stop and linger with something its significance becomes 
magnified or amplified. What to the subject or `naive' reader seems 
like a little thing becomes a big deal to the researcher. The researcher 
transcends the mundaneity of the subject's situation. " 
(Wertz, 1983)p. 205. 
Step 2 
The reader becomes aware of the individual's meanings. 
The researcher must be interested in the way the situation appears to the 
individual, rather than its distance from the researcher's theoretical view point or 
any comparison with another perspective. In this step, the language of the 
individual is not changed, but units of meaning are discriminated and taken as a 
description of the phenomenon, (in this case `remembering'). As Giorgi points out 
this assumes that psychological reality is not ready made in the world, but is 
constructed by the psychologist. The meaning units are discriminated through a 
psychological lens and thus the analysis is only one aspect of a much more 
complex reality. 
Giorgi points out that whilst consensus between researchers can be pursued at this 
stage, this is not an intrinsic demand of the method. There is always an open 
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endedness to the process. Different sorts of analysis eg. textual, literary, would 
lead to looking at the text in a different way. These meaning units, whilst 
discriminated from the whole description, are still context laden. They mark out 
the boundaries of the phenomenon as given by that individual. Thus, through the 
discrimination of meaning units, the researcher is aware of the phenomenon as 
different from any other phenomenon. 
Step 3 
The language of the meaning units is transformed into psychological 
language. 
The transformation of the language of the meaning units into psychological 
language is achieved through a process of reflection and "imaginative variation". 
The researcher must ask "how am I understanding this phenomenon, such that this 
statement reveals it? " or "what does this statement reveal about the phenomenon? " 
(Wertz, 1983), p. 207. It is necessary to reflect upon the discriminated meaning 
units and to include or discard the different possibilities that the meaning units 
present. Wertz pointed out that the description itself is not the ultimate object of 
reflection, "reflection ultimately addresses the subject's participation in the 
network of immanent significations, which make up his lived reality. " [ibid. 
p. 207]. Thus whilst the researcher reflects on the description of remcmbering, the 
ultimate aim of this reflection is to focus on the individual child's experience of 
remembering. The reflection should then be of the relationship between the 
individual and the description. 
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Step 4 
A consistent and specific description of the phenomenon is made. 
This consistent and specific description is made by synthesising the transferred 
meaning units. The reflection has involved a reflection on how the meaning units 
are related. This may be in terms of a relationship to the whole phenomenon or a 
relationship temporally or spatially. In making this synthesised description, the 
transformed meaning units are related. The researcher looks for unity and 
consistency and asks whether all the constituents now included in the synthesis are 
in fact necessary in terms of describing that individual's experience of the 
phenomenon. For instance the fact that Charlotte relates remembering things that 
happened a long time ago on the number 99 bus, is a necessary constituent of her 
experience of remembering, however, the number 99 bus is not, except as an 
example of this long term memory in process. 
Steps 3 and 4 involve the transformation of language, from the individual's natural 
description, to the researcher's psychological language. Wertz points out: 
"The transformation into psychological language is not a mere 
translation into or replacement with the abstract, sedimented terms 
of psychology. What is involved here is original speaking on the 
part of the researcher. As the speaking originates from the researcher's 
own contact with the case, it is highly personal and specific to the-case; 
the researcher speaks his reflection with his context of knowledge 
as he encounters the psychology of the case" (Wertz, 1983)p. 210. 
The aim is for the specific description constituted from the transformed meaning 
units to be consistent with the original description. Thus the researcher must ask if 
all elements in the specific description can be traced back to the original and if all 
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elements of the original are present in the specific description. Giorgi makes the 
point that these psychological descriptions can be expressed at different levels. 
Thus the specific description becomes the focus of the researcher's reflection in 
order to make a second level, or general description. This general description 
again relates to the original and the specific description, but is abstracted at 
another level through the researcher's transformative reflection. The 
transformation of the individual to the general descriptive level, is not the same as 
the transformation between steps 2 and 3. In the latter, the movement is from 
everyday description to psychological description, whilst the transformation from 
individual to general description takes place wholly within this psychological 
frame. The general description is an attempt to describe what is common about 
the phenomenon to other cases. Wertz explains this as the structure of the 
psychological description of the phenomenon, which by its nature is no longer 
limited to the individual case. 
"Structure is a term of knowledge differentiated as such from the 
original individual's living from which it was extracted". [p. 228] 
Thus the general descriptions show how the individual descriptions are applicable 
beyond the original individual. However, this is not to say that they are true of all 
individuals. 
As more than one child is involved in giving their explanations of remembering in 
this case, the general descriptions of remembering made for each individual child 
are combined to form a composite general psychological structure of 
remembering. 
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A worked example of this phenomenological approach using the qualitative data 
from one interview following the memory test follows. 
3.2 A WORKED EXAMPLE 
Charlotte (f)(Age 5yrs 8mths) School C 
Memory Test 
(post test data) 
(For explanation of test and materials used see chapters 3 and 61 
3.2.1 The Raw Data 
JR= Researcher; C=Charlotte] 
1. R: [Goes through objects with child explains test] [Charlotte describes each 
object as she names them eg. this is a shark that catches its prey in the water 
etc] 
2. Observation: [Makes characters out of objects and talks for them, plays 
especially with necklace. Touches each. Makes a story out of all objects] 
3. C: Leaf, and the leaf is very special because when its autumn the leaves fall 
down 
4. R: OK tell me the ones you can remember 
5. C: I can remember the pirate that sails ships and boats, and I can remember 
lots of things I could remember the butterfly it has different kinds of colours 
and I can remember the snail that moves very slowly and I can remember the 
snake that hunts for his or her prey, I can remember the fish that swims around 
and lives under the sea and the shark and I can remember the shell that is 
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somewhere that lives under the sea that's just like floating on the sea, it doesn't 
really float it sinks and I could remember the insect he crawls around 
somewhere, I can remember the flag, that's all, and the necklace I can 
remember, and parrot 
6. R: When I gave you a little time to remember them what did you do to 
remember them 
7. C: Because everytime my Dad tells me to remember things I still remember it 
and you know something that happened on the 99 a long time ago and I still 
remember it 
8. R: But how did you remember these objects what did you do to remember 
them 
9. C: I remembered them by remembering my memory and playing with them so 
that I could hear them so I could remember them so much 
10. R: OK so if somebody else wanted to remember as many as you had done 
what would you tell them to do 
11. C: Remember their memory and if they can't they just have to try their best to 
remember 
12. R: So 
13. C: If they can't remember their one or two or ABC like they say ABD like 
they forgot C and they try to do it over again and they have to use their 
memory 
14. R: Right is there anything they could do to help them remember it 
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15. C: To look at them very carefully and see like that's an insect, that's a spider, 
that's a snail 
16. R: And which bit of you does the remembering 
17. C: Memory 
18. R: And where's your memory 
19. C: My memory is in my brain 
20. R: And any idea how it remembers things 
21. C: It's because I was trying on the necklace and I remember the necklace I 
was playing with the pirate and the parrot and I was playing with the slug and 
the fish and like the necklace was a chain to stop the shark eating all the fishes, 
that's how I remember 
22. R: So was it easy to do or was it difficult 
23. C: It was just a little difficult 
24. R: What was difficult about it 
25. C: To remember all those things was a little hard 
26. R: How could I have made it easier 
27 C: If you just had like a little bit like one or 4, just a little bit. 
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Stage 2 
All constituents present in C's 
description 
1) C- describes each object as she 
names them - "this is a shark that 
catches its prey in the water", "this is 
the frog that hops", "this is the beautiful 
butterfly". She also picks each one up 
and looks at it before describing it. 
Stage 3 
Constituents of description expressed 
in terms revelatory of remembering 
1) C- engages with the objects, she feels 
them and describes them. She 
verbalises her thoughts about each 
object. 
2) During observations period C turns 12) C- turns R's memory game into a 
each object into a character. She I story. She makes her own game and 
touches them and makes a story out of I expresses fun, curiosity and excitement. 
them. She tries the necklace on, taking 
great care. 
3) C- singles out a leaf as a special 13) C- relates specialness of leaf to 
thing "leaf is very special because when I autumn. She expresses her remembered 
it's autumn the leaves fall down. " I knowledge that leaves fall down in 
autumn. 
4) C- lists the items she can remember 14) C- goes further than listing items. 
using "I can remember" at start of each I She places herself at the beginning of 
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one and using some of the descriptions I each object. She refers to her 
she used in 1) above. Sometimes she I knowledge of her own memory "I can 
elaborates on a description. "I can 
remember the shell that is somewhere 
remember lots of things". She plays 
with the initial descriptions, elaborating 
that lives under the sea that's just like I and adding information from stored 
floating on the sea, it doesn't float it 
sinks". 
knowledge about the properties of a 
shell. 
1 5) C- refers to her Dad, "everytime my 15) C- refers to parental figure as a 
Dad tells me to remember things I still I function of her memory. 
remember it". 
6) C- remembers things that happened a 16) C- displays long term memory. This 
long time ago on the 99. 
7) C- "I remembered them by 
is rooted in being present at the time of 
the event. 
7) Remembering is connected to 
remembering my memory and playing I memory. C explains strategies for 
with them so that I could hear them, so I remembering. Playing with the objects 
could remember so much" allows her to hear them, this makes for 
greater recall. 
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8) Others must "remember their 
memory" to be successful. Also to 
"look very carefully" and "see like 
that's an insect" 
9) C- "my memory is in my brain" 
10) Difficult to remember so many, 
"Just a little bit would be easier". 
8) Looking and seeing, paying attention 
to what the objects are is important for 
remembering 
9) Memory is located in the brain 
10) Shows awareness of capacity of 
memory. Fewer objects would be easier 
to remember. 
Step 4 
3.2.2 Specific description of situated structure of remembering 
Charlotte engages with the objects fully. She feels them individually. She 
describes each, making distinctions between them. Then she turns them into 
characters, speaking for them and changing her voice to suit the character. She 
turns my game into her story. She appears fully engaged in the story she made and 
expresses fun, curiosity and excitement. She becomes aware of my presence again 
and tells me what she perceives as the special quality of one object (the leaf). In 
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recalling the items she sets up a mantra and describes each item to me as she had 
earlier done to herself. She adds information about the object as it comes to mind 
and elaborates on the descriptions. She refers to a parental figure and being told to 
remember things. She displays a long term memory, which is rooted in being 
present at an event. Charlotte connects the act of remembering to her memory, 
which she locates in her brain. Playing with the objects, making them into 
characters with a voice has allowed her to remember them, because she can hear 
them. Other people would do well to pay attention and look carefully in order to 
see what the objects are; this will help them to remember. The number of objects 
affects recall. Fewer objects would be easier to remember. Charlotte shows an 
awareness of the capacity of memory and one variable (no. of items) which will 
effect successful performance. 
Step 4 level 2 
3.2.3 General description of remembering 
Remembering a large number of objects necessitates becoming fully involved with 
them. Making distinctions between them and paying attention to their essential 
qualities will help. When told to remember something it is possible to do so. 
Long term memory is connected to being present at the time of the event to be 
remembered. Remembering is connected to memory, which is located in the 
brain. Memory has a limited capacity. One variable that will affect memory 
performance is the number of objects to be remembered. 
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This method was used to provide general descriptions of remembering for all the 
children who took the pre and post tests. 
Following the general descriptions, a composite description for the whole group is 
made. The following is a composite description based on general descriptions for 
the experimental group of which Charlotte was a member at post test. 
3.2.4 Composite general psychological structure of remembering 
(experimental post test group) 
When children of six years speak of remembering freely, they refer most often to 
long-term memories. These are given as stories of situations and events at which 
they were physically present and which have some essential meaning for 
themselves. The stories can be related in great detail and often include the feelings 
of the participants as the events unfold. Relating these stories from long term 
memory appears natural, they are often accompanied with physical gestures and 
are told with energy and enthusiasm. There is a tension apparent between this free 
remembering and reflected thought on remembering (or metamemory). However, 
children of this age are also able to reflect on processes and strategies that 
accompany remembering. 
Remembering can be linked to knowledge, to retrieval of stored facts. "I know 
snakes are poisonous, I remembered it". This is the type of remembering that is 
dictated by adults, especially in educational settings. Remembering is linked to 
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learning, but it is not the same thing. Children of this age can make this distinction 
in the sense of we can learn by watching others, but we cannot remember that way. 
Remembering is different too, from other things we learn, such as reading and 
writing. Strategies that help us in reading and writing do not help in remembering. 
To remember things you need to think. Thinking and remembering take place in 
the brain, but they are not the same thing. Remembering is performed by the 
memory, and thinking about things or concentrating on them allows those things to 
enter memory and be stored there until they are needed, when thinking about them 
again will bring them out again. Remembering is both an internal and a physical 
act, there is a mystery to how the things to be remembered enter memory, but once 
there they are real. The memory store is limited and some things have to be 
deleted to make room for new things. 
Memory is located in the brain, or in the head. The brain is a control centre for the 
body, it is different to the heart. But the brain is physical, it requires "warming 
up" or "exercise" before it begins to work and something inside the brain starts it 
working. The brain is fallible, it can get things wrong and it can find things 
difficult. Remembering is not easy and knowing that you have forgotten 
something brings about an emotional experience, it makes you feel sad and 
uneasy. 
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Remembering a lot of objects requires that you first get to know them. The sense 
of sight and touch enable the remembering. Concentration and focus on what the 
objects actually are or represent means that you can then name them and repeat 
naming aloud or to oneself will help you to remember them. The first objects to be 
named will be the first to be remembered. 
It is easier to remember things if you use a strategy, but not all strategies are good. 
Making stories from the objects and giving voice to the characters in them will 
enable recall of the characters' voices and thus the objects. Making order out of 
the objects either as a pattern or a group (the groups should refer to real-life) is a 
good strategy, as is rearranging the objects in alphabetical order. Counting, 
closing your eyes or writing a list are all good strategies. 
The type of objects to be remembered is important. Consistency of size and 
objects that are similar are easier to remember. 
4 DISCUSSION 
This chapter has described a method of phenomenological analysis, which 
attempts to clarify what it means to be metacognitive at the age of five or-six years 
old. A phenomenological approach has been necessary because it is unclear what 
metacognition is for this age group, or even whether children of this age can be 
metacognitive. Metacognition, like all reflective aspects of consciousness is 
difficult to observe in everyday experience. Braddock makes this point: 
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"As emphasised by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty the object-directedness 
of consciousness makes it difficult for the conscious subject to focus 
attention on the nature of conscious states themselves without 
becoming lost in the objects of these states" 
(Braddock, 2001) p. 2 
The metamemory test carried out as an interview makes just these demands of the 
children. Thus the data it produces are not, as far as we know, everyday data of 
the child's life. It is unlikely, though not impossible, that children of this age 
spend much time reflecting on their memory or how they remember things. 
However, when asked to do so, they are quite capable of reflecting in this way. 
They don't, for instance, confuse remembering with any other cognitive process, 
nor do they have a problem with suggesting how their memory works. That they 
respond to these questions with answers that do not fit readily into cognitive 
psychological models of how memory works, reflects their own experience and 
understanding of their own memory, rather than a learned response of how their 
memory should function. 
The phenomenological method of analysis is sensitive to this personal experience. 
It involves the researcher in actively putting to the side all notions of what 
metamemory is, or what a reflection on remembering is, in order to make clear 
what the children say about these processes. Whilst it is impossible to completely 
eradicate a knowledge of the theory of metacognition during the 
phenomenological analysis, it is sufficient, as Merleau-Ponty said to "slacken the 
intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus bring them to our notice" 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962)p. 13 
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The pursuit of a phenomenological approach with children is firstly, a vicarious 
experience. The phenomenological method used here involves the researcher in a 
process of imaginative variation in firstly discriminating meaning units from the 
initial communication and then reflecting on those, in terms of their intentionality 
towards the phenomenon, characterised here, as remembering. 
The imaginative variation has helped to clarify the essence of metamemory for 
children of this age. Charlotte has told us something of her personal experiences 
of her memory. These are described in terms of physical events, such as being on 
the 99 bus, or as relational, in terms of her circular connection of father-memory- 
self. 
Metamemory, the ability to reflect upon one's memory tends towards relationships 
and events. Whilst the cognitive model of metamemory remains an abstract, this 
phenomenological analysis has shown that the experience of being metacognitive 
at this age, necessitates thinking about real experiences. The phenomenological 
analysis has had the effect of transforming the abstract theory of metamemory 
back to its essence as a lived experience. In this way, this type of analysis has 
made the link between the cognitive psychological concept of metamemory as a 
constituent of metacognition and the phenomenological experience of what it is to 
be metacognitive at this age. Through the process of imaginative variation we 
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now see that metamemory is a reflection on different constituents such as the 
memory as an object or remembering as a process. 
It is clear from the composite general description of remembering above, that 
children of this age can experience themselves as cognitive beings and can reflect 
on their own cognition when asked to do so. They can distinguish cognition from 
action and yet make the intentional link between cognition, emotion and sensory 
experience. This suggests that they are resisting the Cartesian split of mind and 
body. These more general issues are returned to in chapter 10. However, this 
analysis would suggest that there may be something we can call a pre-formal 
operational metacognition, which is embodied and intuitively employed when 
necessary. It may be this intuitive metacognition, which is being brought to light 
by the phenomenological analysis of an intentionally directed cognition. To 
clarify, asking children to firstly undertake a memory task and secondly to reflect 
on how they did it, involves them bringing their intuitive metacognition to 
consciousness. 
The adoption of a phenomenological approach to the data from the four tests 
aimed to clarify what it is to be metacognitive at the age of five or six years old. 
Completing this type of analysis has also involved a reflection on first and third 
person methodologies and the problems associated with each. The 
phenomenological approach was used to maintain the richness of the children's 
explanations, which would otherwise be lost in the purely quantified results 
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examining change in metacognition over the year. However, the approach has also 
clarified the way children reflect on their own thinking. It suggests what 
metacognition is for this age group and the ideas and themes revealed by this 
analysis will be taken up in future chapters. In particular, this new understanding 
will guide the analysis of classroom observations of children's metacognition, (see 
chapters 7 and 8). In this way the phenomenological method which has allowed a 
return from theory to lived experience will guide the understanding of both 
teachers' facilitation of metacognition and children's metacognitive behaviour. A 
phenomenological analysis is, by its nature never completed, but for this project 
the analysis carried out on all the test data, (see chapter 6), begins to clarify the 
elements of metacognition and to describe them in terms of their meaning for 
children of this age group. 
The next chapter presents the four tests of metacognition in full and gives both the 
quantitative results of these tests and the phenomenological descriptions produced 
from the qualitative data for each test using the above method. 
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Chapter 6 
FOUR TESTS OF META COGNITIVE FACTORS 
I INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides data and analyses for four tests of metacognitive factors 
administered individually to 24 children from the experimental schools and 18 
children from the control schools at the beginning of the intervention year 
(September 1999). The tests were repeated with 21 of the 24 original children 
from the experimental schools and 16 of the original children from the control 
schools at the end of the intervention year (July 2000). Results are thus given for 
21 children from the experimental schools and 16 children from the control 
schools. 
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The pre/post test design of this part of the research project seeks to address the 
first two broad research questions: 
1. Can metacognitive ability be enhanced ? 
2. Are metacognitive gains related to cognitive/academic gains ? 
As described in chapter 3, these two broad questions include the more specific 
research questions of: 
la) How is metacognition conceptualised for this research ? 
b) What is metacognition for five to six year olds ? 
c) How can metacognition be measured ? 
d) Does CASE@KS I as implemented impact on any factors of metacognition ? 
and 
2 a) What are cognitive gains for this project ? 
b) What are academic gains for this project ? 
c) To what extent are these measurements clouded by other variables? 
Firstly, the data from the four tests used is analysed quantitatively using specific 
scoring systems for each test. In order to test the hypothesis that CASE@KS 1 has 
an effect on metacognitive development, gains were calculated by subtracting the 
pre-test score from the post test score for the self as learner test, the metamemory 
test and the mental rotation test. Pre- test data was missing from the second theory 
of mind test and the first test reached ceiling at pre-test. The gain scores were 
subjected to chi square tests and the results are given separately for each test. 
Spearman rank correlation was also carried out to test the correlation between all 
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four tests; to test for correlation between these tests and the CASE@KS 1 drawing 
and conservation tests and between these tests and end of year 2 national tests in 
language and numeracy. The data were also subject to a phenomenological 
analysis to elicit deeper meanings. 
Three major problems occur when undertaking a test based method and analysis 
such as this one: 
1) The reliability of the tests 
2) The use of verbal reports as data for psychological processes 
3) The use of test data for phenomenological analysis 
Problem one will be discussed under each individual test section 
Problems two and three are more general and are addressed below : 
2 VERBAL REPORTS AS DATA 
The problem here is both a philosophical one and a practical one. Philosophically, 
relying on a child's responses to questions to display a revelation of their thinking 
processes presupposes a notion of a relatively stable system of cognitive 
representations. It also suggests that children's verbal reports about psychological 
processes are a direct link to their thoughts, or that the thoughts about their own 
thinking processes exist prior to them being asked about them. In other words, 
children hold some concepts about their own thinking processes, which can be 
elicited by careful questioning. Alternatively, it could be that children's answers 
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to questions about their thinking show how they are "able to think, given novel 
problems that they may never before have thought about", (Edwards, 1993). 
However, it is also possible as Estes says that: 
"The novelty with which children speak about thought 
processes leads some to conclude that young children 
have an ability to report and discuss their mental 
activity including an ability to "reflect on and transform 
mental images", and that this ability is not simply a learned 
discourse, based on consensual theories about cognition" 
(Estes et al., 1989) (pp84-5). 
The evidence presented below from this study would seem to support this latter 
view. It is equally important to bear in mind the theories from linguists and 
ethnographers such as Edwards and Mercer (1987); Edwards, (1989); (Potter & 
Wetherell, (1987) and the work of Mead, (1934), which show us language as action 
and language as situated discourse. These theories suggest that any discourse 
including cognitive tests such as those below cannot be decontexualised, but must 
be seen as situated, culturally, historically and linguistically. When asked to speak 
of thought processes, children, whilst using seemingly novel language, are still 
appropriating concepts of thinking that are culturally given. Verbal reports of 
psychological processes of either children or adults must be treated with caution. 
The following data provides a snap shot of children's verbal responses to 
questioning about thought processes, further analysis is undertaken through a 
phenomenological approach to attempt some clarity of the children's responses. 
However, this qualitative analysis does not address the situated nature of the 
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discourse. In later chapters verbal data is subject to a case study analysis to seek 
understanding of how these novel descriptions of cognitive processes and their 
underlying phenomenological meanings may be constructed through situated 
discourse, (see chapter 8). 
3 THE USE OF TEST DATA FOR PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
ANALYSTS 
As described in chapter 5, phenomenology is primarily concerned with embodied 
experience. This means both in what way am I conscious of my body and in what 
way does my body experience the world. Traditional phenomenological analysis 
has relied on first person data gathered from a single question or topic. In contrast, 
this study uses data from test conditions. It may be that children are far more 
aware of and involved with their own physicality than adults are. However, it is 
interesting to note how many children during the testing spoke of physical aspects 
of their body, either in response to specific questions about their thinking, or more 
generally in asides as they worked on the test materials. 
Rather than viewing metacognition as a whole, the four tests were designed to 
elicit children's understandings of separate factors of metacognition, -the -- 
metacognitive aspect being their stored knowledge of and ability to reflect on the 
particular cognitive process under investigation. Gallagher makes the point that 
"Even when evidence is gathered in abstract or 
experimental situations we should try to keep in 
mind the way it can be cashed out in pragmatic 
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and socially contextualised situations" (Gallagher, 2000)p. 3 
Gallagher goes on to suggest that triangulation of methods is necessary to 
understand something as complex as cognition: 
"To understand something like cognition or 
embodied experience we need to use neuroscience 
and psychology as well as phenomenology" (Gallagher, 2000)p. 2 
This study uses triangulation of analyses. Undertaking a phenomenological 
analysis of the test data is one aspect of the analytical process, the quantitative 
results are another and the third, found in later chapters, is a situated content 
analysis. These three approaches are reflected in the tripartite nature of the study 
with tests, observations and interviews and in the contexts of researcher-child, 
child(ren)-child(ren), and teacher-child(ren) interactions. Gallagher's approach to 
phenomenological analysis of cognitive data cautions against generalisations 
"we should not assume that conclusions drawn in 
one domain will necessarily generalise across all 
domains of cognition. Rather we should assume 
domain specificity until the evidence is sufficient 
for making a more generalised claim" (Gallagher, 2000)p. 2. 
The four tests of metacognition described below assume an initial domain 
specificity for each area. Only when all the data is analysed will any more general 
conclusions be drawn, (see chapter 10). 
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4. THE TESTS 
4.1 SELF AS LEARNER 
4.1.1 Introduction 
This test was designed to elicit a dialogue about the self as a developing cognitive 
being. It is based upon Flavell's theory of the person category of metacognitive 
knowledge, (Flavell, 1979). It brings together knowledge of how one learns and a 
more fundamental concept of knowledge; which is that the knowledge one 
possesses at a given time has been learned and the individual existed before this 
knowledge was embodied. The test was designed also to be an ice-breaker, a test 
of counting that all the participants would be able to do with or without help. It 
was important to begin with something seemingly simple to achieve, so that the 
focus would be on the ensuing discourse, rather than the counting. It was also a 
relatively short test, which would allow for familiarity with the recording 
equipment and other social factors to be established before the more complex 
tasks. 
One characteristic of all four tests was to provide stimulus material and a secure 
environment for children to speak about their own thought processes. 
4.1.2 The Test 
The pre-test was conducted on an individual basis, with the researcher and child 
seated at a table away from the classroom environment. In some schools the test 
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was conducted in the library, in others in a corner of a quiet corridor. The test was 
audio-taped and field notes taken. Five red plastic cubes were placed on the table 
and the child was asked to count them. This was facilitated by the researcher 
sometimes joining in the counting, but most often the child did this unaided and 
appeared comfortable with the task. Then the following questions were asked: 
1) How did you learn to count? 
2) Was there a time when you couldn't count? 
3) (if yes) when was that? 
4) (if no) have you always been able to count? 
5) What is the difference between you then before you could count and you now? 
Then the interview was extended to talk about letters of the alphabet with 
1) Do you know some letters of the alphabet? 
2) Was there a time when you didn't know the letters? 
3) What is the difference between you then and you now? 
4) How did you learn the letters you know? 
Post Test 
The post test at the end of the intervention year was undertaken in the same way. 
The only difference was that shapes were used rather than counting cubes. The 
questions were then : 
1) Have you always been able to make patterns from shapes? 
2) Was there a time when you couldn't do this? 
3) What is the difference between you now and you then? 
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4) How did you learn to do this? 
The post test differed from the pre-test to try and ensure that the replies given were 
not just copied memories from the pre-test. However, the post test was 
sufficiently similar, to ensure that the results of both tests were comparable. 
4.1.3 Scoring 
Codes: 
A- Say there was a time when couldn't count/know letters/make patterns 
B- Credit learning to externals - mother/ school/ siblings etc. 
C- Mention self-learning strategies - practising, working it out etc. 
D- Say they've always known 
A combination of code A+C was scored as 1 (ie was taken as an indication of 
metacognitive processing) 
All other combinations were scored as 0 
The reduction of the data into a dichotomous scoring system was done to focus the 
results on the difference between children who were showing some metacognition 
and those who were not. Whilst this reduction may result in a loss of some 
qualitative data at this stage, this is later remedied by the phenomenological 
analysis. 
A score of 1 indicates that the child has said that there was a time before s/he 
could count, know letters or make patterns and has mentioned one or more self- 
learning strategies. The combination of these two categories is important in terms 
of metacognition. Firstly, confirmation of there being a time before one could 
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count indicates a view of counting as a developmental experience. It is not 
something that one is born knowing how to do. Secondly, the mention of any self- 
learning strategy indicates a view that an individual learns these things by some 
means. Certainly adults may assist, as do books, but neither the adults nor the 
books actually do the learning for you. A child scoring I on this test is, in my 
view, indicating some understanding of the learning process. Viewing oneself as a 
learner is a reflective act, a metacognitive act. Whilst the answers to my questions 
are probably constructed at the time and may not reflect "stable, statable 
knowledge" (Brown, 1987), they do indicate that whilst some children, when 
asked to think about the learning process, show a metacognitive awareness, others 
view learned behaviours quite differently. Occasionally a child will say that they 
had always been able to count etc. even when a baby: 
School Z- James (post test) 
R: OK now if I 'd asked you to do this when you were very small would you have 
been able to do it? 
J: Yes 
R: Was there a time when you couldn't do it? 
J. " No 
As the questions went on I sensed that maybe James did not understand the 
question, because I had inadvertently complicated it and so I tried to simplify it 
again: 
R: So is it something you learnt how to do? 
J: No I didn't learn it, I just done it 
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And 
School D- Alan (pre-test) 
After saying he has always been able to count 
R: was there a time when you didn't know the alphabet? 
A: 1 still know them when I didn't know 
R: You've always known them, even when you were very small, you knew the 
letters? 
A: Actually when I was three I still know them, when I was two I still know them, 
when I was one I still know them 
Sometimes the children scored 0 because although they said they had learned how 
to count when questioned further they put this down to either age alone or some 
physical property, for instance: 
School Y- Sara (pre-test) 
R: How come you can count now and you couldn't when you were three? 
S: Because I'm bigger 
And 
School D- Paul (post test) 
R: you didn't know how to do it then [when a baby]? 
P: cos I didn't have teeth and I couldn't talk 
And 
School Z- Hera (pre-test) 
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R: how did you learn the letters? 
S: with my mouth 
More often the children put the change from not being able to count, or know the 
alphabet, to being able to, down to their mother, sibling or teacher eg. 
School Y- Jacob (post test) 
R: Did you have to do anything to learn how to do it? 
J: The teacher told us to do our work how she wanted us 
R: Who does the learning you or the teacher? 
J: Teacher 
However, this could also be interpreted as a language confusion, common to 
children ie. the difference between the words "teach" and "learn". Yet as the 
interview went on there was no other explanation forthcoming and so this was 
scored as 0. 
4.1.4 Results 
Experimental schools n=21 
Control schools n=16 
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The quantitative data show little difference in the pre-test scores between the 
experimental and control groups. At post test the scores were even closer together. 
For those scoring I at the post test the scores for both experimental and control 
groups was high. There was no real difference between the scores of boys and 
girls in either the pre-test or post test results. Only one experimental school child 
made a negative gain from pre to post test. 
4.1.5 Chi Square 
A chi square test was carried out using gain scores. (See appendix 6 for 
metacognitive gain scores for all four tests). 
Table 6.1 Self As Learner (observed frequencies) 
score no of exp 
children 
no of cont 
children 
-1,0 12 7 19 
1 9 9 18 
21 16 37 
x2 = 65 df = Ins 
4.1.6 Summary 
The results of this one item suggest that as children mature over the year (age 5 to 
6 years) they become more aware of themselves as beings who develop and learn. 
This is also the first year of formal schooling (discounting the reception class 
which can still be classed as a relatively more pre-school environment). The 
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enculturation of school no doubt plays a great part in this developing awareness, as 
teachers were observed making frequent references to learning during the school 
day. Parents too, probably reinforce this as they ask their children about what they 
learnt at school that day. (No evidence was gathered about parental influence in 
this study as it was outside of the parameters of access negotiated by the main 
CASE@KSI project). 
The results of the chi square show that the specific intervention of CASE@KS 1 
had no greater influence on this developmental process than does the normal 
primary school learning environment and maturation. 
4.1.7 Phenomenological Analysis 
The test did, however, show some interesting ideas expressed by the children, 
about the process of learning and development. The answers to my questions 
given by each child, were subject to a phenomenological analysis following the 
pattern described in chapter 5. 
This approach sought to answer the following question: What do children offive to 
six years old know about the process of learning? _ 
Since the quantitative results showed no real difference between the control and 
experimental group scores, the general descriptions of both experimental and 
control group were combined to give one composite general description of 
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learning for those scoring 0 and one general composite description of learning at 
for those scoring 1. Originally pre and post test data were analysed separately. 
However, children scoring I at pre-test and those scoring I at post test differed 
only slightly in terms of sophistication. Thus the pre and post test general 
descriptions were combined to form a composite general description of knowledge 
of learning from children scoring 0 and a composite general description of 
knowledge of learning from children scoring 1. The slight differences between the 
pre- and post test descriptions for those scoring I can be seen as consistent with 
further development of the nature of learning. 
Composite general description of the knowledge of learning . 
from interviews 
with children who score 0 on the Self as Learner test (experimental and 
control groups combined) 
For the children who scored 0 on this test learning is not a process, but fixed in 
time. There is no difference between being a baby and being five, except in terms 
of physical growth. Babies can't talk and don't have teeth. But for themselves as 
individuals, they have always known what they know now. They can 
acknowledge the help of others, but see this as others telling them things and then 
they know how to do something. They acquire knowledge by being told by 
someone older. They play no active part in learning. Learning to count is 
described only by the physical actions used ie. counting with hands or fingers. 
Mouths and teeth are important in learning, but this is not extended to 
understanding language. Physical characteristics distinguish themselves now from 
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their pre-verbal selves, themselves as babies. Yet, often these children maintain 
that they still knew how to count before they developed these physical 
characteristics. Most notable in the explanations of this group, are the references 
to physical growth and physicality in general, in relation to knowledge. 
Knowledge is transferred from a significant adult to the child by some direct 
means, without the child having to do anything themselves. Some children stress 
that no one helped them to do things and that they could always do them. Often the 
children in this group were unwilling, or unable to express their ideas on the topic. 
Don't know was a frequent response. 
Composite general description of the knowledge of learning from interviews 
with children who score I on the Self as Learner test (experimental and 
control groups combined) 
At the beginning of the year about half of all the children tested showed some 
awareness of themselves as learners. Learning is linked to getting bigger 
physically and to maturity - getting older. Babies are too small to learn. The 
difference between themselves now and themselves as babies is that now they can 
talk. Language is an important factor for learning. They had learned how to do 
things and five year olds are different from two and three year olds in the amount 
of things they can do. They learn things at home or at school. Other people have 
been important in this process, mothers, siblings and teachers have all helped the 
five year old to learn, but they don't do the learning for you. Sometimes other 
things help you to learn, such as books and television. People also learn by 
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thinking and working things out. Using fingers can help people learn how to 
count. They know more now than they did when they were two or three because 
they have learned things. 
By the end of the year over 80% of all the children tested had some awareness of 
themselves as learners and showed a growing sophistication of the process. 
Learning is still related to growth and age but also to physical activity. Babies 
only sleep, whereas six year olds do things. They use their minds to think and to 
work things out. Practising helps you to remember how to do something. 
Practising makes you get better at doing something. Learning is an active process, 
which involves using your head. To learn things you have to do them. Other 
people can help by showing you and you can copy what they do, but you have to 
practice and do things over and over again to learn them. Parents, siblings and 
teachers can help you to learn but you have to listen and pay attention to what they 
say. Teachers can tell you things but you still have to do it for yourself in order to 
learn it. Talking is important for learning because you need to ask questions if you 
don't understand and if you can't talk, you can't understand the instructions of 
what to do. Babies can't understand some things, so they can't learn them. You 
can learn by watching people, but you have to try things out for yourself. 
Sometimes you can learn things on your own by working problems out in your 
mind and thinking about them very hard. You can also learn by playing with toys. 
You can learn to do a new thing because it is similar to something you have done 
before, for instance you can learn about sorting from sorting out Christmas 
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presents. You know you have learnt something when you can do it for yourself. 
Learning things means that you get smarter. 
4.1.8 Discussion 
Language development may be an issue with the responses of the children scoring 
0. As previously mentioned, there may be some confusion between teaching and 
learning, for instance when a child says "the teacher does the learning". However, 
these same children were able to speak more clearly and precisely about memory 
and remembering in the metamemory test (see below). The few children scoring 0 
at the end of the year often seemed reluctant to answer the questions, "don't 
know" was a frequent response, yet again, these same children gave much fuller 
answers to the memory test. Thus, either the questions on this test were causing 
confusion, or what seems more likely, since the questions were as similar as 
possible throughout the tests, is that the notion of learning as a process is less easy 
to grasp, than that of remembering. The reluctance at the end of the year to answer 
the questions on this test may indicate that these children were at a point of 
transition in their understanding of learning as a cognitive process. They had just 
about given up their pre-test ideas about not having to learn something but always 
knowing how to do it, but had not yet fully formulated their ideas about how they 
learned something, to be confident enough to convey it to me. Just as learning 
itself is developmental, so at the meta-level, an understanding of the idea of 
learning requires a certain maturity and sophistication of thought. Learning is also 
tied much more closely to education and school than is remembering and as such 
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one is probably less immediately conscious of learning until one has experienced 
the very specific learning culture of the classroom. This will take longer with 
some children than others depending on variables such as home background, 
language development and external social forces. It is interesting to note that 
although the self as learner test preceded the metamemory test some of the 
children scoring I on the post test linked learning to remembering, whereas none 
of the those scoring 0 mentioned any other thought process. 
The references to physicality throughout the pre-tests suggest a certain 
developmental stage, one in which the reality of the physical body is predominate 
in a child's thinking. Whilst the references to physical attributes remain a year 
later, they are now enhanced with a growing awareness of cognitive processes. 
For those children scoring 1 at the end of the year physical traits are not the only 
differences between themselves now and themselves as babies, just as their bodies 
have grown, so has their ability to think and reason. 
An understanding of oneself as a learner appears to be a general developmental 
process which was unaffected by the intervention of a cognitive acceleration 
programme. However, self as learner is only one factor of Flavell's theory of 
metacognition. Results of the tests of other factors are below. 
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4.2 THEORY OF MIND 
4.2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 2, theory of mind involves the ability to consider another's 
point of view. A lack of this ability causes problems for both social and cognitive 
domains and as evidenced from work on autism, this lack of a developed theory of 
mind is viewed as a disability. The definitions of Theory of Mind have broadened 
since the early experiments with apes by primatologists, (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978) and the false belief experiments of cognitive scientists such as Wimmer and 
Perner (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). More recently, theory of mind has been 
conceptualised as social knowledge by Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (Tager- 
Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). Their componential model suggests that theory of 
mind has both cognitive and perceptual components and that a distinction can be 
made between immediate judgements of mental states (perceptual) and the ability 
to make more complex judgements (cognitive). A basic understanding of others as 
cognitive beings is generally accepted to be in place at around three years of age 
and by four, children are generally able to pass false belief tests, such as those 
replicated in this study. However, it is also generally accepted that theory of mind 
continues to develop, becoming more sophisticated and allowing for the 
development of understanding intentions and morality. Whilst the social- 
perceptual aspect of theory of mind is thought to develop earlier than the social- 
cognitive aspect, both are considered to continue to develop through childhood. 
(Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000) 
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For this project, theory of mind is conceptualised as a parallel to Flavell's 
"knowledge of others" component of his model of metacognition. (Flavell, 1979). 
It is deemed important for both social and cognitive development. An awareness 
of how others view a problem may help to develop an understanding of problem 
solving strategies in general. The ability to work with others on any task requires 
an understanding of differences and similarities between self and others. 
The false belief task has been used many times to assess the developmental age of 
the emergence of an understanding about the self and others as cognitive beings. 
However, in the mid 90's Carpendale and Chandler suggested that false belief tests 
were limited in what they tested and that success on these tests did not demonstrate 
an understanding of mental life as constructed or interpreted. They argue that 
standard false belief tests "are only about the recognition that people who are 
poorly informed are entitled to their own ignorant beliefs" (Carpendale & 
Chandler, 1996)p. 1686. 
In order to test for knowledge of an interpretative theory of mind, which is a more 
metacognitive construct than is an understanding of false-belief alone, Carpendale 
and Chandler devised a number of tests around the premise that one stimulus can 
be interpreted in more than one way. Success on this kind of test would give an 
indication of the stage of development of an interpretative or constructivist theory 
of mind. Carpendale and Chandler argue that whilst other theorists do suggest that 
189 
success on false belief tests is not evidence of a fully formed theory of mind they 
conclude that: 
"whatever differences they [other theorists eg. Perner, Wellman, 
Flavell] do imagine still divide the 4 year olds' and the adults 
understanding of mind [these] continue to be taken as primarily 
quantitative and skill driven, rather than qualitative" 
(Carpendale & Chandler, 1996)p. 1687 
This distinction, the stress placed on the qualitative difference between a four year 
old's theory of mind and that of an adult, convinced me that for this project a 
false-belief test alone would not be enough. The age of the children, (5-6 years), 
suggested that they would all pass the standard test and this would tell me little 
about their developing theory of mind and whether by the end of the year the 
CASE intervention had had any effect on it. 
4.2.2 The Tests 
Test 1 administered to 24 children from the experimental schools and 18 children 
from the control schools was the standard Perner Smartie tube test of false belief, 
(Penner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987)[See chapter 3]. This test was given only at 
the start of the intervention year. Since all the children were successful on this 
test, as predicted by developmental theory, there seemed no need to repeat this test 
at the end of the year. The second test was in two parts and aimed to assess the 
children's developing interpretative theory of mind. This test was only 
administered at the end of the intervention year to 21 children from the 
experimental schools and 16 children from the control schools. Comparisons can 
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be made between the control school children and the experimental school children, 
since the two groups reflected the make up of the sample for the whole project and 
were therefore as matched as possible at the start of the year. The test was adapted 
from one used by Chandler and Helm (Chandler & Helm, 1984) 
Part one consisted of two cartoon drawings. These took the form of "droodles" 
(Price, 1953) or cryptic line drawings, [See Fig 6.3 and 6.4 below]. These were the 
same ones used by Chandler and Helm. Drawing one consisted of two triangles 
pointing inwards from the side and bottom border of a rectangular frame. The title 
of the picture is "A ship coming to save a drowning witch". There is obviously no 
way anyone could guess this title from the triangles. However once the title is 
given, it is hard to see the drawing as anything else. Following Chandler and 
Helm, the first stimulus for this test was the witch and ship droodle, but with the 
full picture of the ship sailing towards a drowning witch drawn out and an overlay 
with a square viewing window cut out so that the droodle alone could be seen. 
The second picture to be used was a droodle entitled "Two elephants sniffing a 
grapefruit". This droodle was also presented as both the full drawing and the 
drawing with an overlay and a square viewing window cut out. (See below). 
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Figure 6.3 "Droodle"- "A ship coming to save a drowning witch" 
a) The cut out overlay 
b) Thefull picture 
ýý 
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Figure 6.4 "Droop//e"- "Two elephants sniffing a grapefruit" 
a) The cut out overlay 
b) Tune full picture 
0 
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The aim of the questioning in this test was firstly to see if the children could hold 
in their mind perspectives that were different from their own. Secondly, it aimed to 
discover whether they could invent other perspectives and ascribe them to others 
and finally, whether they felt it was all right for different people to hold different 
interpretations of the same object. 
The Chandler/Helm experiment sought to test the role-taking competence of 
children at age 4,7 and 11. They found that, for the group of seven year olds, 
success at being able to take on another's perspective was most affected by 
whether one had previously experienced that role. This was not a factor for the 
four and eleven year olds. Thus, although the same stimulus material is used for 
this test in this project, the nature of this experiment is different to that of 
Chandler/Helm. No attempt was made to replicate their study and as such the 
results of this test cannot be compared with their results. 
4.2.3 Method 
Procedure 
Two small toy figures were introduced to the child. One was named Bob and one 
Sam. The child was then shown the full picture of the witch and the boat and 
asked: 
"what could you say this is a picture of ?" 
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Then the picture was covered up with the overlay, allowing only the "droodle" of 
the two triangles to be viewed and Bob comes to look at the picture. The child was 
asked: 
"What will Bob say this is a picture of.? " 
This was repeated with the other doll, Sam. 
If the child gave different answers for the two dolls they were then asked: 
"Is it OK for Sam and Bob to say it is different things? " 
"Why is it OK? [not OK? J" 
Further questions were asked responding to the child's answers such as: 
"How do they know what it is? " 
For the second picture (two elephants sniffing a grapefruit), the child was shown 
only the droodle cut out and again asked the same questions as above. 
Part 2 of the test again used Bob and Sam, along with a basket and a treasure 
chest. Bob puts a jewel in the basket in front of the child and then goes away. 
Sam comes along and moves the jewel from the basket to the treasure chest and 
then goes away. Bob returns. The child is asked: 
"Where is Bob going to look for his jewel, and why? " 
This is another classic false belief test based upon the original Maxi and the hidden 
chocolate test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). The aim in administering this test was 
just to check that all the children had developed at least this level of theory of 
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mind and therefore there was no base level discrepancy between the control and 
the experimental groups on this measure. 
4.2.4 Scoring 
0= the child ascribed to Bob or Sam or both, the same interpretation of the 
droodle as they had themselves given. (only the child held knowledge of what the 
full picture was) 
1= the child showed some appreciation that only they held full knowledge of the 
picture, but they still allowed Bob and Sam some access to this information eg. 
Bob thinks "it is a witch and Sam thinks it is a boat" 
2= the child invented other disassociated interpretations for Bob and Sam and said 
it was OK for them to hold these views 
Note: If the first droodle was scored as 1 or 2, but the second droodle scored 0 
then the test was scored as 0. If the first and second droodle were scored as 1 then 
the test was scored as 1. There has to be consistency across both droodles to 
achieve the given score, as in the original Chandler and Helm experiment (1984). 
The children who scored 2 in both the experimental and control schools were able 
to give justification for their thinking. In the experimental schools this was often 
couched in mentalistic terms. For example, here is Chloe from an experimental 
school being philosophical: 
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R=Researcher; C=Chloe 
7. Il: So Bob and Sam say it's different things is that OK 2 
8. C: Yep, because different people have different sorts of seeing and she might 
not know these are called triangles so she calls them pointy shapes and he might 
know they are triangles so he calls them triangles. 
15. R: So again all three ofyou now have seen exactly the same thing but you all 
call it something different is that OK ? 
16. C: Yep 
17. R: Why? 
18: C: Cos again people see different things and they might not know it's a 
pattern and Sam might not know that it's lines with a circle in the middle, we all 
see different things and we all know different things because if God made us all 
the same it would be really really boring cos all of us would be the same, say like 
we had seven Shirleys and seven Chloes. 
Other comments from experimental school children show their reasoning: 
Joseph: people think in different ways 
John: lots of people think different things so you are bound to think it's something 
different 
Oliver: because we have different brains that think different things 
Fumi: they have their own ideas and they will think about their own ideas 
Samuel: because they have their own imaginations 
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Martha: because they've got their own brains, we think different and we've got 
our own minus and we say different things 
The above are all examples of explanations which were scored as a 2. In 
comparison here are some explanations scored as a 1. They show a great deal 
more confusion, with reasons linked to age, reality or physical perspectives eg: 
Denise says that the dolls can give different interpretations of the drawing but the 
reason: 
11. R: Why is it OK for them to say different things? 
12. D: Cos one is this side and one is that side 
I try to persuade Denise that the dolls are looking from the same place, she seems 
to agree but then: 
23. R: Why will they both say it's different things if they are looking at it from 
exactly the same place? 
24. D: Cos one is a bit at the back and one is in front 
Although Denise maintained that they would say it was different things her 
explanation relied upon the dolls viewing the picture from different places, even if 
that difference was so slight as to be virtually non existent. 
Louise also has a physical explanation: 
11. R: Would it make sense for them to think it's different things? 
12. L: Yes 
13. R: Why could they do that? 
14. L: Because one could be older and they could make different decisions 
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and later 
29. R: OK so these two have said its the same thing, but you have said it's 
something different, is that OK? 
30. L: Yeah 
31. R: Why is that 
32. L: Cos I'm taller 
33. R: Right. What difference does that make 
34. L: 1 might be older than them 
A child scoring 0 sticks to their notion that different people would give the same 
interpretation when viewing the same picture even though neither can see the full 
picture, for example here is Natasha maintaining her ground under cross 
questioning: 
21. R: So they might say it's the same thing, is that OK, why would they say the 
same thing? 
22. N. " Cos they're friends 
23. R: What about if they weren't friends, if they don't know each other? 
24. N. " They wouldn't befriends because they don't know each other 
25. R: So would it be OK for them to look at this and give it a different title? 
26. N. " No 
27. R: Why not? 
28. N. " Because they want to say the same things 
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29.1Z: Can two people looking at the sane picture give it a different title? 
30. N. No 
4.2.5 Results 
The Smartie tube false belief test administered at the beginning of the year had 
100% success. Part two of the theory of mind test (Bob, Sam and the jewel) 
administered at the end of the year also had 100% success for both experimental 
and control groups. However, results for the interpretative theory of mind test were 
not so equal and it is the results from that test which will be discussed further and 
analysed below. 
The "Droodles" test was given to 21 children from the experimental schools and 
16 children from the control schools. The children's responses to the questions 
were audio taped and transcribed. Six transcriptions taken at random were passed 
to a colleague with the scoring system. 100% inter-rater agreement was achieved. 
The results show a large difference between the experimental and control group by 
those scoring 2, [43% of the experimental group scored 2, whereas only 6.25% of 
the control group scored 2]. However, if the scores of I and 2 are taken together 
then the two groups are much closer: Exp group 71.5% and Cont. group 62.5%. 
This indicates that the difference between the two groups is a result of a qualitative 
difference in reasoning and the explanations given. There was no real difference 
between the scores of boys and girls. 
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Figure 6.5 
Percentage of Experimental and 
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As gain scores were not available for this test, no chi square analysis was carried 
out. 
4.2.6 Phenomenological Analysis 
The question posed for the phenomenological analysis is: if the three scores 0,1,2 
relate to the development of an interpretative theory of mind, how do the children 
in these three categories understand the perception of another's reality? Since all 
the children passed the false belief tests (Smartie tube and Treasure chest) they all 
have some understanding of others as cognitive beings; can then a 
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phenomenological description indicate the qualitative differences between the 
developmental stages? 
The analysis is limited because the data was not originally collected with 
phenomenological description in mind. However, the method has proved useful in 
trying to understand the mental phenomena under examination from the child's 
perspective and when the data are analysed in this way, the voice of the child is 
still apparent. Categories of meaning are not imposed upon the data but built from 
it. 
The question explored by this analysis was: 
What do 5 and 6 year old children understand about others as cognitive beings 
in terms of individual interpretations of a visual stimulus? 
The method of analysis was that described in chapter 5. 
Composite general description of children's understanding of others as 
cognitive beings from qualitative data of those scoring 0 on the interpretative 
Theory of Mind test. 
50% of the children who score 0 on this test could give no explanation at all for 
their answers. They maintained however, that different people had to give the 
same interpretation of the "droodle". 
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The children who did give an explanation emphasised right and wrong. People 
looking at the same picture would see the same thing. They could not interpret the 
picture differently even though the whole picture was not shown. If they did give 
different answers one of them would be wrong. If we looked at the same picture 
we would have to agree on what it was. The picture has a physical reality that is 
fixed and we can see what this is. If one person gave a different answer to 
someone else it could cause an argument because only one person could be right. 
The person who is right is the one who says what it really is. Different people 
would see the same thing if they looked at the picture and they would describe the 
same thing. They would both know the same thing about the picture so they would 
not be able to give it a different title. Since both dolls are looking at the picture 
from the same place (directly in front of it) they could not give different ideas of 
what it is. Also friends would give the same answer because they would want to 
agree with each other. 
Composite general description of children's understanding of others as 
cognitive beings from qualitative data of those scoring I on the interpretative 
Theory of Mind test. 
The children scoring one were much more open to the idea that different 
interpretations of the "droodle" could be given. However, their explanations for 
why this might be tended towards physical properties. They could differ if one of 
them looked more closely at the picture, because then one of them could believe it 
was something else. They could say it was a different thing because they are 
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different sizes (in fact the dolls were the same size). Being a different size would 
mean that one is older than the other and older people can have different ideas 
about the same picture. This would also happen if one was taller than the other. 
They could say it is different things because they can see it from different sides 
(although both dolls were positioned in the same place directly in front of the 
picture). It would depend on where you stand, what you would say the picture was. 
They might also say it was different things so that they were not accused of 
copying each other's answers. This would lead them to fight. But they could also 
say it was the same thing if they agreed about what it was. 
Composite general description of children's understanding of others as 
cognitive beings from qualitative data of those scoring 2 on the interpretative 
Theory of Mind test. 
The children scoring 2 were able to give explanations for their answers, which 
showed an understanding of others as cognitive beings. 
The dolls would give different interpretations of the "droodles" because they 
wouldn't know what each other had said it was. Also one of them might "get" the 
drawing and one might not. They would give different interpretations because 
they have their own imaginations. They have their own brains and everyone 
thinks differently. We each have our own mind and we can say different things. 
Different people have different sorts of seeings, even if they are standing in the 
same place. Also different people know different things and one person might 
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know what something is called, for instance a triangle, another person might only 
be able to describe the shape and not know the name of it. People think in 
different ways even if they are brothers and are looking at the same thing. 
Everyone doesn't know the same thing. Everyone is a different person and so 
everyone is bound to say the "droodle" is a different thing. We all have our own 
brain and different brains think different things. We all have our own ideas. Each 
person is unique. If we were all the same it would be very boring. 
4.2.7 Discussion 
The quantitative results show that at the end of the year many more experimental 
school children are scoring 2 than are control school children. The fact that 
control school children tend towards scoring at level 1 suggests that maturation 
and general educational influence would account for this level. Level 2 requires a 
more sophisticated explanation and shows some real understanding of others as 
cognitive beings and in some cases of the interpretative nature of knowledge. This 
degree of sophistication suggests that the experimental school children have at 
least developed a language of explanation, which is different to that used by the 
control school children. 
The phenomenological analysis suggests a development from level 0 through to 
level 2 of understanding of cognitive processing. Whilst the level 0 children stick 
firmly to the idea that reality is fixed and can only be interpreted in the same way 
by everyone, the level I children have moved to a more ambivalent position. They 
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tend to agree that people can differ in their explanations of something as abstract 
as a droodle, but rely on some kind of physical reason for this, be it age, height or 
viewing point. Most often, these explanations did not equate with the reality of the 
two plastic dolls, but the children maintained these explanations, seemingly 
because they were unable to provide a more interpretative explanation. 
The level 2 children have moved on a great deal. Their explanations indicate a 
degree of reflection and they are able to explain their ideas in different ways. 
From analysing their comments, it seems clear that they have done more than just 
learnt a language of mentalistic explanations. They understand those explanations 
and when cross questioned they do not revert to less mentalistic views. If they had 
simply learnt a language of explaining themselves by some rote method, we would 
expect much more talk along the lines of "we all have minds" or "our brains help 
us think of ideas" etc. But to be able to go further and explain why two people can 
have different ideas is, I would suggest, much more sophisticated and involves not 
just language but an understanding of individual cognition. In other words a 
metacognitive process which is qualitatively different from the processing of the 
children at level 0 and level 1. 
4.3 METAMEMORY 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Metamemory was one of the first components of metacognition to be studied and 
as described by Flavell (Flavell, 1971; Flavell & Wellman, 1977), it forms the 
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basis for the concept of metacognition. It involves knowledge of one's own 
memory; how it works; what factors may influence it as well as an awareness of 
one's own memory at the moment, including control and monitoring aspects and 
knowledge of possible strategies that could enhance memory performance. A 
great deal of work on metamemory and memory performance was carried out in 
1970's and 80's. Much of this work focused on children's knowledge of and use 
of strategies to aid memory performance on recall tasks. In general, it was found 
that even pre-school children can use memory strategies when the task is simple 
(DeLoache et al., 1985). However, middle-school children were found to be more 
likely to understand that a memory strategy can help recall (Moynahan, 1978), 
although even older children are not consistent in their knowledge and use of 
memory strategies. Young children have also been found to overestimate their 
memory capacity, claiming that they can remember more than they do, yet being 
unaware of the deficit between their prediction and performance (Cavanaugh & 
Perlmutter, 1982). Children in school are rarely made aware of these differences or 
specifically taught memory strategies (unless engaged in a particular programme, 
often designed by researchers). 
The purpose of including a metamemory task in this project was initially to get a 
base line of where the children in the study fell in the developmental metamemory 
scale, so that a comparison could be made with their level a year later. In addition 
results from this test could be compared with results from the other three tests to 
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see whether there is a general metacognitive development across all four factors or 
whether the factors are in fact distinct. 
4.3.2 The Test 
Sixteen objects were chosen as recall items. These consisted of small plastic toys 
such as a pirate, a parrot, a fish, a seahorse, a frog and some natural objects such as 
a leaf, as stone, a shell. . Whilst aware of the cultural significance of these objects, 
I felt that they were familiar enough to the children to not present a real problem. 
Many of the toys were from established sets - Playmobil, Lego, which the children 
had already come across in their classroom, if not at home. The objects were also 
chosen because they could form a basis for storytelling and pretend play (see 
qualitative results below) and because they were visually and textually attractive. 
24 children age 5-6 years from the experimental group were tested at the 
beginning of the year (as 3 left before post testing was carried out at the end of the 
year, only the results of 21 children who completed the year are used), and 16 
children from the same age control group were also tested at the same times of 
year. 
Each child was initially asked if they would like to help me find out how children 
learn things, by playing a game. All the children agreed and appeared enthusiastic 
to take part. The test was carried out at the same time as the main CASE project 
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testing and as such the children were becoming used to their day being disrupted 
by researchers and being asked "funny questions". The downside to the method 
was that some children may have become tired and this could affect their 
performance. At signs of tiredness the test was ended, although all questions may 
not have been asked. 
The test was carried out away from the classroom, usually in the library or hall, 
with myself and the child sat side by side at a small table on which the items were 
placed. The test was tape recorded as well as observational notes being taken. 
This test was the third, in a sequence of four tests and as such a relationship (of 
some sort) had already begun to be established between myself and the child. 
Firstly the objects were presented on the table and the child asked to name each 
one. The names the child gave to an object were not changed e. g. some called the 
pirate, a sea captain or a man and that name was accepted. On only a few 
occasions was I asked to name an object usually the seahorse and occasionally I 
was asked questions about whether they were real or not (most often with the toy 
frog). In answer the object was given to the child and asked what they thought, the 
name of an object was given when asked for. After initial naming I explained that 
I was going to give them 2 minutes to try and remember as many objects as they 
could and that they could do anything they wanted with the objects which might 
help them. I then explained that after 2 minutes I would cover the objects with a 
cloth and ask them to recall as many as possible. 
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The aim of the test was not primarily to see how many each child could recall, but 
if in follow up questions they could explain what they had done to help them 
remember them and to express anymore general thoughts they might have about 
the working of their own memory. Observational notes were taken during the 
minutes when the child was remembering the items. After recall, the following 
questions were asked: 
"When I gave you 2 minutes to remember the things what did you do to help you 
remember so many ?" 
Sometimes probes were used 
"Did you do anything else ?" 
Other questions were: 
"Was it easy or difficult to remember them ?" 
"wlzy ? 
"How could 1 make it easier ?" 
"Is there anything you could do to make it easier ?" 
"If a friend wanted to remember as many as you have, what would you tell them to 
do 7" 
"Which bit of you is doing the remembering ?" 
"How does it do that ?" 
All the main questions were given to each child, however the probes were adapted 
to the child's initial answer. The emphasis was on naturalistic conversation (as 
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opposed to test conditions), and as much opportunity as possible was given for the 
child to give a more detailed explanation. Quite often a child would digress to 
talking about other things and, time permitting, were given the chance to express 
themselves as they wanted. Sometimes these stories which seemed initially like 
digressions, were ultimately linked to memory and learning. For instance, a story 
about a father forgetting his keys and getting wet, ended in the child saying he 
should have checked for his keys before he went out. As this could be a repeat of 
another family member's theory a follow up question would be asked, such as 
"How would checking help? " and "How would he remember to check? " In this 
way novel accounts can be integrated into the tests results. 
4.3.3 Scoring 
The tape recordings and observational notes were transcribed and a scoring system 
applied. Initially, the scoring system comprised five categories, these were given 
number codes of IA, 1,2,3 and 4. However inter-coder rating, discussion with 
peers and other researchers led to a more specific 9 number code system. Firstly, 
the transcripts were coded for the following behaviours: 
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Table 6.2 Metamemory Coding System 
Category Code Description 
Observation A Observed using strategies e. g. grouping, 
naming out loud, making characters etc. 
Performance B Remembers 8 or more objects 
C Remembers less than 8 objects 
Explanation D General explanation of how remembered 
eg. thinking, using brain, looking 
E Explains how remembered with specific 
refs to memory strategies eg. counting, 
naming, putting in order 
F Further explanation of own memory and 
how it works eg. "easier to write them 
down ", less objects makes it easier, don't 
always remember things, "my brain 
remembers things because J tell. it to " 
G No explanation 
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Occasionally, the transcripts showed that a child simply repeated something I said 
and if no further explanation was forthcoming this was discounted from the results 
as being a leading question. 
Again the scoring system was given to two other researchers to check reliability. 
An inter-coder rating of 98% was achieved and differences solved by discussion. 
The codes were then combined to form a scoring system, (see table below). As my 
interest here lay in the quality of the explanations given the highest scores were 
given to those with the most sophisticated explanations. G or a score of I indicates 
that no explanation was forthcoming. The coding system was derived from the 
data and as the only children who were not noticeably using any mnemonic 
strategies were also those who provided no explanations, a single code of G was 
allocated to this group. All the other children were observed doing something with 
the objects. 








A+C4-D+ F 4 
A+B+D 3 
A+ C-+D 2 
G 1 
It was hypothesised that the scores from the pre-test for both groups would cluster 
around the lower marks and that one year later there would be an increase in all 
scores due to maturation and development. Any marked difference between the 
post test scores of the two groups would demand further analysis. 
4.3.4 Results 
Both experimental and control schools had similar pre-test results with 95.1% of 
the experimental group scoring 5 or less and 81.25% of the control group scoring 5 
or less. However, the post test results show a much larger difference between the 
two groups. For the experimental group 90.3% scored above 5 on the post test 
whilst only 37.5% of the control group scored above 5 on this test. There was no 
particular gender difference either in the pre or post test results for either group. 
The experimental schools post test results show a marked increase in-scores of 7,8 
and especially 9 compared with the control schools post test. The only difference 
between a score of 8 and 9 is the number of items recalled. Taking scores 8 and 9 
together 61.8% of the experimental group fell into this category at the post test 
stage compared to only 6.25% of the control group. 
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4.3.5 Chi square 
A chi square test was carried out using gain scores. 
Table 6.4 Metamemory (observed frequencies) 
score no of exp 
children 
no of cont 
children 
Total 
<0,0,1,2,3 6 12 18 
4,5,6,7 15 4 19 
Total 21 16 37 
X2 =9.82 df =I p<0.01 
4.3.6 Summary 
The experimental group showed a marked difference in their further explanations 
of how memory works and the factors that influence it, as well as an understanding 
of memory strategies, in comparison to the control schools. 
The control schools show a more even development from pre to post test, with the 
percentage obtaining a score of 7 remaining the same on both tests. A score of 7 
indicates specific reference to memory strategies but no further explanation of 
factors that influence memory. This ability to go further seen in the large 8 and 9 
scores of the experimental schools indicates a possible difference in approach to 
216 
memory in the two types of schools. This phenomenon is analysed further through 
the classroom observations 
The results of the chi square test suggest that CASE@KS1 has a positive effect on 
the development of metamemory as measured by this test. 
4.3.7 Phenomenological Analysis 
Whilst the quantitative scores and analysis show differences between the two 
groups on the metacognitive factors analysed, it remains the case that metamemory 
is an adult concept, a theory developed and described in terms of psychological 
theory. In order to understand more about how children of this age describe these 
factors we call metamemory, a phenomenological analysis of the qualitative data 
was carried out using the method described in chapter 5. The question this 
analysis seeks to answer is: 
"how do children of five and six years old experience remembering and what do 
they know about their own memory ?" 
Composite general descriptions of remembering were produced in four categories 
as follows: 
category 1= those scoring 2&3 
category 2= those scoring 4&5 
category 3= those scoring 6&7 
category 4= those scoring 8&9 
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Specific descriptions of remembering were composed for each child from their 
answers to my questions in both the pre-test and post test. These were further 
analysed and transformed to provide essential general descriptions for each child 
scoring in the above categories. 
Composite general description of remembering category I 
For children scoring in this category remembering is largely a mysterious process. 
It is automatic and linked to "cleverness". Mothers in particular never forgot 
things even though they had to make lists to remember shopping. The list making 
did not help them to remember. Remembering is about looking at things. 
Remembering is done by the eyes and the arms, but this cannot be explained and is 
an automatic process. Remembering is connected to using your brain and 
thinking. Whilst these children were observed seemingly using some type of 
memory strategy eg. quietly repeating the names of the objects to themselves, their 
subsequent descriptions of how they remembered them never matched the 
observation. Such strategies were denied as being of any use in remembering 
things. 
Composite general description of remembering category 2 
Those scoring in this category connected remembering with using their brain. 
Some people have good memories and some have bad. Remembering is described 
as a "coming to" and can be helped by an outside agency, either a mother or a 
spiritual agency like God. Being unable to remember makes one feel sad. 
Remembering was connected to the memory and the memory was located in the 
brain and was seen as a store house which required "clearing out" before new 
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things could be put in to be stored for later. In general the children believed their 
memory to be trustworthy. It would not give them false answers. Remembering is 
not easy and sometimes you might have to guess. 
Composite general description of remembering category 3 
Children scoring in this category said that removing the objects from sight made it 
difficult to remember them. Naming objects out loud or to oneself can help in 
remembering them. It is easier to remember things if you use a strategy, but not 
all strategies are good. Making stories from the objects and giving voice to the 
characters will help to recall the objects. Making order out of the objects in terms 
of putting things next to each other or in alphabetical order will help you to 
remember them. One child described "sorting out" as firstly putting all the objects 
one at a time into a circle made from a necklace, this was "sorting in" then 
removing them one at a time, this was "sorting out" and the whole strategy would 
help you to remember the objects. The objects could be grouped or put into a 
pattern and that would enable you to remember them. Touching the objects is 
especially important because the feel of the object can be stored in your brain and 
recalled later. Equally knowing and saying the names of the objects would help 
recall. Counting, closing your eyes or writing a list are also good strategies for 
remembering. 
Composite general description of remembering category 4 
Remembering a large number of objects necessitates becoming fully involved with 
them through the senses especially touch and sight. It helps if the objects 
themselves form a cohesive group and if they can be sorted out in some way. 
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Repeatedly naming the objects out loud or to oneself can help in remembering 
them. It is easier to remember things if you are told to remember them. 
Remembering is linked to learning but is not the same thing. We can learn by 
watching others but we cannot remember that way and remembering is different 
from learning to read and write. Strategies that help in reading and writing, like 
copying, do not help in remembering. To remember things you need to think. 
Thinking and remembering take place in the brain but they are not the same thing. 
Remembering is performed by the memory and thinking about things or 
concentrating on them allows those things to enter memory and be stored there 
until they are needed, when thinking about them again will bring them out again. 
Remembering is both an internal and physical act. There is a mystery to how the 
things to be remembered enter memory, but once there, they are real. 
Memory is located in the brain or in the head. It takes concentration to remember 
things and you need to work hard at it. The brain is a control centre for the body; 
it is different to the heart. But the brain is physical, it requires "warming up" or 
"exercise" before it begins to work and something inside the brain starts it 
working. The brain is fallible, it can get things wrong and it can find things 
difficult. Remembering is not easy and knowing that you have forgotten 
something brings about an emotional experience, it makes you feel sad. 
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Using strategies like naming will help you to remember. The first objects to be 
named will be the first to be remembered. Fewer objects would be easier to 
remember. One strategy mentioned was a form of "chunking" described as "put a 
few in your head at once and then put in some more". Seeing a real thing was 
more memorable than a picture or a toy. 
4.3.8 Discussion 
The quantitative results of this test showed a marked difference between the scores 
of the control and experimental schools in the post tests. The increase in numbers 
of experimental school children scoring highly on this test indicates that they are 
giving qualitatively different and more sophisticated explanations of how memory 
works and the factors that may influence it. 
The results of the chi square test suggest that CASE@KS 1 has a positive effect on 
the development of metamemory as measured by this test. The quantitative results 
are further verified by the phenomenological descriptions derived from the 
transcribed test data at the end of the year. The analysis of the descriptions of 
remembering in those children scoring 6,7,8 and 9 on the test, show a remarkable 
insight for children of this age. They are aware of possible strategies that may help 
us to remember and ideas of how remembering works, its link to memory and 
thinking, and how it differs from other cognitive processes. Whilst not all 
children, even by the end of the year, had these kind of insights, the children in the 
experimental group were more able to explain their thinking about remembering 
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than those in the control group. The phenomenological analysis has helped to 
highlight the sophistication of these explanations and provides a unique 
understanding of how children of this age can think about, conceptualise and 
explain their thinking about the process of remembering and the concept of 
memory. 
4.4 MENTAL ROTATION 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Whilst the previous three tests have tested for specific factors of metacognition 
namely knowledge of self, knowledge of others and knowledge of memory, this 
fourth test concentrates on knowledge of problem solving. It addresses the 
questions - What do five and six year olds know about how they solve problems? 
and Are they aware of the mental processes they may be using? Knowledge about 
how we solve problems allows us to make informed choices about the type of 
problem we have to solve and the best method to use. Awareness of the thinking 
process involved in each problem solving situation will enable us to match the 
most effective strategy to both the task and to our knowledge of our own 
cognition. For the purposes of this project, a test was used which would stimulate 
children into explaining and describing how they had solved the problems. Can 
five and six year olds who successfully solve a mental rotation problem explain 
how they did it? What explanations would those who were unsuccessful at solving 
the problem give? Would the test show children of this age to be the mental 
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realists that Piaget suggested (ie. viewing mental processes as objective 
phenomena) (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), or can they explain their thinking in terms 
of mental representations? David Estes, (from whose work the test was adapted), 
has suggested that even four year olds can have some access to their problem 
solving processing. In his study, those four year olds who referred to mental 
processing to explain their results on the mental rotation test, produced results 
consistent in reaction time and error rate with mental rotation processing. Those 
who did not refer to mental activity to explain their results were found to have 
responded randomly. (Estes, 1998) 
Metacognitive processing in terms of conscious knowledge of the mental 
processes involved in problem solving has also been found to be the significant 
factor in successful problem solving by other researchers, (Antonietti, Ignazi, & 
Perego, 2000; Chi et al., 1980; Chi et al., 1982; Davidson et al., 1994; Schoenfeld, 
1992; Swanson, 1990). The pilot study for this project had shown that most ten to 
eleven year olds could explain the cognitive process they used to solve the mental 
rotation test, whereas the year one children in the pilot study gave a much broader 
range of explanations. Would the results of the year one children in the main 
study replicate those in the pilot study and would the CASE intervention 
programme, which is based on collaborative problem solving, positively affect the 
development of this aspect of metacognition? 
223 
4.4.2 The Test 
The mental rotation test was adapted from the computerised test used by David 
Estes (1998), with his permission. The original test measured reaction times and 
performance as well as seeking explanations. The pilot study for this project 
involved changing the test to suit this project and the aim of eliciting explanations 
rather than measuring performance. Four cards were produced. On each card was 
a drawing of two monkeys. Each monkey had one arm in the air. On cards A and 
B the monkeys had the same arm in the air and on cards C and D the monkeys held 
up different arms. Cards B, C and D showed the second monkey rotated firstly to 
901 then 120°and finally to 180°, (see page 221, for copies of cards). The child 
was shown card A and asked if the monkeys had the same arm in the air or 
different arms. The question was repeated for each card. The child was re-shown 
card D and asked to explain the answer they had given. Further questions 
followed from the natural responses of the child. These were: 
How did you work it out? 
Which bit of you did the working out? 
Was it easy or difficult? 
What was easy or difficult about it? 
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The test was administered to both control and experimental groups at the 
beginning and again at the end of the intervention year. At the beginning of the 
yearn exp = 24 and n cont =18, by the end of the year this had diminished to n exp 
=21 and n cont = 16. Results are given below using the sample size present at the 
end of the year. 
4.4.3 Scoring 
Following Estes' categorisations (Estes, 1998), explanations were coded into three 
groups: 
Non mental = all references to physical rather than mental explanations or no 
explanation at all (eg. "this arm up and this arm down", knowledge of left and 
right) 
General mental = all references to general thinking (eg. "I thought about it", "I 
used my brain") 
Mental Rotation = all references to specifically rotating the image mentally (eg. "I 
turned it around in my mind") 
These explanations were converted to numeric scores: 
Non mental =0 
General mental =1 
Mental Rotation =2 
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A 20% sample of the pre-test data was selected for marking by two other 
researchers. 100% inter-rater reliability was achieved. 
Whilst some of the children who scored 0 and gave incorrect answers to the cards 
simply guessed the answer, others were observed trying to work them out. This 
often involved physically twisting their body or trying to look at the card upside 
down. Here is Julien from Control School Y demonstrating how he worked out 
card D at the pre-test stage (although he got the answer wrong): 
12. R: How did you work this one out? 
13. J: [turns card around with his hands] 
14. R: that's interesting what did you just do? 
1 5. J. " turned it over 
16. R: but because they are on the same card if : you turn it over the other monkey 
goes upside down, is there any way you can do it? 
17. J: draw another monkey, the same way up 
24. R: which bit of you are you using to work it out? 
25. J: hands and fingers 
Whilst Julien gets close to the idea of rotation he can't yet make the processing 
leap from physically turning the card around, which in effect doesn't help at all, to 
mentally turning it around. Whether he had tried to mentally rotate the second 
monkey or not we cannot know, but we can say that he didn't succeed in doing it 
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and he wasn't aware that was how he had tried to solve the problem. He may have 
used only a physical rotation method. 
A number of children at the pre-test stage who scored 0 were unable to give any 
sort of explanation of their problem solving, suggesting that they guessed the 
answers to the cards. Similarly, at the end of the year Sarah from experimental 
school A also gives a non mental and physical answer: 
G. R: Look at card D again tell me how you worked this one out 
7. S: because there was one the right way up and the other upside down I got up 
and looked at it like that (moves around to the other side of the table and twists 
body) and 1 knew them two were not the same cos that one is a little bit longer 
8. R: why did you get up and move around like that? 
9. S: because that one was upside down 
10. R: ifyou move around that side of the table won't the other one be upside 
down? 
11. S. yep 
Whilst Sarah maintained this as her strategy the explanation for it became no 
clearer as the conversation continued. This lack of clear explanation is not simply 
an age-related issue, as can be seen by comparison with the few same age children 
who scored 2, for example Finn from control school Z at post test: 
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3. R: Ok let's look at picture I) - tell me how you worked that out 
6. F: because 1 put them in my brain and then I turned this monkey around and 
then it was d fferent 
11. R: was it easy or difcult? 
12. F: easy 
13. R: which was the easiest card? 
14. F. [chooses card A] 
15. R: which was the most difficult? 
16. F: (chooses card D) 
17. R: why was that one more difficult? 
18. F. " because that one (card A) is not upside down and they are the same and 
this one (card D) is upside down and you have to turn it around in your head. 
Pritti from the same school agrees, although she is observed physically turning and 
twisting her head to work out card D: 
3. R: How did you work out card D? 
4. P: I imagined this monkey was like that (uses her fingers to turn it around) and 
then I know the answer 
9. R: which bit of you did all that working out? 
10. P: my brain 
13. R: which was the most difficult card? 
14. P: CandD 
Is. R: why? 
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16. P: because this one is this way and the other is the other way (ref to card D 
on which one monkey is upside down) 
Chloe and Oliver from experimental school B and Samuel from experimental 
school C also explain their thinking clearly at the post-test: 
3. R: How did you work out card D? 
4. C: I just tried to turn them over in my head and put it over each other and see 
which one is like the same, so I put it over in my head and see if it's the same 
4.0: 1 like memorised it turning it around in my head 
7. S: I just turned it over in my brain and then put them together again 
Here is Victoria (experimental school C) with a typical 1 score answer at post test. 
Whilst she got card D right, card B was incorrect: 
8. R: Tell me how you worked out this one (D)? 
9. V. " in my head 
10. R: what did you do in your head? 
11. V: I worked it out 
12. R: how did you do that? 
13. V. " with my brain 
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Or Natasha from Control School X scoring I at post test: 
7. R: How did you work it out 2 
8. N: cos I'm trying hard in my head and I can do it 
19. R: which bit of you is doing the working out? 
20. N: my brain 
And Hera from control school Z maintaining a general mental answer under 
intentional leading questions at the pre-test stage: 
6 R: How did you work out card D? 
7. H: I thought about it and that one is down, that one is up 
8. R: so how do you know that that arm is different to that one? 
9. H: because he's upside down 
10. R: so what did you do to work it out? 
11. H: I thought that was up and that was down 
14. R: would you have to do anything to make him look like that monkey? 
15. H: turn him around 
16. R: but if I turn the card around the other one is upside down, is there any 
other way you could turn him around 
17. H: [pause] 
18. R: which bit of you could turn these around without moving the paper? 
19. H: my feet, my hands 
20. R: could you turn them around in your head? 
21. H: no 
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22.1l: could you turn them around by thinking? 
23. H: no 
4.4.4 Results 
Results are given for 21 children in the experimental group and 16 children in the 
control group. 
At the beginning of the year the majority of children (81% exp and 75% cont. ) 
scored 0 on this test, ie. they gave non mental explanations or no explanation at all 
and all but one of these children gave incorrect answers for the four cards. There 
was no apparent gender difference. At the end of the year there was only a small 
improvement. 28.5% of the experimental group scored 2 compared to 18.75% of 
the control group. The majority of children in both groups still scored 0. 
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4.4.5 Chi square 
A chi square test was carried out using gain scores. (See appendix 6.1 for 
metacognitive gain scores for three tests). 
Table 6.5 Mental Rotation (observed frequencies) 
score no of exp 
children 
no of tont 
children 
Totals 
-1,0 16 10 26 
1,2 5 6 11 
Totals 21 16 37 
x2 = 0.81 df=1 n. s. 
4.4.6 Summary 
The quantitative results show only a slight difference between experimental and 
control groups at post test. The chi square result is not significant. Thus it appears 
that the CASE@KSI project has not had a marked effect on the children's ability 
to explain mental rotation. 
Of the few children who gave some kind of general mental answer (scored 1) at 
the beginning of the year not one got all four cards correct. However, two children 
from the experimental schools gave mental rotation explanations at tbe_ beginning 
of the year and both these children had all four cards correct. The same correlation 
happened with those scoring 2 (ie. giving mental rotation answers) at the end of 
the year. Thus it may be that once the children can solve the problem they are 
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likely to able to explain how they did it. The children gave the correct answers 
before they were asked how they had worked them out. 
The control schools scored considerably more is at pre and post test. (25% of the 
control group scored 1 at pre test and 18.75% scored 1 at post test compared to 
9.5% of the experimental group scoring I at pre test and only 4.8% scoring 1 at 
post test). 
In order to understand better how these five and six year olds explain their 
problem solving abilities the data were subject to a phenomenological analysis in 
line with the analysis used for the other three tests. Since the quantitative 
categories of 0,1,2 are fairly crude divisions between non mental, general mental 
and mental rotation answers, the phenomenological descriptions can add depth of 
meaning to these scores and give some insight into what children of five and six 
know about their problem solving, mental processes. The method for this analysis 
is fully explained in chapter 5 and so only the composite general descriptions are 
given below: 
4.4.7 Phenomenological Analysis 
Composite general description of those scoring 0 (or giving non mental 
answers) on the mental rotation test 
Although this group also contains those who could give no explanation for how 
they solved the mental rotation problem, many other children were observed trying 
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to work the problem out and subsequently tried hard to explain how they had done 
it. 
A knowledge of left and right was seen to be important even though it was often 
incorrect and didn't produce correct answers on the tests. However, this 
knowledge in its correct form would be a useful strategy to use to solve the 
problem, so knowledge of the usefulness of the strategy was present. One's own 
perspective in relation to the monkeys was also important. Standing on your head 
or being able to change your perspective by twisting your body or trying to look at 
things sideways or upside down would all help to solve the problem. The emphasis 
lay with the solver to do something to enable the problem to be solved. This 
causes difficulty because it is hard to twist your body around or put your head 
upside down, even though it would be useful to do so. It is important to look very 
carefully at the monkeys. There may be a clue, for instance that one is slightly 
bigger than the other, or that they have different feet or are different colours. This 
would mean that you could say they were different without having to turn one 
monkey around. Similarly you could just guess that they were all the same. 
Whilst it seems clear that one monkey needs to be turned around to be compared 
with the other monkey, the only way you could do this would be either by drawing 
the monkeys again, or cutting one out and turning it around. You might use your 
fingers to trace one monkey and then remember its position whilst you trace the 
other one and then match them. Memory seems to play some part in the solution. 
Clever people would just know how to do this and would not need to work it out. 
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Another strategy might be to think about real monkeys in the zoo and remember 
how they hold onto trees. Whatever the solution, the monkeys would need to be 
turned the right way up because it would damage them to be upside down. Their 
position on the card determines how difficult the problem is. The most difficult 
. one being when one monkey is rotated a full 1801 
Composite general description of those giving general mental explanations 
(scoring 1) for the mental rotation test 
For the children scoring 1 on this test, their understanding of problem solving had 
moved from it being something of a physical process to knowledge that it is a 
mental process. There is an understanding that problems have to be worked out 
and this working out takes place in the brain. The brain tells us what to do. You 
need to try hard in your head and then you will be able to do it; so effort is 
necessary. Looking carefully is important but you also need to think about it in 
your head. Your eyes or hands can help you but it is your head and your brain that 
works out the problem by thinking about it. Your brain can pretend things about 
the monkeys, which may help you to work it out e. g. that their face is in a different 
place. But mental rotation of the image is not possible. 
Composite Eeneral description of those giving mental rotation explanations 
(scoring 2) on the mental rotation test 
The children who scored 2 on this test all referred directly to mental rotation as a 
problem solving strategy in this case. It appears to be easy, obvious and a natural 
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thing to do. "Just" is a frequent word used in this section. You just need to turn 
the monkeys over in your brain and put them together again. You just need to use 
your brain to move the monkeys around then you will get the correct answer. Just 
turning it over in your head means that you can see if it is the same as the other 
one. Whilst it takes practice to be able to do this it is the best way to solve the 
problem and it leads to correct solutions. It is not clear how we learn to do this but 
your brain thinks for you and tells you to pretend that one monkey is turned 
around so that you can think about it easier. It may be your memory that helps you 
to do this or you have to use your imagination. Your eyes help your imagination 
to see things the other way round. Once you can do this you wouldn't solve the 
problem in another way. 
4.4.8 Discussion 
From the quantitative results it appears that mental rotation is a fairly sophisticated 
strategy. The majority of children across both groups gave non mental answers at 
the beginning and the end of the year. The chi square result using the gains from 
pre- to post test indicated that the CASE project had not impacted on the children's 
ability to reflect on the mental processing necessary to solve a mental rotation 
problem.. 
Once the children are able to explain the mental rotation strategy they gave largely 
correct answers to the problem and vice versa. Once they are giving consistently 
correct answers, they tend to be able to explain that they used mental rotation as a 
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strategy. Similarly, once this strategy is conscious and is able to be explained, it 
becomes the most natural solution, the easiest and most obvious way to solve the 
problem. The children who gave non mental answers produced a number of 
different possible solutions in a seemingly "brain storming" way. But once mental 
rotation had become conscious, the children no longer freely suggested alternative 
strategies. 
Knowledge of problem solving strategies has long been accepted as crucial to 
successful problem solving (Chi et al., 1980; Flavell, 1976; Hayes, 1981). This 
conscious knowledge allows us to choose strategies that will best fit both the task 
and the problem solver. Recent work by Antionetti has suggested the importance 
of visualisation for problem solving: 
"Individuals who represent problems in pictures or through mental 
images are facilitated in considering all the elements of the problem 
simultaneously, in schematising the structure of the problem and in 
changing the perspective. Experimental findings support the notion 
that instructions to visualise help subjects to restructure problems 
(Antonietti et al., 2000)p. 3 
The children scoring 2 in this test clearly explained their strategy in terms of 
imagining or seeing the monkeys turned around. Even the children who gave non 
mental answers tended to stress the importance of their eyes and seeing for solving 
the problem. Becoming consciously aware of these types of problem-solving 
strategies is a development of metacognition. Practice on solving problems and 
maturation appear to aid this development the most. Whilst the phenomenological 
analysis showed the experimental group to give slightly more sophisticated 
answers than the control group this could be accounted for by differences in 
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linguistic ability at the pre test stage. Whilst non-CASE classroom activity at the 
present time in year one does not allow for much, if any, collaborative problem 
solving, obviously some problem solving activity goes on. The nature of the 
CASE lessons with their highly structured problem solving should impact on the 
development of conscious processing and strategy use. The fact that this has not 
shown in these quantitative results may be because a year is not long enough to 
assess the impact of such a programme. 
The next section correlates the results from all four of these tests of metacognition 
with both the CASE project pre- and post test scores, and with the longer term 
national school tests (SATS) at the end of year 2. 
5 METACOGNITION, COGNITION AND ACADEMIC 
ATTAINMENT 
A fundamental question, which is addressed in this chapter, concerns the nature of 
metacognition itself. Is metacognition one general factor of cognition or are there 
specific metacognitions linked to different aspects of cognition, developing 
separately and on their own time lines, having in common only the fact that each 
involves a reflection on a parallel aspect of cognition? --- 
The four tests presented here were derived from the literature and designed to 
cover four major areas of metacognition: knowledge of self as learner, theory of 
mind, metamemory and mental rotation (the ability to use and be aware of using 
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mental processes to achieve a goal). A correlation of results from each test with 
the other tests, both pre- and post- intervention, could suggest whether these tests 
were tapping one general cognitive process or not. 
Spearman rank correlations were carried out for the pre-test scores for three tests: 
self as learner, metamemory and mental rotation and for the post test scores for 
theory of mind (droodles), metamemory and mental rotation. 
5.1 Results of Spearman Rank Correlations 
Table 6.6 Correlations for pre-test scores (experimental and control) 
pre- as learner pre- metamemory 
pre- metamemory 0.21 1.0 
pre- rotation -0.02 0.2 
Table 6.7 Correlations for post- test scores (experimental and control 
post as learner TOM post metamemory 
TOM -012 1.0 0.28 
Post metamemory 0.02 0.28 1.0 
Post rotation 0.11 -0.17 0.05 




The lack of a correlation pattern over the four tests suggests that there are 
problems with the idea of the tests tapping one general metacognitive process. 
Whilst there are problems around measuring metacognition, the use in this study 
of phenomenological analysis of the test data suggests some internal validity for 
each test, in that each test appears to be tapping into metacognitive processing in 
that particular domain. 
Some discussion of the literature pertaining to the theoretical issue of whether or 
not metacognition is one unified aspect of cognition has been undertaken in 
chapter 2. However, the analysis of these tests suggests that these four aspects of 
metacognition are independent of each other. A study by Thorpe and Satterly, 
(1990), examined four commonly used measures of metacognition (generating 
strategies, word list generation, organisation of prose and judging task difficulty) 
to see if a common metacognitive factor could be identified. The research 
parallels this study in that it was conducted with primary school age children, 
although the youngest were seven years old (a year older than for this project). 
Results from their four tests showed a clear age related developmental trend from 
the seven year olds to the eleven year olds. This is replicated by evidence from the 
pilot study for this project where the mental rotation task was administered to six 
year olds and eleven year olds, (see chapter 4). 
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In the Thorpe and Satterly study, a factor analysis of the variables identified in 
each of their four tests found that there was no evidence for a common 
metacognitive factor across the measures. They conclude that metacognition is 
"specific to the task from which it is derived" (p. 19), and that they could not 
support the theoretical claim of a general metacognitive factor. 
Whilst this study tends to support the Thorpe and Satterly research, it is also 
probable that the small sample size and the difficulty of using self-report measures 
with children of five and six years old have affected the quantitative results. 
5.3 Metacognitive and Cognitive Gains 
In order to address the research question of whether metacognitive gains can be 
related to cognitive gains, the gains for each test were correlated with gain scores 
for the main CASE@KS 1 pre and post test. The metacognitive gains were then 
correlated with the end of year 2 UK national academic tests in language and 
mathematics. 
The main CASE@KS I project carried out pre- and post intervention tests of both 
the experimental school children and the control school children. A qne third 
stratified sample of all the children was individually tested on classic Piagetian 
conservation tasks of number, liquid amount, solid amount and weight. (Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1974). A further test of spatial awareness based on Piagetian protocols 
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1976), and further developed by CASE researchers was 
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administered to all the children in groups of six, (Shayer, Wylam, Kuchemann, & 
Adey, 1978) 
These tests were taken as measures of cognition. Results of the main CASE@KS l 
project showed that the experimental group made significantly greater gains in 
cognitive development than the controls. An effect size of 0.47 was reported, 
(Adey et al., 2002). Academic gains were measured by results on key stage 1 
national curriculum tests in language and mathematics taken at the end of year 2, 
but at the time of writing no effects have been reported on these measures. 
Spearman Rank Correlations were carried out for each of the four tests with the 
results of the conservation tests, the drawing test, the post intervention Ravens 
scores and the end of year 2 national curriculum tests. This should tell us if 
metacognitive gains as measured on the four tests presented here are related to 
cognitive and academic gains. 
5.4 Results of Spearman Rank Correlations 
Table 6.8 Cognitive gains correlated with metacognitive gains (exp and cont) 
gains consv gains draw gains self gains m-c. m 
gains draw 0.017 
gains self 0.315 -0.201 
gains mcm -0.402 0.165 -0.226 
gains rotat 0.204 0.051 0.288 -0.057 
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Table 6.9 Cognitive gains correlated with metacognitive gains (exp only) 
gains consv gains draw gains self gains mem 
gains draw 0.139 
gains self 0.205 -0.015 
gains mem -0.384 0.275 -0.081 
gains rotat 0.051 -0.187 0.247 -0.011 
Gains on the cognitive tests showed only a weak correlation with gains on the 
three metacognitive tests. Some negative correlations were found between gains 
on the conservation and drawing tests and the three metacognitive tests.. There 
was a stronger correlation between raw scores for the experimental and control 
schools on pre-test drawing and pre-test metamemory (exp 0.573, cont 0.511). 
Scores for the experimental schools on pre-test mental rotation correlated with 
experimental schools scores on pre-test drawing (0.579). 
5.5 Discussion 
The lack of strong correlations between gains on cognitive and metacognitive tests 
could be due to methodological issues or to theoretical issues. Looking for 
correlations from the gains on these two types of test is problematic because the 
tests use different scoring methods. There was no attempt to standardize scores on 
either set of tests. Whilst significantly larger cognitive gains were reported for the 
experimental group compared to the control group (Adey et al., 2002), a 
245 
significant increase in metacognition was only reported for one test, metamemory. 
Whilst some pre-test scores correlated more highly (eg. drawing and metamemory 
and drawing and mental rotation), the pattern is not sufficiently strong to make any 
theoretical conclusions about the processes these tests were designed to examine. 
The negative correlation between conservation gains and metamemory gains is 
particularly difficult to ascribe to any theoretical cause. It seems more likely that 
this is a result of unequal scoring systems and the difficulty of comparing 
cognitive measures with metacognitive measures. The lack of a strong correlation 
between cognitive and metacognitive gains over the year defies the theoretical 
literature which has over time consistently reported positive correlations between 
cognition and metacognition, (see chapter 2). Reasons for this lack of correlation 
may include the time scale (one year not being long enough to develop 
metacognitively), the scarcity of metacognition even in the CASE@KS 1 tasks and 
the lack of facilitation of metacognition outside of CASE@KSI tasks. These 
issues are further explored in the next chapter. 
6 METACOGNITION AND ACADEMIC RESULTS 
The CASE@KS1 project measured academic attainment for the experimental and 
control groups based on the results of end of year 2 national tests in language and 
mathematics. As gains could not be calculated for the academic tests, Spearman 
rank correlations were carried out using the raw scores on the individual 
metacognition tests and the scores on the two academic tests. 
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6.1 Results of Spearman Rank Correlations 
Table 6.10 Correlations of metacognition tests and academic tests (exp and 
cont 
lang maths 
pre as learner 0.364 0.075 
pre memory 0.189 0.152 
pre rotation 0.096 0.081 
TOM (droodles) 0.247 0.155 
post memory 0.409 0.267 
post rotation 0.133 0.253 
lang 1.0 0.588 
The correlations for the combined experimental and control schools show no 
significant correlation between scores on the metacognition tests and scores on 
national curriculum tests in language and mathematics. 
When the experimental schools are partialed out there is a stronger correlation 




The analysis of the test data found no significant correlation between scores on 
any of the tests of metacognition and scores on national key stage I tests in 
mathematics and language. 
These results counter other research (discussed in chapter 2) which suggests that 
metacognition has a more positive effect on academic performance. Recent 
research has investigated this notion along with an exploration of the nature of 
metacognition itself. Veenman, Wilhelm and Beishuizen (2004), tested children 
of 9,11,14 and university students on computerized tasks in the domains of 
biology and geography, where participants used the computer to test the effects of 
different variables on a particular dependent variable eg. water, light, size of pot 
on plant growth. The results of their correlational analysis of intellectual ability, 
metacognition and learning performance found a high correlation between these 
factors. By partialing intellectual ability they performed semi-partial correlations 
to find the contribution of metacognition to learning performance. For their 
youngest three age groups they found that metacognition significantly contributed 
to learning performance, but not so for university students. Their results led them 
to conclude that metacognition is a general factor related to the individual rather 
than domain specific. However, their conceptualisation of metacognition was of 
metacognitive skill and this may still only be one metacognitive process linked to 
problem solving, rather than a general process, responsible for monitoring and 
controlling the whole of cognition. 
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It is not clear to what extent the UK national academic tests at the end of key stage 
I require metacognition or what type of metacognition. It is possible that 
metacognition correlates with academic performance on only some types of tasks. 
However, this study is too small in scale to make those generalisations. It is also 
possible that methodological problems of measurement are confounding these 
results. 
One interesting finding is the correlation between metamemory and language and 
theory of mind and language. This finding parallels the research of Thorpe and 
Satterly (1990), who also found a link between language ability and high scores on 
tests of metacognition. Their research however, was concerned with verbal 
language ability, whereas the academic test here is concerned with written 
language ability. There may still be some overlap between these two media and 
verbal language ability is explored further in chapters 7 and 8. 
7 SUMMARY 
This chapter reported quantitative and qualitative analyses of data derived from 
four tests of metacognition: self as learner, metamemory, theory of mind and 
mental rotation. The aim was to answer two broad research questions: 
1. Can metacognitive ability be enhanced ? 
2. Are metacognitive gains related to cognitive/academic gains ? 
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Question I encompassed questions around the nature of metacognition itself. Is it 
one construct or many different ones? What is metacognition for very young 
children? How can metacognition be measured ? Question 2 concentrated on 
whether performance on metacognitive tests correlates with performance on 
Piagetian tests of conservation, with a spatial awareness drawing test and with UK 
national curriculum academic tests in language and mathematics. 
Results of the four individual tests of metacognition administered to 21 
experimental school children and 16 control school children were produced for 
each test. Chi square tests explored whether the CASE@KS1 project had 
significantly enhanced the metacognitive ability of the experimental school 
children above the control school children. The results of the Self as Learner test 
suggested that whilst children developed metacognitively in this area over the year 
the CASE@KSI project had no greater influence on this development than the 
normal primary school learning environment and maturation. 
Results of the interpretative theory of mind test showed a qualitative difference in 
reasoning and the explanations given by the experimental group compared to the 
control group. As this test was not administered at the start of the year it was not 
possible to say what influence the CASE@KSI intervention had. 
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The metamemory test showed a greater gain for the experimental group than for 
the control group. It was suggested that the CASE@KS I intervention had a 
positive effect on the development of metamemory in the experimental group. 
A test of mental rotation was used as an example of problem solving. The aim 
was to see if children of this age could explain their own cognitive processing in 
terms of how they solved this problem. Results of this test showed that over the 
year there was very little improvement in the children's explanations of how they 
solved this problem. The chi square results showed no significant difference 
between experimental and control children. 
This chapter also explored the construct of metacognition itself. Results of the 
four tests were subject to correlational analysis to determine whether they were 
testing one general factor of metacognition or several different factors. Results of 
the correlation suggested that the four factors of metacognition tested were in fact 
distinct and separate items. Children who scored highly on one test did not 
necessarily score highly on the other three. 
In order to explore further the construct of metacognition in terms of children in 
year one classrooms, the test data were subject to a phenomenological analysis. 
Rich descriptions produced by this method gave a valuable insight into how 
children of five and six years old reflect upon and explain their own thinking. The 
analysis shows firstly, that children of this age are capable of metacognitive 
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processing and secondly, that they describe not only what they know about their 
own thinking, but also what they feel about different aspects of thinking. The 
phenomenological analysis helped to define metacognition for this project, as 
knowledge of cognition, feelings about cognition and the active process of 
monitoring and controlling cognition. 
This chapter has investigated the use of tests to measure metacognition. In doing 
so issues of validity, reliability and consistency have emerged. Achieving tests of 
metacognition that can be used with this age group has proved difficult. As the 
construct of metacognition appears to involve different factors rather than one 
general one, standardised and age-related tests of specific areas of metacognition 
need to be developed. 
The final section of the chapter sought to explore the extent to which 
metacognition is related to cognition and to academic performance. Again 
methodological issues of test measurement were confounding variables. However, 
a correlational analysis of metacognitive gains on three of the four metacognitive 
tests and cognitive gains as measured by the main CASE@KS I project were 
carried out. Metacognitive scores and scores of academic attainment from national 
tests taken a year later were subject to Spearman rank correlation. The results of 
both these analyses showed no significant correlation between metacognition and 
cognition and between metacognition and academic performance. 
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The results of this chapter show that whilst metacognition can be enhanced in 
specific areas such as metamemory, other aspects of metacognition may develop 
automatically given a normal primary school environment. Different aspects of 
metacognition appear to develop differently and whilst some aspects may be 
useful in some areas of cognition, it is by no means clear from these results what 
the connection between metacognition and academic attainment is. 
The next chapter looks more specifically at metacognition and learning. In order 
to do this metacognition needs to be observed in a classroom setting. This chapter 
has produced a working definition of metacognition for this project and informed 
by the phenomenological descriptions from the children these findings are carried 
over to and inform the observational method used in chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 
ME TA COGNITION IN THE CLASSROOM 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A row offlower paintings is drying on a washing line across the classroom. In 
the far corner three small children wearing large headphones are listening to 
audio stories, whilst two others read picture books and squash onto the same 
beanbag. At the large butler sink a group are floating and sinking a variety of 
things. There is a lot of shouting as one boy scatters plastic counters over the 
water, some sink and some float. Over in the home corner, last week's shop has 
become an alter, and three children are dressing it with pretend icons. Two 
children jostle for space on the computer, which bleeps, groans and plays a 
tune every few seconds. An assistant is cutting up pieces of felt, whilst another 
works quietly in a corner with a boy. The teacher's "noiseometer ", a home 
made paper device stuck on the side of the white board has been raised again 
and is now in the red zone. The sun streams in through the large windows onto 
a group finishing their stained glass window pictures. Their fingers are sticky 
with PVA, the desks are mottled with multi-coloured fragments of cellophane. 
Every bit of the walls is covered in posters, writing displays, maths puzzles, 
alphabet-friezes and pictures o animals, plants and shells. 
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Year one classrooms are colourful, busy, often noisy, creative and potentially 
confusing places. They bubble over with life, with social interactions, with the 
minutiae of human activity. Yet however colourful and confusing the year one 
classroom first appears, it is also a highly structured environment. The National 
Curriculum, the Numeracy Hour, the Literacy Hour, language support, special 
needs support, teachers, assistants and voluntary helpers all work within a 
framework designed to aid the educational development of all the children. Into 
this structure comes CASE@KS 1, which is based on collaborative problem 
solving and designed to accelerate the cognitive development of the children. The 
CASE@KS1 project provided a good opportunity to investigate metacognition in 
year one classrooms. The CASE@KS I project has metacognition as one of the 
five pillars, which form the structure of all case tasks. If teachers follow the 
CASE@KS1 programme they should be seeking to facilitate metacognitive 
processing during the collaborative problem solving CASE activities. In addition, 
the National Numeracy Strategy, which is put into practice as the numeracy hour 
in primary schools, includes a period of reflection on what has been learned at the 
end of the lesson. Teachers are encouraged to ask pupils how they worked out 
their answers, in order to promote reflection on their thinking processes. 
The aim in carrying out observations of CASE and numeracy hour lessons in the 
experimental and control schools was to answer the following research questions, 
which arose from the main research question 3: 
Q3: Ilow is metacognition facilitated in year one classrooms? 
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a) Is metacognition apparent in year one classrooms? 
b) What do teachers do to effect metacognitive processing in their pupils? 
c) Are teachers successful in provoking metacognitive responses from pupils? 
d) What other variables affect the development of metacognition in year one 
classrooms? 
This chapter, firstly discusses general issues arising from the observation method 
and relates these to the specific issues of observing in year one classrooms; 
method, content, frequency, recording and relationships are discussed. Secondly, 
the specific aspects of CASE@KS I activities and numeracy hour lessons are 
described. In particular, in terms of CASE tasks, collaboration, group work and 
problem solving are important aspects of the programme. The numeracy hour also 
includes whole class and group work sessions and these two structures are 
discussed. Thirdly, a method of analysis of the observations is presented. This 
new method is based on both the theoretical model of metacognition developed by 
Flavell (1979), to form categories of children's metacognitive behaviour and on a 
grounded approach which uses the transcribed observational data to form 
categories of teacher behaviours that facilitate metacognition. Examples of these 
categories as present in the data are given and explained. 
Section 5 presents a small quantitative element, in the form of frequency counts of 
teachers' behaviours aimed at facilitating metacognition, (hereafter called teacher 
FM behaviours) and children's metacognitive behaviours, (hereafter called child 
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M behaviours) as categorised above. Frequency counts of these coded behaviours 
were made for both CASE tasks and numeracy lessons in experimental and control 
schools. This gives a general indication of how much metacognitive behaviour is 
going on in these lessons. An analysis by category shows which aspects of 
metacognition are most frequently employed in which lessons. 
Section 6 provides examples of excerpts from CASE tasks and numeracy lessons, 
illustrating the interaction between teachers and children in terms of metacognitive 
behaviours. This analysis is discussed in terms of the possible variables that are 
impacting on these behaviours. 
2 OBSERVATION METHOD 
Pilot observations for this project, (see chapter 4) undertaken in schools, which 
were not part of the main study, raised a number of issues. These can be 
generalised to the use of observation, as a method for collecting data for 
educational research. These centre around a) the effect of the observer on the 
observed; b) what to observe; c) how often to observe; d) how to record the 
observation; e) how relationships between the various participants develop over 
the observation period; f) how to interpret and analyse the findings. .. - . 
2.1 Observer/observed 
"When the observers are physically present and 
physically approachable the concept of the observer 
as non-participant, though sociologically correct is 
psychologically misleading" (Gussow, 1964) 
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This proved to be the case in the classroom observations for this project. Whilst 
originally, I sought to be a non participant observer of a group of children, 
working with their teacher, on a CASE@KS I task, or working as a group in a 
numeracy lesson, without the teacher, it soon became obvious that the above 
statement was true. Simply sitting at, or near a table, with a group of children 
renders you a "helping adult". In the CASE tasks this was not so noticeable, 
because the teacher was present and she obviously took precedence over a 
"visiting adult". However, in the non-CASE observations, it was impossible not to 
engage with the children to some extent. They asked for help or sought to engage 
me in conversation or asked my opinion about minor disputes around the table. 
By the time of the observations, I had already met all the children I was observing, 
during the pre-intervention testing period. Undertaking the four tests, (chapter 6), 
with each child individually, had led to some kind of relationship with them. Each 
child would already have some opinion of what I was like and what I might do for 
a job. In turn, I must have formed some impressions of each individual child, eg. 
that this one is shy, or that one is very chatty. Thus, it seems likely that, when 
observing the groups, the children would relate to me based on their earlier 
impressions. I had to become aware of my impressions of the individual child, in 
order to bracket them and understand how they might have affected my 
observation of the group, for instance paying more attention to one child rather 
than another. 
"The researcher should not waste time trying to 
eliminate "investigator effects" instead she should 
concentrate on understanding those effects" 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983) 
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During the observation year, field notes were made about some of these 
interactions between the children and myself, in order to enable me to reflect on 
the role of observer and to keep track of changes in relationships. This becomes 
important when seeking to untangle the various variables involved in a year one 
classroom. 
2.2 What to observe 
The observations for this project were focussed observations. In the experimental 
schools, the CASE groups organised by the teacher, consisted of six children in 
schools B and C, five children in school D and by Christmas, of the intervention 
year, only four children in school A. There was also a slight drop in numbers in 
the control schools. School X had five children in my focus group, as did school Z 
and school Y had six children. The observations were focussed on these small 
groups. These were the same children that were tested at the beginning and end of 
the intervention year. In the experimental schools, the groups were observed 
doing CASE@KS1 tasks with their teacher and were observed during the 
numeracy hour. In the control schools the groups were observed during the 
numeracy hour. Within this structure, the observations concentrated on trying to 
identify any aspects of metacognition and the context in which these happened. 
Whilst most attention was given to children's speech and verbal interactions with 
each other and with the teacher, some non verbal cues were recorded, when these 
seemed significant. After a while, it became it easier to judge that someone was 
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bored or had switched off from the task. Sometimes this could be related to 
dynamics within the group, but at other times it was more difficult to understand 
why this had happened. In addition to this focussed observing, field notes were 
made on the more general aspects, such as the classroom environment; what had 
happened just before the lesson; what was about to happen after the lesson and the 
number and type of interruptions during the lesson. Field notes were made about 
developing relationships between myself and the participants, about my perception 
of the school as a whole, interactions with other teachers and head teachers and 
reflections about how teachers and children perceived my role, (see appendix 7.1). 
These were used to ensure that I was consciously aware of these aspects. They 
were not usually used in the analysis unless they seemed particularly pertinent to 
the development of metacognition. 
2.3 how often 
As this project is located within the larger structure of the CASE@KS I project, 
(which involved a team of five researchers), the project directors arranged access 
to the schools. Restrictions were made to enable all the researchers, engaged on 
the main project, and on their own individual projects, equal access to the 
experimental and control schools, without overloading the schools, or becoming 
too intrusive. So observations had to be carried out during the CASE@KS 1 
intervention year, beginning in September 1999 and ending in July 2000. The 
project aimed to be sympathetic to the pressures on teachers and as such there 
were periods of time when access was not sought, for instance in the last couple of 
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weeks of term, especially the Christmas term, or when staff were out on training or 
off sick. Consequently, for this project, 48 observations of CASE lessons were 
made over the year. Each observation lasted between 30 and 40 minutes. In order 
to lessen the impact on the schools, individual researchers were asked not to turn 
up for observations too early, or to hang around after the observations, unless 
invited by the teacher or head teacher. In practice, turning up 5 to 10 minutes 
before the lesson still allowed enough time over the year to gather field notes on 
the school as a whole, on the staff room culture, on the relationships between staff 
and the head teacher and on other staff such as language support assistants and 
classroom assistants. This all helped to form a broad picture of the organisation 
and provide a context for looking at important variables in the development of 
metacognition. In addition to the 48 CASE observations, 12 observations were 
made of numeracy lessons in the experimental schools and 9 observations were 
made of numeracy lessons in the control schools. These non-case observations all 
lasted an hour and tended to end before a recess period, lunch or playtime. 
2.4 how to record 
During the pilot phase of this project different methods of recording observations 
had been tried. Originally, an observation schedule was produced, but this was 
dropped because, whilst it focussed on some important aspects of the lesson, it 
limited the type of data collected. Whilst this project does not claim to be 
ethnographic, a return to the literature, especially that of ethnographers, such as 
Wolcott, Delamont, Hammersley and Atkinson, provided useful and thought 
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provoking examples of recording observational data. Wolcott in particular 
provides useful strategies for deciding how to look at an event including the 
paradoxical - 
1) look at everything 
2) look at nothing in particular 
(Wolcott, 1981) 
Trying to look at everything, involves making notes about aspects of the classroom 
which are not restricted to the focus group activity. This was often done before the 
lesson began, or if there was a prolonged interruption, or sometimes at the end of 
the lesson, whilst the children were clearing away. As much of the perceived 
ambience of the classroom as possible, was recorded in field notes. The second 
instruction, to observe nothing in particular, could also be undertaken in these 
otherwise empty minutes and as I interpreted the instruction, it involved being in 
the classroom, soaking up the atmosphere and waiting for something to catch my 
attention. On one occasion, this was one of my focus group, Sarah, trying to 
explain to the teacher why she was late for registration and being helped out by 
another one of the group, Kali. Sarah had comforted Kali in the toilets, because 
she had been bullied by another child, thus making Sarah late for registration, 
whilst Kali had made it on time. It was interesting to note this. Would this spirit 
of co-operation and empathy carry over into the CASE task immediately after 
registration and if so, would that positively or negatively affect the amount of 
metacognitive thinking going on in the lesson? 
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During the CASE group work and the control lesson observations, all verbal 
interactions between the children and between children and teacher were tape 
recorded, by placing a microphone in the centre of the group work table. In whole 
class situations, preceding numeracy or literacy group work, a microphone was 
placed in the general area of the children. In these lessons, children tended to sit on 
the carpet as one large group, before splitting into smaller groups. In addition, 
notes were made, recording some speech verbatim, in case the microphone had not 
picked up that particular instance and as a marker to aid voice recognition. Year 
one classrooms can be very noisy and small children can speak very quietly, so it 
is important to focus on listening very carefully to what is going on and to write 
down as much as possible, using the tape recording for back up. Video was tried 
during the pilot phase, but was not used during the main project, because it seemed 
too intrusive. It also proved difficult to video a group successfully and make notes. 
Writing is a more normal activity for a classroom, than video, even in the 21 S` 
century and so a researcher, sitting with a group of children, making notes, is not 
as intrusive a presence, as someone filming. In addition, all the children in this 
project had already encountered me recording them during the four tests and I had 
at that time explained the tape recorder to them and allowed them to investigate it 
and listen to their voices. Thus by the time of the classroom observations, the tape 
recorder had lost some of its novelty value. Notes were made about how the 
teacher structured the CASE lesson and how the group was controlled. These 
proved to be important aspects in the facilitation of metacognition and resonated 
with data from the teacher interviews, (See chapter 9). 
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2.5 Relationships 
Something has already been said about the relationship between researcher and 
participant. In addition, this observation period also brought up issues around the 
relationship between the teachers and myself. Such relationships can be 
problematic as Sara Delamont points out: 
"It is hard to recognize that as a researcher one is a 
nuisance (at best) and many people in the setting 
may actively resent, fear or resist one's presence" 
(Delamont, 1992 p. 122). 
The roles of observer and observed are beset with problems of power. On the one 
hand, teachers can feel threatened, or on trial when an observer is in the classroom, 
yet on the other hand, teachers can take the stance of proving just how difficult and 
complicated their job is, compared to the observer's job. Perceived status and age 
of the teacher and observer adds to this dynamic. In some ways a senior 
researcher may find the dynamic not in their favour, as young or newly qualified 
teachers may invest them with the role of their college tutors. Novice researchers 
may come up against experienced teachers, who feel antithetic towards external 
influence on their practice. In the CASE@KS1 project, an extra dynamic was 
introduced, in the sense that the project was set up with a team of researchers from 
the university, in collaboration with the local education authority. The senior 
researcher, link teacher and project directors were all involved in the professional 
development of the teachers and in mentoring them through CASE project lessons 
and providing feedback. My position, as an individual researcher, on one particular 
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aspect of the project, was different. However, the teachers, all new to CASE 
theory, tended not to make the distinction and at the beginning of the project, I was 
often asked questions about CASE theory, or expected to provide feedback on the 
observed lesson. Questions such as "did I do that right? " "I wasn't sure about this 
bit, do you think it went OK? " etc. were frequent at the beginning of the project. 
In order to solve this dilemma, I decided to respond honestly to all questions 
asked, but not to judge or suggest different ways of working to the teachers. 
Whenever there was an opportunity, I stressed that the purpose of my research was 
to study the development of metacognition in the children, thus taking the 
emphasis off the teachers. At the beginning of the project, three of the teachers 
seemed rather more hostile to my presence, than did the others. Ironically, by the 
end of the project, I felt I knew these teachers better than the others and by that 
time some kind of friendship had grown between us. The development of 
relationships with teachers during a research project is a process based on several 
factors: 
1) Conduct - the obvious things such as keeping to the arranged schedule for 
observations, waiting to be invited into such places as the staffroom or assembly 
and leaving promptly, so that the teacher's time is not taken up with chatting about 
the researcher's business, unless the teacher wishes to. 
2) Status - remembering that as a visitor to someone else's working environment, 
it is not appropriate to comment on that environment. Status also involves whether 
you are seen as an expert or not. It would be disingenuous to pretend that you 
know less than you do about something. In order to develop an honest relationship 
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with research participants it seems best to be clear about your level of expertise in 
a particular area, but not to generalise this to all areas of education, and not to 
provide opinions on other educational theories. 
3) Role - the researcher should make their role clear and 
frequently refer to the 
purpose of their research. Questions should be answered honestly, but one needs 
to take care not to influence the teacher's practice and thus the project data. 
4) Friendship - as most educational researchers will have worked in education in 
some way in the past, it is not unlikely that friendships with research participants 
will form, based on a shared understanding of the work or training. Friendships 
can be helpful to the project, in that the teacher in question begins to relax and act 
more normally in the researcher's presence. However, they can also cause 
problems, if the teacher begins to see the researcher as a "co-conspirator" in the 
project. In order to counter this, it is important to let friendships develop as 
naturally as possible, based on shared experience, other than in the educational 
field. It is best then to chat about things other than the project and to get to know 
the teacher as a person, rather than as a teacher only. It is important to keep in 
mind the end of the project and the researcher leaving. 
5) Concern - the researcher should take responsibility for the feelings the project 
is producing in the participants and seek to minimize any negative fall out from the 
project. Trust, based on scrupulous regard to confidentiality tends to make 
participants feel safe with the project and minimizes negative feelings. 
6) Respect - the participants should be informed about the outcome of the project 
and provided with copies or references to the published material. 
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These general points have emerged from the experience of observing in 
classrooms for this project. 
Relationships with the children, as research participants, were also maintained 
with regard to the above points, where appropriate, and with a greater concern and 
reflection on the issues of power in the relationships. 
3 GROUPS AND TASKS 
3.1 Group work 
One aspect common to both CASE@KS I tasks and the numeracy hour, is the idea 
of group work. However, this is conceptualised differently in each case. In the 
CASE@KS 1 tasks the aim is for a group to collaborate, to solve a problem based 
task, with the support of the teacher. The teacher's role is to facilitate the smooth 
running of the group, to lead the task through the CASE structure (the five pillars) 
and to offer direction, if the discussion should falter. Thus the whole CASE@KS 1 
activity is conducted as group work. The numeracy hour format usually consists 
of a whole class introduction to the topic, mostly taking place on the carpet. The 
teacher leads, asking questions of individual children and explaining the- 
mathematical content. This usually takes about fifteen to twenty minutes and then 
the children go to their group tables to work on examples of that day's topic. 
Whilst seated together these children may sometimes be working in pairs or 
individually. During observations for this project, the children were never asked 
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to work as a group of more than three, although they did all spend some time 
talking to others on their table, either about the task, or just socially. During this 
group work period, the teacher tended to move around the classroom, visiting each 
table in turn for a few minutes, or she sometimes became engaged with one group 
for longer. 
In the CASE@KS1 programme, three tasks at the beginning of the year are 
specifically designed to encourage working together, listening and communicating 
skills. A great deal of research has been done into group work and there is a 
general consensus that groups need time to become effective and that some kind of 
training in working as a group is necessary (Bennett & Dunne, 1990; Galton & 
Williamson, 1992; Hockaday, 1984; Kutnick & Rogers, 1994). Hardman and 
Beverton (1993), go even further, in suggesting that to work effectively as a group, 
pupils need to be made aware of what they term "metadiscoursal" skills These 
include showing children how to question or challenge, how to listen and take a 
positive interest in the group, skills of turn taking, including yielding a turn and 
holding the floor, the use of discourse markers such as "well", "I think" and 
paralinguistic features. 
A distinction needs to be made between co-operative group work and collaborative 
group work. Galton & Williamson, (1992), define co-operative group work as 
when children are allocated individual tasks as part of a group project. The project 
comes together at the end when the individuals contribute their own piece to the 
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project. Collaboration involves all the children working towards a single outcome 
and producing an agreed solution through discussion and sharing of ideas. The 
task then must also be suitable for collaborative work; it must require multiple 
perspectives and have the possibility of different solutions, (Kutnick, 1994). 
3.2 Group Formation 
Research on the formation of groups for collaborative working has highlighted the 
importance of taking into account various variables when forming the groups, 
(Bennett & Cass, 1989). These include group size; level of ability; friendships, 
age, personality and gender. There is no definitive answer to the question of what 
the most effective make up of a group is. For the CASE@KS I focus groups, the 
teachers were asked to form groups that were moderately mixed, in terms of 
attainment levels and gender. Heterogeneous/mixed ability groups have been 
found to work most effectively on problem solving tasks and to make use of more 
elaborate interactions, (Slavin, 1990; Webb, 1991). Friendship grouping is 
problematic, with some research showing it to have a limiting effect on group 
effectiveness (Webb, 1991), whilst other research has shown it to be advantageous 
(Hockaday, 1984). Groups of six were chosen, as experience had suggested that 
this was a good size for collaborative work and it worked practically with classes 
of 30 children, (Adey, 2002). The numeracy hour groups were slightly more 
problematic, as the tendency is for teachers to group children in numeracy by 
attainment level. The experimental school teachers were asked to keep the CASE 
focus groups together for numeracy during the year. The control school teachers 
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were asked to form a moderately mixed group of six children that would be kept 
together in numeracy for the year, to form a focus group for this research. All the 
teachers participating in this research seemed happy to comply with this and kept 
the focus groups for this project together, for the year, in these lessons. 
3.3 The Tasks 
Task type and task structure has been shown to have an effect on the ability of a 
group to work collaboratively, (Yager, Johnson, & Johnson, 1985). King, (1991) 
and Meloth & Deering, (1994), showed that children who were made aware of task 
structures and given models of how to ask questions, developed better 
metacognitive awareness, when measured on post intervention retention and task 
comprehension, than students who were simply allowed to work co-operatively. 
In addition, group interactions have also been found to be affected by the type of 
task, (Cohen, 1994; Webb, 1985). Some tasks while seemingly appearing to be 
collaborative work, really only require sharing of information or dividing up of the 
work into individual tasks. Other tasks require high levels of collaboration, 
including the metacognitive elements of planning, evaluating, choosing strategies 
and checking. The CASE@KS1 tasks are of an elaborated problem solving 
structure, designed to provoke intellectual stimulation, facilitate collaborative 
working and provide "metacognitive experiences" as delineated by Flavell, (1979). 
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The tasks given during the group work period of the numeracy hour varied. 
Sometimes these involved worksheets, which were to be completed individually, 
but could involve collaboration as a pair. Other tasks involved two or three 
children working together to produce one completed project, for instance a bar 
chart or a diagram of how different coins can be combined to make a particular 
amount. Observations of these periods showed that quite often, when asked to 
work together in this collaborative way, one child did most of the work. 
Sometimes the tasks seemed easier to do together, but at other times they seemed 
easier to do alone. For instance trying to draw around coins on one piece of paper 
really involves taking turns and sometimes this meant one child taking more turns 
than the other. 
3.3.1 CASE(aýKS1 Tasks 
The 26 CASE@KSI activities, now published as "Let's Think"! (Adey et al., 
2001)), are grouped into four of the schemata identified as forming concrete 
operations in Piagetian developmental theory, (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). The 
schemata used are seriation, classification, point of view and causality. Within a 
schema each task is structured by the pillars of CASE theory, (Adey & Shayer, 
1994). These are: concrete preparation, cognitive conflict, social construction, 
metacognition and bridging. For this project, the teacher working with a group of 
six children, must structure the activity using these pillars, whilst facilitating 
collaborative working, to achieve a consensual agreement to the problem. 
CASE theory has described the case pillars as follows: 
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Concrete Preparation: Introduction to the problem 
Context 
Introduction to materials and vocabulary needed 
Cognitive Conflict: Intellectual challenge 
Difficulty geared to Vygotskian theory of ZPD with 
support provided by the teacher 
Social Construction: Discussing ideas within the group 
Asking for explanations 
Describing own ideas 
Metacognition: Becoming conscious of one's own thinking 
Bridging: Finding other contexts within which the schema can 
be used 
(Adey et al., 2001) 
3.3.2 An example of a CASEIKSI task: 
Schema: Classification 
Task : Clowns 
Timing: Spring Term 
Material: 
6 base pictures of clowns 
6 pairs of shoes, pairs of gloves, trousers, badge, bat and bow tie of 
different colours 
6 pairs of shoes, pairs of gloves, trousers, badge, hat and bow tie of 
different patterns 
Task: 
For each child to dress a clown so that none of his clothes have the same 
colour or pattern. 
CASE@KS1 activities aim to facilitate metacognition through the interaction of 
particular tasks with the other key aspects of the CASE programme, such as 
collaborative group work and CASE pedagogy. 
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Whilst CASE@KSI activities are structured around the above pillars, it is clear 
when observing a real group in action on a CASE task, that the pillars overlap. 
Observations throughout the year and subsequent analysis of those observations, 
sought to tease out the metacognitive aspects of a group working on a CASE task, 
from other aspects and to come to some understanding of how the dynamics of the 
group, within the larger classroom structure, impact on metacognitive processing. 
4 ANALYSIS OF OBSERVATIONS 
Initial readings of the transcribed observations showed that at this age (5-6yrs), the 
majority of the interactions were between teacher and child/children. When the 
children interacted with each other, they did so, largely in terms of themselves, 
making statements beginning with "I". Interactions between children and children 
were also largely in the form of "I" as in "I don't understand what you are saying". 
Based on these initial observations, a coding system was developed using two 
methods. Firstly, the need to identify the children's metacognitive statements led 
to a theory based approach. The theory was derived from Flavell's description of 
metacognition as involving stored metacognitive knowledge, in the categories of 
person, task and strategy variables and monitoring and control aspects, in_the form 
of metacognitive strategies/actions. 
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Flavell suggested that metacognition comes about from the interaction of 
metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive strategies and metacognitive 
experiences. Metacognitive experiences are: 
"any conscious cognitive or affective experiences that 
accompany and petain to any intellectual enterprise" 
(Flavell, 1979)p. 906 
This would include, for example, both fleeting feelings of incomprehension and 
lengthy dwelling on a feeling of puzzlement. 
It seems clear from Flavell's theory that provoking metacognitive experiences 
through engaging children in novel situations that require a great deal of thought, 
including planning and evaluation, is likely to lead to the development of stored 
metacognitive knowledge and the ability to monitor and control cognition through 
metacognitive strategies. 
The analysis of the classroom observations sought to identify any of these aspects 
of metacognition, as they are shown in the children's verbal behaviour, during a 
problem solving activity. Thus, the following coding system was developed to 
label these different categories of metacognition. 
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4.1 Coding of Children's Metacognitive Behaviours (M 
Behaviours) 





Code Explanation Example 
SELF Shows knowledge of self "I know what to do" 
in relation to cognition "I love hard work" 
OTH Refers to what others "She doesn't know" 
think/desire "He doesn't want to be 
last" 
UNIV Refers to universals of "We've got to solve a 
cognition problem" 
UND Questions task "Something is missing" 
information 
PRE Predicts success/failure "We'd be done in a 
minute" 
RAT Refers to ease/difficulty "This is so hard to do" 
COMP Compares with other "This is like the stairs 
tasks one" 
- 
le-EVA Evaluates: indicates "We should build up the 
knowledge about what boxes, that will be 
might be useful quicker" 
PLAN Refers to planning the "We need to know which 
task way to go round the 
table" 
"We should talk about it 
together" 
Metacognitive Strategies/Actions 
PAR Paraphrases to confirm 
understanding 
"Did you mean ....? 
" 
SQU Asks a question of self "I think that's right, is 
it? " 
CHE Checks work "This one's good, this 
one's not" 
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To help to answer the question of "What teachers do to facilitate metacognitive 
processing in their pupil", the transcribed observations were searched for any 
aspect of teacher verbal behaviour that could be categorised as aiming to facilitate 
metacognition. Twelve categories of behaviour were identified from the 
transcripts and labelled as follows: 
4.2 Coding of Teacher Facilitating Metacognitive Behaviours (FM 
Behaviours) 
Table 7.2 Teacher FM Behaviours - Codes 
Code Explanation Example 
TS Refers to self-learning "What could you do if 
strategies you've got problems? " 
TK Questions acquisition of "How do you know 
knowledge that? " 
TI Seeks information "What are you going to 
do now? " 
TE Aids explanations "X explained how she 
has sorted these into 
colours" 
TQ Questions, comments on, "Why did you do it like 
or asks for explanations that? " 
of strategies 
TP Asks for predictions of "Will this work? " 
success 
TL Shows expectations of "How are we going to do 
planning this, what do we need to 
think about? 
TO Expects checking "Check what you are 
counting in" 
TC Refers to own cognitive "I don't understand it 
___ _processes either" TT Refers to cognitive "We all need to think 
processes in general really hard about this" 
TU Refers to universals of We are going to solve a 
cognition problem 
TV Prompts evaluation "Was it difficult to do or 
was it eas ?" 
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Two points need to be made about this type of qualitative research. Firstly, 
compartmentalising verbal interactions in this way is artificial. Boundaries are 
drawn around the categories by the researcher, but in reality some categories may 
overlap. Coding is a tool that allows large amounts of data to be organised and 
managed and the same data can be coded in different ways depending on the 
research question. In this case, only examples of metacognitive behaviours are 
coded, although notes were made about other aspects of the class. The second 
point to note is that the categories are interpretations of verbal behaviour. They 
have been interpreted as facilitating metacognition, because they ask questions that 
require one to think not about the solution to a problem, but about how to get to 
that solution, or to reflect on one's own feelings of knowing something, or to 
become conscious of thinking about something. Sometimes, it is only clear from 
the context of the individual speech act that the teacher is engaging at a 
metacognitive, rather than cognitive level. For instance a simple question taken in 
isolation such as "how did you do that? " could be referring to the cognitive 
strategy used to solve a problem and the answer might be "we put the biggest here 
and the smallest here". But, "how did you do that? " could also be metacognitive if 
it refers to the metacognitive strategy. In this latter sense, the question is a short 
form of asking, "how did you know how to do that? " This may get an answer 
referring to past knowledge or to an analogy, "because it's the same problem as 
the sticks" or a more general answer, "I had to think about it and decide how to 
organise it". A critic may suggest that these two questions are sufficiently 
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different to be obvious in the text, but in reality, people are not nearly so precise 
with language and meaning is often conveyed by stress and tone, rather than a 
change of words. Sometimes, of course, the meaning will not be conveyed 
accurately and a teacher, believing themselves to be asking questions that provoke 
metacognitive thinking, may in fact be getting either rote answers, usually 
beginning with "I think" or answers on the cognitive, rather than metacognitive 
level. Inter-rater coding of a sample of six observations by three coders at different 
times produced 95% agreement. Coding erred on the side of caution with disputed 
areas not included in the final analysis. 
There are two basic types of FM behaviour that the teachers engaged in. One is 
asking questions with a metacognitive element to them or making statements with 
a metacognitive element. Table 7.2 gives examples of both questions and 
statements. The second FM behaviour and one that is still coded using the twelve 
category system is that of modeling the behaviour required. A good example of 
this is shown in the extract below: 
4.3 School B CASE task -Buttons, Autumn Term 
Towards the end of the task the children are coming to some agreement about how 
a variety of buttons should be sorted out and put into order: 
275: Andre: Oh these have got squashed up together, but we've got no more to 
276: go with it, so we could squash them up together, ....... 
[continues at some 
length] 
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277: Teacher: I don't think I 'm, following what you 're saying. "1'C 
278: Andre: I think we should squash them all together because these are all 
279: squashed together 
280: Fumi: Why do they have to be stuck together ? 
281: Teacher: 1 don't understand why they have to be stuck together ? 7C 
The example is presented not as an example of children explaining their thinking 
behind their actions, but as an example of the teacher modeling the behaviour of 
not understanding. By participating in the group on a level with the children and 
speaking of her own incomprehension of Andre's explanation, the teacher models 
good metacognitive behaviour and this allows Fumi to ask the question that has 
been bothering her and, it turns out, other members of the group also. 
Whilst the four teachers in the experimental schools tried hard to ask questions 
which would facilitate metacognition, modeling behaviour was a much rarer 
occurrence. This contrasts with how teachers were observed to model other 
behaviour for their young students, especially social skills, - listening to others, 
treating each other with respect, not shouting, not hurting each other. It is clear 
that, with the notable exception of the School B teacher, the teachers of both 
control and experimental schools, rarely refer to their own thinking processes. 
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5 RESULTS 
5.1 TEACHER FM and CHILD M BEHAVIOURS 
Frequency counts of child M and teacher FM behaviours were made for all CASE 
activities observed and all numeracy lessons observed in both experimental and 
control school, (see appendix 7.2). These instances of metacognitive behaviour 
were totalled for the year for both CASE lessons and numeracy lessons in the 
experimental and control schools. There were many more observations made of 
CASE lessons than numeracy lessons in both experimental and control schools. 
Thus the total number of child and teacher behaviours recorded over the year was 
divided by the number of observations made, to give an average number of child 
M and teacher FM behaviours for each school, (Table 7.3 below). This count 
revealed that one experimental school (school B), had consistently high counts for 
both teacher FM and child M behaviours, and one control school (school Y), had 
consistently low counts for both types of behaviour. 
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Table 7.3 
Total number of teacher FM and child M behaviours, observed 




Average Child M 
Behaviours 
Average 
A Case task 12 184 15 104 8 
11 Case task 12 157 13 196 16 
C Case task 12 100 8 74 6 
D Case task 12 204 7 122 10 
A numeracy 3 31 9 24 8 
B numeracy 3 36 12 27 9 
C numeracy 3 22 7 6 2 
D numeracy 3 39 13 11 3 
X numeracy 3 25 8 39 13 
Y numeracy 3 7 2 15 5 
Z numeracy 3 32 10 27 9 
Spearman Rank Correlation was carried out on the frequency counts of the teacher 
FM and child M behaviours for 48 CASE@KS 1 activities in the four 
experimental schools. This would indicate if the teacher FM behaviours observed 
during these 48 tasks correlated with the child M behaviour observed during the 
same tasks. 
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The positive correlation of 0.453 is significant (p<0.0I ). This supports the 
prediction that teacher FM behaviours and child M behaviours in CASE tasks are 
positively correlated. 
Table 7.3 shows that Control school X had the highest count for child 
metacognitive behaviours in numeracy lessons and had a relatively high count for 
teacher FM behaviour in these lesson. However, further analysis by code (see 
appendix 7.2, tables A. 7.16 and A. 7.30), revealed these counts are made up from 
high scores in few categories. The teacher FM behaviours tended to be coded as 
TQ, which is teacher questioning, and asking for explanations for strategies used. 
This may not always lead to metacognitive answers. Whilst the teacher may be 
asking these questions to provoke thinking about how strategies were arrived at, 
the answers were often descriptions of the strategy used. Control school X failed 
to score in six child metacognitive categories and the relatively high total score is 
again made up of a high score in one particular category EVA. This indicates 
children evaluating a strategy they are using. 
Inspection of the frequency counts in the control schools numeracy lessons 
revealed that the high counts are frequently a product of repetitive prompts of the 
same kind by the teacher, (appendix 7.2, table A. 7.16). One limitation of this 
method of frequency count analysis is that high scores may be made from 
repetitive behaviours, rather than qualitatively different behaviours. Thus further 
analysis is always needed to understand what the prompts are. It is possible for a 
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low frequency count to reveal a broader and arguably, qualitatively better range of 
metacognitive behaviour than a higher count of repetitive behaviours. Thus the 
frequency count analysis can only be used as a starting point from which to 
explore the data using qualitative methods. However, it is interesting to note the 
categories of teacher behaviour, which are most frequently and least frequently 
used in the experimental and control schools. 
5.2 TEACHER FM BEHAVIOURS 
Frequency counts were made of the numbers of teacher behaviours coded, as 
described in table 7.2 above. These frequency counts were made for each CASE 
activity observed over the year, (see appendix 7.2 tables A. 7.4-A. 7.15). Similarly, 
frequency counts were made of teacher behaviours coded and observed during 
numeracy lessons in the experimental and control schools over the year. (See 
appendix 7.2, tables 7.16 and 7.17). The teacher FM behaviour categories with 
the least number of instances overall in experimental and control schools during 
numeracy lessons are: 
TS - refers to self-learning strategies 
TI - asking for information 
TE - aids explanation 
TP - asking for predictions of success 
TL - shows expectations of planning 
TO - expecting checking 
TC - refers to own cognitive processes 
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TU - refers to universals of cognition 
(See appendix 7.2, table A. 7.36). 
These results show that whilst there can be a relatively high number of teacher F 
M behaviours counted over the observation period, these may be a result of a 
limited range of metacognitive behaviours being repeated. Out of the twelve 
categories delineated and counted, eight categories had scores of less than 10 
instances of that particular teacher FM behaviour during the year in numeracy 
lessons. As many more observations were made of CASE lessons than numeracy 
lessons over the year, it is difficult to make comparisons. However, the teacher F 
M behaviour categories with the fewest instances in CASE lessons for all four 
experimental schools, over the year were, TS, TI, TP, TO and TU. (see appendix 
7.2, table A. 7.17) All these categories had less than 20 instances over the year. It 
appears that these categories score low instances of teacher FM behaviour in both 
numeracy lessons and in CASE tasks. 
The categories with the most number of instances overall in both the experimental 
school CASE lessons and experimental school numeracy lessons are also the same 
categories that score highest in the control school numeracy lessons. These are: 
TT - refers to cognitive processes in general 
TQ - questions, comments on or asks for explanations of strategies 
TK - questions acquisition of knowledge 
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TV scores over 10 in the control school numeracy lessons, but is a less frequent 
aspect of teacher FM behaviour in experimental school numeracy lessons, (See 
appendix 7.2, table A. 7.36) 
It is, perhaps, unsurprising that these three categories had the highest frequency 
counts in the experimental schools, as these are the aspects of facilitating 
metacognitive development most often referred to during CASE@KS I 
professional development days. Teachers are encouraged to ask questions such as 
"How do you know that? " (TK); to ask for explanations of strategies used "Why 
did you do it that way? " (TQ) and to make reference to thinking processes 
throughout the task - "We all need to think about this" (TT). The teachers are also 
asked to ensure that at the end of the lesson, the children reflect on the task (TV). 
However, whilst this appears to happen in the CASE lessons, when experimental 
school teachers transfer to numeracy lessons, they tend not to include this 
behaviour to the same extent. This may be due to other factors, such as the 
structure of the numeracy hour, time to reflect at the end of the hour, or the 
conflict between organising the class for lunch or break time and prompting 
evaluation of the lesson. However, one control school, school Z, had a high count 
for this code, (appendix 7.2, table A. 7.36), suggesting that she frequently asked her 
class to evaluate their learning at the end of the numeracy hour. V 
It is interesting, that although the experimental school teachers were encouraged to 
refer to their own cognitive processing (TC), in order to act as a model for the 
children, with the one exception of the School B teacher, the frequency of this 
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behaviour was very low. Chapter 9 seeks further understanding of teacher 
behaviours through analysis of teacher interviews. 
5.3 CHILDREN'S M BEHAVIOURS 
The transcripts of the experimental and control schools were analysed and coded 
into the four categories and twelve sub codes, (see table 7.1). In all cases only the 
interactions of the focus group children were analysed. In the numeracy lesson 
observations, the focus group children remained as a group for the middle part of 
the lesson and returned with the other groups to the whole class session at the end 
of the lesson. Frequency counts were made of these twelve behaviours for the 
whole focus group, for each CASE activity undertaken and each numeracy lesson 
observed, in the experimental and control schools, (See appendix 7.2 tables 
A. 7.18-A. 7.31) 
The child metacognitive behaviour categories with a year end total of less than ten 
instances in experimental and control schools during numeracy lessons are: 
UNIV - refers to universals of cognition 
UND - questions task information 
PRED - predicts success/failure 
COMP - compares with other tasks 
PLAN - refers to planning the task 
PAR - paraphrases to confirm understanding 
SQU - asks a question of self 
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(See appendix 7.2, tables A. 7.30 and A. 7.31) 
Thus seven out of the twelve categories have less than ten instances of that 
particular child metacognitive behaviour recorded in 21 observations of the focus 
group children, working in numeracy hour lessons. Similarly, but with the 
exception of COMP and PLAN categories, the other same five categories also 
recorded the fewest instances of those particular child metacognitive behaviours 
during CASE task observations across all the experimental schools, over the year, 
(See appendix 7.2, table A. 7.31). 
The codes of child metacognitive behaviours with the highest instances across all 
observations, both CASE and numeracy in the experimental and control schools 
are: 
SELF - Shows knowledge of self in relation to cognition 
OTH - Refers to what others think or desire 
RAT - Refers to ease/difficulty 
EVA - Evaluates 
These categories of child behaviour parallel the high frequency counts of teacher 
behaviours, in the categories, TT, TQ, TK and TV. Teachers engaging in a lot of 
questioning around the strategies employed (code TQ) generate more child 
thinking about those strategies. Similarly teachers asking lots of questions about 
how knowledge has been acquired (Code TK) generate more thinking on the part 
of the child about themselves as cognitive beings (code SELF). They may also be 
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engaging in questioning themselves in order to answer TK type questions. This 
would go along the lines of 
Teacher: how do you know that ? 
Child: (pause) I remember learning it before 
TK 
SELF 
Whether the pause is really filled with the reflective question "how do I know 
that? " we cannot tell. However, from the high number of instances of children 
referring to themselves as cognitive beings, we can speculate that given the 
opportunity, children of this age are able and willing to reflect on their thinking in 
this way. 
In the following extract it is noted that through the teacher's careful facilitation the 
children engage in the metacognitive process of evaluating and discussing 
explanations of their thinking process. In addition, Chloe in particular, has a 
metacognitive experience, when through the group interactions, she comes to 
understand something about her own cognitive explanations. 
5.4 SCHOOL B CASE TASK - BOTTLES 
This task is part of the causality schema. At first the children are presented with 
two small plastic bottles. They contain different amounts of rice. The children 
have to predict which bottle will roll down a slope. Then they test their 
predictions. They use their new knowledge of what weight of bottle will roll to 
categorise the several other bottles into rollers or non-rollers. Finally they test their 
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assumptions. This excerpt comes near the beginning of the task when the children 
are seeking to predict and explain which of the two bottles will roll. 
28. Chloe: I think he had a reason for it (referring to John's strategy) 
29. but I don't have a reason I just think the heavy one will roll 0TH 
30. Teacher: what do you think Andre? TT 
31. Andre: (no answer) 
32. Oliver: I think the lightest can go fastest and can go further, 
33. the heavy can't go so fast because its heavy so it won't go as far. 
34. Chloe: Oh, I've changed my mind. SELF 
35. John: I've changed my mind too because 1 think Oliver's idea is SELF 
36. better than my idea. RAT 
37. Teacher: And why do you think that? TT 
38. John: Because if we have lots of things in it, if it didn't have 
39. anything it would go really fast and then we wouldn 't have to pull 
40. or push it along. 
41. Joseph: If it's lighter it will go faster because it's like a ten year old 
42. and grandpa racing. The ten year old would probably win because 
43. the ten year old would be smaller and like the light bottle and he 
44. would be younger and have more strength, so light bottle will go 
45. further. COMP 
46. Teacher: Oh that :s an interesting idea. What do you think about John's 
47. idea Andre? TV 
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48. Andre: I think John 's idea is goon! RAT 
49. Teacher: What do you think about Joseph's idea, is it a good idea that 
50. we can compare people running and these bottles? TV 
51. Andre: Yes. 
52. Teacher: Why do you think it 's a good idea? TV 
53. Andre: Cos the 10 year old would be skinnier. 
54. Teacher: But is the bottle skinnier? 
55. Andre: No, it's quite fat. 
56. Teacher: Is that really like a grandfather a bottle of rice? 
57. Oliver: It is quite like a grandfather. 
58. Teacher: How do you know this one is going to go slower than 
59. this one then? 
60. Andre: Because this one has got more rice in it and this one has 
61. got less, and the light one goes. further up to this end and this one 
62. will only go about up to there. 
63. Teacher: And how do you know that? 
64. Andre: This one (bottle with less rice) will go up to there and this 




66. Teacher: How do you know that? TK 
67. Andre: Because this one has less rice. 
68. Teacher: So what does that mean? 
69. Andre: So it will go further. 
70. Teacher: Why though? Why does having less rice mean it goes further? 
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7/. Chloe: I don't understand this. SELF 
72. Teacher: He's got an idea, he thinks that the lighter one is going 
73. to go further TE 
74. Chloe: He's not telling us why. UND 
75. Teacher: Fumi why do you think Andre thinks the lighter one will go TT 
76. fiirther 
77. Fumi: This one is more... heavy one will go further. 
78. Teacher: Oh is that what you think Andre? TT 
79. Andre: This one has less and this one has more and this one will go 
80. to here and this one will go about here, might stop in the same place. 
81. Fumi: Yeah, it might go to here..... 
82. Chloe: The lightest will go further, the heavy one is slower, 
83.1 think Oliver's idea is right. RAT 
84. Andre: Yes, Yes 
85. Chloe: It's like Molly and me when we rolled down the hill and 
86 1 was lighter and rolled further. COMP 
87. Teacher: Chloe has used an example of something she has TT 
88. experienced before and she thinks that the lighter one goes further. TE 
5.4.1 Analysis 
In this extract, whilst much of the verbal interaction is between teacher and child 
in terms of question and answer, it also clear that the children are engaged with 
and responding to each other. This collaboration is facilitated by the teacher as she 
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asks different children to comment firstly on John's idea that the heavier bottle 
will roll further and then on Oliver's idea that the lighter bottle will go further. The 
teacher makes it clear that the children should evaluate the evidence given for the 
claims rather than just the claim itself (Lines: 46,49,52,56,68). This task takes 
place in the Spring term and so the group members are practised at working 
together. John appears to feel safe enough to verbalise his thoughts about his own 
idea and compare it to Oliver's (Line 35 and 36). This is no mean feat for five year 
olds to accomplish. In this extract the teacher continuously asks the children to 
consider "how they know". Yet this is not mere repetition of the same question. 
The teacher is fully involved in the group process and facilitates the inclusion of 
all the children in this process, for instance asking Andre to comment on John's 
idea (Line 46/7) or asking Fumi to comment on why she thinks Andre thinks 
something (Line 75). Whilst the teacher comments on Joseph's idea (Line 46) 
herself she also asks Andre to comment firstly on John's idea and then on 
Joseph's, thereby seeking a comparison between the two ideas. In addition the 
teacher seeks reasons for why the idea is a good one (Line 52). The teacher has 
moved the conversation away from the pragmatic level of which bottle will roll 
further, to a more abstract level of explaining and evaluating the ideas about what 
might happen. Thus the object of the interactions becomes not the bottles 
themselves, but thoughts and predictions about the bottles -a first level of 
metacognition. 
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If we consider Chloe's contribution, we find a second level of metacognition. 
Chloe begins by referring to her own thought processing, in comparison to John's 
(Line 28) "1 think he had a reason for it, but I don't have a reason ". Then in light 
of Oliver's different explanation, Chloe changes her mind (Line 34). She was 
never very sure of her first inclination anyway, as we have just seen and she is able 
to convey this confusion to the group later, (Line 71) and she goes further, 
suggesting that the reason for her confusion is the lack of a convincing explanation 
(Line 74). Finally Chloe realises that she agrees with Oliver's explanation (Line 
83), because it now fits with her own thoughts and past experiences of heavy and 
light objects (Line 85). Throughout this extract, whilst Chloe has been largely 
quiet, she has been engaged in the process of working out her own opinion. The 
collaborative nature of the group, sharing and discussing ideas and the teacher's 
careful facilitation of a metacognitive environment has enabled Chloe to work 
through a "metacognitive experience", (Flavell, 1979). 
This analysis shows how the teacher has structured her questioning to facilitate the 
children in thinking about and evaluating each other's ideas. By doing this, they 
begin to think about how they are thinking about the problem and which 
explanation seems most likely, in terms of their own experience and what they 
have just heard and observed. 
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5.5 TEACHER FM BEHAVIOUR IN NUMERACY LESSONS 
EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL SCHOOLS 
Both experimental and control schools have far fewer teacher FM behaviours 
during numeracy lessons when compared to CASE lessons. One reason for this 
may be the structure of the numeracy hours. All schools followed a similar 
structure with whole class mental arithmetic followed by what is usually called, 
group work. In reality this tended to consist of children sitting in groups, but 
working individually or at most in pairs. This was followed by a return to the 
whole class for debriefing and reflection. This structure means that teachers are 
less able to model metacognitive behaviour, since for the middle part of the lesson 
children are working alone and may or may not be visited by the teacher. 
Secondly, the nature of many of the arithmetic problems the children were 
working on gave little scope for metacognitive thinking. 
The control school numeracy lessons tended to provide teacher FM behaviours in 
a limited number of categories. These were most often in general references to 
thinking, in questioning strategy use or in questioning acquisition of knowledge. 
Planning and checking work were not evidenced nor was predicting success or 
failure and evaluating learning was only rarely seen, as in the examples below. 
There are individual differences between the control school teachers in the extent 
to which they engage in FM behaviours. Here are two control schools aiming for 
metacognition at the end of the numeracy hour: 
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5.5.1 School X Numeracy Hour Autumn Term - Last 10 minutes 
118: Teacher: One last thing before we finish off, did you frnd 
it easy or difficult? 
119: Chorus: Easy 
TV 
RAT 
120: Teacher: so what did you find easy about it? TV 
121: Louise: counting the sides, we learned the numbers 
122: Teacher: what numbers? 
123: Louise: we learned it more because we knew the numbers 
124: Teacher: did you find it hard Drew, what did you find hard 
in the beginning? TV 
125: Drew: [stays quiet] 
126: Teacher: what did you find hard Lewis, did you find anything 
127: hard about sorting them out? TV 
128: Lewis: forgot what shapes go together 
129: Teacher: OK [asks children to return to the mat where they continue to 
identify shapes from descriptions of them for last 5 mins before lunchtime] 
5.5.2 School Z Numeracy Hour Spring Term - Last 10 minutes 
109: Teacher: Put your hand up if you found the work difficult 
110: [2 hands go up] 
111: Teacher: put your hand up if you found it easy 
112: [lots of hands] 
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113: Teacher: put your hand up if you could do the maths today with higg>er 
numbers 
114: [few hands] 
115: Teacher: [talks about what will be happening in the rest of the week and 
children go to lunch] 
Whilst both these examples show some attempt at facilitating metacognitive 
behaviour the school Z teacher relies on a quick show of hands whilst the school X 
teacher tries to engage the children in reflecting on the work they had just done. 
However, in both cases the attempts to facilitate metacognition are limited in 
scope and depth. The tendency is to focus briefly on evaluating individual 
responses to the tasks, which is a basic level of metacognition, since it involves a 
reflection on the relationship between individual cognition and a common task. 
Yet neither teacher was able to extend this. The numeracy hour is, by its nature, 
content led. The teacher has a scheme of work and a certain amount of material 
content to get through that term. This, combined with the whole class, group 
work, whole class, structure makes it difficult to include metacognitive processing. 
Whilst teachers in both control and experimental schools tried to ask "how" 
questions, these were largely aimed at the cognitive level, seeking an answer in 
terms of cognitive strategies used rather than metacognitive strategies aimed, as 
Flavell said, at monitoring and controlling cognition. 
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Whilst experimental school teachers used a wider variety of FM behaviours in 
CASE lessons, this did not transfer to numeracy lessons. Taking all schools 
together, only school A achieved a similar breadth of teacher FM behaviours in 
the numeracy hour, and as the frequency count table (appendix 7.2, table A. 7.36) 
shows, some categories in school A have few instances recorded. For the other six 
schools, the trend was for there to be a zero score in six to nine categories of 
teacher FM behaviours, (see appendix 7.2, tables A. 7.16 and A. 7.17). 
5.6 CHILDREN'S METACOGNITIVE BEHAVIOUR DURING 
NUMERACY LESSONS IN EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL 
SCHOOLS 
Appendix 7.2, tables A. 7.30 and A. 7.31 show the frequency counts for children's 
metacognitive behaviour during the numeracy lessons observed. Control school X 
has by far the highest count of children's metacognitive behaviours during these 
numeracy lessons. During the plenary session the teacher usually asked each 
group to comment on the difficulty or ease of the task and during the group work 
the children in this focus group often commented to each other on how they were 
finding the task. It may be that by modelling this behaviour in the plenary 
sessions, this teacher has provided an impetus for the children to copy this 
behaviour amongst themselves, when engaged in the group work. 
Appendix 7.2, table A. 7.35 and A. 7.36 shows counts of teacher FM and child 
behaviours coded as metacognitive during numeracy lessons. The school D teacher 
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appears to engage in a high number of metacognitive behaviours during the 
numeracy hour (total 39), but the children are not responding in a like manner, 
(total 11). This means an average of only 3 child metacognitive behaviours per 
numeracy hour observed, (table 7.3 p. 277). Observations showed that this teacher 
often asks the children how they know something, but the children are often 
unable to answer or explain. This may be because they haven't developed 
sufficient language skills to explain their thinking. However, during CASE tasks 
there was an average of 10 child metacognitive behaviours per observation, (Table 
7.3). Thus it could also be, that during the numeracy hour the children are less 
engaged in thinking about their thinking and more engaged with getting the right 
answer to the sums. They then find it difficult to switch between the cognitive 
process of finding the correct answer and the metacognitive process of thinking 
about how they have done this. 
Table 7.3 shows that control school Y had twice as many children's behaviours 
coded as metacognitive compared to teacher behaviours, (15 child behaviours v7 
teacher behaviours). Further inspection reveals that the children in this group are 
often talking to other group members during the group work section in terms of 
themselves, their own ability or their own difficulty with the task. This is also 
metacognition in Flavell's terms, since it is a reflection on the self as a cognitive 
being. However, without the intervention of an adult to direct this thinking, it 
seems unlikely to provide a fruitful line of metacognitive development on its own. 
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It is also possible that without adult support children could become stuck with 
unhelpful or biased metacognition about their cognitive ability for certain tasks. 
Numeracy hour lessons are structured so that the last part of the lesson allows for 
feedback to the whole class and for the children to reflect on what they have learnt. 
It is here, at the end of the lesson, that we would expect to see more metacognitive 
behaviours. Yet analysis of these observations does not support this theory. Field 
notes taken at the time show, that more often than not, this return to the whole 
class period is rather rushed. Children have to physically move, they have not 
always finished the work at the tables and the end of the lesson usually means 
lunch time or play time. In this context, it is difficult to see how teachers are 
meant to engage children in metacognitive processing. The observations show that 
it can be difficult for year one children to remember what they have just done, let 
alone how they have done it, once they have moved from the site of the activity. 
Secondly, the lack of metacognitive behaviours seen in the numeracy lessons may 
be a result of the lack of collaborative group work that takes place. Whilst 
children are sent to "work in your group" in the middle of the lesson, this usually 
means sitting as a group, but working individually or occasionally in pairs, but 
even then most often it results in producing individual work. Working in pairs 
seems to be a shorthand of teachers, meaning that you can talk to your partner as 
long as the talk is about the work you are engaged in. This appears to be a 
meaning easily understood by the children. 
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6 REFLECTING ON THINKING 
Referring to thinking in general (TT) seems to be frequently employed by teachers 
in all the schools. Yet, there are qualitative differences between the way it is used 
in the experimental and control schools, as the following comparison of a CASE 
activity with a non-CASE activity in two experimental schools and a numeracy 
lesson in a control school shows. This example also shows the complex 
interactions and relationships between the teachers, children and the task in terms 
of facilitating metacognitive development. These particular examples are chosen 
because they show how different teachers facilitate metacognition and how 
children respond to different task structures and ways of teaching. 
Example one is from a CASE task 
6.1 SCHOOL B CASE ACTIVITY CLOWNS SPRING TERM 
There are six children involved in this activity -4 boys and 2 girls. (Andre (m), 
Chloe (f), Fumi (f), John (m), Joseph (m), Oliver (m)). The activity is about 
dressing a clown, whilst following a rule about what he can wear. In this excerpt 
the children each have a clown. In the centre of the table are sets of clothes such as 
hats, shoes, trousers in different colours. These children have used this equipment 
some weeks earlier with a different rule for how the clowns can be dressed. The 
cognitive conflict in this task usually comes from choosing and swapping items of 
clothing, ensuring that the children work collaboratively, so that all members of 
the group end up with a completed clown. However, in this lesson the teacher 
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begins the task by expecting the children to think about what is required and how 
they might achieve this. This excerpt comes after a period of concrete preparation 
when the children familiarise themselves with items of clothing, asking questions 
of each other and all choosing one item, which has to be different from that chosen 
by anyone else in the group. 
6.1.1 Example 1 
34. Teacher: Today we're going to dress our clown and he's going to have 
35. a different colour for each bit of his clothing, except for his 
36, gloves and his shoes. Before we start can anyone think of 77' 
37. any ideas of how we are going to organise this, how we are TL 
A going to do it. Before we start what might we need to think TT 
39. about. Joseph what do you think we're going to have to think about. 
40. Joseph: Taking turns round the table, first Andre takes his turn, 
41. then Fumi, then Oliver, then John, then Chloe, then me. YLA 
42. Teacher: That's very organised 
43. Andre: It won't be very easy though going round cos you EVA 
44. might not know who's after you and you will need the order 
45. Oliver: I think we should pick the same colour and do different. _ 
46. clothings PLA/EVA 
47. Teacher: Oh 
48. Oliver: Cos then we will be able to pick all the colours really easily EVA 
49. Teacher: What does anyone think ? TT 
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50. Now we've got two d Brent ideas we've got Joseph and 
51. Andre's idea of all taking turns, what was the other 
52. idea Chloe ? 7Q 
53. Chloe: Er do some colours, I think we should do the same colours 
54. because then it wouldn't be as tricky as it was before C'OMPi EVA 
55. John: It would be really really easy, we'd be done in a minute FRED 
56. Chloe: Yes, we'd be done in a minute 
57. John: And then we could just sit here 
58. Joseph: And wait five hours 
59. Teacher: Maybe we could do both ways 77 
60. Oliver: How can we do that? UND 
61. Andre: Yeah, I know some could take same colours and 
62. some different colours then it would work PRpJ) 
6.1.2 Analysis 
In lines 36-39 the teacher frequently refers to thinking. She asks a particularly 
interesting question of Joseph: "What do you think we're going to have to think 
about? " This enables the child to shift his point of view from how he would do the 
task as an individual to how the task could be done as a group. He presents a 
strategy, which is then evaluated by Andre (line 43/44). The teacher does not 
question this but allows a third child, Oliver, to present and explain another 
strategy and to evaluate for himself how successful that might be (line 45/8). The 
teacher then facilitates the collaborative process by bringing in other children who 
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have not yet spoken - "what does anyone think" (line 49). She points out that there 
is more than one way of organising this task, line 50. This gives Chloe the chance 
to express her thoughts, which she does by evaluating the strategy she prefers in 
the light of her past experience with the equipment. Line 53-54 "1 think we should 
do the same colours because then it wouldn't be as tricky as it was before". 
Towards the end of the activity (not shown in the excerpt above) this same child 
will refer again to her past experience as she evaluates the success and failure of 
the strategies used. The teacher asks: 
188. Teacher: Why do you think it helps? [referring to the strategy 
they have used] 
189. Chloe: Because we didn't have too much muddling, last time we had 
seven hundred percent muddling. 
In the example 1 excerpt Chloe's evaluation is reaffirmed not by the teacher, but 
by another child, John - line 55. As the conversation begins to trail off the teacher 
prompts by giving her own idea to use both strategies - line 59. Oliver is puzzled 
by the suggestion, but does not sit in silence, he asks for clarification and this is 
given by Andre, who feels he understands and predicts success for his idea - line 
61. 
This excerpt continues with the children planning and discussing how they will 
attempt the task before starting it. The teacher occasionally reminds them of the 
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rule "not the same colours" but otherwise rarely intervenes. The children evaluate 
each other's ideas. They are expected to think for themselves but also to think 
about how they can achieve the task as a group. Throughout this excerpt and in the 
rest of the lesson, the teacher, in combination with the activity, is providing a 
metacognitive experience for the children. She does this not by continuous 
questioning, but by becoming part of the group herself. She allows the children to 
sort out their own ideas in a supportive atmosphere: 
36. Teacher: Can anyone think of any ideas? 
49. Teacher: What does anyone think? 
The teacher refers to thought processes in a naturalistic way. She indicates she is 
listening without judging. 
47. Teacher: Oh 
and adds her own idea for evaluation 
59. Teacher: Maybe we can do both ways 
and she allows the children time to think. Her focus in this excerpt is on planning, 
generating ideas, evaluating and explaining to others rather than on completion of 
the task. In a relatively short excerpt the quality of the interactions is high, the 
children are enthusiastic and committed to the task. They are engaged in 
metacognitive processing, reflecting on their own and others' ideas and evaluating 
their own understanding. 
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6.2 SCHOOL A- NUMERACY LESSON. 
This example follows the guide lines of the numeracy hour with whole class 
teaching on the carpet followed by children sitting in groups but working 
individually with worksheets and then a plenary session for the whole class at the 
end. Because of this format I have extracted short excerpts from each part of the 
lesson. 
6.2.1 Excerpt 1 Whole class teaching 
34. Teacher: Now I'm going to try and trick you, you have to use your 
35. brains and tell me what I'm counting in and how many I've 
36. counted [T counts silently by showing fingers firstly in 2's 
37. and counts up to 6] 
38. [Children put up hands to answer] 
39. Teacher: [does same counting in 10's] 
40. Ryan: six 
41. Teacher: Is it six? watch again 
42. Ryan: three 
43. Teacher: What am I counting in? 
44. Sarah: tens 
45. Teacher: Right why did Ryan get it wrong 




47. Kali: He's not counting on I; VA/OTH 
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48. Sarah: He s not counting in tens kVA'OJH 
49. Teacher: Yes, 1 was counting in 10's and so the answer was 30 not 3 
6.2.2 Analysis 
In this excerpt the teacher begins by referring to thinking, and indicates the reason 
for "use your brains" L. 34/5, so that we don't get tricked. Whilst "I am going to 
trick you " could be an attempt by the teacher to bring an act of deception to the 
surface and therefore may have a metacognitive intent, it is not clear that the 
teacher is consciously doing this. At line 45 she asks the children to take on 
another's point of view and to explain the lack of success. The answers are 
interesting. The first child, Sarah picks up on the importance of thinking - this 
must be Ryan's reason for failure, L46. Whereas Kali refers to a failure to use the 
correct strategy, L47. Then Sarah changes her own idea, maybe it's not a lack of 
thought only, but a lack of strategy use that causes failure and she adds her own 
idea L. 48 "He's not counting in 10's ". The teacher confirms that she agrees and 
explains why - because "I was counting in 10's ". The children are being asked to 
reflect on someone else's failure and to suggest alternative strategies that may be 
more successful. Sarah and Kali have the metacognitive experience of feeling they 
know why Ryan failed. 
6.2.3 Excerpt 2 
As the teacher sets up the children to work in groups she asks them to reflect on 
the task in hand 
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49. Teacher: Good. 't'hat 's what I 'm asking you to do this morning. 
50. Use what you know about counting in 2 's, 5 's, 10's. Check TO 
51. what you are counting in. 
52. Teacher: [Explains work sheets same as board questions] 
53. Teacher: What is the. first thing you have to do? 
54. Sarah: Put date and name 
55. Gillian: Start work 
56. Kali: Don't know 
57. Teacher: Check what you're counting in. I've got 2p's here what TO 
58. should I be counting in 
59. Ryan: 2s 
60. Teacher: [Repeats this with lOp's] [Goes through first e. g. on worksheet] 
61. Teacher: [Asks Kali to explain to class what they have to do first] Tls 
62. Kali: Put date and name, know what you're counting in and 
63. then put answer in the box. 
64. Teacher: What could you do ifyou've got problems? TS 
65. Sarah: Ask teacher EVA 
66. Matt: Use number squares EVA 
67. Charles: Put hand up EVA 
68. Kali: Use hand prints [on wall showing counting in 5's] EVA 
69. Teacher: Any questions before we begin? 
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6.2.4 Analysis 
In this excerpt the teacher begins by referring to stored knowledge and to 
checking, line 50151 and then seeks confirmation that the children have 
understood, line 53 "What is the first thing you have to do? " She allows the three 
children, Sarah, Gillian and Kali to have different ideas or to indicate lack of 
understanding without judgement, lines 54-56. At line 64 she is seeking self- 
learning strategies and whilst one child Sarah refers to asking the teacher, the other 
two provide self-learning strategies. At line 69 the children are given the chance to 
check their understanding of the task and seek clarification before they begin. 
6.2.5 Excerpt 3 towards the end of the lesson 
93. Teacher: [Tells everyone to return to carpet] 
94. Teacher: What did you find hard? TV 
95. Gillian: I tried [then tails off into silence] 
96 Ryan: I tried to work it out SELF 
97. Teacher: There were a lot of answers wrong because you 
98. didn't check what you were counting in TO 
99. Charles: The first one was hard for me there was RAT 
100. too many pennies for me .--. SELF 
101. Teacher: Did you do it? 
102. Charles: The answer was 12 
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6.2.6 Analysis 
In this plenary session the teacher follows the numeracy hour convention of asking 
children to reflect on the ease or difficulty of the task. She refers again to 
checking. This repetition from the beginning of the lesson indicates the importance 
this teacher places on checking for oneself. At L. 99/100 Charles' answer is 
interesting as he reflects on his own performance and shows knowledge of his own 
cognition, indicating that he knows why he found it difficult: 
"There were too many pennies for me" 
6.3 CONTROL SCHOOL X- NUMERACY LESSON 
Three excerpts have been chosen because of the format of the lesson. 
6.3.1 Excerpt 1 
l. Teacher: Now get your thinking thumbs ready. 
2. [children stick up a thumb] and 1 want you to put up 
3. your thinking thumb if you can tell me what is 2 
4, more than this [T shows a card with no. 4 on it. ] TT 
5. Children put up their thumbs teacher chooses a child in each case 
6. Drew: S 
7. Teacher: What did you do Drew? TQ 
8. Child ?: She added one 
9. Teacher: What is one more than [holds card with I on it] 
10. Lisa: one more than one is 2 
11. Teacher: Two more than [card with 5 on it] 
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12. Denise: 5 
13. Teacher: [repeats question] 
14. Denise: 7 
15. Teacher: 10 more than [card with 6 on it] 
16. Louise: 16 
17. Child ?: That's easy 
18. Teacher: How did you do it 
19. Louise: 1 added it in my head 




In this first excerpt of whole class teaching the teacher refers to thinking in terms 
of "thinking thumbs", she does not refer to thinking as an abstract term or give 
reasons for thinking. At line 17 a child refers to finding the sum easy, although it 
was not his question to answer. The teacher does not question his assumption that 
the sums are easy but asks Louise, who got the sum correct for the strategy used. 
"How did you do it? ". When the child responds with her strategy "I added it in my 
head", the teacher passes on without comment. The lesson proceeds with the 
children calculating more sums. 
6.3.3 Excerpt 2 
This takes place on the carpet a little while later. The children are asked to join 
three paper coins on the board and total them. 
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43. Teacher: We are sitting beautifully this morning. 
44. [Louise joins up 20,20 and 101 
45. [Class shout out 50p] 
46. Teacher: How did Louise add up her coins? TQ 
47. Natasha: She added up 20,20 and 10 
48. Teacher: Can you do it any other way or was that the quickest way TQ 
49. Natasha: That s the quickest way then you don't need to go /0,20,30, EVA 
50. Teacher: Why did Louise choose 20 first TQ 
51. Natasha: Because it's the biggest coin first EVA 
52. Teacher: Yes and that 's a good way to add coins, the biggest 
53. first then the smallest TE 
54. Natasha: I know .... 
(she is ignored and her sentence trails ofd SELF 
55. Bahaki: (joins up Ip, 2p lp and says 4p] 
56. T: How did you add it up TQ 
57. Bahaki: 2+1+1 
6.3.4 Analysis 
At line 46 the teacher asks for a child to explain from another's point of view and 
picks up the answer with a question designed to evaluate the strategy, "can you do 
it any other way or was that the quickest way ?" By asking this double question 
the teacher in effect gives the answer and the child Natasha repeats this, (line 49). 
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At line 52 the teacher herself evaluates the strategy, when Natasha wishes to add 
her own idea "I know .. " she is ignored and the teacher continues with the task. 
This third excerpt is from the plenary session when the teacher asks individuals 
from each table to explain what they have done. 
6.3.5 Excerpt 3 
147. Teacher: what is the smallest you have made 
148. Theo: smallest, 4p 
149. Teacher: How did you make it? TQ 
150. Theo: 1,2, and 1 
151. Teacher: Did anyone make anything smaller 
152. Natasha: 3p. 1,1, and 1 
153. Teacher: What about the group over here what was your 
154. largest amount? 
155. Lewis: f2.05 
156. Drew: f2.05 
157. Denise: f3.00 
158. Natasha: fl and fl and 5p 
159. Teacher: Yes you had the pound coins over here didn't you 
160. Teacher: Drew, how did you make your largest amount TQ 
161. [Drew has trouble describing how she did it] 
162. Teacher: We will have to finish therefor now 
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6.3.6 Analysis 
Whilst this session of a numeracy hour lesson is where we would expect to find 
the metacognitive reflection taking place, it is obvious from this transcript that this 
does not always happen. Whilst the teacher does ask "How" at line 149, referring 
to a strategy, the child responds "mechanically" with "1,2,1". Whilst this format of 
child doing sum, teacher asking how it was done, has been repeated throughout the 
lesson, the teacher does not go any further and accepts a simplistic answer, thus a 
possible metacognitive experience, where the child would have to really reflect on 
their thinking, is lost. 
6.4 DISCUSSION 
From the three examples of classroom activities shown above it is clear that the 
CASE lesson (example 1 clowns) and to a lesser extent the CASE school 
numeracy lesson (example 2) include metacognitive activity of a qualitatively 
different kind than does the control school numeracy lesson (example 3). In the 
CASE lesson the teacher engages the children in planning and evaluating 
strategies, and in thinking about thinking. She asks the metacognitive question 
"what do you think we're going to have to think about? " She is providing the 
important role of posing the questions that students will eventually need to ask of 
themselves when confronted with a problem to solve. The CASE activity provides 
the framework for this type of questioning; the emphasis is on communication, 
collaborative working and the process of problem solving rather than the final 
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outcome. Example 2 of a CASE teacher in a numeracy lesson also shows examples 
of facilitation of metacognition. Here the teacher refers to thinking; she asks the 
children to reflect on the task and to generate self-learning strategies. She engages 
the children in thinking about the problems they may encounter and strategies for 
dealing with them and concludes with the children's reflection on their thoughts 
regarding the difficulty of the task. In both examples references to metacognitive 
processing run throughout the lesson. They are not only tagged on at the end as a 
period of reflection. It can be very difficult for children of this age (5-6yrs) to 
reflect retrospectively. 
The third example from a control school class follows the conventions of the 
numeracy hour. The teacher speaks of thinking, but here it is reduced to "thinking 
thumbs". She asks students to evaluate strategies but does not continue the process 
in any depth, although the children are responding in a "thinking way". Her 
concern is with successful calculation of number rather than the process of 
problem solving. This is not to disparage the teacher, rather the context within 
which she is working puts metacognitive processing to the end of the lesson as a 
means of reflecting on what has been learnt. This is not only difficult for the 
children in terms of memory capacity, but also affectively. Young children tire 
quickly after an hour of cognitive activity, especially when the playground 
beckons. The teacher too often runs out of time and it is very difficult to achieve 
any meaningful reflection in the last few minutes when distractions abound. 
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An important aspect of the CASE intervention is the teacher's ability to model a 
language of learning. Without a shared communication which responds to the 
children's attempts to explain their thinking and which encourages them to explore 
their thinking within the group, it is unlikely that all the children will develop 
metacognitively. It is likely that as with individual differences in cognition, some 
children will be more metacognitive to begin with. For some children, early pre- 
school experiences, or parental interaction may have helped them to think about 
and reflect on their cognition. For others, who may not have had these 
opportunities in any consistent manner, developing metacognition may be slower 
or more difficult. Nuthall has suggested that the learning process is "deeply 
embedded in, or are, in fact part of the sociocultural processes and structures of the 
classroom" (Nuthall, 1999)p. 244. How children view school and learning will 
also impact upon their ability to adapt to a more metacognitive classroom. 
7 SUMMARY 
Results from the frequency counts of teacher behaviours showed that in general in 
both CASE and non CASE examples, teachers rarely referred to self-learning 
strategies ie. asking children to consider what they might do if they got stuck on a 
problem. They rarely asked children to predict whether their method-would lead 
them to success or failure and perhaps surprisingly they rarely referred to checking 
answers or planning how to solve a problem. On only relatively few occasions did 
teachers refer to the more abstract "universals of cognition" (Flavell, 1979), for 
instance, naming the task, "solving problems", or "categorising" 
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However, both experimental school teachers and control school teachers 
frequently referred to "thinking" in more general terms. They often asked 
questions about the strategies being used and about knowledge, beliefs and 
opinions. 
The most common metacognitive behaviours found in the numeracy hour lessons 
were the more general ones of speaking about thinking, questioning strategies and 
questioning acquisition of knowledge. There were fewer teacher FM behaviours 
in the control schools than in the numeracy lessons of the experimental schools, 
but again there was some individuation amongst the schools. Some factors that 
were noted which could have impacted on this included an increase in class size at 
the start of the Spring term as Reception Year children move up into Year One; 
staffing shortages and changes in school management. In one particular case the 
class teacher left in the Spring term and was replaced by an experienced long-term 
supply teacher. These factors are further analysed in Chapter 9. 
In CASE activities frequency counts of teacher FM behaviours correlated 
positively with child metacognitive behaviours. Experimental school teachers 
were observed to use a greater number of behaviours that aimed at facilitating 
metacognition during numeracy hour lessons than the control school teachers were 
observed using. However, in comparison to the types of FM behaviours the 
experimental school teachers used during CASE tasks, the FM behaviours used in 
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the numeracy lesson were less diverse. It seems likely that the CASE tasks 
encourage teacher FM behaviours to a greater extent than the numeracy hour. 
The general trend for the experimental school teachers to have a greater number of 
FM behaviours observed in the numeracy hour lessons may be due to a transfer of 
CASE training from CASE activities to other areas of teaching. However, in one 
category, prompting evaluation, the result was reversed with control school 
teachers displaying more frequent use of this behaviour. This was observed as 
being due to repetition of questions around whether the children found the work 
difficult or easy and tended to occur at the very end of the lesson and often 
produced simple repetitive answers. 
The structure of the numeracy hour showed that it provided less scope for either 
child M behaviours or teacher FM behaviours, and that attempting to reflect at the 
end of the hour was difficult for children of this age. 
Whilst some teacher FM behaviours such as questioning the acquisition of 
knowledge seemed to match the child M behaviour of considering their own 
cognition, other teacher FM behaviours did not match so closely. Further analysis 
suggested that modeling behaviour was an important factor, not simply asking 
questions. 
A comparison of child M behaviour in the numeracy hour in both control and 
experimental schools showed that these were similar across schools in terms of 
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frequency and variety. Two factors were suggested which may account for the 
lack of children's metacognitive behaviours in the numeracy lessons: one was the 
structure of the lesson and the second was the lack of collaborative group work. 
A CASE task, an experimental school numeracy lesson and a control school 
numeracy lesson were analysed in greater detail and compared in terms of teacher 
FM and child M behaviours. This analysis suggested, that in these particular 
cases, the experimental schools displayed metacognitive behaviour of a 
qualitatively different kind to that shown in the control schools. This behaviour 
was more complex, deeper and more challenging. The CASE activities appeared 
to facilitate this by providing a structure which emphasised the process of working 
through a CASE task together, rather than one which focussed on the outcome. In 
contrast to the control school teachers, the experimental school teachers were more 
likely to engage in metacognitive questioning or modeling throughout the lesson 
rather than in the last few minutes. 
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Chapter 8 
GROUP INTERACTION AND INDIVIDUAL 
DEVELOPMENT- Three Children Developing 
Metacognition 
I INTRODUCTION 
In much of the UK educational system today children are either pitted against each 
other in terms of day to day classroom work or are assessed against certain 
"norms" for their age in terms of end of year or key stage tests. At the same time a 
vast quantity of educational research has shown that learning is above all a social 
process. Reference texts for initial teacher training courses still make reference to 
Piagetian and Vygotskian perspectives on learning. Teachers of young children 
too, are generally concerned that their students develop good social skills as well 
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as numeracy and literacy skills, (see teacher interviews for this project in chapter 
9). Yet the structure of the National Curriculum emphasizes individual 
achievement and individual assessment. It is still somewhat unusual to find Year 
One children working together collaboratively to achieve a common goal in many 
of their subject areas, although there are exceptions, most notably in art, music, 
sport and drama. The collaboration to achieve a common goal is a fundamental 
aspect of the CASE@KSI programme. Learning is here seen as being socially 
constructed through dialogue, discussion, argument, involvement, risk and 
emotional content. The CASE@KS1 lessons provide "metacognitive experiences" 
(Flavell, 1979) for their participants and so we should expect to see some evidence 
of metacognitive development in the students taking part in the programme. 
The previous chapter analysed observational data over the year at group level and 
explored some of the factors, which accounted for the frequency with which 
different metacognitive behaviours occurred. This chapter analyses the same 
observational data to show the impact of the group interactions on the 
development of metacognition in individual children. This section of the project 
refers to two research questions: 
1) What is metacognition for five and six year olds? 
2) Ilow is metacognition facilitated in year one classrooms? 
The first question complements the phenomenological analysis of the pre- and 
post- test data reported in chapter 6; the second question complements the analysis 
of the teacher interviews reported in chapter 9. 
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2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In chapter two, in addition to exploring the historical development of the definition 
of metacognition from different perspectives, evidence from many studies was 
gathered to show how the development of metacognition has had a positive impact 
on attainment in different curriculum areas. This chapter however, goes further; it 
follows Flavell's early research, which suggests that the development of 
metacognitive processing is also important for the development of the whole 
person: 
"Perhaps it is stretching the meanings of metacognition too far 
to include the critical appraisal of message source, quality of appeal 
and probable consequences needed to cope with these inputs 
sensibly, but I do not think so. It is at least conceivable that the 
ideas currently brewing in this area could someday be parlayed 
into a method of teaching children (and adults) to make wise and 
thoughtful life decisions as well as to comprehend and learn better 
in formal educational settings" (Flavell, 1979)p. 91 I 
Metacognition develops with age (Flavell, 2000) and with practice (Doran & 
Cameron, 1995). Interactions with others can provide the stimulus needed for the 
individual to become more aware of their cognitive processing (Wertsch, 1978). 
Kuhn suggests that development of theory of mind and metacognitive knowledge 
can be accelerated by "various forms of scaffolding" (Kuhn, 2000). She goes on to 
say that while children of four and five years old develop a basic understanding of 
others as cognitive beings, they tend not to be aware that different people can have 
different yet legitimate understandings of the same information. This is also borne 
out in the results of the "droodles" theory of mind test reported in chapter 6. This 
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understanding is what CASE@KS I tries to develop through exposure to the 
challenges, views and values of others in the group. It is this aspect of 
metacognition, along with the development of metacognitive monitoring and 
control processes, which is likely to have the greatest impact on the development 
of the whole person not just in a formal educational arena. 
This idea is further articulated by a line of research on metacognition which has 
emphasized the development of the self-system and its correspondence with the 
development of self-regulated learning (Borokowski et al., 1990; Kopp, 1982; 
Schunk, 1989). Metacognitive beliefs about the nature of intelligence and 
individual cognition are, it seems, formed in early childhood through social 
interaction (Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993), and Thomas has shown how these 
constructions can then impact on future learning. (Thomas, 2000). 
This chapter analyses the effects of providing metacognitive experiences through 
collaborative group work on the individual development of metacognition. In 
particular, it asks how do individual children experience the metacognitive 
experiences that CASE@KS 1 aims to provide? What are the negative and positive 
aspects of working in this way and what can the experiences of three children add 
to the vast array of psychological and educational research on metacognition? 
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3 METHOD 
The observations of the seven focus groups of children (four experimental and 
three control) were analysed with reference to Flavell's model of metacognition 
(Flavell, 1979) and the results reported in the previous chapter. From this broad 
categorical analysis various themes emerged which provoked further questions 
about how metacognition was being developed and experienced in the group. Of 
these themes, three areas seemed to be important because they: 
a) were the product and producer of high quality verbal interactions 
b) they reoccurred on different levels across the experimental groups 
c) they were largely absent from the control school groups 
In searching the data for good examples of these themes, the focus of analysis 
began to change and became centred on an individual child who appeared to 
clarify one of these themes in her/his dialogue within the group. However, as the 
analysis proceeded it became clear that the way in which a particular theme was 
displayed through the group interaction was particular to that group and to the 
individuals within it. Thus the interpretations of the discourse of the three 
individual children reported in this chapter are specific to those children in those 
groups. They are chosen because they show individual children struggling with 
working in a group and with their own individual cognitive and metacognitive 
processing. Their stories may be similar to those of other children in the 
programme but they will not be the same. 
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The method of analysis of these particular classroom observations is based on case 
study methods. The case study has been described as 
"a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical 
investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within 
its real life context using multiple sources of evidence" 
(Robson, 1993)p. 146 
The emphasis is on the idea that the case is studied as valuable in its own right, but 
also that its value rests on its "usefulness as models for others in exploring their 
own unique situations" (Elliot, 1990). Whilst Stake suggests that "case study is 
defined by interest in individual cases, not by methods used" (Stake, 1994), there 
is a general view that case study should involve multiple data collection methods 
in order to triangulate and produce a rich and deep description of the particular 
case. In this study the interpretation of the interactions of one individual child 
with the group is based solely on transcribed audio recordings of these interactions 
and field notes taken before, during and after the observation. These studies then 
are limited in that little is known about the home/social and larger school life of 
the children. During the year some information on these factors was gathered 
from teachers and from relating to the individual children. However, this was on 
an ad hoc and anecdotal level and so was consciously excluded from the following 
analysis, although of course there is the problem of this slight knowledge 
unconsciously affecting the selection of data to be analysed. The only way to 
counter this is to be aware that this may be happening and to bracket out this other 
knowledge from the analysis as far as it is possible to do so. The three case studies 
then are not triangulated at this micro level, but in the larger context of the whole 
324 
study they form part of a multi-method analysis of the different factors which may 
impact on the development of metacognition in young children. 
A further limitation of this part of the study is that whilst it purports to analyse an 
individual's metacognitive reactions in a group setting, the setting itself is 
constrained by the structure of CASE@KSI tasks. Thus the children are in part 
reacting to this structure as well as to being participants in a research project. 
Whilst usual classroom norms may be altered by CASE@KS1 tasks eg. putting 
hands up/not putting hands up to ask questions, general classroom etiquette is still 
maintained so that expectations of what will happen in a CASE@KS1 group will 
differ from expectations of what will happen in free social groups eg. at playtime. 
These factors will all influence the observed performance of the individual within 
the group. In addition some children will have more problems working 
collaboratively than will others. The observations at various times show some 
group dissonance which may be a result of language, cultural or personality 
factors. Some children disengage from their group for various reasons, some of 
which we see below. Taken as a whole the observations over the year show 
naturally occurring inconsistencies, possibly due to the above factors. Thus the 
descriptions provided here are unique. The aim in analysing these interactions is 
to show how these individual children, two from one focus group and one from a 
different focus group experience the awakening and development of their own 
metacognition through collaboration with their peers on CASE@KS I tasks. 
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4 CASE STUDIES 
The first two case studies are taken from the same focus group in one of the 
experimental schools. School B is a voluntary aided primary school with nearly 
200 children on roll. The teacher of class one is newly qualified and in her first 
year of teaching. Class one consists of 30 children all aged five to six at the start 
of the school year. The children come from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and 
overall 48% of the school population have English as a second language. This 
CASE@KS 1 focus group consists of six children all of whom have good spoken 
English and all of who are slightly above average for the class in terms of maths 
attainment as measured by teacher marked school tests. The group consists of four 
boys and two girls. The boys are Andre, John, Joseph, Oliver and the girls are 
Chloe and Fumi. 
4.1 CASE STUDY 1 
Chloe - "The need to explain" 
At the beginning of the year Chloe is five years and five months old. She is 
articulate and confident. She can be relied upon to give an opinion on most 
subjects and she appears to be at ease talking with adults and children alike. Her 
speech patterns include adult-type structures such as "actually I would say ... 
" or 
"I wouldn't think that could be true". Chloe appears to be popular with other 
children and she often takes the lead in group activities. 
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In common with the rest of her group, at the beginning of the year Chloe's 
engagement in the collaborative process of CASE@KS I tasks is limited. In the 
first term's tasks the majority of the interactions are between teacher and child or 
children. The teacher begins trying to facilitate metacognitive thinking by the 
group by asking "how" questions "how do you know that? "how could we begin 
this? " and by expecting evaluation "was it easy or difficult to do? " and "why? " In 
these early CASE tasks there is little obvious metacognition going on from the 
children's point of view. More often the children including Chloe will directly 
answer the teacher's questions with short simple answers: 
Flowers Task - Start of autumn term 
Chloe: I'm measuring these [holding two plastic flowers together] 
Teacher: which one have you chosen, how are you going to work out which is the 
tallest one? 
Chloe: this one 
Teacher: how do you know that 
Chloe: because 1 measured it and then I can see 
As the term goes on Chloe begins to fill the leadership role, but this does not go 
uncontested: 
Farm Animals Task: Autumn term 
John: that will make a nice pattern [he has sorted animals into lines by species] 
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Chloe: good idea, cos ii will go together a hit more than we're doing [referring to 
other strategy of sorting animals into adults and babies which some of the group 
have done] 
Chloe: this is going all wrong, I think they should be lines of same animals, put 
sheep over there [Andre is not listening, he wants to put pig in the sheep line 
because it is the same colour, Chloe moves Andre's pig] 
Andre: I don't know what she's doing 
Chloe: you're putting baby pigs in order and in order of colour 
Andre: I didn't understand any of what she said 
Teacher [to Chloe] Ask Andre what he doesn't understand 
John [explains to Andre how he has put the red pigs in order] 
Andre: what's Fumi going to do [Andre has noticed that Fumi is not involved] 
Chloe: someone should tell her 
Oliver: [tries to explain to Fumi] 
Chloe: this is a very complicated sort of pattern 
In this excerpt whilst Chloe begins to evaluate the group's ideas and drives the 
task onwards she fails to respond to Andre's requests for her to explain her 
actions. Even when the teacher reinforces the request, it is left to another child to 
explain. Chloe attempts to carry on her own sorting strategies whilst delegating 
the explanation of the strategy to others. A lack or unwillingness to explain is 
hindering Chloe's self-goal of completing the task. A similar situation occurs 
during the next task, which is also concerned with classification. In the buttons 
task the number of variables by which the buttons could be sorted is increased and 
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the task becomes more complicated as the children must finally use their sorting 
rule to fill an empty set. 
Buttons Task - Autumn Term 
Chloe has again taken the lead, but this time instead of asking for explanations 
Andre has physically removed himself from the group: 
Teacher: why do you think he's over there? 
Chloe: cos we're not explaining 
Chloe to Andre: we'll help you, we'll tell you what to do 
Teacher: do you think Andre wants you to tell him what to do Chloe? 
Chloe: he doesn't understand what we 're doing 
Teacher: well do you think by telling him he'll understand what do you think you 
could do instead? 
Oliver: show him 
Chloe is beginning to show some metacognitive processing. She is becoming 
consciously aware of what others in the group are thinking. Later during the same 
task both Andre and Fumi tell Chloe again that they don't understand: 
Fumi: I w'on't know what she's saying [looking upset and sniffing], all she's 
saying is put it there, I don 't understand where to put it 
Chloe: OK well that's quite easy to explain 
[but Chloe goes off on another idea of how to sort the buttons and doesn't in fact 
explain the first strategy] 
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Whilst Chloe is clearly not responding fully to the group's requests for 
explanations, she is beginning to acknowledge the requests. 
Rocks Task - Start of Spring Term 
The children are using different criteria to determine "biggest", causing some 
confusion: 
Chloe: you can't just think, you have to measure them 
Andre: unless you can see 
Chloe: yes, that's the tallest 
Joseph: biggest not tallest 
Andre: they are saying that this one is bigger than this one, and I say this one is 
bigger 
Joseph: what he's saying is bigger is taller 
Chloe: I think what we should do is talk together 
[the rest of the group carry on measuring rocks] 
Chloe: wellt think we should just talk and decide how we are going to do these 
things 
[Chloe suggests a strategy for measuring "bigness". Oliver and Joseph suggest 
other equally possible criteria for measuring "bigness". Chloe gives üp trying to 
lead the group her way and puts her head down on the table] 
Teacher: why aren't you joining in any more, have you done all the thinking you 
can do? 
Chloe: my brain's hurting 
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Chloe has certainly developed some understanding of the need to explain her 
strategy to the group, but is also becoming aware of the difficulties of getting a 
consensus in order to move forward from discourse to action. This is a 
metacognitive experience since it is concerned with understanding that others 
think differently from oneself, and that there can be more than one useful strategy 
for solving a problem. It involves metacomprehension in that it requires 
understanding of how others are understanding the tern "bigness". Metacognitive 
experiences are often emotional and Chloe clearly shows what she is experiencing 
both verbally and non-verbally. 
Shapes Task - Spring Term 
During the spring term Chloe is often challenged to explain her thinking to the 
others. In the shapes task the children are trying to draw and then describe the 
shapes they can see from their individual perspective around the table. Some of 
the three dimensional shapes are in front of the others and at times only part of a 
shape is in view. Joseph has drawn his view of the table showing the circle only 
by its edge. This has confused Andre and Fumi 
Andre: what is that? 
Joseph: the circle's not just round its got edges 
Fumi: what is it? 
Chloe: its like a flat thing and some edge, curved sides, so if you're this side its 
actually put so that you can see this side, but if you go like this [leans to one side] 
you can see this side 
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Andre: what? 
Teacher: can you have another go Chloe, Andre still doesn't understand 
Chloe: its part of it because the shapes are in the middle and this shape is on the 
edge, 1 think ... 
[tails offj 
Teacher: yes 
Chloe: No, I don't understand what 1'm saying myself 
Fumi: from the other side you can only see this edge so he's drawn the edge of the 
circle 
Here Chloe has had to reflect on her own understanding of the drawing and her 
own thinking from her first explanation of it to come to the realisation that she 
doesn't really understand it herself. Inadequate though Chloe's explanation has 
been in terms of her own thinking, it has helped Fumi to clarify hers, so that she 
can now explain the drawing in a very clear and concise way. 
There are many instances throughout the spring term where Chloe's attempts to 
explain to the others are not understood, but she is becoming more aware of her 
own lack of understanding through this process. 
Crossroads Task - Summer Term 
Chloe has explained how she came to choose the card that represents her view of 
the crossroads, but Fumi thinks another card is the correct one: 
Chloe: Fumi look that tree is on different sides and the bus stop is on different 
sides 
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Oliver: that's on the right 
Chloe: you see this picture, the car is at the bottom and on this picture 
Andre: she doesn't know which picture, you're just saying and this picture and 
this picture 
Chloe: but the bus stop and the duck picture 
Teacher: but they've both got the duck and bus stop --the picture with the green 
dot? 
Chloe: yes the green dot picture has the duck on this side 
Fumi: I don't understand which picture 
Chloe: Well, what I'm saying is that is at the top [pointing to the duck on the 
board] and that is at the bottom of the card, [pointing to the duck on the card] 
mmm, I can't really understand it myself 
Andre: so you don't know what you are talking about 
By the end of the summer term Chloe has come a long way in terms of 
understanding the need to explain her thoughts and actions and in reflecting on her 
own understanding. She also begins to use comparisons to explain her thinking as 
in this task: 
Bottles Task - Summer Term 
Andre: this bottle will roll down and this one won't 
Teacher: how do you know that? 
Andre: because this one has less rice 
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Teacher: so what does that mean 2 
Andre: so it will go further 
Teacher: why does having less rice mean it goes further? 
Chloe: I don't understand this, he's not telling us why. I think Oliver's idea is 
right, the lightest will go, further, the heavy one is slower 
Andre: yes, yes 
Chloe: its like Sara and me when we rolled down the hill, I was lighter and rolled 
further 
John: but bottles are smoother than people so it's not the same 
By the end of the summer term explaining her thinking has become a natural 
response for Chloe and whilst her ideas are not always proved correct her 
explanations of her thinking are growing in clarity. 
In one of the final tasks of the year Chloe clearly states her reasoning and why she 
disagrees with other group members to do this she refers to a rule of the task 
Transport Task - Summer Term: 
Chloe: moving the motorbike would not break the rule, the rule is lorries are not 
allowed in the middle of town, if you move the bike that would not be breaking the 
rule. 
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For Chloe to develop this clarity of explanation she has had to develop the ability 
to reflect upon her own understanding and to reflect on how she has come to her 
own solution. 
4.2 CASE STUDY 2 
Oliver- Planning, evaluating and predicting 
At the beginning of the year Oliver is five years and seven months old. He is also 
articulate, but a little more reserved than Chloe. He tends to take time to think 
about things before speaking. At the beginning of the year, like Chloe, he 
responds mainly to the teacher's questions or instructions and looks to her for a 
lead. However, he also pays particular attention to the task in hand and suggests 
strategies for solving problems either verbally or quite often by doing something 
and then explaining when asked to do so. 
In the flowers task it is Oliver who first comes up with the strategy of measuring 
the roses by comparing them to the block in which they will be placed. When 
Fumi starts measuring at a different level to the others it is Oliver who realises: 
Oliver: she needs to measure it here, put end on the table 
In the first term it is often Oliver who comes up with a useful strategy and more 
often than not gains positive feedback for this from the group by them adopting his 
strategy. 
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Farmyard Task Autumn Term 
In the Farmyard task it is Oliver who suggests not only a strategy for sorting the 
animals "put all the blue ones here" but also how this should be arranged: "each 
person has different animals, then put sheep in a line and ducks in a line" and 
then goes on to monitor the group as they do this: 
Oliver: Why aren't you doing it like this? Who's doing pigs? 
and later 
Oliver: this big duck should be near the little duck, we need to put the purple line 
together....... these are too squashed they keep falling over 
In the buttons task Chloe refers to Oliver's strategy: 
Buttons Task - Autumn Term 
Chloe: He's got a really good idea that I think everyone will agree with 
Oliver is beginning to pick up on and comment on how the group is working for 
instance later in the buttons task: 
Oliver: we are sorting them out good, but not talking 
Chloe: yeah so nobody knows what we're doing 
Oliver is monitoring the progress of the group in terms of achieving the goal. A 
metacognitive process which leads Chloe amongst others to agree that they need to 
employ the metacognitive strategy of talking about and planning their approach as 
well as explaining what they are doing. It is also Oliver who suggests that Chloe 
should "show" Andre how she is sorting the buttons rather than tell him. Of all the 
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group, Oliver seems to be most consistently aware of the feelings of other 
members. He responds to these feelings in a practical way, by ensuring that the 
group focus on the problem at hand, often verbalising the group's actions, as we 
see later in the Buttons task: 
Oliver: Andre what we are trying to do ...... 
[he is interrupted by Chloe who takes 
over the explanation] 
Chloe: Fumi's putting hers there and we're all putting them here 
Oliver: Well we're actually trying to put these ones like they're big and then they 
go small [pointing to a row] but they're aren't any more small ...... 
[interrupted by 
Chloe] 
Although Oliver is most observant about the group, his interjections are often 
picked up and continued by other more vocal members especially Chloe, he 
always gives way. 
Oliver continues to suggest strategies in the spring term, in the Rocks task 
suggesting different strategies for the group to decide upon: 
Rocks - Spring term 
Oliver: we should measure them like this [holding two stones together to compare 
their height] ... or we can 
do it like this [putting stones side by side] 
but when the group seems to be overloaded he also responds: 
Chloe: my brains hurting 
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Joseph: 1 can 't fit more in my brain 
Oliver: half time 
Teacher: half time, good idea. 
At the end of the task Oliver suggests that the stones are turned over to see the 
letters and continues to talk with Joseph about other ways of sorting them after 
they have been tidied away. 
Like Chloe he also begins to use increasingly sophisticated ways of explaining his 
ideas. 
Shapes Task - Spring Term 
Oliver: these are actually to do straight, you can't turn your head, cos your other 
angles wrong and you have to cross it out again, like here, if I was over here [he 
moves around the table] I could see it 
Teacher: why can't you see the little triangle 
Oliver: Cos this triangle is in the way, it's just like when you go to school, the big 
children go behind the little children so that they can see. I think Chloe can see 
them. 
Oliver is using his knowledge and experience to help his problem solving in this 
task. He is also growing in awareness of different perspectives and this allows 
him to suggest a useful plan to the group of how to tackle the crossroads task: 
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Oliver: If we are looking down we can see everything, pretend you are a bird in 
heaven looking down. 
Clown Task - Summer Term 
In this activity Oliver helps the group to plan how they will approach the task: 
Oliver: I think we should pick the same colour and do different clothings, cos then 
we will be able to pick all the colours really easily 
The group evaluate Oliver's idea along with other plans: 
Chloe: 1 think we should do the same colours because then it wouldn't be as tricky 
as it was before 
John: it would be really really easy, we'd be done in a minute 
Andre: I know some could take same colours and some different colours then it 
would work 
Oliver: why can't we do like I get all the green colours and John would have to 
have that and Fumi she'll have all the purple 
T. " Ah but what was the task ? 
John: We need to have not the same colours 
Oliver: we could all pick like one different clothing but all green, then maybe all 
purple, then maybe allpink 
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Joseph: that's a good idea, last time we were taking them out and it got really 
tricky at the end because we had to keep swapping over 
Oliver's plan is finally adopted by the group, but confusion arises as to how it is to 
work, again Oliver organises the group: 
Chloe: Yes, but you see I've already had my turn, so it's the second round 
Joseph: No but I don't know if we're going Andre, Chloe, me Oliver or not 
Oliver: The first round we're not, 1 think we should go Chloe, Joseph ....... ust pick 
a colour and then we'll put everything that colour on our clowns. 
Despite Oliver's best efforts some confusion arises and at the end the teacher asks 
them to evaluate 
Teacher: do you think this was easier this time or last time 
Oliver: this time 
Chloe: because we didn't have too much muddling, last time we had 700% 
muddling 
Teacher: what do you think Oliver, do you think your strategy works? 
Oliver: yeah 
Teacher: how do you know it works? 
Oliver: because we did it in the end 
Andre: for once we got it together without muddling up 
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Oliver: I think if we do this again I've got another strategy, next time we should 
write down the colours 
Oliver has gained confidence through having his plans and ideas evaluated by the 
group and he is able to fine-tune his strategy ready for next time. In order to use 
this refined strategy Oliver will need to use metacognitive processing to compare 
the structure of a new task with this one in order to evaluate whether the strategy 
will be successful in another context. There is a slight hint of this transfer in the 
bottles task when the group, having predicted which bottles will roll, are finding it 
difficult to decide where to put the bottles that they feel are neither light nor 
heavy: 
John: everyone is doing it but I don't know where to put them 
Fumi: here's the losers and rollers over there 
Chloe: these are heavy so these are winners 
John: where do we put mediums 
Oliver: put them in both groups 
This remark by Oliver is a possible transfer from the dinosaur sorting task when an 
overlapping set is formed to include dinosaurs that have criteria common to both 
sets. However, in this case the strategy will not work and the group rejects the idea 
and decides to put the medium bottles with the losers. 
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Of all the children in the group, Oliver has throughout the year, come up with 
strategies, not only to solve the cognitive problem at hand, but also to organise the 
group. He is consistently aware of what the individual members of the group are 
doing and how the group itself is functioning. Whilst not all his attempts to do this 
are successful and he often gives way to other ideas in the group, when others fail 
to explain or begin to take the group in an unproductive direction Oliver 
intervenes. 
Through the year as his confidence in speaking in the group grows, his ability to 
plan, predict and evaluate cognitive strategies becomes more apparent and his 
growing metacognitive processing acts as a control and monitoring tool for group. 
Over the year, a dynamic is played out between Oliver's own need to employ 
metacognitive processing to enhance his own problem solving skills, which is 
enabled by the group collaboration, and the needs of the group itself for a group 
metacognition, to enable it to function successfully to solve the CASE@KS 1 tasks. 
Oliver was particularly sensitive to the feelings of other members of the group and 
emotion plays a part in metacognitive development, as research on feeling of 
knowing judgements (Lories, Dardenne, & Yzerbyt, 1998), and theory of mind 
(Wellman, 1990) suggest. 
The above two case studies have shown individual children working in the same 
group. The following case study highlights a different aspect of metacognitive 
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processing. It is most clearly shown through the group dynamics of a CASE@KS1 
group in school A, where the teacher whilst equally proficient and with only a 
little more experience than the school B teacher, has a very different style. 
School A 
This school is a state funded secular or county school. It has a one form co- 
educational entry with a total of 196 pupils. Pupils are grouped in seven classes 
from reception to Year 6.84% of pupils come from minority ethnic backgrounds 
and nearly 50% from homes where English is not the first language. 31 languages 
are spoken in the school, and there is a fluctuating population of refugee and 
asylum seekers, many of whom are housed in short stay accommodation. Nearly a 
quarter of the school roll transfers each year. This high level of fluctuation 
affected the CASE@KSI focus group. The group began with six members, but 
one left in the Autumn term before the project really got underway and so was not 
included in any analysis and another left at the beginning of the Spring tens, thus 
only four children from this focus group finished the year. The class consists of 
thirty children, eleven of whom joined in January, having been moved up from the 
Reception class at the beginning of the term in which they have their fifth 
birthday. So at the start of the year there were only nineteen children. in the class. 
The teacher was newly qualified and beginning her probationary year. The group 
consisted of three girls: Kali, Sarah and Gillian (Gillian left in January), and two 
boys Ryan and Charles. The group was deemed to be average for the class in 
terms of teacher assessed maths scores and all had good spoken English. 
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4.3 CASE STUDY 3 
Sarah - "knowledge of self and others" 
At the beginning of the year Sarah was five years and nine months old. She is a 
particularly friendly child and likes to chat along about stories and out of school 
activities. She particularly likes reading and has a reading age in advance of her 
chronological age. She always appears to be smiling and laughing but she can get 
upset very easily. She is confident speaking in a group and talking to adults. At 
the start of the programme Sarah is concerned to make known what she knows, but 
finds that she doesn't always get the openings within the group to do this: 
Flowers - Autumn Term 
Teacher: Can anyone remember what we did last week? 
Charles: we had wood 
Teacher: we had wood, didn't we, can anyone remember what we did with it? 
Sarah: Ido 
Charles: we made, made a staircase 
Teacher: we made a staircase, we're going to do something a bit like that today 
Sarah: I know --- 
Teacher: How do you know Sarah? 
Sarah: Cos when other people came I saw them 
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The teacher's approach is very gently, repeating what the children say rather than 
pushing them along. She picks up Sarah's statement of knowledge and challenges 
it with a question aimed at making Sarah reflect on her knowledge. 
However, the teacher's gentle style combined with the predominately teacher/child 
rather than child/child interaction during this first term leads to a discrepancy in 
the intentions of the teacher and the intentions of Sarah as this excerpt from the 
Flowers task shows: 
Teacher: Oh that's a good idea Kali, does anyone think they are the same size 
Sarah: No 
Teacher: Have a look, I know it's quite difficult. Is there one bigger or one 
smaller? 
Gillian: that one's bigger and that one's nearly 
Teacher: nearly the same size isn't it, but it's a bit 
Sarah: that's smaller and that's bigger than that 
Teacher: so do you think this one is the biggest in the whole pile? 
Sarah: and if you get one more [picking up another flower] 
Teacher: do you think so 
Sarah: it will be the middle and then just one more [picking up another flower] 
Teacher: which ones are you looking for to try, which ones are you looking for 
Sarah 
Sarah: this ones more bigger this one's smaller 
345 
Teacher: OK shall we try [Sarah is putting flowers in the rack], hang on a minute 
Sarah we haven 't decided something have we? 
Throughout this task Sarah tries to race ahead of the group and the teacher to 
complete the task herself by trial and error. Whilst the teacher aims to keep her 
own discourse going regarding planning the activity and deciding how to measure 
the flowers, Sarah aims to shape the discourse her own way and to move on to 
action without regard for the rest of the group. When thwarted she begins to work 
as part of a pair with Gillian, but only so that she can put in as many flowers as 
possible, whilst the teacher resorts to making the group take turns at putting the 
flowers in. Towards the end of the task Sarah is keen to make her statement: 
Sarah: I did all of them 
Sarah to Kali: I put this one in and this one 
Sarah's motivation here seems to be to finish the task herself quickly and without 
help. The teacher, on the other hand, tries to provoke a more metacognitive 
approach by slowing the group down and getting them to reflect on how they are 
solving the problem. The discrepancy between the teacher's intention and Sarah's 
intention is an important one and reoccurs as a theme throughout the year. 
In the dinosaur sorting task it is Sarah who eventually discovers the problem. She 
is very excited about this: 
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Dinosaurs - Autumn Term 
Sarah: hey 1 know that 's a t-rex but it's yellow it should be in here [meaning hoop 
containing yellow dinosaurs] 
The rest of the group however, feel that the t-rex should remain with the other t- 
rex. Sarah is now alone in her idea: 
Sarah: that was yellow, that should be here [in hoop with other yellow dinosaurs], 
doesn't matter if it's the same as that 
The group maintains the opposite point of view and Sarah begins to get upset and 
angry. The teacher refers to the emotional effect of the group decision on Sarah 
rather than the logical consequences of their decision for solving the problem: 
Teacher: Oh dear we've got some unhappiness here, Sarah is unhappy.... Sarah 
says it 's yellow and should be in this hoop [with other yellow dinosaurs], what do 
you say Kali ? 
Kali: it should stay in there [hoop with other t-rex] 
Teacher: but then Sarah's going to be unhappy if we leave it there, has anyone got 
an idea of how we could solve this problem? 
Gillian: put it there [in the hoop with yellow dinosaurs] 
Teacher: but then Kali's going to be unhappy because she wants it in the t-rex 
hoop 
Eventually Kali has an idea: 
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Kali: put it in the middle so that it's here and there [she places t-rex standing with 
legs on both hoops] 
Teacher: well what a great solution 
Sarah: That's what I was about to say, I was about to say put it between them 
The nature of the problem has been changed here from a logical classification 
problem to a problem of how to make sure no one is unhappy. The result though 
is that Sarah has to defend her self image by not allowing Kali to "win" by finding 
the compromise solution. Sarah's statement here may be consciously untrue, 
unconsciously untrue ie. a false metacognition in that she genuinely thinks that she 
was about to give the answer, or a conscious true metacognition. The emotional 
context of it though makes it even more difficult to interpret this statement. 
This emotional context to the group is maintained and encouraged by the teacher 
through the rest of the task: 
Teacher: could you explain to everyone wiry we should put the t-rex there [in the 
middle] 
Charles: if we put there [hoop containing other t-rex], Sarah will be crying 
Gillian: or we could share it because it's notfair 
Sarah: ifl put it in here [hoop containing yellow dinosaurs] then she'll be 
unhappy 
Teacher: so why did you decide to put it here [in the middle] Kali, can you explain 
lo everybody 
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Sarah: I had that idea too 
Kali: cos when we put it here yeah 
Sarah: then we'll be sharing 
Kali: then it will be kind 
For Sarah the important aspect is that her voice is heard, that the group 
acknowledges that she also had the solution to the problem. Having just 
undergone the experience of being outside the group, Sarah is now acting to 
protect her self view. Her view of her self is in this case tied up with her 
metacognitive knowledge of her self as a problem solver. Defence of this self- 
efficacy leads her to possible false metacognitions and stops her from working 
collaboratively to the extent that when another group member is allowed a turn she 
gets more upset. 
Later in the dinosaur sorting 
Charles: it's an elephant so it goes in there [he puts the mammoth in the middle of 
two hoops] 
Teacher: Ah 
Sarah: I was just about to say again [she is starting to cry] 
The emotional context of this group remains high throughout the year. The 
teacher often refers to social skills such as kindness, sharing, helping, being upset, 
being friends and the children also use this language when asked to describe what 
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they are doing. Throughout the year, Sarah is the most overtly emotional of the 
group but this emotional level is facilitated by the group interactions, eg: 
Clowns - Spring Term 
Sarah: the triangle, square and circle I keep getting them muddled up 
Ryan: Sarah when you say trousers, say trousers not trouser 
Sarah: I didn't say trouser. Everyone is copying me. 
Sarah to Kali: the rules are you can't have the same colours 
Teacher: well done for pointing that out Sarah, because you are helping your 
friends 
but later Sarah has to admit 
Sarah: I don't know how to do it 
the teacher suggest the group help Sarah 
Sarah: I know what the rules are, the rules are you're not allowed to put on the 
same colours and the same patterns [she appears very confused and her voice is 
upset] 
In this extract Sarah is being more metacognitive, becoming conscious of her own 
cognitive processing "1 keep getting them muddled up ", "I don't know how to do 
it ", "I know what the rules are .. 
" but these beginnings of metacognition are 
steeped in emotion. Sarah's feelings of confusion consciously recognised in this 
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metacognitive way are at odds with her belief about her self as someone who 
"knows the answer ", "has an idea ". The discrepancy between her stored self- 
image and the feedback from her ongoing metacognitive processing is leading to 
confusion and unsettling emotions. 
As Sarah moves through the year she begins to develop some metacognitive 
knowledge about her self which conflicts with her self image from the beginning 
of the year. The structure of the CASE@KSI tasks with their inbuilt cognitive 
conflict and the context of collaborative problem solving force this uncomfortable 
development upon her. In the group situation Sarah's early stance of knowing 
what to do is challenged by other children having alternative ideas, which also 
prove correct. 
5 DISCUSSION 
These three case studies highlight different aspects of the development of 
metacognition, but of course the aspects overlap. Common to all three case 
studies is the importance of the interaction between task, context and individual. 
In the case of Chloe and Oliver the logical progression of the group towards a 
consensus solution is encouraged by the teacher and this facilitates the practice and 
development of metacognitive processing linked to logical problem solving: 
planning, predicting, explaining, evaluating. In the case of Sarah a different aspect 
of metacognition is to the forefront. The emotional/affective aspects of this focus 
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group are encouraged by the teacher and through this Sarah begins to develop 
beliefs about herself based upon her performance within the group. 
The collaborative. group is an essential element of this growing awareness. It is 
within the group situation that Chloe is made to be explicit about her ideas. She 
learns that she needs to reflect upon those ideas and have them clear in her own 
mind. She also learns that other people's comments and reactions to her ideas can 
enable her to clarify or modify them. Realising that she doesn't always understand 
what she has said is an important aspect of monitoring and controlling her 
thinking. Asking questions of oneself can begin by being questioned by others. 
Through the collaborative nature of the group these children are not only learning 
the social group skills of listening, contributing and sharing, the group is also 
impacting upon their individual ways of thinking. In the early part of the year the 
teacher was still the driving force of the group, but as the year goes on she is able 
to take more of a back seat, sometimes gently steering the group rather than 
driving it. It is this skillful facilitation of the group that encourages the children to 
become more aware of their thinking. The teacher becomes a model for the 
language and behaviour associated with higher level thinking. Both Chloe and 
Oliver learn something about themselves as cognitive beings. Chloe admits to 
herself that she doesn't always understand, Oliver realises he has some good 
strategies for solving the problems. Feedback from the group is encouraging this 
development. 
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It is particular to the CASE@KS I programme that the focus groups constituted at 
the beginning of the year remain together working together on CASE@KSI tasks 
each week for the whole year. As Nelson has observed 
"social encounters are replete with metacognitive determinations 
about the cognitive and motivational states of other people" 
(Nelson et al., 1998)p. 143 
We can see in the case study examples above that the children's metacognitive 
development is progressing in terms of these social areas as well as in logical 
problem solving. This means that any observations of children working together 
must take into account within group social factors, individual personality factors 
and external group factors such as the teacher's style and motivations and the 
usual classroom environment. 
Social psychologists have pointed out that people are sensitive to and change their 
behaviour, including their cognitive behaviour, in relation to perceived changes in 
their social and physical environment, (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Higgins & 
Kruglanski, 1996). The nature of these adaptations though is also dependent on 
conceptions of the self. Research from social psychology has shown that people 
have beliefs about their own "self-efficacy" (Bandura, 1995), about their abilities, 
(Ellis & Kruglanski, 1992) and also estimate their own intellectual abilities with 
reference to their own beliefs about their social group, (Levy & Langer, 1994). 
People who are low in self-efficacy are found to be easily discouraged and tend 
not to apply the metacognitive dimensions of self-regulation. Bandura has 
suggested that beliefs about self-efficacy develop from either modeling of others 
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or the direct influence of others, as well as from past experiences, (Bandura, 
1995). These beliefs about the self affect the acquisition of metacognitive 
strategies and these acquisitions may in turn affect the beliefs about the self, (Jost 
et al., 1998). 
The metacognitive development of the children working in CASE@KS I focus 
groups, is being facilitated by the teacher modeling metacognitive strategies, by 
the members of the group directly challenging, persuading and agreeing with each 
other and by assimilating a number of metacognitive experiences over the whole 
year. 
It is particularly important that the group is led in such a way that positive 
metacognitions are modeled and that negative or low self-efficacy beliefs are 
challenged. In particular, other classroom and experimental studies have shown 
that the beliefs children hold about intelligence are strongly associated with 
learning and performance, (Ferrari, 1996). 
Some children have been found to subscribe to a fixed theory of intelligence, 
which shows people possessing or not possessing an aptitude for a particular 
subject. If children holding these beliefs do badly on a test they tend to have 
feelings of self-deprecation and helplessness. Other children may hold a theory of 
intelligence, in which people can increase their aptitude in a particular area. 
Children holding these beliefs tend to achieve better results and also suffer less 
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when they do less well on a test, (Dweck et al., 1993). These theories about 
intelligence are part of the store of metacognitive knowledge that we develop over 
the years. 
Metacognitive development, like cognitive development, progresses within the 
constraints and opportunities of the social and intellectual context. The 
metacognitive experiences that children are involved with can have far reaching 
consequences for their self-image and views of their abilities in different areas. 
Additionally, metacognitive beliefs about others, relying, as they do on external 
observations of others, have to be interpreted by and in relation to the self. So for 
Sarah in these case studies, the high emotional content of the metacognitive 
experiences she encounters through the focus group will affect both her view of 
her self and of others in the group. There is a danger that untrue metacognitions 
can go unchallenged and that in Sarah's case, failure to always solve the problem 
at hand may lead to more general feelings of distress. 
Since metacognitive beliefs can be influenced and changed by social persuasion, 
the way the group is managed and the models of metacognition that are allowed to 
pervade are all important. In the case of CASE@KS 1 the class teacher, her 
knowledge and understanding of metacognitive processing, along with her own 
metacognitive assumptions and her intentions towards facilitating metacognitive 
development in the children are particularly important aspects and these will be 
considered in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 9 
TEA CHERS AND META COGNITION 
I INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 7 showed how different teachers across all the schools, both experimental 
and control differ in the extent and manner in which they try to facilitate 
metacognition in their students. The frequency counts of teacher FM behaviours 
showed that, whilst there is no significant difference between experimental and 
control school teachers in terms of overall quantity of behaviours, there is a 
difference in the spread of behaviours employed. The control school teachers used 
a much narrower range of FM behaviours than did the experimental school 
teachers. 
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Chapter 8 showed how the teachers in two experimental schools tried to facilitate 
metacognition. In school B the teacher was seen to model the language and 
behaviour associated with higher level thinking. Chapter 8 suggested that the way 
collaborative groups are led affect the type of metacognition that is produced. In a 
Year One classroom the teacher is in a powerful position to affect the production 
of metacognition and challenge negative or low self-efficacy beliefs. 
From analysis of sixty nine classroom observations taken over one academic year, 
it seems clear that all eight teachers were trying to foster good thinking skills in 
their students. However, some teachers were clearly more successful in terms of 
the range and complexity of reasoning and metacognition that their students 
produced. 
This chapter aims to investigate what aspects of teacher intervention are important 
in facilitating the development of metacognition in five to six year old children. 
Specifically, through analysis of teacher interviews conducted at the start and end 
of the intervention year, answers to the following questions are sought: 
Research Question 4: 
What factors associated with teachers impact on the development of 
metacognition in year one classrooms ? 
This lead research question was further broken down in to three sub questions: 
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1. Does teachers' knowledge of and beliefs about metacognition impact on the 
development of metacognition in the classroom? 
2. Do teachers' beliefs and opinions about learning and teaching affect the way 
they try to facilitate metacognition in the classroom? 
3. Can teachers' ability to promote metacognition be developed through 
continuing professional development? 
2 INTERVIEWING TEACHERS 
R. D. Laing suggested that in any room where there are two people there are 
actually at least six. The two of them and four ghosts "What I think of you", 
"What you think of me", What I think you think of me" and "What you think I 
think of you" (Laing, Phillipson, & Lee, 1966). 
In order to ascertain someone's opinion we ask a question. It is thought necessary 
for the interviewer to keep a professional distance in order to receive rather than 
influence the responses. Successful interviewing though also involves building a 
rapport between interviewer and interviewee. Achieving this balance is not easy, 
as Denzin, (1970), amongst many others, points out. But it is thought that this 
"professional" skill of becoming a "good interviewer" develops with practice and 
experience. We must guard against asking leading questions or prompting 
answers by use of verbal or non-verbal communication. The interviewer is 
supposed to be aware of their own influence, both verbal and non-verbal on the 
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interviewee. The interviewer must take into account both physical and emotional 
contextual factors, must achieve some kind of rapport or friendliness whilst 
remaining objective, being friendly but not too friendly, must keep the interviewee 
focussed on the questions, but not lead them to answers. The interviewer must also 
allow the interviewee to express their opinions fully whilst adhering to time 
constraints and perhaps, above all, the interviewer must actively listen to the 
interviewee's responses, whilst maintaining eye contact. It is obviously not 
professional for an interviewer to show nervousness, boredom, apathy or to lose 
track of the interview, to mentally switch off, or to maintain eye contact to the 
extent that her eyes glaze over. Yet all of these "negative" aspects of the interview 
process occurred during the fifteen interviews carried out for this project. Rather 
than invalidating the data collected, these natural human failings render the 
interviews authentic. 
These conversational encounters with the teachers involved far more than the 
transcribed data of the questions and answers. Through these encounters I came to 
understand something about each of the teachers involved and I came to 
understand something about what I thought they thought of me and what I thought 
they thought I thought of them. Hearing their voices again sometimes months later 
when transcribing the interviews, involved revisiting these initial encounters. 
The act of transcribing whilst undertaken as "verbatim" transcripts actually 
involved reviewing the interviews. It is at these points - the initial meeting, the 
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transcribing and the following readings of the transcripts that the analysis of the 
data is constructed. Investigating how feelings and states of mind of the 
interviewer affect this analysis would involve a psychoanalytic approach to the 
research, which is outside the scope of this thesis. However, it is acknowledged 
that the following analysis has been informed by both conscious and unconscious 
interpretations. 
3 PRACTICALITIES 
The interview questions for the set of interviews to be carried out at the beginning 
of the intervention year (September 1999), were devised to gain information about 
teachers' perceptions of their "style" of teaching and their beliefs about how 
children learn and should be taught in year one. The questions also asked about 
the teachers' knowledge of metacognition as a theory. After being given a short 
description of the definition of metacognition used in this project, they were asked 
if this resonated with them, as being important for children's learning at this age. 
The teachers were also asked to reflect on their own experience of learning and 
relate this to the idea of metacognition. The interview schedule was piloted on two 
other primary school teachers and as the feedback from them was positive, the 
interview schedule was used for the main study. 
Seven interviews were carried out at the end of September 1999.1 had met all the 
teachers once before during the main CASE@KS 1 programme pre-testing of the 
children. In each case the interviews were carried out at the end of the school day 
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either in the teacher's own classroom or in a corner of a usually empty staffroom. 
Field notes made at the time reveal that these initial interviews ranged from the 
"awkward", (School B) to the "easy and friendly", (School A). All the teachers 
were asked all the questions, but in-between they were allowed to veer away from 
the specific question. Some teachers took the opportunity of being listened to, to 
give their unbidden views on education policy or staffing resources or curriculum 
matters. In general though, in these first interviews, the teachers tended to keep to 
the point of the questions and consequently, the interviews did not last longer than 
45 minutes. 
In March 2000 the original school C teacher left her school and was replaced by a 
new very experienced teacher, who was initially employed only for one term. The 
initial teacher (hereafter labelled Cl), was unavailable for interview at the end of 
the year. The new school C teacher (hereafter labelled C2) was interviewed a 
week after she started in the school. 
At the end of the school year the remaining seven teachers were interviewed again. 
The interview schedules this time, used answers from the first interviews and 
asked the teachers if there had been any change since the first interview. For 
instance School Y interview question 1 end of the year 2000: 
L. 3 R: One thing you emphasised quite a bit last September 
was routines and behaviour, do you still feel that these 
things have the same priority? 
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L. 6 7` Yes, because I. find this class very different, from any 
other experience I've had with a year one class 
In this way, the second interviews were more personalised. However, they all 
covered the same three major areas of teachers' perceptions of their teaching 
style, their opinions regarding how year one children learn and how they should be 
taught and their beliefs, opinions and knowledge of metacognition. They were 
also asked for actual examples of children in their class, displaying metacognitive 
behaviour, (See appendix 9.1). 
These second interviews were much longer than the initial interviews, on average 
taking just over an hour each. Due to constraints of the main project, all three 
control school teachers had to be interviewed on the same day when the teachers 
were attending a CASE@KS 1 professional development day ready for the 
following year, when they would run the programme. The control school teachers 
were also interviewed by other researchers on the same day. This was less than an 
ideal situation and it is probable that "interview fatigue" on both sides has become 
another complicating factor in these data. 
4 ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the eight interviews focussed on the transcribed data. The analysis 
initially concentrated on the teachers' responses to four main questions: firstly, 
questions about their teaching style, secondly their beliefs and opinions about how 
children of this age learn and should be taught, thirdly their knowledge of and 
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opinion about the theory of metacognition as explained by me and fourthly a 
reflection on their own metacognitive capacity. From this content analysis, three 
major themes emerged. The teachers were placed in one or other of these thematic 
categories depending on the extent to which their answers concentrated on these 
themes. Whilst the labels "protective", "child centred" or "disciplined" are just 
that - labels, they each head up a category which contains consistent beliefs and 
opinions. The teachers are placed in these categories because their responses to 
the interview questions are consistently, thematically linked and constitute this 
particular category. 
This analysis is compared to the analysis of the classroom observations, with data 
from chapter 7 reformulated, to provide comparisons between what teachers say 
about metacognition and what they do about it in the classroom. A thematic 
analysis rather than a case study method was used because answers to the initial 
questions by the teachers, were remarkably consistent and these responses 
naturally fell into three themes as described below. A case study method was also 
rejected because the focus of the research question for this project, is factors 
influencing the development of metacognition in young children, rather than a 
focus on individual teacher's development. In this sense the importance of the 
teacher interviews is to gain an understanding of the teachers' beliefs and opinions 
and knowledge in order to see if this affects the way or the extent to which they 
are able or willing to facilitate the metacognitive development of their students. 
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The experimental school teachers all undertook the CASE@KS I professional 
development programme, which involved six off-site professional development 
days, where the concepts and theoretical framework of CASE@KS I were 
introduced and the tasks were demonstrated. Of these six days, one hour-and-a- 
half session concentrated on metacognition. However, all aspects of the 
programme were open for discussion by the teachers at any of these days. The 
teachers were also supported in school with six visits by one of the research team 
and again teachers were able to discuss theory, as well as having the tasks 
demonstrated. The teachers also visited each other, with four visits, scheduled 
over the year. There were also a couple of social/conference events to which the 
teachers were invited. 
5 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
Of all the eight teachers interviewed across the year, three teachers in experimental 
schools A and B and control school Z were newly qualified and in their first 
teaching post. The teacher of control school Y was in her second year as a 
qualified teacher. Teacher Cl was in her fourth year and teacher D was in her 6h 
year. The remaining two teachers, one in control school X and the other teacher 
C2, who took over the year one class in experimental school C at Easter 2000, had 
much more teaching experience, but had both taken long gaps between teaching 
posts. Teacher C2 had trained as a teacher at the end of the 1960s, whilst the 
teacher of school X completed her training at the end of the 1980s. They both had 
diverse experience of different classes, year groups and schools. 
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One of the major factors affecting all the teachers, but seemingly impacting more 
on the more experienced teachers, was their perception of the effects of the 
introduction of the National Curriculum, followed by the Numeracy and Literacy 
hours and formal testing in terms of end of year 2 external tests. All eight teachers 
mentioned one or more of these aspects in their first four responses, although they 
were not directly asked about these issues. The more experienced teachers 
unsurprisingly, made comparisons between teaching pre- and post- national 
curriculum. For instance: 
Control School Teacher X: 
In response to a question about her style of teaching: 
L7 "1 think I've become more formal as compared to, 1 was 
trained ten years ago you see and 1 took a break and then 
I came back It was very much child centred in the training 
and also lots of group work but because of the National 
Curriculum, the Numeracy hour and the Literacy hour 
I've become more formal I feel in my teaching" .............. 
She goes on to say 
L. 13 "in some ways its easier, its more manageable in some ways you 
know" 
All the teachers mentioned the National Curriculum or external testing, in the first 
set of interviews. This was generally done in a neutral way, acknowledging the 
impact and difference these policies have had, but at this stage not voicing any 
particularly strong positive or negative feelings about them. 
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6 THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
The first four questions of the first set of interviews asked teachers to concentrate 
on their approach to teaching Year One. They were all asked about whether they 
thought they had any particular style of teaching, what they thought were the most 
important aspects of teaching Year One children and what advice they would give 
to a newly qualified Year One teacher, (Appendix 9.1). 
Analysis of these first four questions suggested three main themes. These are 
labelled "protective", "child centred" and "disciplined". The teachers tended to 
emphasise one of these themes in response to the interview questions. Whilst 
there was some overlap in terms of some teachers mentioning more than one 
theme, the interviews were remarkably consistent over these first four questions, 
with teachers tending to stick to one theme once they had mentioned it. The 
following table shows the category allocated to each teacher as a result of their 
responses to these initial questions. 
Table 9.1 Thematic Analysis - Teacher Categories 
Category Teacher School 
Protective A Experimental 
Protective C2 Experimental - 
Protective X Control 
Child Centred B Experimental 
Child Centred Z Control 
Disciplined Cl Experimental 
Disciplined D Experimental 
Disciplined Y Control 
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Within these categories there is a continuum. For instance teacher D, teacher Y 
and teacher Cl all emphasise skills, routines and discipline, but teacher D is less 
rigid about this than either of the other two teachers. Similarly teachers A, C2 and 
X emphasise social aspects and adopt a protective role, but teacher A is more 
firmly in this role, with teacher X more in the middle and teacher C2 still 
emphasising this role, but to a lesser extent. 
The child centred category includes two teachers and again there are individual 
differences within the category. Teacher B's responses are more reflective about 
her own practice, whilst teacher Z tends to subscribe to a view of teaching which 
comes from her teacher training course, but which also fits in with her own beliefs. 
These three thematic categories are further elaborated below. 
6.1 "PROTECTIVE" 
The teachers in this category emphasised the social aspects of teaching Year One 
children and the children's emotional development. The key words used by all 
three teachers in this category in response to the first four questions are: 
( 
"patience ", "repetitionf/, 
iireassuranceff 11encouragement1f, 1praise! f, "social 
skills ", "listening ". For instance teacher A says that an important aspect of 
teaching Year One is: 
L. 14 "Not taking for granted that they know what you 
mean. Being patient about repeating things " 
Control school teacher X emphasises the children's vulnerability: 
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L. 16 "1 think you have to remind yourself that they have 
been in school only a year or maybe less .... 
L. 22 "they still need lots of reassuring, lots of encouragement " 
and in response to question 4, which asks what advice she would give to a newly 
qualified Year One teacher, teacher X says of the children: 
L. 28 "And also they just need so much more reassurance and 
encouragement and praise, they are very kind of sensitive 
and they just fall back if'you're not careful and give them 
confidence so that they can work independently, really 
" that would be the main thing. 
Teacher C2 emphasised the development of social skills: 
L. 31 "1 think the social skills are terribly important..... they've got to 
learn to listen first of all " 
L. 39 "I also believe in doing a certain amount of free play ...... with 
painting developing that side of things. A skill that not necessarily 
has a finished product, but something they can enjoy" 
Development of the social skills of appropriately communicating with other people 
is an important aspect of early years teaching and rightly acknowledged as 
important by all the teachers. These three teachers' emphasis on the social skills 
also includes an emphasis on the children's vulnerability and their role as 
protectors of children's emotional development and providers of stability. In the 
classroom these teachers tended to take on a role, which included protection of the 
individual child to a greater degree, than did the other teachers in this sample. For 
example, these teachers tended to draw attention to the children's feelings with 
questions such as "why is Sarah looking sad? " (Teacher A) or with references to 
personal qualities of individual children such as "you are kind" (Teacher C2) or 
reminders to be "thoughtful ", "generous" (Teacher X). These teachers were also 
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observed to manifest this protective role in other non verbal ways. Most obviously, 
this involved putting their arm around a child, or asking a tearful child to sit next 
to them, rather than asking the naughty child to sit next to them, which seems to 
say "teacher as disciplinarian". 
6.2 "CHILD CENTRED" 
This theme is about emphasising teaching in terms of the child's individual 
learning. It involves a view of teaching as trying to expand the child's world and 
knowledge and to facilitate their natural curiosity. It involves a holistic approach 
to teaching. This is one that engages the children in intellectual, sensory and 
experiential ways of learning. It also includes taking account of the child's 
individual life experiences. The two teachers (experimental school teacher B and 
control school teacher Z) who encapsulated this approach were both newly 
qualified and in their first teaching positions. They both placed emphasis on 
children learning through interaction and through connecting school learning with 
life. They gave very similar responses when asked about their style of teaching and 
important aspects of teaching Year One. 
Teacher B 
L. 30 "really encouraging the children to talk about their experiences 
to be able to really engage and interact in what they're doing 
with their life around them... " 
L. 33 "if they're [activities] all related to things that are related to their 
life somehow... " 
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L. 36 "really just to really get involved in it. " 
Teacher Z 
L. 4 "very much based on the children, very much based around them 
what I think they'd be interested in learning... " 
L. 6 "what they already know, what they bring to the classroom 
from their background, what they're own personal 
fascinations are, I think children always learn much more 
if they can relate to it themselves... " 
L. 43 "Also I think I've been trying to impress on them that 
the learning is for their sake... " 
L. 53 "1'11 always encourage the children to build on what they know... " 
6.3 "DISCIPLINED" 
This theme emphasises behaviour and routine. Answers to the first four interview 
questions carried out at the start of the year are categorised as "disciplined" if the 
teacher consistently emphasised the need for good behaviour from the children, 
before teaching can take place. The three teachers who at the start of the year 
illustrated this theme placed a great deal of importance on this aspect of their 
teaching. They also referred to external contextual factors of their teaching, such 
as the National Curriculum, the Numeracy and Literacy hour, which could be seen 
to have imposed a disciplined routine on them and which may be affecting their 
approach to teaching. There is also an emphasis on skills within this theme. 
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One of the three teachers who stressed the discipline aspect of teaching did have 
severe discipline problems in the classroom and left the school all together at 
Easter (experimental school teacher Cl). Another had what she described as a 
very low ability class and at the start of the year, had little classroom support for 
her high number of special needs children, (control school teacher Y). These 
larger contextual factors can be heard in the responses of these two teachers. 
Teacher Y 
L. 8 "The literacy hour and the numeracy hour have already 
dictated how I teach. " 
L. 12 "set them up with skills that will help them to focus at school, 
discipline and set routines and things that should be followed... " 
when asked about advice to a newly qualified teacher of Year One she said: 
L. 17 "Routine and behaviour and not to be so concerned about all 
aspects of teaching, but be concerned about specific areas... " 
This teacher also remarked on other contextual factors, which impact on her 
teaching. In particular the fact that children came from different nurseries and 
reception classes, all with different first experiences of school. Whilst the schools 
used the same base-line tests, this teacher saw problems with consistency of the 
tests' administration and this led to very mixed ability classes. 
The second teacher to emphasise discipline referred to her own school experience: 
Teacher Cl 
L. 4 "I started off wanting to be very formal which is a reflection 
of my own education. " 
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L. 10 "... they work with a task book...! found that a good way of 
doing things... " 
L. 14 "Its very much now trying to keep them in their seats... " 
L. 18 "There's less play involved and they are already unfortunately 
being pushed towards doing an exam, a test at the end of 2"d 
year... " 
L. 23 "I want them to achieve as high as they can in their writing... " 
Speaking of asking open questions she remarked: 
L51 "I find it quite d f/icult sometimes to do that, its obviously easier 
to just tell them something... " 
The third teacher to illustrate the "discipline" theme emphasised organisation and 
skills. 
Teacher D 
L. 20 "... the reading is a crucial thing to get that off and away... " 
L. 27 "Well the curriculum's set up anyway, what you have to teach 
that's by the by, the most important thing I've found this year is 
planning, careful planning and organisation... " 
L. 89 "... for a long time the national curriculum has put the emphasis 
on teacher to child teaching... " 
L. 91 "1 know my self as a teacher coming out of college [in 1984] it was 
very much what you have to teach them not what they need to 
know. " 
7 SECOND INTERVIEWS JUNE/JULY 2000 
_ 
In the second set of interviews carried out at the end of the year the teachers were 
asked if their teaching style and approach to teaching had changed since 
September, (See appendix 9.1). 
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7.1 SECOND INTERVIEWS "PROTECTIVE" GROUP 
The three teachers who were characterised as "protective" in September, 
(experimental school teachers A and C2 and control school teacher X) all indicated 
some movement away from this "protective" stance throughout the year. 
This change is most marked in experimental school teacher A. At the beginning of 
the year, teacher A seemed to focus very much on the emotional and social 
development of individual children. By the end of the year, although she mentions 
social aspects ", these are couched in terms of working collaboratively. 
Teacher A 
L. 6 "... next year I will focus a lot more on the social aspects of 
the group, group dynamics... that is something that needs to 
be supported a lot more in the rest of the class and not just 
in that group at that time... " 
L. 10 "1 think that without those children working together and 
being able to accept things from each other everything else 
falls down. " 
She felt that her own teaching style has changed and developed over the year: 
L. 22 '7 listen a lot more and I kind of step back a bit more than I 
did at the beginning... " 
L. 26 "And if they go round in circles a bit and go round a bit longer 
that's fine, I'm not so, whereas before it would be worrying me 
and now I'm not so concerned. " 
Experimental school teacher C2 who joined the project half way through the year 
had also moved away from her "protective" stance to find the routines and 
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discipline imposed by the national curriculum and literacy and numeracy hours 
have impacted upon her approach to teaching. 
Teacher C2 
L. 12 "To a certain extent I've had to change it because I'm trying 
to fit in the national curriculum, which I haven't done before... 
1 'm following rather than separating things now, 1 'n: just trying 
to follow the guideline of the literacy and numeracy hour really. " 
However, there is an element of misgiving in her responses, towards this change, 
for instance: 
L. 98 "I do think that there is a general acceptance that the children 
are fed all this information at an alarmingly fast rate. There 
isn't any time for further investigation on a particular subject 
because you are following a week to week routine. " 
In answer to a question about her opinion of the CASE@KS I professional 
development programme she begins to reflect on why some children may be more 
metacognitive than others and concludes that television viewing habits are largely 
to blame. She then recounts an episode of over hearing these young children 
discussing an adult audience participation programme and she expressed her 
horror at realising that viewing this type of programme was fairly common 
amongst her year one class. Whilst this opinion has no particular connection to the 
development or facilitation of metacognition from a theoretical point-of view, this 
teacher felt that this kind of television viewing had a negative impact on the 
children's developing cognition. She did not provide any evidence for this, other 
than her own belief 
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The third teacher in this group from control school X continued to emphasise the 
need for confidence boosting praise whilst acknowledging a change in the 
children's growing maturity and their need for more independence. 
Teacher X 
L. 10 "... they have to take responsibility, for their learning... " 
L. 11 "... also as they get to the end of the year I would expect more 
independence from them, but that doesn't reduce the 
encouragement and the praise and the confidence building. " 
L. 43 "1 encourage the primary helpers or whoever is in the 
classroom to be positive rather than negative. " 
Asked for advice for a newly qualified teacher of Year One she responds: 
L. 151 "Confidence building really and try to be as positive as you can. " 
L. 155 "Keep the child happy really and then she will be able to learn. " 
There appears to be a qualitative difference between the changes to their teaching 
that these three teachers report at the end of the year. All three acknowledge the 
growing maturity of the children over this year, which spans the chronological age 
of five to six years plus. They refer to this developmental change in reference to a 
change in their own approach to teaching. However, there are notable differences. 
The control school teacher, X, recognises this developmental process, but still 
emphasises her own role in terms of building confidence and giving 
encouragement. 
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The experimental school teacher, C2, shows her ongoing concern for the 
children's emotional development particularly through her examples of the 
television viewing habits of the children in her class. She is concerned too with 
the rate at which children are expected to achieve and indicates that external 
factors such as the national curriculum have speeded up this process, allowing less 
time for practice of newly learnt skills. 
The experimental school teacher A more clearly indicated how she feels she has 
changed through the year. She said that her newly developed emphasis on group 
working skills would be implemented in the following year. She has moved away 
from her initial focus on the emotional development of individual children, to a 
concern for facilitating good collaborative working skills. Whilst this may still 
involve taking account of the individual's social skills, there is less emphasis on 
"emotional development" and more on the interactions between members of the 
group. 
7.2 SECOND INTERVIEWS - "CHILD CENTRED" GROUP 
The two teachers (control school Z and experimental school B) categorised under 
this heading at the start of the year referred to teaching children as "engaging 
them " and used words such as "interact ", "involve ", "life experiences ", "fun ", 
' practical ", "working out ", "problem solving ". Whilst both teachers began the 
year with this view of teaching, at the end of the year teacher B continued to stress 
these aspects of teaching, but acknowledged that the children have matured and 
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that she doesn't have to concentrate so much energy on behaviour. She referred 
directly to learning how to learn. 
Teacher B 
L. 19 "Teaching is now developing more about how you learn and 
how you do this. " 
L. 20 "Just really getting them on board with thinking, being aware 
that they are learning and that they are achieving something 
and using their knowledge better. " 
As at the beginning of the year she is still concerned to link learning to life. 
L. 23 "... a connection between what they are learning now and 
the bigger picture. 1 try to relate things to the outside world. " 
Whilst it appeared to me through classroom observations and these two interviews 
that this teacher's style had developed on a continuum from September, she 
viewed herself differently: 
L. 29 "My style has completely changed Completely. Because in 
September I didn't know how to teach. 1'd just started, I 
didn't know what it was all about. It's much more focussed 
on learning now. " 
L. 33 'It's the learning that's important, how they are taught, 
what they are doing, how they've learnt it and how they've 
organised it, how they're communicating and to expect them to 
behave. " 
At the beginning of the year these two newly qualified teachers, just a couple of 
weeks into their first teaching post gave very similar answers to questions about 
teaching style, both emphasising linking school learning to the child's own 
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experience. By the end of the year, there is a more marked difference between the 
two. Whilst the experimental school B teacher has continued this emphasis on 
"child centred" learning, the control school teacher Z appears to have moved to a 
more routine based approach, centred on the timetable, with outside influences 
acknowledged as impacting on learning rather than extensions of it. For instance 
in response to the first question of this second interview, which picked up on 
responses to the first interview and asked this teacher if she still saw building on 
the child's own experience as important she says: 
Teacher Z 
L. 11 "1 think the more they move through, I suppose, the institution 
of school, the less important that probably becomes. 1 think my 
children have now been in school for another year, so they've got 
more fixed ideas, I suppose about certain things I... 1 but 1 do think 
it's still really important to consider what anything that might he 
in their home life that might be affecting the way they look at 
things. " 
There is a subtle difference between the views she expressed at the beginning of 
the year and these views. Whereas at the beginning of the year, she emphasised 
building on children's life experiences, she now considers the children's home life 
as "affecting the way they look at things. " Out of school experiences are now seen 
as another variable for the teacher to consider, rather than a resource to be mined. 
When asked more directly about her teaching style at the start of the year, she was 
unsure (unsurprisingly, given the short time she had been teaching), but she 
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emphasised the children's personal fascinations, along with a need to teach them 
basic literacy and numeracy skills. By the end of the year, she emphasises the 
routines and structure of school life. 
Teacher Z 
L. 26 "I was going to say formal, but 1 don't think that's the right 
word, but I think the children, they have a timetable and 
they know the timetable and we all know the timetable and 
whether that's in an ideal world how they should be taught 
is a different matter, but we do still stick quite to the 
timetable. " 
When asked about the "ideal world" situation she came back to an emphasis on 
child centred learning. 
Teacher Z 
L. 33 "In year one there would be an awful lot more of play or 
structured play and the child self directing their learning [... / 
I think five and six is very very young to expect them to do 
science and RE and handwriting, you know its quite tough, 
that's the way it is unfortunately. " 
By the end of the year this teacher has possibly moved categories to adopt a 
position more in line with the "disciplined" category than the "child centred" 
category. 
7.3 SECOND INTERVIEWS - "DISCIPLINED" GROUP 
By the end of the year the experimental school teacher [C I] had left the school and 
she declined to give another interview. The control school teacher [Y], who at the 
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start of the year referred very much to discipline and routine, at the end of the year 
gave an interesting insight into why she had responded in this way. 
Teacher Y 
L. 8 "I find this class very different from any other experience 
I've had with a year one class, because they are a low ability 
and I'm still working at a level that the reception class is 
working at. " 
L. 22 "This class needs routine more than other children" 
Thus characterising her as a "disciplined" teacher only extends as far as this class 
and this is an important consideration to acknowledge for all the analysis of these 
data. She also comments on "researcher effects". 
Teacher Y 
L. 38 "1 'd say when you are there or another researcher is there 
observing, it's more structured. The lessons are more 
structured and time is more rigid! " 
L. 43 "Although you're not watching me you are still in there 
watching and that's a general feeling with any member 
of staff, if someone 's in there you change it around a 
little bit. " 
For this teacher, the structured approach she takes to teaching is determined by her 
perception of her class's inability to work in any other way. In addition, she is 
responding to being observed during the numeracy hour, by keeping to the 
numeracy hour format and time structure. Thus there is a consistency in this 
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teacher's approach from the first interview in September, through the termly 
observations to this interview at the end of the year. However, by the end of the 
year she is far more forthcoming with her explanations and reasoning behind her 
style of teaching. 
The third teacher, who at the beginning of the year was placed in this category was 
Teacher D. At that time she was at the other end of the continuum, in effect 
making it less clear whether she should be in this category, or in the child centred 
category. At the beginning of the year she emphasised skills. At the end of the 
year she emphasised children learning strategies to enable them to progress in 
learning skills. 
Teacher D 
L. 16 "... what 1 would hope that they would do, is to look for a 
strategy that they could use to work out their problem. " 
L. 23 "... there are certainly some children that can apply 
strategies to situations. " 
She then gave an example of children understanding why some add and subtract 
signs cannot be interchanged. 
Teacher D 
L. 28 "... but that's really a few more able children who can just 
visualise it in their head, what the connection between the 
numbers are, where 1 think the majority of the children 
haven 't got that stage. " 
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L. 37 "Children who find it difficult to explain how they've worked 
it out, they don't really understand what they've done. " 
This teacher also felt that she has developed her skills over the year and she now 
has much more in common with the "child centred" category of teachers than the 
"routine/disciplined" category. 
Teacher D 
L. 61 "... my questioning has improved so much, its got more 
how and why questions, questions that don't require a 
straight answer... " 
L. 63 "I'm trying to encourage them to explain how they got 
their answer. I do give them more time to think ... " 
L. 67 "I've tried to encourage the other children to give them 
space to think as well... " 
8 SUMMARY 
This section of the analysis focused on describing the teachers' beliefs and 
opinions about teaching and learning in the year one classroom. From a thematic 
analysis of interviews conducted with seven teachers at the beginning of the year 
and one teacher mid way through the year, each teacher was assigned to one of 
three thematic categories: 
Protective - emphasis on individual emotional development 
Child Centred - emphasis on individual and group cognitive development 
Disciplined - emphasis on practical aspects of timetable and routine 
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Eight interviews contributed data to the first interview session and seven 
interviews to the second interview session. 
The major findings of this analysis were, that at the beginning of the year 
three teachers emphasised children's emotional development and their social 
skills. These teachers tended to see the children as vulnerable and adopted a 
"protective" role towards them. They tended to stress the young age of the 
children and referred to a need for more structured play in the year one classroom. 
By the end of the year all three teachers had changed to some extent. The growing 
maturity of the children meant that less focus was placed on protection. However, 
this is on a continuum. The experimental school teacher C2, now ensconced in the 
routines and structured approach of the national curriculum, still comments on the 
emotional vulnerability of the children in her class, with reference to them 
watching inappropriate adult television programmes. The control school teacher 
(teacher X), continues to emphasise confidence building and keeping the children 
happy. In contrast, the experimental school teacher (teacher A), who at the 
beginning of the year was probably most strongly identified with this protective 
category, has moved the most. She now emphasises social skills in terms of group 
collaboration and team working, rather than in terms of individual emotional 
development. She also feels that she gives children more opportunity to learn for 
and by themselves and she is less inclined to step in and direct and more inclined 
to let the children make mistakes. Thus in terms of this categorisation, she can be 
seen to have moved from the protective category to the child centred category. 
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The two teachers, one control and one experimental who were placed in the child 
centred category at the beginning of the year (teachers B and Z), were both, in 
their first teaching post, having just come out of college. They both emphasised 
starting from where the child is and building on the child's own knowledge. They 
were keen to point out how teaching should make connections between what is 
learnt in school and what is brought in from outside. 
By the end of the year both teachers had undergone a change themselves. For the 
experimental school teacher (B), this seems to have been more of a development 
of her earlier ideas. Looking back herself, she felt she had focussed more on 
behaviour at the beginning of the year, when in fact she had, in comparison to 
other teachers, stressed a "child centred" approach to learning. However, by the 
end of the year she had developed both in terms of her teaching style, and in her 
facilitation of metacognition. She had become clearer about her own style of 
teaching and focussed even more on the children's learning. In particular, she had 
become more interested in encouraging the children to learn how to learn and to 
become independent learners. 
In contrast, the control school teacher (Z) placed less emphasis on the children's 
own learning at the end of the year and more on routine and structured work. This 
appears to be a result of larger contextual factors, such as the structured school 
environment, and the national curriculum timetable. However, it seems she is 
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aware of this change as a limitation and refers to an "ideal world" where the focus 
would be much more on the views she held at the start of the year. 
Wider contextual factors were made explicit too by the control school teacher who 
at the beginning of the year was categorised as disciplined, (Teacher Y). At the 
end of the year, she clearly explains that her approach to teaching has been 
determined by the academic ability level of her class. She implied that, given a 
different or higher ability level in her class generally, her style of teaching would 
be different and perhaps more "child centred", in terms of these categories of 
analysis. Her teaching style was also influenced by my presence and she indicated 
that this would be the case for most other teachers too. However, there is nothing 
in her second interview, which explains anymore about how her teaching style 
might be different to the one she has adopted here. When pushed on these 
questions, she referred to the national curriculum, numeracy and literacy hours 
governing how the class is taught. The second teacher in this category (teacher 
C l) had severe discipline problems in her classroom and even though she 
advocated a more formal, disciplined style of teaching, this was not ultimately 
effective and she left the school. 
The third teacher, from experimental school D, stressed routine and behaviour at 
the beginning of the year. However, analysis of her answers put her at the other 
end of the spectrum of the "disciplined" category from teacher Y. This was 
because as well as emphasising routine and behaviour she also emphasised 
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children's learning in terms of skills. By the end of the year this skills based 
approach had developed into a strategy based approach, with an emphasis on 
children knowing and understanding something about their own learning. In this 
sense this teacher moved from the "disciplined" category to the "child centred" 
category. 
Table 9.2 Summary of Categories at Beginning and End of the Year 
Teacher Beg. of year Category End of year Category 
A (Experimental) Protective Child Centred 
B (Experimental) Child Centred Child Centred 
C1 (Experimental) Disciplined n/a 
C2 (Experimental) Protective Protective 
D (Experimental) Disciplined Child Centred 
X (Control) Protective Protective 
Y (Control) Disciplined Disciplined 
Z (Control) Child Centred Disciplined 
The next section of this analysis focuses on teachers' beliefs, knowledge and 
opinions of the benefit of metacognition to learning. 
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9 WHAT TEACHERS SAY ABOUT METACOGNITION 
Question 5 of the first set of interviews carried out in Autumn 1999 asked the 
teachers if they had come across the idea of metacognition during their teacher 
training or subsequent career, (see appendix 4.2). 
Of the seven teachers interviewed at this time only one, (teacher A), was able to 
explain her understanding of metacognition as "thinking about your own 
thinking ". She had gained this knowledge through personal contact with a 
psychologist and through her own interest and study. One control school teacher, 
(teacher X), had a vague idea that it related to independent learning, whilst another 
control school teacher, (teacher Y), thought that it was connected with Piagetian 
theories of child development, but was unable to elaborate any further. The 
remaining three experimental school teachers and one control school teacher had 
no knowledge of the theory of metacognition. At this point in the interview I 
provided a short summary of my understanding of metacognition as including both 
knowledge about one's own thinking and monitoring and control of thinking, (see 
appendix 4.2]. The teachers were then asked if anything in this explanation 
resonated with them as important for children's learning. 
Once given this brief explanation, all the teachers without exception, picked up on 
the theory and elaborated on its usefulness for children's learning. Teacher A 
suggested that metacognition would help children become more self reliant and 
enable them to solve problems. Teacher B thought that metacognition would be 
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crucial in learning to read and that it would be important to know how you had 
arrived at a particular answer. Teacher CI explained that a more metacognitive 
approach to teaching would lead to asking more open questions. Teacher D 
emphasised the need for children to stop and reflect on what they are doing. She 
related metacognition to what happens in the Reading Recovery Programme, 
which has a metacognitive element. 
Similarly, the three control school teachers found that the brief synopsis I gave of 
metacognition resonated with their own ideas of teaching and learning. Teacher X 
mentioned recapping at the end of the numeracy hour and making connections. 
Teacher Y thought that it would enable children to build on what they have 
experienced, but included the caveat that this depended on their developmental 
stage and her present class would not be up to this kind of reflection. Teacher Z 
understood the theory and suggested that a metacognitive approach would 
encourage a conscious awareness of cognitive strategies and allow children to 
reflect on their own learning. 
From the first set of interviews a general consensus occurred amongst the teachers, 
suggesting that metacognition is important for learning, and children's 
development, that it should be promoted and facilitated by teachers, using 
questioning and discussion. 
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In an attempt to go beyond the surface of possibly compliant answers to this 
question of the teachers' perceptions of the importance of metacognition for 
learning, later questions asked if they had any personal experience of 
metacognition in terms of their own learning. Thus they were asked to reflect 
upon themselves as learners rather than as teachers. The answers to this question 
fit remarkably well into the previous categorisation of the teachers into the 
thematic categories of "protective", "child centred" and "disciplined". Thus 
remaining with these categories the following pattern emerges. 
9.1 THE "PROTECTIVE" TEACHERS 
[Teachers A, C2 and X] 
Teachers A and X related metacognition to their own studying. Teacher A said 
that she was aware of not being very logical: 
Teacher A 
L. 55 "... so it takes me a while to get to the answer and it would 
be better i (I could speedup. " 
This teacher seems to experience metacognition as exposing a flaw in her 
cognitive processing. It points to something that should be remedied. Similarly, 
teacher X finds metacognition illuminates her perceived lack of organisation in 




L. 80 "... you're never quite sure you know, you didn't really see why 
you're doing it or how it all fits in. Sometimes it conies to you 
and sometimes not. " 
Teacher C2, interviewed in the spring term after she had taken over from teacher 
Cl, was struggling with having to work to an unfamiliar curriculum with a 
difficult class and take on board the CASE@KSI project. She found the questions 
about metacognition too much to answer and avoided them. 
9.2 THE "CHILD CENTRED" TEACHERS 
[Teachers B and Z] 
The "child centred" teachers saw metacognition as an aid to their own studying. 
Teacher B believed that she had a "photographic memory" and that she became 
aware of this when studying for her own GCSEs, as an adolescent. She said that 
she always knew that she had a good memory and found tests and examinations 
easy. When revising for these end of school external exams she realised that she 
was making use of her "photographic memory" and could visualise the text book 
page containing the information she needed during the exam. Becoming aware of 
how she remembered things helped her to study more effectively. --- 
Teacher Z said that she was aware of metacognition in terms of reflection upon her 
own development as a teacher. She found it useful to "realise the gaps in my 
knowledge " and thereby to direct her attention to areas that she felt were weaker. 
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9.3 THE "DISCIPLINED" TEACHERS 
[Teachers Cl, D and Y) 
These teachers seemed to find the least use for metacognition. Teacher Cl viewed 
knowing about her own thinking as "a worry ", because she worried about 
forgetting things and felt that she read too fast and didn't take things in. Teacher 
D said that she was not conscious of being metacognitive at all and similarly, 
teacher Y said that she didn't think that people did think about what they were 
doing whilst they were studying. 
10 CHANGE OVER THE YEAR 
By the end of the year there are some marked changes in the attitudes and opinions 
of the teachers towards metacognition. In keeping with this thematic analysis 
these changes are discussed in terms of the three categories of teachers. 
10.1 THE "CHILD CENTRED" GROUP 
[Teachers B and Z] 
From analysis of the second interview, teacher B appears to have seized the idea of 
metacognition and developed her teaching style around it. She referred to both the 
CASE@KS 1 professional development training day on metacognition and support 
from the research team as instrumental in this development. She acknowledged 
that at first she had doubts about how the children would respond. 
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Teacher B 
L. 61 "Before it was so many whys, why did you do that, and whals, 
what made you do that, and I didn 't find those questions helpful 
at all, I just didn't because I 'd say "why did you do that? " and 
they'd say "because that's the way I did it ". But as soon as I 
asked "how do you know that's right? ", "how did you get 
there? ", suddenly all this information comes out. When I 
started asking questions like that it was really really unnatural, 
it just wasn't a question I would ask, it didn't make sense for me 
to ask that question. 1 didn't understand how children would 
relate to "how did you do that? " because I thought they were 
like building questions like I would get answers about what they 
had done, like "1 did this and this and this ", but that was what they 
answered to "what " questions, so when I started "how " questions 
suddenly they all started you know talking about how they did it in 
their own brains. " 
This teacher is also aware that she may be getting learnt rote answers but believes 
that over time the children are developing cognitively, not just verbally. 
Teacher B 
L. 86 "It's not so much a personal experience at first, you know they 
just learn to say the answer to the question, but then they seem 
to engage with it and then they begin thinking about their own 
thinking in a much more personal kind of way. " 
By the end of the year, this teacher feels that her own teaching style has become 
more facilitating of metacognition and that developing metacognition is helping to 
motivate the children "in taking on board challenging ideas and thinking about 
them ". A. 1201 
Teacher B has developed a way of questioning the children based on CASE@KS 1 
professional development training which aims to facilitate metacognitive 
experiences and combined this with practice strategies such as writing down 
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learning intentions and regularly reflecting on what has been learnt that week. She 
also says: 
Teacher B 
L. 140 "We often have conversations about thinking... " 
L. 146 "1 give lots of rewards for thinking [ .. 
] and lots of praise for 
the class if they are thinking. 
She also refers directly to modelling thinking: 
L. 150 '7 don't say 'hey you've learnt something new, but I do 
say 'hey great thought, we can use that thought' and I've 
done a lot of modell ing about thinking. " 
She goes on to give examples of this and relates how the children are now 
beginning to ask each other how they know something. She also believes that her 
own metacognition has developed as a result and that this has motivated her to 
continue to develop her knowledge and practice of teaching and learning. 
L. 188 `1 didn't use to engage with my learning at all, I just 
received the information and did the tasks but since doing 
this I've learnt more about how to engage with my own learning. " 
So even though this teacher had been successful in tests and exams throughout her 
own school and college career, she felt that this was down to a particularly good 
"photographic" memory and the ability to regurgitate required inforniatioh and 
that this was ultimately unsatisfying in terms of personal motivation. Her 
enthusiasm for promoting and understanding metacognition can be seen in the 
context of her own personal development. She found her own metacognitive 
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development to be motivating and fulfilling and so she has passed this enthusiasm 
onto her class and actively engaged with and modelled metacognition. 
The other teacher in the "child centred" category, teacher Z, also newly qualified 
at the start of the year, appears to have become more aware of formal routines and 
external influences as the year has gone on, moving her away from the "child 
centred" category. When talking about thinking and learning she refers mostly to 
strategies such as reviewing learning intentions. 
Teacher Z 
L. 89 `I would have started, after the drawings with saying 'what 
do you want to find out about hearing and then at the end of 
the lesson I've got put up, usually the reason we are doing 
this is .... and my 
learning intention. I've got an Ofsted 
inspection in two weeks, so they know what the point of 
doing it is, but then at the end it would be very much 'hands 
up, who thinks they have learnt what they are supposed to 
learn', you get a variety of responses to that. " 
L. 95 R: "What sort of responses do you get when you ask those questions? " 
T: "You get children who have demonstrated to me that they have 
understood, put their hands up saying they haven't and I also get 
children who I know haven't understood saying that they have, 
yeah, I'm not sure why, I'm not sure whether it's to get my 
attention. " 
She also goes on to say that this perverse answer to the questions only arises when 
she explicitly asks the question, but that these particular children never -initiate 
saying that they don't understand something, whereas some other children will. 
This teacher feels that whilst she has modified many aspects of her practice since 
the first interview she believes she is still the same "general sort of teacher ". Her 
greatest influence on the development of her teaching style over this year has been 
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observation by and of other colleagues in the same school. Whilst she is still keen 
to work from the child's own experience, building on knowledge, she has become 
much more aware of classroom management issues and routines, such as when to 
change book bags, give out homework and cover all areas of the national 
curriculum. In this last interview, she rarely mentions development of children's 
thinking and although prompted to comment on how she facilitates higher level 
thinking, she tends always to refer back to externals at both micro and macro 
levels ie. lesson planning, literacy and numeracy hours and Ofsted. She does, 
however, feel that she has learnt a good deal about being a teacher and about 
specific issues such as special needs. Still there is a sense of a growing disquiet 
with the external influences on her teaching. 
Teacher Z 
L. 200 "I've learnt a lot about working with special needs children 
in a main stream setting, so things like that, but that's really 
just an expansion of knowledge, rather than a change in my 
philosophy, it's building on what I already know, if you see 
what I mean, it's not actually like I've gone 1 don't think 
that's the way that should be done, not really no, apart 
from I think the curriculum is very strict for a six year old 
but that's unfortunately not my option to change. " 
10.2 THE "PROTECTIVE" GROUP 
[Teachers A, C2 and X] 
The group of teachers labelled "protective" had less to say about metacognition 
than did the child centred group. In particular teachers C2 and teacher X related 
any questions about metacognition to the children's growing emotional maturity. 
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There is a sense that teacher C2 coming to the project late, never really grasped the 
theory of metacognition and tends to avoid questions about it altogether or to 
interpret them as questions about the whole CASE programme. For example when 
asked if her understanding of metacognition has developed or changed in any way 
she answers: 
Teacher C2 
L. 18 "Yes it has improved I can see it in the testing that it benefits the 
way they can think. 1 do see, you can almost see a button being 
pushed when they actually understand what they are looking, for. I 
still find the grouping quite hard and the liming of the grouping. " 
When asked for any examples of metacognition in her classroom she gives 
examples of the children displaying curiosity and growing in confidence in terms 
of asking more unusual questions. 
Teacher C2 
L. 26 "There was one golden moment when we were talking 
about bears about polar bears living in the wild or in 
the zoo and one boy said, 'but how would they get polar 
bears to the zoo? ', and I just thought what a lovely question, 
because normally you wouldn't go beyond the thought of polar 
bears being in the zoo... " 
She also voices her reservations about the whole CASE@KS 1 project whilst 
seeming to agree that metacognition should be facilitated. 
Teacher C2 
L. 47 "Yes I would have thought so. [referring to whether it is worth 
spending time trying to facilitate metacognition]. There was an 
interesting comment by someone who was observing a CASE 
activity, she said its an awful lot to ask children to imagine that 
an orange piece of card was the middle of a town, she thought it 
was too much to expect them to understand this. 
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K: "And what was your feeling? " 
Ti. "1 agreed with her at that point. " 
This could be interpreted as another aspect of protecting the children from being 
pushed beyond their developmental level. 
Similarly, the experimental school teacher, (teacher X), re-emphasised the need to 
build children's confidence and give positive feedback. In her second interview 
she explains that the children's growing maturity over the year now allows them to 
feel more confident in expressing to her, or to other children, their own 
understanding, or lack of understanding. She feels this has also been helped by the 
structure of the literacy and numeracy hour, which both call for a reflection on 
what has been learnt, at the end of the lesson. However, she feels that this 
reflective element is also intuitive. 
Teacher X 
L. 105 "Well, it's something you do without really thinking about it... " 
She has promoted a "helping each other" philosophy in her class by introducing 
reading to each other and commenting on each other's stories, and by having 
children helping other children who are struggling. This, she believes, has led her 
class to grow in confidence about expressing their feelings about the work. 
Throughout this interview this teacher continued to emphasise the care and 
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consideration needed in teaching children of this age. She appears very sensitive 
to the children's emotional states and finally reiterates her earlier view 
Teacher X 
L. 155 "... keep the child happy and then she will be able to learn. " 
Of the three teachers in this "protective" group, experimental school teacher A 
appears to have changed the most over the year. By the time of the second 
interview, she is emphasising group skills over individual emotional development 
and feels that she has a better understanding of metacognition and how to facilitate 
it. However, closer analysis of her answers to questions about metacognition and 
requests for examples of her children being metacognitive show that she is really 
emphasising the theory of mind aspect of metacognition. For instance, her 
explanation of what metacognition looks like: 
Teacher A 
L. 71 "Like being able to admit that another child has got another idea 
or see that they are looking at things from a different point of 
 view... 
Her examples of metacognition refer to the points of view task, a CASE task 
which, more than any other, attempts to facilitate and develop theory of mind. 
L. 78 `7 think that points of view one, in pairs, that worked really 
well, cos they had to put themselves in another child's 
position... " 
In terms of her own development over the year, she feels that she has got better at 
asking questions and giving children more time to work things out for themselves. 
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In this sense she has moved away from the overtly protective style she manifested 
at the beginning of the year. At that time, she was concerned not to make things 
too difficult for the children and found herself wanting to give them the answer, 
rather than see them struggle to work it out. In terms of her own metacognition 
though, she still promotes a deficit view: 
Teacher A 
L. 109 "I'm more aware that I don't always think about things. I'm 
more aware that I don't always think things through and I 
don't always approach things in a logical way. " 
As with other teachers across the groups, teacher A finds the time constraints of 
the curriculum make facilitation of metacognition more difficult. 
10.3 THE "DISCIPLINED" GROUP 
[Teachers Y and D] 
Teacher Cl having left mid way through the year was unavailable for a follow up 
interview. 
The follow up interview with teacher Y at the end of the year is consistent with her 
responses to the first interview. She still feels the need for routines and discipline 
because she feels that her class is less able than other classes. She also believes 
that the external constraints of the literacy and numeracy hours prevent her from 
being more flexible. 
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Teacher Y 
L. 16 "1 think that in some ways the numeracy hour doesn't allow 
that to arise you can't be flexible because you've got to follow it. " 
However, she does relate using the plenary section of the numeracy hour to 
encourage the children to reflect on their learning. When asked what kinds of 
questions she asks them she responded: 
L. 72 "Sometimes 'what have you learnt today? or what do you 
think I wanted you to learn? ' My more able children really 
like thinking that they have learnt something, the less able 
don't know what they have learnt and don't know how to 
answer that question, it's too cryptic for then. " 
In her responses to the second interview this teacher placed her emphasis on the 
structure of the numeracy hour, which requires a reflective period at the end, 
saying that without this structure, even this amount of reflection would not happen. 
Although: 
L. 116 "Some children would think because they do think, some 
wouldn't whether I do the plenary or not. " 
She also comments that the plenary session is: 
L. 135 "seen as important, but I don't know if it is. " 
She does not expand on this or explain `seen by who as important'. In both 
interviews, this teacher has been consistent in viewing her class as of low ability, 
in referring to the constraints placed upon teaching by the numeracy and literacy 
hours and in believing that very few of her class are able to be metacognitive. She 




L. 155 "1 have a very high absence rate and that's got worse. My 
class is the worst class in the school for absence and also 
a high turn over of children in the class, so that affects the 
whole class. " 
In contrast, the experimental school teacher [D], who was placed in this category 
at the beginning of the year has by the end of the year developed both her own 
awareness of metacognition and her enthusiasm for encouraging the children to be 
metacognitive. She makes explicit references to the CASE@KS I professional 
development programme and claims that it was the mixture of theory and practice 
on this programme that has changed her teaching. She says that CASE 
professional development has made teaching both more interesting and more 
challenging. 
Teacher D 
L. 58 "My expectations of the children are probably higher. I'm 
expecting them to be able to explain things together, 
expecting them to get to a higher standard. " 
She has also come to distinguish rote answers from the children such as "1 worked 
it out in my head", from more genuine attempts to explain their thinking. 
This teacher feels that she has become more aware of herself as a learner and has 
reflected on how she learns. She said that she uses this knowledge to try and 
encourage the children to reflect on their own learning. She now has a working 
definition of metacognition as "knowing how you think, knowing how you learn " 
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and feels that she is modelling metacognition in both CASE and non CASE 
lessons. She has also become aware of how the children are working 
collaboratively and finds that often they change particular strategies in order to be 
fair rather than logically choosing the best strategy. For instance, when asked to 
invent a new game as a group, they attempted to put together a set of rules for the 
game by using each person's idea. In effect, this resulted in an unworkable game. 
However, she felt that even this failure to achieve the goal, still resulted in the 
children successfully listening to each other, explaining their thinking and 
ensuring that everyone took part. In this sense, by the end of the year, this teacher 
has more in common with the child centred group than with the disciplined group. 
She still finds the constraints of the curriculum make facilitating metacognition 
difficult and she particularly comments on established teaching practice, which 
gives little time for children to think before answering. However, she has 
embraced the theory of metacognition and has given a talk on metacognition to the 
other teachers in her school, many of who, she states, have also become 
enthusiastic about ways of facilitating metacognition in the children. For instance, 
she relates how the nursery teacher has found, that by asking her children more 
metacognitively oriented questions, she has enabled even those very young 
children to begin to talk about their thinking. 
11 SUMMARY 
By the end of the year there has been some development in how some of the 
teachers in this sample view the possibility of and importance of facilitating the 
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metacognitive development of children in year one. The general consensus of the 
first interviews showed the teachers agreeing with the general idea that facilitating 
metacognitive development is important. This is somewhat modified by the 
second set of interviews, as some teachers move away from this position, to one 
which subscribes more closely to how the established curriculum is taught within 
their local context. This is particularly the case for the newly qualified teacher of 
school Z, who appears to have subjugated her own initial beliefs about the 
importance of metacognition, to the routines and external discipline provided by 
the national curriculum. In effect, this gives her more in common with teacher Y 
from the "disciplined" group, who also feels that her teaching is largely affected 
by external factors, such as time and curriculum constraints and in her particular 
case, the perceived ability level of the children in her class. 
The "protective" group of teachers tended to maintain their emphasis on the 
child's emotional and social development. The teacher of School A moved away 
from emphasising individual emotional development to stressing collaborative 
working skills. Within this she indicated an awareness of metacognition 
developing through collaboration. However, the emphasis tended to be on the 
growing theory of mind aspects of metacognition, rather than on either 
metacognitive knowledge per se or monitoring and control aspects of 
metacognition. 
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In contrast, teacher B from the "child centred" group has developed her own 
understanding of metacognition, has experimented with different ways of 
facilitating its development in her class and speaks with enthusiasm about the 
results she has seen. Teacher D too, has developed more of an awareness and 
understanding of metacognition through the year, aided by her own interest and 
opportunity to talk to other teachers in her school. This has given her an insight 
into her own teaching practice and how the children are responding to her 
teaching. 
By the end of the year, three of the four remaining CASE teachers appear to have 
developed greater understanding of the theory of metacognition and an enthusiasm 
for employing strategies that may facilitate its development. The other CASE 
teacher, who came to the project only half way through the year, was not seen to 
make this move. All the CASE teachers were aware of working under national 
curriculum constraints, but for the three teachers who engaged with the theory, 
they seemed to feel that it freed up their thinking, rather than added to the burden. 
The fourth CASE teacher and the control school teachers tended to emphasise the 
difficulties of fitting in the demands of the curriculum and commented on the 
possible harmful effects of this perceived pressured learning on the children. 
From this analysis of teacher interviews we would expect to find that by the end of 
the year three teachers, (A, B and D) would be employing more or a wider range 
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of FM behaviours in their teaching. We might also expect that the children in 
these focus groups would be displaying more or a wider range of metacognitive 
behaviours. 
Similarly, from analysis of the remaining interviews we would expect to find that 
teachers in the "disciplined" group and to some extent the "protective" group of 
teachers would use fewer or narrower FM behaviours, with their pupils 
correspondingly displaying fewer or narrower metacognitive behaviours those of 
the "child centred" group. 
In order to test this prediction, the frequency counts from the tables established in 
chapter 7 were re-tabulated. Firstly 3 CASE tasks observed at the end of the year 
are analysed in terms of teacher FM and child M behaviours, (see appendix 9.2 
and 9.3). Secondly, frequency counts are given for the teacher FM and child M 
behaviours in one numeracy lesson in the summer term, (appendix 9.4) 
12 FREQUENCY COUNTS OF TEACHER FM BEHAVIOURS 
AND CHILD M BEHAVIOURS- COMPARISON OF 
EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOL TEACHERS AND CHILDREN IN 
CASE LESSONS - SUMMER TERM 
The figures provided here are for the summer term only. These are calculated 
through observation of three CASE tasks in each experimental school. The tasks 
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observed in schools B, C and D were "Shadows", "Transport" and "Farmyard", 
whilst for school A, the shadows task was replaced with the "Bottles" task. 
Table A. 9.3, (Appendix 9.2), shows that the first prediction from the interview 
analysis is justified. The total number of teacher behaviours coded as facilitating 
metacognition in the experimental schools over three tasks in the summer term of 
2000 shows that teacher C2 employed far fewer of these behaviours than did the 
other three experimental school teachers, (A total of 16 behaviours over 3 tasks for 
the school C teacher against 53 for the school A teacher, 31 for the school B 
teacher and 33 for the school D teacher). However, as teacher C2 only joined the 
CASE programme half way through the year she missed out on most of the CASE 
training. Whilst two of the CASE teachers moved to the "child centred" category 
by the end of the year, teacher C2 remained in the, "protective category". 
A frequency count of the children's behaviours coded as metacognitive over these 
three tasks in the same schools is shown in table A. 9.4, (appendix 9.3). The 
children's behaviours more clearly justify the prediction that far less metacognitive 
behaviour is apparent in the focus group of school C than in the other three CASE 
focus groups. There is a total of only 8 children's behaviours classified as 
metacognitive in the CASE tasks for school C in the summer term, compared to 15 
for school A, 23 for school B and 28 for school D. In addition, this low frequency 
count for school C is made up from only three categories: self- shows knowledge 
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of self in relation to cognition; oth - refers to what others think/desire; the - 
checks work. 
13 FREQUENCY COUNTS OF TEACHER FM BEHAVIOURS 
AND CHILD M BEHAVIOURS IN NUMERACY LESSONS OF 
EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL SCHOOLS - SUMMER 
TERM 
In the summer term, one numeracy lesson was observed in each of the seven 
schools. Frequency counts of the teacher and child metacognitive behaviours 
observed were made, (see appendix 9.4, table A. 9.5]. 
Observations of these numeracy lessons confirmed the prediction that control 
school teacher Y would use fewer metacognitive behaviours than the other control 
and experimental school teachers. The teacher in school Y used only 2 behaviours 
coded as F M, during the summer term numeracy lesson. Similarly, teacher C2 
also scores very low on teacher metacognitive behaviours in these numeracy 
lessons, (4 ), although teacher D is not far behind, (6). The school B teacher 
scores 10 FM behaviours, largely made up from the code [TT], referring directly 
to her own and her students' thinking processes. 
Of the "disciplined" and "protective" groups of teachers, teacher Z scores the 
highest, but she places less emphasis on referring to cognitive processing [TT] and 
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more on asking students to evaluate the task they have just done [TV] or 
questioning how the students know the correct answer [TK]. Thus there are 
differences between the higher scoring "disciplined" teacher [Z] and the higher 
scoring "child centred" teacher, [B] in terms of the types of teacher FM behaviour 
they display during numeracy hours. Teacher B tends towards referring to thinking 
in general [TT] and to her own cognition [TC] rather than asking for evaluation, 
[TV]. As the observations showed in chapter 7, TV can often be reduced to a 
show of hands or a series of short closed questions at the end of a lesson to 
evaluate that day's work. 
Whilst most of the experimental school teachers tended to view the facilitation of 
metacognition as important when interviewed, the frequency counts of FM 
behaviour observed in the summer term in both CASE tasks and numeracy lesson 
is still low. Different CASE tasks seem to promote different amount of teacher F 
M behaviours, with the bottles and shadows tasks generating more of these 
behaviours than either the farmyard or transport task. 
The frequency counts of child M behaviours in the numeracy hour of the summer 
term, (appendix 9.4, table A 9.5), also support the prediction from the interview 
analysis that students in schools C and Y would display less metacognitive 
behviours than those in the other schools. 
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14 DISCUSSION 
Conducting semi-structured interviews with five experimental school teachers and 
three control school teachers both prior to and after the CASE@KS I intervention 
programme sought to answer the following questions: 
1. Do teachers' beliefs and opinions about teaching and learning affect the way 
they try to facilitate metacognition in the classroom? 
2. Does teachers' knowledge of and beliefs about metacognition impact on the 
development of metacognition in the classroom? 
3. Can teachers' ability to promote metacognition be developed through CPD? 
Analysis of the initial interviews revealed three styles of teaching which were 
labelled "Protective", "Child Centred" and "Disciplined". From the initial 
interviews three teachers (schools, A, C2 and X) were categorised as "protective", 
two teachers (schools B and Z) as "child centred" and three teachers (C 1, D and Y) 
as "disciplined". By the end of the year there had been some change in the 
teachers' styles of teaching and in their knowledge of metacognition. Two 
teachers (schools A and D) had now much more in common with the "child 
centred" category, whilst teacher Z, initially in the "child centred" category, by the 
end of the year had more in common with the "disciplined" category. However, 
the categories were not seen as fixed, but involving a continuum from strong to 
weak examples of the category. Thus frequency counts of teacher FM behaviour 
show a good deal of individual difference across the categories. 
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A comparison of the frequency counts of teacher FM behaviours and child M 
behaviours at the end of the summer term showed that in general teachers in the 
"child centred" category, (now teachers A, B and D) employed more and a broader 
spread of FM behaviours than did the "protective" teacher. However, different 
CASE tasks had an effect on both the teacher FM and child M behaviours found. 
The CASE tasks observed during the summer term appeared to facilitate fewer 
teacher FM and child M behaviours than other tasks such as clowns and picture 
stories. 
The tables show that there were individual differences amongst teachers and tasks 
in the quantity and spread of teacher FM behaviours observed. Teachers A and D 
("child centred"), had high numbers of teacher FM behaviours in two of the 
CASE tasks, but this did not transfer to the numeracy lesson. Whilst teachers 
expressed positive views about the importance of metacognition for learning 
during the interviews, these opinions did not transform their practice in every case, 
during observed lessons. 
However, the three experimental school teachers in the "child centred" category at 
the end of the year, whilst having low frequency counts on FM behaviours in the 
numeracy hour still had a slightly greater spread of teacher FM behaviours than 
the "disciplined" or "protective" teachers. The highest frequency count amongst 
the "disciplined" teachers was by teacher Z who was originally placed in the 
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"child centred" category, but who by the end of the year tended to stress more 
discipline, structure and routine aspects of teaching. 
In terms of metacognitive knowledge those teachers who engaged with the theory 
and communicated their enthusiasm for it (teachers B and D) had higher counts of 
child M behaviour during CASE lessons in the summer term. (23 and 28 
respectively, against 15 and 8 for the other two teachers) These child behaviours 
also covered a wider range than did those of the children in the other classes in 
both CASE and numeracy lessons. This finding is shown more clearly in the 
qualitative examples of the group work of children in these two schools given in 
chapters 7 and 8. 
The school A teacher's knowledge of metacognition developed over the year as 
she moved from her "protective" style of teaching to a more "child centred" style. 
However, in the interviews she tended to stress the theory of mind aspects of 
metacognition and in this sense she was still concerned with children's emotional 
and social development, rather than their cognitive development. Whilst she did 
try to model thinking and asked questions about how students had gained 
knowledge of something, her emphasis was on listening to and understanding 
another's point of view. 
From comments by teachers B and D it seems clear that the CASE@KS I 
professional development programme had influenced their knowledge of and 
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enthusiasm for promoting metacognition in their classrooms. The only 
experimental school teacher seemingly unaffected by the programme, in terms of 
metacognition, (teacher C2) joined only half way through the year and appeared to 
have so many other things to contend with, that the whole CASE@KS 1 
programme was seen as an extra thing to do. It is not surprising that she did not 
understand the theory or attempt to put it into practice, especially since she 
received less than half the CPD experience. 
Conversely, the control school teacher Z at the start of the year appeared to 
understand the idea of metacognition and was able to elaborate on my description 
and relate it to her own ideas of developing children's thinking. By the end of the 
year with no access to the professional development programme her knowledge 
had not progressed and she tended to stress other aspects of learning such as 
discipline and routines. However she did still manage to have a relatively high 
count of teacher and child metacognitive behaviours at the end of the year. 
With the exceptions of schools Y and C, the frequency count for child M 
behaviours in the summer term numeracy lesson across the other schools ranged 
from 5 to 10 instances. This is both low and consistent for the numeracy hour. 
Similarly, teacher FM behaviours were fairly consistent (with the exception of 
schools Y and C) in the numeracy hour at between 6 and 10 instances. 
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The analysis has shown that whilst teachers can assimilate the theory of 
metacognition from a professional development session and translate this into 
practice within their classrooms, their use of this behaviour is affected by the task. 
The more receptive teachers in this programme, in terms of metacognition theory 
already held views of teaching and learning, which concentrated on cognitive 
aspects of children's behaviour, of problem solving and of the importance of 
thinking. In addition, by the end of the year they had changed or developed their 
ideas about their own metacognitive ability, seeing it as an important aspect of 
their teaching to reflect upon themselves as learners. In this way teacher B, of all 
the teachers, tends to model metacognitive thinking. She was particularly 
enthusiastic about showing her students how she thinks about her own thinking 
and how that helps her to solve problems. Whilst she does not score the highest on 
teacher FM behaviours, she is reasonably consistent in her behaviour across tasks, 
including the numeracy hour. Teacher D also makes this leap by the end of the 
year, using her ability to reflect on her own thinking as a model to encourage 
metacognition in her pupils. These teachers, by the end of the year, have found the 
ability to step back, to let their students work out the problems together and to 
facilitate, rather than protect their students in their cognitive and social 
development. 
The analysis shows that teachers' knowledge of metacognition can impact on the 
development of metacognition in the classroom but as shown by the frequency 
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tables, this does not always transfer out of the context in which it is learned, at 
least not within one year. Thus there is no discernible increase in metacognitive 
behaviours in the numeracy lessons. It seems then that more support and more 
input is needed on the theory of metacognition and strategies for facilitating it in 
contexts other than CASE@KS I tasks. 
Teachers' beliefs and opinions about teaching and learning were seen to influence 
their facilitation of metacognition with an emphasis on routines, structures and 
external constraints being the least productive in terms of positive metacognitive 
behaviour. Whilst as chapter 8 suggested, some level of emotional involvement 
with the task is necessary for true engagement, an over emphasis on emotional 
states of individuals, tends to hamper metacognition and children then make 
decisions based on this emotional context rather than on what would work best. 
This chapter has focussed on the teacher's role in the development of 
metacognition in these five and six year olds. The next chapter will bring together 
the results from the metacognitive tests, the classroom observations, the individual 
case studies and this analysis of the teachers to describe what metacognition is in 





The first part of this chapter will summarize the findings from the empirical data. 
This research project has used a mixture of methods and approaches to investigate 
metacognition in five and six year old children. 
The starting point was a personal interest in self-regulated learning, which 
developed from experience of teaching both traditional academic and vocational 
subjects to post school students. A frustration felt from a seeming lack of ability 
of a good many students to reflect on their own cognition and learning, even 
though they appeared motivated to learn, led to a general interest in the area of 
metacognition. 
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Many years later the opportunity to investigate metacognition in young children 
was presented in the form of a major research project, designed to accelerate the 
cognitive development of five and six year old children. The CASE@KS l project 
was so structured that the facilitation of metacognitive processing was an integral 
part of the intervention programme. 
An initial interest in whether CASE@KSI would be successful in enabling 
children of this age to develop metacognitive processing, led to more complex 
questions about what is meant by metacognition. Existing theories of cognitive and 
metacognitive development have tended to view metacognition as late developing. 
Thus this project needed to address the wider issues surrounding theories of 
metacognition and its development. 
The main CASE@KS 1 project and thus this project was based in an educational 
context funded by a local education authority and relied on the goodwill of 
teachers and other school staff, parents and most of all the children concerned. In 
addition to answering the research questions this project hoped to provide 
descriptions of metacognition occurring in classrooms which could prove 
beneficial as examples for teachers in the future. 
The second part of this chapter, The Conclusion, will discuss the findings related 
to the wider context of theories of metacognition. This research has used a 
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mixture of research methods and paradigms appropriate to the different nature of 
each research question. Methodological issues, which arose during the project, are 
discussed. Finally, The Conclusion outlines themes that have emerged, relates 
these to recent literature on metacognition and suggests areas for future research 
on metacognition. 
2 SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL DATA 
Chapter 6 addressed the following questions: 
Research Q1: Can metacognitive ability be enhanced? 
a) How is metacognition conceptualised for this research ? 
b) What is metacognition for five to six year olds ? 
c) How can metacognition be measured ? 
d) Does CASE cr KS I as implemented impact on any factors of metacognition 
Research Q2: Are metacognitive gains related to cognitive/academic gains? 
a) What are cognitive gains for this project? 
b) What are academic gains for this project ? 
c) To what extent are these measurements clouded by other variables ? 
Theoretical literature had suggested that metacognition involves both stored 
metacognitive knowledge (akin to declarative knowledge "knowing what") and 
monitoring and control processes (akin to procedural knowledge "knowing how"). 
In addition, theories of metacognition suggested that it involved different factors. 
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The research presented in chapter 6 aimed to test some of these theories of 
metacognition and to find out what it means to be metacognitive at the age of five 
or six. In addition, as the main CASE@KSI project aimed to develop 
metacognition along with cognition in the experimental group of children, tests 
were designed to measure any growth in metacognitive processing over the year. 
Four tests of metacognition were devised and children were tested at the beginning 
and end of the year. Results were given for 21 experimental school children and 
16 control school children. As the data produced by the tests was categorical, chi 
square tests using gain scores were carried out for each test. Test 1, Self as 
Learner, showed no significant difference between the experimental and the 
control group. Whilst children did become more aware of themselves as learners 
over the year, this appeared to be a result of maturation and the normal school 
environment. The specific intervention of CASE@KS I project had no greater 
influence on this developmental process. Test 2 covered the area of Theory of 
Mind and included two different tests. The first was a classic theory of mind test 
(Smartie Tube) administered to all the children at the beginning of the year. As 
this test reached ceiling, the literature was searched for tests, which may 
distinguish between different levels of theory of mind. An interpretative theory of 
mind test (Droodles Test) was used at the end of the year, along with another 
classic theory of mind test (a version of Maxi and the Chocolate). As expected, 
the Maxi test reached ceiling at the end of the year, confirming the results of the 
Smartie Tube test and indicating that all the children in the sample had this basic 
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theory of mind. However, the Droodles test showed a large difference between the 
experimental and control groups (43% of the experimental group scored 2, whilst 
only 6.25% of the control group scored 2). This suggests that the experimental 
group had, by the end of the year, developed an interpretative theory of mind as 
described by Carpendale and Chandler, (1996). It is difficult to ascribe this 
difference unequivocally to the CASE @KS1 intervention because this test was 
not administered at the start of the year. However, the need to explain one's 
thinking and to understand that others may hold different views are fundamental 
aspects of the CASE@KS I programme and it seems likely that practice over the 
year in thinking about and verbalising these aspects of cognition has had some 
effect. 
The third test was of metamemory and sought to test children's understanding of 
memory and knowledge of memory strategies. The explanations the children gave 
about how they remembered a number of objects and about what they know about 
their own memory were categorised and scored. The results showed that whilst 
the two groups scores were similar at the pre-intervention stage, at the end of the 
year there was a large difference. Over 90% of the experimental group scored 
above 5 whilst only 37.5% of the control group did likewise. Results of a chi 
square test using gain scores was significant suggesting that CASE@KS I had a 
positive effect on the experimental group's ability and/or willingness to reflect 
upon and explain this cognitive process. 
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The final test of metacognition challenged the children to use mental rotation 
strategies, to solve a visual problem and to explain these strategies. At the 
beginning of the year the majority of both experimental and control groups failed 
this test in terms of performance and explanations. By the end of the year, there is 
some increase in the success rate of both groups, however still the majority of 
children in both groups failed the test. In general, the control group scored better 
than the experimental group but this didn't reach significance. However, some 
children in the control group scored less on the post test than on the pre test. From 
these results it seems clear that the CASE@KS 1 intervention has not impacted on 
the development of the children's ability to explain how they solve mental rotation 
problems. 
In order to understand the connection between cognition and metacognition the 
gains for each test were correlated with gains on tests of conservation and a spatial 
perception test as well as with end of year 2 national tests in language and 
numeracy. There was no significant correlation found between metacognition and 
cognition or metacognition and academic results as measured by any of these tests. 
Results of Spearman Rank correlation for all four tests of metacognition showed 
no significant correlation between the tests. This suggests that rather than tapping 
one general factor, called metacognition, these tests were possibly tapping distinct 
metacognitive abilities. 
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Chapter 6 introduced a particular qualitative analysis of the data in order to gain 
some understanding of what metacognition is for five and six year old children. 
The term is problematic since most early theories of metacognition tend to view it 
as analogous with a high level of abstract thinking. However, recent literature 
from developmental, social and cognitive psychology has shown that young 
children can be aware of their own thinking and can explain their reflections to 
others, (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Edwards & Mercer, 1987; Flavell et al., 1995; 
Hockaday, 1984; Kontos, 1983; Mercer, Wegerif, & Dawes, 1999). 
Phenomenological descriptions of metacognition were created from the transcribed 
test/interview data. These descriptions indicate how children of this age describe 
their own thinking. In using their own language, but viewing this through a 
psychological lens, the re-created general phenomenological descriptions provide 
qualitative evidence for young children's ability to be metacognitive. These data 
show that the young children in this study make clear and distinct differences 
between different types of cognitive activity. The majority of them were able to 
talk about remembering and to provide theories how their memory might work. 
Some, though not all, were able to articulate notions of learning and an 
understanding of others as cognitive beings. However, they were less able to 
describe their own problem solving abilities in the mental rotation task and this 
may be linked to their inability to solve this type of task. The rich descriptions 
from the phenomenological analysis show that metacognitive knowledge about 
memory and remembering is the clearest of the four types of metacognition tested. 
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Chapter 7 sought to answer the following research question: 
Research Q3: How is metacognition facilitated in year one classrooms? 
a) Is metacognition apparent in year one classrooms? 
b) What do teachers do to effect metacognitive processing in pupils? 
c) Are teachers successful in provoking metacognitive responses from pupils? 
d) What other variables affect the development of metacognition in year one 
classrooms? 
This chapter reported on classroom observations of both CASE and numeracy 
lessons, which were carried out over the year in both the experimental and control 
schools. The observations concentrated on the children who were given the tests 
of metacognition at the start and end of the year. The aim of these observations 
was to understand more about how metacognition is facilitated in year one 
classrooms by observing both teachers and children as they worked through 
CASE@KS 1 tasks. 
The observations were analysed using both a theoretical approach based on 
Flavell's theory of metacognition (Flavell, 1979) and a grounded approach, where 
the data were searched for instances where teachers appeared to facilitate or 
encourage metacognition. The analysis aimed to investigate if anything that could 
be categorised as metacognition, was apparent in the observed lessons and then to 
consider both the teacher's role and the impact of other variables on any instances 
of metacognition found. 
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The result of this analysis was that, overall instances of metacognition were 
infrequent in both control and experimental groups. Teachers rarely asked 
children to predict results, to plan their work or to check their results. They rarely 
referred to self-learning strategies and what children could do if they became stuck 
on a problem. However, both groups of teachers more frequently referred to 
thinking in general, and they tended to ask questions about strategy use, 
knowledge and beliefs. Whilst there were less teacher behaviours coded as 
facilitating metacognition in the control schools than in the experimental schools, 
there was some individuation between teachers, suggesting that teachers' own 
beliefs, opinions and knowledge of metacognition is a factor. 
In addition different tasks tended to encourage a different range of metacognitive 
behaviour. The tasks which consistently engaged children in more and a wider 
spectrum of metacognitive behaviours were the buttons sorting task, the story tasks 
where pictures had to be sequenced into a story and the puzzle type tasks of 
clowns and bottles. It may be that the sorting and story tasks produce more 
metacognitive behaviour because they have a relatively simple task structure, 
which is already familiar to the children. This would lessen the cognitive load on 
working memory, allowing the children to think more about how they are doing 
the task, than seeking a solution to it. These tasks are also relatively open ended, 
with more than one solution equally valid. Thus the children can engage in 
explaining and justifying their own thinking to the others in the group. The clown 
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task and the bottles task provided a more problem solving scenario. It may be the 
curiosity value of the problem, which motivates the children to engage in thinking 
about planning, predicting, evaluating and monitoring their thinking as they begin 
to realise that these aspects are necessary in order to achieve the goal of a 
collaborative solution. 
Chapter 7 also provided information about the normal year one curriculum. 
Observations carried out in the numeracy hour in both experimental and control 
schools showed that the numeracy hour provided less opportunity for 
metacognition by both teachers and children than did the CASE@KS I tasks. Both 
child M behaviours and teacher FM behaviours in the numeracy hour were found 
to cover a more limited range than the CASE lessons. Experimental school 
teachers engaged in only slightly more FM behaviours in numeracy lessons than 
the control school teachers, although there was some individuation. However, the 
experimental school teachers did use a broader range of FM behaviours in the 
numeracy lessons than did the control school teachers. Thus there may be some 
transfer of CASE professional development training from CASE activities to other 
teaching. However, in general it seems that one year is not enough for the CASE 
teacher programme to enable teachers to transfer CASE pedagogy to other areas of 
their teaching. 
Sometimes large counts of a particular FM behaviour were a result of teachers 
repeatedly asking children the same type of question, for example, whether they 
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had found the work difficult or easy. This type of question tended to occur at the 
end of the lesson and often resulted in simple answers or a show of hands rather 
than any more meaningful reflection. Such results indicated a limitation of the 
frequency count method of analysing complex situations, and showed the need for 
a more qualitative analysis to support the quantitative method. 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the way children begin to develop 
metacognition, an analysis was made of the interactions of three individual 
children with their groups. Chapter 8 reported on this qualitative analysis and 
suggested that the need to explain one's thinking, the use of metacognitive 
strategies such as planning, evaluating and predicting and developing a knowledge 
of oneself and others could be encouraged through structured collaborative group 
work as used in CASE@KSI. 
Both logical rational thinking and emotional affective thinking were found to 
provoke metacognitive behaviour. The chapter argued that it is through interaction 
with others, in pursuit of a common goal, that children can be helped to have 
metacognitive experiences, which will facilitate the development of metacognition 
(Flavell, 1979). Metacognitive development occurs within a social and intellectual 
context. In terms of the classroom the teacher is initially responsible for providing 
an environment in which metacognitive experiences can occur and in which 
children can practice and develop metacognitive skills. 
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The CASE@KS I programme placed a great importance on providing the teachers 
with both theoretical and practical knowledge of the programme. Implications of 
the findings of this research for pedagogy are discussed on page 432 Chapter 9 
aimed to investigate the following research question: 
Research Q4: What factors, associated with teachers, impact on the 
development of metacognition in year one classrooms? 
a) Does teachers' knowledge of and beliefs about metacognition impact on the 
development of metacognition in the classroom? 
b) Do teachers' beliefs and opinions about teaching and learning affect the way 
they try to facilitate metacognition in the classroom? 
c) Can teachers' ability to promote metacognition be developed through CPD? 
Through a thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews with both control and 
experimental school teachers, three "types" of teaching were identified. These 
were labeled, "protective", "disciplined" and "child centred". Individual teachers 
were found to loosely fit into one of these styles in terms of facilitating 
metacognition. Chapter 9 clearly points out that teachers were found to range 
widely within these categories and the categories were viewed as nominal rather 
than prescriptive. However, the important finding reported in chapter 9 was not so 
much the naming of categories but the extent to which teachers changed 
throughout the year. Particularly interesting was a control school teacher who 
became more disciplined, and an experimental school teacher who developed her 
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teaching for metacognition along an affective trajectory, which resulted in her 
stressing the theory of mind aspect of metacognition, rather than rational logical 
thinking. One teacher in particular, from school B, appeared to develop her own 
metacognition during the year, as well as enthusiastically embracing the theory. 
She managed to create high quality metacognitive experiences for the children in 
her class. This was clear from the consistency of the results of the frequency count 
of teacher FM and child M behaviours described in chapter 7 and also from the 
qualitative analysis of classroom observations of both CASE tasks and to a lesser 
extent numeracy lessons throughout the year. 
Analysis of data in chapter 9 shows that the teachers' own personality, their 
engagement with the theory of metacognition, their beliefs and opinions as to its 
usefulness led to different amounts or different kinds of metacognitive experiences 
for the children in their classes. 
3 LIMITATIONS 
This research project is, by necessity, limited in method and scope. Firstly, the 
initial sample size of 24 children in four experimental schools and 18 children in 
three control schools is small for undertaking any kind of statistical analysis. 
Secondly, the four tests used to provide data on different factors of metacognition 
were not balanced in terms of difficulty, nor were they standardised in any formal 
way. The tests were used to provide a stimulus for children to talk about their 
thinking and the correlation of gains with other test gains can only be tentatively 
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drawn. However, an attempt was made to administer the tests in a uniform manner 
at both pre- and post test stage. 
The classroom observation data was subject to categorisation and frequency 
counts, thus turning essentially qualitative data into numbers. This of course 
involves issues of reliability in coding and highlights the problems of individual 
differences. An attempt was made to address these problems by learning from the 
analysis of the pilot phase data and changing the analysis method to include both a 
theory driven and a grounded approach. The unit of analysis became the CASE or 
non CASE lesson and individual differences were explored through focussed case 
studies of particular children. The coding of the observational data was also 
subjected to an inter-rater reliability check. 
The teacher interviews also highlighted methodological issues. Practically, it was 
difficult to interview a number of teachers in one day, but this was the only 
opportunity to speak to them. Chapter 9 made claims for some change in teacher 
behaviour over the year through analysis of this interview data. Whilst field notes 
and classroom observations supported this finding, it is also possible that other 
variables had an effect. It is possible that over the year, the teachers became more 
relaxed in my presence and relationships began to develop. Thus some portion of 
the interviews, such as expressing their opinions openly, may be affected by social 
and emotional factors. However, this is the case with all research that involves 
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repeated interviews. Thus the findings from chapter 9 need to be viewed in the 
light of the observational data provided in chapters 7 and 8. 
Whilst this project has sought to use a variety of methods to investigate 
metacognition, it is by viewing the results of all the methods of analysis used, that 
conclusions are drawn. The aim was to allow qualitative methods of analysis, such 
as the phenomenological descriptions, to add depth to the quantitative data. Thus 
whilst one method alone may be very limited, by approaching the subject from 
different perspectives and interpreting different sets of data it is hoped that a more 
reliable interpretation of the phenomenon can be given. 
In terms of scope, many variables, which are likely to impact on the development 
of metacognition, especially home, and family influences were outside the scope 
of this project. Equally children's friendships within school, which could possibly 
have highlighted areas of social and emotional metacognition, were not formally 
explored. Both time and access were limiting factors. 
One of the difficulties faced throughout this project has been the question of, how 
do we know what six year olds mean? Language has played an important role in 
the whole of this project and yet to some extent it has been sidelined. Whilst 
analysis of verbal interactions has provided the backbone of the whole project, 
many of the philosophical issues associated with language research have not been 
pursued. This is largely due to the need to focus on metacognition as an internal 
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process and not allow language to become the focus of the project. However, 
where pertinent and where I felt something about language needed to be overtly 
stated this has been done. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This research sought to answer four main research questions: 
Q1: Can metacognitive ability be enhanced? 
The results of both quantitative tests and observational data suggest that 
metacognitive ability can be enhanced in some areas and with some caveats (see 
below). The results of the metamemory test suggested that the CASE@KSI 
project had a positive effect on the development of metamemory in the 
experimental school children, over the year of the project. It also seemed likely 
that the CASE project had a positive effect on the development of an interpretative 
theory of mind for the experimental school children. However, there were some 
individual differences amongst schools and amongst individual children. Data 
from classroom observations suggested that the experimental school children used 
more and a broader selection of metacognitive behaviour than the control school 
children. By the end of the project, observational and interview data suggested that 
there was some transfer of metacognitive behaviour from CASE lessons to other 
areas of the curriculum. 
Research question 2 asked: 
Q2: Are metacognitive gains related to cognitive/academic gains? 
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The results of correlation between metacognitive tests, tests of conservation and 
spatial awareness and UK national tests in language and mathematics found no 
significant relationship between metacognitive gains and cognitive/academic 
gains. Factors influencing these results were discussed in chapter 6. 
Research question 3 asked: 
Q3: How is metacognition facilitated in year one classrooms? 
Classroom observational data suggested a number of teacher behaviours, which 
were facilitating metacognition and providing metacognitive experiences for the 
children. Child metacognitive behaviours were found to be a result of high quality 
interactions with teachers and peers and were affected by the type of task set. 
Research question 4 asked: 
Q4: What factors, associated with teachers, impact on the development of 
metacognition in year one classrooms? 
Interview and observational data suggested that teachers' beliefs, opinions and 
knowledge of metacognition affected their facilitation of metacognitive 
experiences in the classroom. Teacher's wider views on learning and pedagogy 
also appeared to affect the metacognitive environment of the classroom. 
Subject to the limitations discussed previously, the main findings of this research 
project are that: 
1. Five and six year old children can engage in some forms of metacognitive 
processing and can use simple metacognitive skills to achieve a goal. 
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2. The development of any metacognitive processing depends upon the quality 
and type of metacognitive experiences that children have, which in turn, rely on 
the construction of a metacognitive environment. 
3. Both peer interaction and adult intervention are necessary to develop 
metacognition. 
4. The facilitation of metacognition takes time and requires tasks where the 
thinking through is at least as important as getting an answer. 
5. Metacognition is often difficult to facilitate, can be interpreted in different ways 
and can lead to confusion between cognitive and metacognitive processes. 
6. Problems with measuring metacognition make it difficult to provide strong 
evidence for the impact of metacognition on academic performance. 
7. Metacognitive processing involves both cognitive and affective factors and not 
all metacognitive reflection is necessarily positive. 
8. Whilst social metacognition appears to be a naturally occurring developmental 
process, metacognition related to more specifically academic learning, requires 
support. 
9. This particular research suggests that metacognition is not a unitary construct 
but that there are a number of different relatively independent factors. 
5 IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
5.1 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of this research project suggest that the features of metacognition 
tested ie. metacognitive knowledge about the self as a learner; metacognitive 
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knowledge about others as cognitive beings; metacognitive knowledge about 
memory and remembering and metacognitive knowledge about problem solving 
develop at different rates. Young children can reflect upon and speak about 
themselves as learners and about their own memory processes. Whilst an 
understanding of the false belief aspect of theory of mind has developed by the age 
of five, the more complex interpretative theory of mind has not fully developed in 
all children by the age of six. The interpretative theory of mind test indicates 
whether children understand that different people when exposed to the same 
stimulus can have different views or reactions to it. The results of this test showed 
that by the age of six there is still a great deal of individual difference between 
children's ability in this area of metacognition. It is this understanding of theory 
of mind which forms a basis for people to communicate their ideas effectively, to 
argue or defend their point of view and to weigh up the evidence for competing 
positions as Kuhn as pointed out, (Kuhn & Dean, 2004). Thus whilst some basic 
aspects of metacognitive knowledge have developed by the age of five to six 
years, more sophisticated metacognitive processing may need to be encouraged 
through specific learning environments. Theoretical models of metacognition 
need to take into account the different developmental time lines of different 
aspects of metacognition. A model showing the relationship between what has 
developed by the age of five or six and what is in the process of developing could 
to lead to specific educational interventions targeted at these particular transition 
points. 
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The results of much of the research into metacognition undertaken over the past 
two decades has produced a view of metacognition as a function of a mature, 
rational, logical mind and as Whitebread points out this produces a model of 
metacognition which emphasises what children cannot do, rather than what they 
can, (Whitebread et al., 2005). Thus attempts to teach children to be more 
metacognitive has led to fears about unnaturally pushing young children into 
reflective modes of thinking, when they are naturally active, unreflective beings 
(Simms, 2001). However, evidence from the phenomenological analysis of 
children's views of different aspects of thinking indicates that given the chance to 
do so, young children can reflect upon their own and others' thinking and can give 
quite sophisticated and complex ideas. For instance children of five to six years 
old expressed such complex ideas as "we can learn by watching others but we 
cannot remember that way" and "remembering is not easy and knowing that you 
have forgotten something makes you feel sad", as well as expressing what they 
don't know. They suggested that how things get into memory is a mystery but 
they know when they are there. 
Whilst this project used Flavell's original framework of metacognition (op. cit) to 
produce a coding system of classroom interactions, the results of the classroom 
observations show that Flavell's original model needs to be re-constructed with a 
greater emphasis on the social construction of metacognition. The classroom 
observations showed that metacognition can be developed through group 
collaboration by reflecting on others' thinking as well as on one's own. 
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Conceptual models of metacognition need to describe how these "bottom up" 
processes of reflecting through group interactions link with the "top down" 
individual stored metacognition and go on to influence the development of more 
sophisticated metacognitive processing. Evidence from the three case studies in 
this project suggest that the group interactions do influence individual 
metacognitive development, but only longitudinal studies will show the extent to 
which this development is stable and secure. My suggestion is that this 
development is unlikely to be secure at this age and that in order to facilitate the 
development of secure and stable metacognition consistent metacognitive 
environments are necessary. 
New theoretical models of metacognition also need to take account of individual 
differences, both in terms of cognitive aptitude (Corkill, 1996) and socio-economic 
differences (Pappas, Ginsburg, & Jiang, 2003). These factors appear to affect the 
extent to which children use metacognitive processing and are able to express 
themselves in the appropriate related language. In addition, recent work on the 
connection between metacognition and intelligence suggests that metacognition in 
terms of metacognitive skill is at least partly independent of intelligence and is a 
general person-related characteristic, rather than domain specific, (Veenman et al., 
2004). 
Thus new conceptual models will need to incorporate these types of individual 
factors and be broadened to include the range of affective factors such as 
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motivation, individual personality traits and even emotional reactions to learning 
environments. The range of data analysed for this project suggests that all these 
factors can affect the metacognitive behaviour of children in the classroom. The 
classroom observations showed that in order to facilitate metacognition, 
metacognitive environments where children feel secure and able to express their 
thinking and reflect on their understanding need to be created. 
5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGY 
If metacognitive environments are to be created in order to help children develop 
positive metacognitive knowledge and regulate their own thinking then teachers 
need to be fully conversant with the theory of metacognition and how it can be 
facilitated. The research for this project suggested that teachers' opinions, beliefs 
and knowledge about metacognition influenced the type of metacognitive 
behaviours they facilitated in their classrooms. Whilst the sample of teachers in 
this study was small and the broad classifications into three types of teacher was a 
simplification, the study nevertheless showed that a relationship did exist between 
teachers' attitudes to teaching and the creation of a metacognitive environment. 
The professional development of teachers, how teachers react to intervention 
programmes, how teachers change and develop and how teachers affect their 
pupils' learning is a huge theoretical field in its own right. Briefly, there appears 
to be a range of views of how teachers should be trained from apprentice type 
schemes, to the more theoretically driven approaches, to the more individualistic 
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reflective practitioner approach. Whilst personal reflection in any professional 
field would seem to be a good idea and certainly helps in the development of 
individual metacognitive knowledge, there is the danger as Furlong points out 
(Furlong, 2000) that self-reflection may undervalue the existing theoretical 
knowledge about teaching. It is possible that the self-reflective practitioner could 
become stuck in a self-referential loop without regard for external evaluation. 
However, the other side of this coin is that a total reliance on evidence based 
practice simplifies the complex teacher/pupil relationships. In providing 
recommendations on how teachers can facilitate metacognition in their classrooms 
these two competing approaches need to be considered. 
Firstly, it was evident from this research project that most of the teachers knew 
nothing about metacognition at the start of the programme. During the CASE 
professional development programme only one half day was given over to the 
theory of metacognition and whilst some teachers took a personal interest and 
pursued their own learning about the theory, others did not. As the CASE@KS I 
programme last for only one year it may be more important for teachers to be 
given theoretical input on metacognition at the start of the year and to continue to 
develop their knowledge through workshops with the teacher tutors during the 
year. The use of reflective diaries (as originally conceived on the research 
programme, but later dropped) may prove a good way for teachers to map their 
own metacognitive development. 
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However, product-process models of teaching and learning, which attempt to 
relate (either as correlation or causally) teachers' behaviour to children's 
attainment, have come in for a great deal of criticism from as far back as the 1970s 
to more recent years, (Doyle, 1977; Fenstermacher, 1979; Gardner, 1974; 
Richardson, 1994). Yet evidence from classroom observations from this project 
showed a link between the types of questioning and the interactions the teachers 
had with the children and the range and quantity of metacognitive behaviour the 
children displayed, (see tables A. 9.3-A. 9.5). The analysis of this data showed that 
teachers need to be helped to facilitate metacognition in their classrooms. It would 
seem difficult for them to do this without some knowledge of the theory of 
metacognition; of why it is important for learning and what kinds of behaviour 
facilitate or hinder its development. Thus a theoretical input on metacognition and 
examples of classroom behaviour where metacognition is apparent (such as those 
given in this project) would be a good beginning. 
However, as chapter 9 showed, the teacher's own ability to be metacognitive will 
impact on how and to what extent she facilitates metacognitive behaviour in the 
classroom. As Clarke has pointed out reflection on practice is an active rather than 
a passive process. Teachers "need to become articulate, to be communicative, or to 
use thoughts as objects of systematic attention with their colleagues" (Clarke, 
1994 p. 44). In this latter sense teachers need to become metacognitive themselves 
(as did teacher B in this project), in order to fully facilitate metacognition in their 
pupils. The move, it seems to me, is one from teacher as professional practitioner 
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to teacher as life-long learner. In order to create metacognitive environments in 
which pupils are encouraged to explore and play with their own thinking, teachers 
need to be seen to be doing the same thing, to not only model the language of 
metacognition, but to be fully engaged in metacognitive interactions. 
In addition, just as the pupils in CASE lessons work collaboratively to solve 
problems and develop their thinking so teachers could benefit from collaboration 
with their peers on the problems of creating metacognitive environments which 
will benefit all the pupils in the class, with all their individual differences. 
6 RESEARCH INTO METACOGNITION 
This research project has purposely used a mixture of methods to research 
metacognition and has drawn on a range of methodologies. In doing so it has 
employed established quasi-experimental and quantitative methodologies to 
confirm previous research findings and to attempt measurement of metacognition. 
In addition to reaching conclusions about the nature of metacognition, this thesis 
has also explored methodological issues, in particular, the application of 
phenomenological approaches. Along this journey into different methodologies, 
many problems and obstacles have been met and explored. Some of these, such as 
the problem of measuring an internal mental process through categorisation of 
what someone says, are specifically tied to the concept of metacognition. 
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Measurement of any mental process is fraught with difficulties of validity and 
reliability and cognitive researchers come up with more and more ingenious 
psychological tests to try and reduce the variation in individual factors. This type 
of research continues through the work of special interest groups, such as the 
metacognition group of EARLI, along with the work of individual researchers. 
This project has developed a unique framework for categorising classroom 
behaviour as metacognitive, which uses both a theoretical approach and a 
grounded approach. This framework can be used as a basis for more detailed 
analysis of one or more aspects of metacognition. It may also prove to be useful to 
other teachers as examples of young children displaying metacognitive processing 
in early years classrooms, and as examples of how some teachers have tried to 
provoke metacognitive experiences in young children and support the 
development of metacognitive processing. 
Throughout the project the particular research question has determined the method 
used. The qualitative analysis of classroom interactions, in particular the use of 
case studies to produce more detailed analysis of individual children, showed 
children developing an increasingly sophisticated way of thinking about problems. 
The snapshots of children working together, exchanging thoughts and constructing 
new ideas as a result of interactions with their peers provided evidence that 
children as young as five and six years old can engage in both rational, logical 
problem solving and reflect on their thinking process. 
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The evidence from one to one contact with the children plus observing them 
interacting with their teachers and peers has suggested that whilst they do copy 
each other and construct answers to questions spontaneously, they can also 
maintain their beliefs and opinions and use argument to persuade others. By the 
end of this project, I came to view these children less as easily manipulated 
participants in terms of language and more as knowing and increasingly 
sophisticated users of language in their own right. 
This project has also addressed ethical issues of conducting research with young 
children. Throughout the year issues such as consent, power relations and 
confidentiality were assessed and reassessed. As the project progressed so 
relationships were built and children and teachers appeared to become more like 
collaborative researchers than observable phenomena. By the end of the project 
all four experimental schools appeared enthusiastic about the research. Children 
were interested to talk about their thinking, teachers asked for reading on 
metacognition and in some schools, other members of staff actively sought to 
engage in conversations about metacognition with me. 
The qualitative evidence from this project suggests that nothing is to be gained by 
narrowing the concept of metacognition just to include fully formed abstract 
thoughts about thinking, which are competently transformed into speech or actions 
which are then measured. Whilst distinctions do need to be made between 
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cognition and metacognition, future research from an educational point of view 
might best be focussed on how environments can be created in everyday 
classrooms, where thinking is valued in and for itself. From the findings of this 
research it appears that young children have a naturally developing theory of mind 
and metacognitive processing which can be built upon, prized and developed 
through careful nurturing. The social metacognition that children often readily 
engage in can be made more explicit, so that peers help to construct positive 
metacognitive beliefs amongst themselves. The only way to change classroom 
environments however is through the teachers and other adults who control them. 
Thus future research may need to build on the research into teachers' beliefs, 
opinions and knowledge of metacognition presented here. 
In terms of theoretical research there is still a great deal of scope for exploring the 
developmental trajectory of metacognition not just in children but throughout the 
life span. The differences and similarities between cognitive and social aspects of 
metacognition could be further elaborated. Whilst the pursuit of reliable and valid 
tests of metacognition is an important and noble quest, the use of qualitative 
analysis especially phenomenological descriptions may prove to be a fruitful line 
of research. 
Over recent years the growth in research into metacognition has continued. Now 
research on metacognition can be found throughout the fields of psychology, 
education, neuroscience and health. With the establishment of a special interest 
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group in metacognition in Europe and a new journal dedicated to research on 
metacognition and learning, (Veenman, 2005), it seems likely that this area of 
research will continue to grow. 
As John Flavell suggested in 1979, research into metacognition and cognitive 
monitoring may help us to teach children and adults : 
"to make wise and thoughtful life decisions as well 
as to comprehend and learn better in formal educational 
settings". (p. 910) 
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APPENDIX 4.1 
METACOGNITION (Pilot Test Scoring) 
Name of child ................................................................. 
Name of school ............................................................... 
Name of teacher .............................................................. 
Child age/gender ............................ 




GENERAL MENTAL: I 
MENTAL ROTATION: 2 
CARD 2 
ROTATE 
Q1: HOW DID YOU DO THAT? / HOW DID YOU WORK THAT OUT? 
Q2: WHAT WAS DIFFICULT ABOUT IT? / WHAT WAS EASY ABOUT IT? 
Q3: CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT YOU SAID TO YOURSELF WHEN YOU 
WERE DOING IT? 
Q4: CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT THINGS YOU THOUGHT ABOUT TO 
HELP YOU DO THIS? 
CARD 3 
ROTATE: 
QI: HOW DID YOU DO THAT? / HOW DID YOU WORK THAT OUT? 
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Q2: WHAT WAS DIFFICULT ABOUT IT? / WHAT WAS EASY ABOUT IT? 
Q3: CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT YOU SAID TO YOURSELF WHEN YOU 
WERE DOING IT? 
Q4: CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT THINGS YOU THOUGHT ABOUT TO 
HELP YOU DO THIS? 
CARD 4 
ROTATE: 
QI: HOW DID YOU DO THAT? / HOW DID YOU WORK THAT OUT? 
Q2: WHAT WAS DIFFICULT ABOUT IT? / WHAT WAS EASY ABOUT IT? 
Q3: CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT YOU SAID TO YOURSELF WHEN YOU 
WERE DOING IT? 
Q4: CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT THINGS YOU THOUGHT ABOUT TO 
HELP YOU DO THIS? 
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APPENDIX 4.2 
TEACHER INTERVIEWS (sept/oct 99) 
Research Question: 
2) What aspects of teacher intervention are important in the development of 
metacognition. 
Interviews (1) (sept/oct 99) 
Trying to find out: 
a) Extent of teacher's knowledge of the theory of metacognition 
b) Teacher's attitude to the importance of this theory for learning 
Interviews (2) (Jul 00) 
Trying to find out: 
a) Has teacher's knowledge of the theory of metacognition developed in any way 
b) Has their attitude to its importance for learning changed 
Analysis 
a) Score knowledge of theory, by placing each teacher in a category described by 
what they say about the theory and their familiarity with it, 
b) Analyse answers that show their attitude to the importance of metacognition 
for learning 
c) Analyse attitude to other aspects of teaching (using their own words as 
descriptors) 
It should be possible to test their perceived attitudes to learning by observing them 
in practice. It should also be possible to see if there is any correlation between the 
teacher's beliefs about the development of metacognition and any actual 
development shown by the children. 
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APPENDIX 4.2 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (1) (PILOT & September 1999) 
Preamble: 
I am working on a project with year one children that sets problem solving 
activities to be worked on in groups of six. The project is researching whether this 
approach will develop children's thinking skills over a year. My particular interest 
is in the development of children's thinking and the teaching strategies that may 
influence it. 
I would like to tape-record the interview with your permission because it will give 
me a more accurate record than taking notes. The comments you make will be in 
total confidence and your name will not appear on any typed transcripts of the tape 
or in any subsequent reports. The findings of my research will be produced along 
with the findings from the full CASE project and I expect you will get to see this 
report when all the data is analysed and written up. 
Before we begin do you have any questions you want to ask me about the 
interview procedure itself. 
I: Can you tell me how long you have been teaching 
Q2: How would you describe your approach to teaching 
(Prompt: Do you feel you fall into any particular category of teaching style) 
Q3: What would you say are the most important aspects of teaching yrl children 
(probe: Can you say any more about this) 
Q4: If you had to give advice to an NQT of yrl children what would you tell them 
to focus on 
(probe: anything else) 
Q5: During your own teacher training or other P. D. did you come across the 
theory of metacognition 
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If yes: 
a) can you explain the context in which this was described 
b) can you explain your understanding of the term 
If no: 
Give explanation: 
The term is controversial in that different people take it to mean slightly different 
things. I am using to mean basically the ability to think about your own thinking, 
to see yourself as an active thinker. To know that you know something or to 
understand that don't understand something and to be able to explain your thinking 
to others. An eg. Of metacognition might be: 
"I thought I didn't know the answer, but then I remembered something from 
another lesson and then I realised I could work out the answer" or "I had to stop 
and ask myself what I was doing wrong" 
With a younger age group we might see the beginnings of metacognition in any 
statements about thinking things out, or using my brain to work it out or planning 
how to do something. 
Q6: Is there anything I've said in this explanation that resonates with you as bcing 
important for your children's learning 
Q7: Can you think of any egs from your own teaching of children showing a 
metacognitive ability 
Q8: Is this type of thinking something that is promoted in classrooms in your 
experience 
(probe: Should it be promoted more) 
Q9: Are there any teaching strategies you use to promote it 
Q10: Are there any aspects of metacognition that might have helped you in your 
own studies. 
Q 11: Do you think metacognition can be taught 
End 
That's all my questions, thank you. Is there anything you would like to add. 
(pause) 
Is there anything you would like to ask me. 
Thank you very much for your time. 
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APPENDIX 6.1 
METACOGNITION TESTS - GAIN SCORES 
Experimental 
school pupil as learner metamem rotation 
A 1 1 4 U 
2 -1 6 0 
3 0 4 0 
B 5 0 4 0 
6 1 3 0 
7 0 2 0 
8 1 6 0 
9 0 7 0 
10 0 3 0 
c 11 0 7 0 
12 0 4 0 
13 0 6 0 
14 0 5 1 
15 1 3 1 
16 0 3 1 
D 17 1 5 0 
18 1 2 0 
19 1 7 2 
20 1 7 0 
21 1 5 2 
mean 0.38 4.76 0.33 
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Control 
school pupil as learner metamem rotation 
X 22 1 1 1 
23 1 0 -1 
24 0 4 0 
25 0 7 -1 
26 0 3 1 
y 27 0 -5 0 
28 1 0 1 
29 1 0 0 
30 1 0 2 
31 1 -1 0 
32 0 1 0 
z 33 1 6 2 
34 1 0 2 
35 1 4 -1 
36 0 1 -1 
37 0 3 0 
Mean 0.56 1.50 0.31 
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APPENDIX 7.1 
Field Notes - School A December 1999 - giant story 
My third visit to this classroom and so far I've been struck by the sense of order 
and calm. On arrival the class was assembling together on the carpet with the 
teacher at the front. They were singing a little song that brought them quickly 
together and focused on the teacher. A classroom assistant was also present. Most 
of the children were smiling and appeared to be listening attentively to the teacher, 
Various activities had been planned, finishing art work, some work sheets from 
yesterday, a science activity about floating and sinking. The children were given 
very clear instructions about what to do and what to do if they finished early -- read 
or draw at your table. 
There is still only 19 children in this class, the rest move up after Christmas. 
Teacher tells me she is a bit apprehensive, since she has settled this group well and 
thinks the new children could be disruptive. 
The CASE group join my table. The brightly coloured story cards are on the table. 
The children immediately begin looking at them, but wait for the teacher before 
picking any up. 
Concrete preparation - short and clear. Largely child led. Each child chose a 
picture and pointed to something they noticed in it. A few words were clarified eg. 
fork, giant, castle. The goal - to make a story - was presented clearly. 
All children engaged in the task. Teacher tended to emphasise sharing and being 
kind to each other. Sarah tried to dominate again, but she gave way without 
crying. 
They took turns to move the cards around, but at times they worked together, 
discussing amongst themselves what to do next. It was difficult to hear all this and 
I hope the tape has recorded it. 
Some attempt at metacognition at end especially TV, but not much at all. Children 
seemed to be engaged in the task, but teacher doesn't really engage in FM. 
Interruption by another teacher near end of lesson means CASE activity cut a bit 
short, children left to tidy up. 
School seems very calm even at end of day. I seem to get along well with the 
teacher. She has a child 1 year younger than mine and we spent ten mins at end 
discussing play groups rather than the research. She is interested in metacognition 
though and told me that one of her relatives is a psychologist. 
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APPENDIX 7.2 FREQUENCY COUNT TABLES 
Table A. 7.4 Teacher F. M. Behaviours - Experimental School A Autumn Term 
Code/Task Flowers Dinosaurs Giant Story Buttons Totals 
TS 0 0 0 0 0 
TK 10 2 0 1 13 
TI 0 0 0 0 0 
TE 3 0 0 2 5 
TQ 10 2 0 7 19 
TP 0 0 0 0 0 
TL 2 0 0 2 4 
TO 3 1 1 2 7 
TC 3 0 0 1 4 
TT 7 2 1 6 16 
TU 1 6 2 0 9 
TV 1 0 2 2 5 
Totals 40 13 6 23 82 
Average 20 
Table A. 7.5 Teacher F. M. Behaviours - Experimental School A SnrinLy Term 
Code/Task Boxes Shapes Crossroads Race Clowns Totals 
TS 1 0 0 0 3 4 
TIC 3 0 1 1 0 5 
TI 1 0 0 0 0 1 
TE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TQ 6 0 8 0 0 14 
TP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TL 3 0 0 0 0 
TO 0 0 4 0 2 
TC 0 0 0 0 I 1 
TT 3 2 4 3 3 15 
TU 0 0 1 0 0 1 
TV 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Totals 17 2 19 4 9 51 
Average 10.2 
Table A. 7.6 Teacher F. M. Behaviours - Experimental School A Sunnmer Term 
Code/Task Transport Bottles Farmyard Totals 
TS 0 1 0 1 
TK 9 2 2 13 
TI 0 0 0 0 
TE 1 1 0 2 
TQ 5 0 0 5 
TP 0 3 0 3 
TL 0 1 0 1 
TO 0 0 0 0 
TC 1 2 0 3 
TT 6 10 5 21 
TU 0 0 0 0 
TV 0 2 0 2 
Totals 22 22 7 51 
Average 17 
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Table A. 7.7 Teacher F. M. Behaviours - Experimental School 13 Autumn Term 
Code/Task Flowers Animals Buttons Giant Totals 
TS 0 0 0 0 0 
TK 1 0 0 0 1 
TI 0 0 0 0 0 
TE 0 0 0 0 0 
TQ 4 0 1 0 5 
TP 1 0 0 0 1 
TL 1 0 0 0 1 
TO 1 0 0 1 2 
TC 0 0 4 0 4 
TT 0 3 14 3 20 
TU 0 0 0 0 0 
TV 1 0 2 2 5 
Totals 9 3 21 6 39 
Average 9,75 
Table A. 7.8 Teacher F. M. Behaviours - Experimental School B Spring Term 
Code/Task Rocks Shapes Crossroads Clowns Bottles Totals 
TS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TK 0 0 0 1 3 4 
TI 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TE 0 1 0 0 3 4 
T 4 0 3 3 0 10 
TP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TL 6 0 0 2 0 8 
TO 0 1 0 1 0 2 
TC 3 3 1 1 0 8 
TT 4 12 4 10 9 39 
TU 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TV 0 1 0 6 4 tt 
17 18 8 24 19 86 
Average i -i. z 
Table A. 7.9 Teacher F. M. Behaviours - Experimental School B Summer Term 
Code/Task Transport Farmyard Shadow Totals 
_ TS _ 0 0 0 0 
TK 0 0 2 2 
TI 0 0 0 0 
TE 0 0 0 0 
TQ 1 0 0 1 
Tp 0 0 0 0 
TL 0 0 1 1 
TO 0 0 0 0 
TC 1 3 2 6 
TT 8 2 8 18 
TU 0 0 0 0 
TV 0 2 2 4 
Totals 10 7 15 32 
Average 10.6 
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Table A. 7.10 Teacher F. M. Behaviours - Experimental School C Autumn Tern 
Code/Task Marble Run Buttons Shapes Giant Totals 
TS 0 0 0 0 0 
TK 2 0 2 0 4 
TI 0 0 0 0 
TE 0 0 0 0 
T 4 2 4 4 14 
TP 0 0 0 0 0 
TL 0 0 0 0 0 
TO 0 0 0 0 0 
TC 0 1 0 0 1 
TT 2 1 3 2 8 
TU 0 1 0 0 I 
TV 0 0 0 0 
Totals 8 5 9 6 28 
Average 7 
Table A. 7.11 Teacher F. M. Behaviours - Experimental School C Spring Term 
Code/Task Rocks Cook Story Crossroads Race Bottles Totals 
TS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TK 0 1 9 5 3 18 
TI 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T 14 1 0 4 0 19 
Tp 0 0 0 0 0 p 
TL 2 0 0 0 0 2 
TO 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TC 0 0 1 0 0 j 
TT 0 2 2 4 0 8 
TU 1 0 0 0 0 
TV 1 0 3 2 I 7 
Totals LL 8_____l 15 15 4 56 
Average 11, 
Table A. 7.12 Teacher F. M. Behaviours - Experimental SchoolC Summer Term 
Code/Task Shadows Transport Farmyard Totals 
TS 0 0 0 0 
TK 1 0 1 2 
TI 0 0 0 0 
TE 0 0 0 0 
T 2 3 0 5 
TP 0 0 0 0 
TL 0 0 0 0 
TO 0 0 0 0 
TC 0 0 0 0 
TT 5 2 1 8 
TU 0 0 0 0 
TV 1 0 0 1 
Totals 9 5 2 16 
Average 53 
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Table A. 7.13 Teacher F. M. Behaviours-Experimental School D Autumn Term 
Code/Task Marble Run Shapes Buttons Giant Totals 
TS 0 0 0 0 
TK 2 1 2 2 
TI 6 1 1 0 
_ TE 2 2 3 3 10 
T 9 8 6 7 30 
TP 0 0 2 0 2 
TL 1 0 1 1 3 
TO 0 0 0 0 0 
TC 0 0 0 0 0 
TT 2 3 4 8 17 
TU 0 0 0 0 0 
TV 0 0 5 4 9 
Totals 22 15 24 25 86 
Average 21 
Table A. 7.14 Teacher F. M. Behaviours-Experimental School I) Spring Terrn 
Code/Task Rocks Cook Story Crossroads Race Bottles Totals 
TS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TK 3 0 3 8 0 14 
TI 3 0 1 0 0 4 
TE 0 2 0 1 0 3 
TQ 5 12 1 1 0 19 
TP 2 1 0 0 0 3 
TL 0 1 0 1 3 5 
TO 0 0 0 0 0 
TC 1 0 0 0 0 
TT 1 3 5 6 4 19 
TU 0 0 1 0 0 1 
TV 5 2 1 3 5 16 
Totals 20 21 12 20 12 85 
Average 17 
Table A. 7.15 Teacher F. M. Behaviours-Experimental School 1) Summer Term 
Code/Task Shadows Transport Farm and Totals 
TS 0 0 0 0 
TK 6 0 4 10 
TI 0 0 0 0 
TE 0 0 0 0 
TQ 0 1 0 1 
Tp 0 0 0 0 
TL 0 0 0 0 
TO 0 0 0 0 
TC 0 0 0 0 
TT 11 2 4 17 
TU 0 0 0 0 
TV 3 2 0 5 
Totals 20 5 8 33 
Average II 
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Table A. 7.16 Teacher F. M. Behaviours, Totals for the Year - Control School 
Numeracy lessons 
Code/Sch School X School Y School Z Totals 
TS 0 0 0 0 
TK 1 1 8 10 
TI 0 0 0 0 
TE 2 0 0 2 
JQ 12 1 0 13 
JP 0 0 0 0 
TL 0 0 0 0 
TO 0 0 0 0 
TC 0 0 0 0 
TT 7 3 11 21 
TU 0 1 0 1 
TV 3 1 13 17 
Totals 25 7 32 64 
Tables A. 7.17 Teacher F. M. Behaviours, Totals for the Year -Experimental 
Schools Case and Numeracy lessons 
Code/Sch Schoo lA Schoo lB Schoo lC Schoo lD Totals 
CA/Num CA NU CA NU CA NU CA NU CA NU 
TS 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 
TK 31 5 7 5 24 5 31 12 93 27 
TI 1 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 13 0 
TE 7 2 4 0 0 0 13 2 24 
TQ 38 3 16 11 38 4 50 11 142 29 
Tp 3 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 9 0 
TL 8 2 10 0 2 0 8 3 28 5 
TO 13 4 4 1 0 2 0 0 17 7 
TC 8 0 18 2 2 0 1 0 29 2 
TT 52 8 77 15 24 9 53 7 206 39 
TU 10 1 0 2 2 0 1 0 13 3 
TV 8 4 20 0 8 2 30 4 66 10 
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Table A. 7.18 Child M Behaviours-Experimental School A Autumn Term 
Code/Task Flowers Dinosaurs Giant Story Buttons Totals 
SELF 5 7 2 3 17 
OTH 0 0 1 1 2 
UNIV 0 0 0 0 0 
UND 1 0 0 0 
PRED 0 1 0 0 l 
RAT 1 0 3 2 G 
COMP 2 1 0 0 3 
EVA 7 2 3 2 14 
PLAN 1 0 0 0 1 
PAR 0 0 0 0 0 
SQU 2 3 0 0 5 
CHE 3 0 0 2 5 
Totals 22 14 9 10 55 
Average 13.75 
Table A. 7.19 Child M Behaviours-Experimental School A Spring Term 
Code/Task Boxes Shapes Crossroads Race Clowns Totals 
SELF 3 0 1 0 4 8 
OTH 0 0 1 1 0 2 
UNIV 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UND 0 0 1 0 I 2 
PAD 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RAT 0 0 1 0 0 1 
COMP 3 0 0 1 0 4 
EVA 7 0 4 0 3 14 
PLAN 0 0 0 0 1 1 
PAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SQU 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CHE 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Totals 13 0 10 2 9 34 
overage d 
Table A. 7.20 Child M Behaviours-Experimental School A Summer Term 
Code/Task Trans ort Bottles Farmyard Totals 
SELF 1 2 1 4 
OTH 0 0 1 1 
UNIV 0 1 0 1 
UND 0 0 0 
PRED p 0 0 0 
RAT p 1 0 1 
COMP 2 0 0 2 
EVA 1 4 1 6 
PLAN 0 0 0 0 
PAR 0 0 0 0 
SU 0 0 0 0 
CHE 0 0 0 0 
Totals 4 8 3 15 
Average 5 
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Table A. 7.21 Child M Behaviours-Experimental School B Autumn Term 
Code/Task Flowers Animals Buttons Giant Story Totals 
SELF 0 1 9 5 15 
OTH 0 3 6 4 13 
UNIV 0 0 0 0 
UND 1 0 0 0 I1 
PRED 0 0 0 0 0 
RAT 0 1 1 2 4 
COMP 1 0 0 2 3 
EVA 2 5 14 5 26 
PLAN 0 0 0 2 2 
PAR 0 0 0 0 0 
SU 0 0 0 0 0 
CHE 0 0 2 2 4 
Totals 4 10 32 22 68 
Average 17 
Table A. 7.22 Child M Behaviours-Experimental School B Spring Term 
Code/Task Rocks Shapes Crossroads Clowns Bottles Totals 
SELF 6 4 5 5 8 28 
OTH 3 0 2 1 6 
UNIV 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 0 2 2 4 
PRED I 0 0 2 0 3 
RAT 0 0 0 7 5 12 
COMIP 0 1 5 4 5 15 
EVA 6 0 1 12 2 21 
PLAN 5 0 0 5 0 10 
PAR 0 0 0 0 0 tl 
SU 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CHE 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Totals 18 8 l5 39 25 105 
Average 21 
Table A7 23 Child M Behaviours-Experimental School B Summer Term 
Code/Task Trans ort Farmyard Shadows Totals 
SELF 2 2 2 6 
OTH 0 2 3 5 
UNIV 0 0 0 
D 1 0 1 2 
PRED 0 0 0 0 
RAT 0 3 1 4 
COMP 0 0 0 0 
EVA 2 2 1 5 
PLAN 0 1 0 1 
PAR 0 0 0 0 
SU 0 0 0 0 
CHE 0 0 0 0 
Totals 5 l0 8 23 
Average 7,6 
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Table A. 7.24 Child M Behaviours-Experimental School C Autumn Term 
Code/Task Marble Run Buttons Shapes Giant Story Totals 
SELF 1 2 1 3 7 
OTH 1 1 0 2 4 
UNIV 0 0 0 0 0 
UND 0 0 0 0 0 
PRED 0 0 0 0 0 
RAT 0 0 2 0 2 
COMP 0 0 0 0 0 
EVA 0 8 0 2 10 
PLAN 0 0 0 0 0 
PAR 0 0 0 0 0 
SQU 0 0 0 0 0 
CHE 1 2 0 0 3 
Totals 3 13 3 7 26 
Average 6.5 
Table A. 7.25 Child M Behaviours-Experimental School C Spring Term 
Code/Task Rocks Cook Story Crossroads Race Bottles Totals 
SELF 1 5 0 1 2 9 
OTH 2 2 0 1 0 5 
UNIV 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UND 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PRED 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RAT 0 0 2 0 2 4 
COMP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EVA 2 3 0 0 0 
PLAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SQU 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CHE 2 3 4 1 7 17 
Totals 7 13 6 3 11 40 
Average 
Table A. 7.26 Child M Behaviours-Experimental School C Summer Term 
Code/Task Shadow Transport Farmyard Totals 
SELF 1 1 1 3 
OTH 3 1 0 4 
UNIV 0 0 0 0 
UND 0 0 0 0 
PRED 0 0 0 0 
RAT 0 0 0 0 
COMP 0 0 0 0 
EVA 0 0 0 0 
PLAN 0 0 0 0 
PAR 0 0 0 0 
SQU 0 0 0 0 
CHE 0 1 0 1 
Totals 4 3 1 8 
Average 2.6 
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Table A. 7.27 Child M Behaviours-Experimental School I) Autumn Tern 
Code/Task Marble Run Shapes Buttons Giant Story Totals 
SELF 0 0 5 3 8 
OTH 1 0 0 1 2 
UNIV 0 0 0 0 0 
UND 0 0 0 0 0 
_ PRED 0 0 0 0 0 
RAT 0 0 1 8 9 
COMP 0 0 2 1 3 
EVA 7 2 3 3 15 
PLAN 4 1 0 3 8 
PAR 0 0 0 0 0 
SU 0 0 0 0 0 
CHE 0 0 0 1 1 
Totals 12 3 11 20 46 
Average 11.5 
Table A. 7.28 Child M Behaviours-Experimental School I) Spring Term 
Code/Task Rocks Cook Story Crossroads Race Bottles Totals 
SELF 0 3 3 0 0 6 
OTH 0 1 1 0 0 2 
UNIV 0 2 0 0 0 2 
UND 0 0 1 0 0 1 
PRED 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RAT 5 1 0 1 2 9 
COMP 0 4 1 2 1 8 
EVA 2 7 1 0 1 11 
PLAN 0 1 0 3 0 4 
PAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SQU 1 2 0 0 0 3 
CHE 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Totals 8 21 9 6 4 48 
Average 9.6 
Table A. 7.29 Child M Behaviours-Experimental School 1) Summer Term 
Code/Task Shadows Transport Farm and Totals 
SELF 2 2 5 9 
OTH 0 1 1 2 
UNIV 0 0 0 0 
UND 0 0 2 2 
PRED 0 0 0 0 
RAT 0 4 2 6 
COMP 3 2 0 5 
EVA 0 3 1 4 
PLAN 0 0 0 0 
PAR 0 0 0 0 
SU 0 0 0 0 
CHE 0 0 0 0 
Totals 5 12 11 28 
Average 9.3 
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Table A. 7.30 Child M Behaviours, Totals for the Year - Control School4, 
Numeracy lessons 
Code/Sch School X School Y School Z Totals 
SELF 7 5 13 25 
OTH 6 2 1 9 
UNIV 0 0 1 1 
UND 0 1 0 1 
PRED 0 0 1 1 
RAT 5 2 7 14 
COMP 3 1 1 5 
EVA 12 2 1 15 
PLAN 0 0 0 0 
PAR 0 0 0 0 
SQU 0 1 0 1 
CHE 6 1 2 9 
Totals 39 15 27 gl 
Table A. 7.31 Child M Behaviours, Totals for the Year - Experimental Schools, 
CASE and Numeracy lessons 
Code/Sch Schoo lA Schoo lB Schoo lC School D Totals 
CA/Num CA Num CA Num CA Num CA Num CA Num 
SELF 29 7 49 7 19 2 23 2 120 18 
0TH 5 5 24 0 13 1 6 0 48 6 
UNIV 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 3 1 
UND 3 1 11 1 0 0 3 0 17 2 
PRED 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 
RAT 8 2 20 6 6 2 24 1 58 11 
COMP 9 0 18 1 0 0 16 2 43 3 
EVA 34 7 52 9 15 1 30 5 131 22 
PLAN 2 0 13 0 0 0 12 0 27 0 
PAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SOU 5 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 8 2 
CHE 7 1 6 2 21 0 3 0 37 3 
Totals 104 24 196 27 74 6 122 11 496 68 
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Table A. 7.32 Teacher FM and Child M Behaviours in Individual CASs; Tasks 
across all Schools 






Shapes B. C D* 44 14 
Buttons B C. D * 73 66 
Giant Story A B, C D* 43 58 
Cook Story C ,D 
25 34 
Rocks BCD 55 33 
Crossroads BCD * 54 40 
Race AC ,D 
39 11 
Bottles ABCD* 57 48 
Shadows BCD 44 17 
Transport ABCD* 42 24 
Farmyard ABCD* 24 25 
Flowers A, 13 49 26 
Dinosaurs A 13 14 
Boxes A 17 13 
Clowns A ,B 
33 48 
Animals B 3 10 
Marble Run CD 30 15 
Table A. 7.33 Teacher FM Behaviours and Child M Behaviours in Buttons Task 
across all Schools 
School Most Frequent Total T Most Frequent Total S 
Teacher Behaviours Student Behaviours 
p TQ -7 23 Self - 5,0th - 1, 10 
TT-6 Rat -2, Eva -2 
(others combined 10) 
B TC -4 21 Eva - 14, Self - 9, 32 
TT - 14 0th - 6, Che -2, 
others combined 3) Rat -1 
C TQ-2 7 Eva-8, Self-2, 13 
TT-5 Oth- 1 Che -2 
D TQ -6 24 Self - 5, Eval - 3, 11 
TT -4 Pred - 1, Comp -2 
(others combined 14 
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Table A. 7.34 Teacher FM Behaviours and Child M Behaviours in Experimental 
School Numeracy lessons and Control School Numeracy Lessons 
Observations: 3 numeracy lessons in each experimental school = 12 
3 numeracy lessons in each control school =9 
Total Behaviours over the Year 
School Child Behaviours Teacher Behaviours 
A (Exp) 24 29 
B (Exp) 27 36 
C (Exp) 6 22 
D (Exp) 11 34 
X (Cont) 37 25 Ly 
(Cont) 15 7 
Z (Cont) 27 22 
Table A. 7.35 Comparison of Experimental School Child M Behaviours and 
Control School Child M Behaviours During Numeracy Lessons By Code 
Code School A School B School C School D School X School Y School Z 
SELF 7 7 2 2 7 5 13 
OTH 5 0 1 0 6 2 1 
UNIV 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
UND 1 1 0 0 0 1 
PRED 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RAT 2 6 3 2 5 2 
COMP 0 1 0 2 3 1 
EVA 7 9 1 5 12 2 
PLAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SQU 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
CHE 1 2 7 0 6 1 2 
Table A. 7.36 Comparison of Experimental School Teacher FM Behaviours and 
Control School Teacher FM Behaviours During Numeracy Lessons By Cocle 
Code School A School B School C School D School X School Y School Z 
TS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 5 5 12 1 1 8 
TI 0 0 0 0 0 0_ - 0 
m 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 
T 3 11 4 11 12 1 0 
TP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TL 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 
TO 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 
TC 0 2 0 0 0 0 p 
TT 8 15 9 7 7 3 11 
TU 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
TV 4 0 2 4 3 1 13 
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APPENDIX 9.1 
Teacher Interviews #2 . tune/. Iuly 2000 - Experimental Schools 
Teacher Interviews #2 June/July 2000 
As you know this is the second interview. The first one being last 
September. In this interview I would like to concentrate a little more on 
the concept of metacognition. I am interested in your views, thoughts and 
opinions on this, it is not a test to see how much you know about the 
theory. I am particularly interested in examples and stories you may have 
from your own classroom. 
With your permission 1 would like to tape record the interview, because it 
is more accurate than taking notes. The comments you make will be in 
total confidence and your name or the name of your school will not 
appear on any typed transcripts. I hope to be able to provide you with 
summary report of my research when all the data has been analysed and 
written up. 
Before we begin is there anything you would like to ask me about the 
interview procedure itself. 
Last time we talked you mentioned (speaking & listening) skills 
as being one of the most important aspects of teaching Yr. I children. 
Have your views changed in anyway since then. 
Probe: Why do you think that now 
02. How has your own teaching style changed since the last time we 
spoke 
Probe: Can you give an examples 
03. How has your understanding of metacognition changed since the 
last interview 
Probe: How has the changed come about 
Q4. How would you define mctacognition now 
Probe: What do you think are the most important aspects to emphasise 
45. Have you any stories or cgs. of metacognition from this year 
group 
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06. Could you give me cgs. of the questions you ask in CASE: lessons 
to facilitate metacognition 
Q7. What has been your experience of the response to these 
questions 
Probe: Can you give any cgs. 
Probe: How does it work for different abilities. 
(8. What affect do you think this type of questioning has had on 
your teaching style. 
Q9_ Do you sec any benefits to pursuing metacognition with young 
children 
Probe: Any stories to relate about this 
010_IIow much help and instruction have you had in understanding 
the construct of metacognition 
Probe: Has this been enough 
Probe: What would you like to have had 
011. What obstacles have you found to promoting metacognition 
Q12. How do you see promoting metacognition fitting in with the 
National Curriculum 
013. is there anything you want to add 
Is there anything you want to ask me 
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